( 1 ) THIS is a tenant's execution second appeal under S. 100 read with S. 47 cpc. against the decree passed by the Civil Judge at Kolar in Ex. A. No. 9 of 1970, confirming the decree passed by the Court of the Munsiff at kolar in Ex. C. No. 73 of 1970. ( 2 ) THE respondent, who is the landlord of the suit premises, commenced proceedings under S. 21 (l) (h) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (to be hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), against the appellant for eviction on the ground that he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for his personal occupation. That application was resisted by the appellant-tenant in that proceeding. On 21st February 1969 the appellant and the respondent entered into a compromise and made an application in HRC, no. 4 of 1967, to the Court of the Munsiff at Kolar, before which the rent control proceeding was pending, to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. On the said application, the learned Munsiff passed the following order:"both parties file a compromise petition. I. A. No. I under order 23 Rule 3 CPC. and admit its execution. Terms of I. A. No. I are lawful. Hence, petition is allowed in terms of I. A. No. I. Parties to bear their own costs. " ( 3 ) IT is the compromise decree thus passed by the learned Munsiff that the respondent-landlord sought to execute in the Court of the Munsiff at kolar. The execution was resisted by the appellant-judgment-debtor on the ground that the respondent-decree-holder has given the suit premises on a fresh lease to the appellant on 6th February, 1970. It is, therefore, contended that the respondent-decree-holder is not entitled to execute that compromise decree passed on 21st February 1969 in the rent control proceedings. In support of his case, the appellant relied upon a document said to have been executed by the respondent-decree-holder. ( 4 ) THE respondent, however, took the stand that there is an interpolation in the document making it appear that the suit property has been given on fresh lease to the appellant-judgment-debtor. The executing Court after considering the material placed before it, accepted the contention of the respondent-decree-holder and came to the conclusion that there is an interpolation. Consequently it overruled the objections of the appellant and directed the execution to proceed. The executing Court after considering the material placed before it, accepted the contention of the respondent-decree-holder and came to the conclusion that there is an interpolation. Consequently it overruled the objections of the appellant and directed the execution to proceed. ( 5 ) THE aforesaid decree passed by the executing Court was challenged by "the appellant-judgment-debtor in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar, in Ex. A. No. 9 of 1970. The learned Civil Judge after considering the material placed by the parties, confirmed the decree passed by the executing court and dismissed the appeal of the judgment-debtor. ( 6 ) IT is the legality of the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in appeal that is challenged by the judgment-debtor in this second appeal under s. 100 read with S. 47 CPC. Sri P. Subba Rao,. the learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity and as such not executable. He invited my, attention to the decree for eviction passed by the munsiff in the rent control proceedings on the basis of the compromise petition signed and filed by both the parties. The contention of Sri Subba rao is that the Munsiff could pass a decree for eviction against a tenant only if ho was satisfied about one of the grounds specified in S. 21 (1) of the Act. He urged that as the landlord came forward with an application for eviction on the ground that he required the premises reasonably and bonafide for his personal occupation, no decree could be passed by the munsiff unless he was satisfied that the premises in question was reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his personal occupation and further that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused. He urged that what has been done by the learned munsiff is simply to record the compromise arrived at between the parties and to pass a decree in terms thereof without satisfying himself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused in support of his contention Sri Subba Rao relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal , AIR 1970 SC. 794 . 794 . The Supreme court, dealing with S. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which provision is similar to S. 21 of the Act, has laid down as follows:"the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 13 (l) have been proved. Where the Court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the Court was not competent to pass the decree. Hence, the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. " ( 7 ) SRI H. R. Venkataramaniah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, tried to distinguish this case by contending that the language of S. 21 of the Act is not identical with the language of S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and aimer Rent Control Act, 1952, which was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, reads as follows:"13 (1 ). S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, reads as follows:"13 (1 ). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall he passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated): provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied- (b) that the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing has, after the commenctment of this Act,- (i) sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises; (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation;" ( 8 ) THOUGH S. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, is similar to s. 21 of the Act, what was pointed out by Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned counsel for the respondent, is that S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent control Act requires the Court to be satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in that section exists, before the Court can pass an order for eviction, whereas the language of S. 21 of the Act is not such as to indicate that the Court must be satisfied about the existence of one of the grounds mentioned in S. 21. Though exactly similar phraseology is not used in s. 21 of the Act, it is clear that the Court is precluded from passing an order for eviction unless it is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in S. 21 is established. A similar contention was raised in a case arising under the Act in the case in Pulakurthi Hussain v. S. Gururaja Rao , (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 108:. This Court following- the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya devi v. K. L. Bansal , (1969) 2 SCJ 145 negatived a contention similar to the one advanced by sri Venkataramanaiah in this case. L. J. 108:. This Court following- the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya devi v. K. L. Bansal , (1969) 2 SCJ 145 negatived a contention similar to the one advanced by sri Venkataramanaiah in this case. This Court has held that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, is equally applicable to cases arising under S. 21 of the Act. The point urged by Sri Venkataramanaiah, is, therefore, no more res Integra so far as this Court is concerned. The point raised by Sri Venkataramanaiah is fully concluded by the decision of our own High Court in Pulakurthi Hussain's case, (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 108:. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention urged by Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the principle laid down by the Supreme court cannot be applied to cases arising under the Mysore Rent Control act, 1961. Sri Venkataramanaiah next urged that in this case though the order for eviction was passed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties, the Court was in fact satisfied that the ground mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act was established in this case. In support of this submission, Sri Venkataramanaiah relied upon the statement of the learned Munsiff made while recording the compromise that the compromise is lawful. ( 9 ) THE fact that the learned Munsiff has recorded that the compromise is lawful does not amount to his holding that he, was satisfied that the ground mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act was established in the case. The learned Munsiff has nowhere stated in the order that he was satisfied that the premises was reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his personal occupation. The learned Munsiff has also not recorded any finding to the effect that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord as required by S. 21 (4) of the Act. When the learned Munsiff observed that the agreement is lawful, it only conveyed that the agreement, by itself, is not opposed to any law. The learned Munsiff has also not recorded any finding to the effect that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord as required by S. 21 (4) of the Act. When the learned Munsiff observed that the agreement is lawful, it only conveyed that the agreement, by itself, is not opposed to any law. It is difficult to construe that observation that in the appeal filed by the landlord in the District Court, it is decided that if the premises occupied by the landlord, belonging to one Srinivas, is nut required to be vacated or if the landlord is not required to vacate that premises for some other reason, the landlord agreed to continue the tenant of the suit premises. ( 10 ) THE other recitals in the compromise pertain to the payment of rent, with which we are not concerned. From the recitals of the compromise as summarised above sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, contended that there was material before the Court to satisfy itself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide. As the learned Munsiff has stated that the agreement is lawful, it is contended that it must be assumed that the learned Munsiff came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide, on the; basis of the compromise petition signed by both the parties. From the terms of the compromise all that one can infer is. that there was some sort of an arrangement arrived at between the landlord and the tenant for their mutual convenience. The tenant agreed to vacate the premises before 31st December 1969, if the other contingencies favourable to the tenant did not occur as contemplated in the compromise. What is really important for consideration is as to whether the learned Munsiff was satisfied that the requirement of the landlord was reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused. The learned Munsiff has not stated that he was satisfied about these matters. He has only come to the conclusion that the agreement is lawful. The learned Munsiff has not stated that he was satisfied about these matters. He has only come to the conclusion that the agreement is lawful. The terms of the compromise coupled with the order of the learned Munsiff that the agreement is lawful, are not at all sufficient' to draw an inference that the Munsiff satisfied himself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused it is, therefore, difficult to accede to the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that in this case the learned munsiff was satisfied about the grounds mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h) and s. 21 (4) of the Act. ( 11 ) SRI Venkataramanaiah next contended that the appeal filed by the appellant in the Court of the Civil Judge at Kolar, was not maintainable he submitted that the only competent Court, to which the appellant could have preferred an appeal against the order passed by the executing Court in this case, was the Court of the District Judge. It was, therefore, cose' forded that the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in this case is wihout jurisdiction. In support of his contention Sri Venkataramanaiah rebed upon the provisions of S. 48 (1) of the Act, which provide for appeals against the orders passed by the Court under the Act, to the Court of the district Judge. S. 48 (1) of the Act reads as follows;"notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, every person aggrieved by an order under Ss. 14,. 16, 1. 7 or s. 21, passed by the Controller or the Court, may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal in writing to the 'district judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the premises are situate. " ( 12 ) IT is clear that S. 48 (1) of the Act is not of any assistance to Sri Venkataramanaiah, inasmuch as S. 48 (1) of the Act does not deal with" appeals against the orders passed by the executing Court for the execution of orders passed under S. 21 of the Act. S. 48 (1) of the Act provides for appeals against orders passed under specific provisions of the Act, viz. , Ss. 17, and 21. S. 48 (1) of the Act provides for appeals against orders passed under specific provisions of the Act, viz. , Ss. 17, and 21. It cannot be said that the order passed by the executing Court in this case is an order passed under any one of the sections mentioned in s. 48 (1) of the Act. The order was passed by the executing Court before which an execution petition was pending to execute the order already passed by the Court constituted under the Act, under S. 21 of the Act. As the order of the executing Court in this case is not one passed under any one of the provisions mentioned in S. 48 (1) of the Act, it is clear that no assistance can be taken from this section to contend that an appeal, against the order passed by the executing Court in this case, could only have been filed before the Court of the District Judge and not before the Court of the civil Judge, as was done in this case. Sri Venkaatramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, fairly conceded that there is no other provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder which he can depend upon in support of his contention that an appeal could be filed only in the Court of the District Judge against the order passed by the executing Court. ( 13 ) THE decree passed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties in this case, is a decree passed by the Court as defined in S. 3 (d) of the Act. The Court under the Act is a Civil Court. As no special provision has been made in the Act for executing the decrees or orders passed under S. 21, they have to be executed as decrees passed by a Civil Court. This Court in the case in Meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma , (1968) 2 Mys. L. J. 255 has laid down that the Court, functioning' for the purpose of part V of the Mysore Rent Control Act, in which S. 21 occurs, functions as a Civil Court, that it is open to such Court to exercise 'jurisdiction and all the powers conferred by the CPC. and that an order passed by the court under S. 21 of the Act can be executed by the Court under the provisions of the CPC. and that an order passed by the court under S. 21 of the Act can be executed by the Court under the provisions of the CPC. As an order or decree passed under S. 21 of the Act is one passed by a Civil Court and as no special remedy has been provided under the Act for execution of such orders and decrees, it is clear that the provisions of the CPC. , in regard to execution of such orders and decrees, are attracted by virtue of the provisions of S. 141 of the CPC. The order passed by the 'executing Court in this case, is one relating to execution which clearly falls under S. 47 CPC. It is, therefore, a 'decree' within the meaning of that expression as defined in S. 2 (2) CPC. An appeal against such a decree is provided by S. 96 CPC. But, S. 96 (1) does not speak of the forum to which an appeal under S. 96 lies. S. 96 (1) states that an appeal lies to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Courts exercising original jurisdiction. In order to determine the forum to which an appeal under S. 96 CPC. can be preferred, one has to look into the provisions of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964. S. 20 of the mysore Civil Courts Act, which is the relevant provision for our purpose, provides for appeals from decrees and orders passed by a Munsiff in original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, when an appeal is allowed by law, to the Court of the Civil Judge. As already mentioned, an appeal is provided against the decree passed by the executing Court by virtue of s. 96 CPC. If the decree is one passed by the Muhsiff, an appeal against that decree lies to the Court of the Civil Judge under S. 20 of the Mysore civil Courts Act, 1964. As already mentioned, an appeal is provided against the decree passed by the executing Court by virtue of s. 96 CPC. If the decree is one passed by the Muhsiff, an appeal against that decree lies to the Court of the Civil Judge under S. 20 of the Mysore civil Courts Act, 1964. An appeal, against the decree passed by the executing Court executing an order or decree passed under S. 21 of the Act by a Munsiff, therefore, lies to the Court of the Civil Judge by virtue of S. 20 of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964, There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, that the learned Civil Judge had no competence to entertain and dispose of the appeal filed by the appellant in this case. ( 14 ) THE further contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah is that a second appeal is not maintainable against the decree passed by the Civil Judge in this case, to this Court. This contention was also based on S. 48 of the Act. I have already held that S. 48 of the Act provides for appeals only against orders passed by the Court under Ss. 14, 16, 17 and 21 of the Act and not against orders passed by the executing Court in proceedings for execution of orders and decrees passed under the aforesaid provisions. S. 100 of CPC, provides for a second appeal against the appellate decree passed by the court under S. 96 of CPC, There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that no second appeal was competent to this Court, in this case, against the appellate decree passed by the Civil Judge. ( 15 ) AS the decree passed in this case, on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, is one passed without the Munsiff satisfying himself about the existence of the grounds mentioned in Si21 (1) of the Act, it is clear that the decree passed by him is a nullity. The respondent is, therefore, not entitled to execute a decree which is a nullity. The respondent is, therefore, not entitled to execute a decree which is a nullity. But, Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, requested me to make a direction similar to the one made by this Court in a similar case in Pulakurthi Hussain's case (2), directing the Munsiff to hear and dispose of the rent control proceedings before him expeditiously on the basis that the decree passed by him on the basis of a compromise, is a nullity. Sri Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has no objection for issuing such a direction. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I allow this appeal and set aside the decrees passed by the Civil Judge and the Munsiff. The execution petition, filed by the respondent, is dismissed. I further direct that the proceedings on the file of the learned Munsiff at HRC. No. 4 of 1967 be continued and the case be disposed of expeditiously on the basis that the decree ' passed by him on the basis of the compromise is a nullity. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .