JUDGMENT Untwalia, J. The petitioner has obtained a rule from this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution against the respondents to show cause why the order of termination of his service, dated the 30th August, 1969, a copy of which is Annexure 10 to the writ application, be not quashed, and, consequently, why the order appointing respondent no. 4 in the post held by the petitioner by Annexure 11 of the same date, be also not quashed. 2. Cause has been shown on behalf of the State of Bihar, respondent no. 5, by learned Government Pleader No. II who has also appeared on behalf of the officers of the Government, respondents 1 to 3, and by Mr. Shok Haran Singh, on behalf of respondent no. 4. 3. Since the main question in this case has revolved round the interpretation of the order of the Government dated the 27th February, 1962, contained in Annexure 7, it is necessary to state the facts of this case in somewhat detail as they appear from the writ application, the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents and the affidavit in reply filed by the petitioner. His case is that he was appointed on a temporary basis, as Senior Instructor in the scale of Rs. 100-190/- in the Relief and Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Bihar. When that Department was abolished, the services of the petitioner were transferred to the Industries Department in the same scale of pay. In continuation of his earlier services the petitioner joined the post of Senior Instructor in the Industries Department. He was posted as Senior Instructor at the Handloom Training cum Prduction Centre, Topchanchi, Dhanbad, in the year 1960. The said Centre was abolished in accordance with D. I. No. 1045 dated the 16th February 1961. The petitioner claims to have been appointed to the Government Polytechnic, Patna, as Senior Instructor, by an order dated the 8th March, 1961, a copy of which is Annexure 4. The Additional Director of Industries, Shree Chandra Bhushan Prasad, issued this appointment letter. It was a purely temporary appointment, as the letter indicates. The petitioner was disputed by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, in consultation with the Industries Department of the Government of Bihar, to Nepal. The Additional Director of Industries, Shree Chandra Bhushan Prasad, issued this appointment letter. It was a purely temporary appointment, as the letter indicates. The petitioner was disputed by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, in consultation with the Industries Department of the Government of Bihar, to Nepal. While being so deputed, be filed a representation which was addressed to the Additional Director of Industries, Bihar, some time in November, 1961, a copy of which is Annexure 5. In this representation he stated that he was willing to go on deputation under the Indian Aid Mission, Kathmandu (Nepal), but he requested the Additional Director to confirm him in the post which he was bolding, so that he may hold a lien on that post. The same Additional Director, Shree Chandra Bhushan Prasad, who had issued the letter of appointment to the petitioner in March, 1961, issued an order dated the 25th November, 1961, contained in Annexure 6, confirming the petitioner in the post of Instructor in Fabric Structure, Cloth Analysis and Weaving Calculation, in the Patna Polytechnic. Only a few months later, the petitioner received an order of Shree N. P. Sinha, Director of Industries, dated the 27th February, 1962 a copy of which is Annexure 7. It is advisable to quote this order, almost in full :- "Shri Rajendra Jaibhadra Jha, who was appointed temporarily in this department order no. 2857 dated 8.3.61, to the post of Instructor in Fabric Structure, Cloth Analysis and Weaving Calculation at Patna. Polytechnic, is appointed substantively to the same post with effect from 9.3.61. He will remain on probation for a period of two years with effect from the date of his appointment and will hold lien on this post while on deputation. This supersedes this department order no. 15777 dated 25.11.61 confirming him in the above post." A copy of this order was sent to the petitioner, in which it was written :- "Shri Rajendra Jaibhadra Jha will hold lien on the post of Instructor in Fabric Structure Cloth Analysis and Weaving Calculation at Patna Polytechnic, while on deputation, under Indian Aid Mission, to Nepal." 4. 15777 dated 25.11.61 confirming him in the above post." A copy of this order was sent to the petitioner, in which it was written :- "Shri Rajendra Jaibhadra Jha will hold lien on the post of Instructor in Fabric Structure Cloth Analysis and Weaving Calculation at Patna Polytechnic, while on deputation, under Indian Aid Mission, to Nepal." 4. The petitioner, therefore, sent another representation to the Director of Industries on the 26th February, 1964, a copy of which is Annexure 8, In that representation, while expressing surprise as to how the previous order of confirmation had been cancelled and he had been put on probation for two years, the grievance made was- "(iii) That, however, the probationary period imposed on me with effect from 9.3.61 expired on 9.3.63 but till now order confirming me on the post of Instructor Fabric Structure Cloth Analysis Weaving Calculation has not been communicated to me." The petitioner's grievance is that his confirmation made by Annexure 6 was cancelled without any show cause notice issued to him. He, however, continued to serve in Nepal on deputation and returned to join his original post on the 15th of April, 1967. Annexure 9 of that date, which is the order of the Principal, Government Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, Patna, to which institution the post appertains, shows that the petitioner was allowed to join his post pending definite order from the Headquarters, that means the Government. After a period of more than two years, the petitioner received the impugned order dated the 30th August, 1969, contained in Annexure 10, terminating his services, by terminating his period of probation. In other words, the petitioner's services were terminated and his grievance is that even under Annexure 7 his appointment had become substantive and permanent on the Expiry of the period of two years, during which he was on probation, which period expired in March, 1963, and his services could not be terminated by the impugned order. The order contained in Annexure 10 was passed by the Director of Technical Education, Bihar. The same officer passed an order contained in Annexure 11, whereby respondent no. 4, who had to revert to his original post of Jobber, Textiles, Government Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, Patna, on corning back of the petitioner from Nepal in 1967, was promoted to the post of Instructor, Textile Fabric Structure, etc. at the same Polytechnic. The same officer passed an order contained in Annexure 11, whereby respondent no. 4, who had to revert to his original post of Jobber, Textiles, Government Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, Patna, on corning back of the petitioner from Nepal in 1967, was promoted to the post of Instructor, Textile Fabric Structure, etc. at the same Polytechnic. The petitioner's grievance is that by illegally terminating his services, the post has been given to respondent no. 4. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, it is stated that the petitioner was working temporarily by virtue of his appointment to a post at Topchanchi. The Torchanchi Centre was wound up by the Industries Department and the temporary services of the petitioner were terminated. A post of Instructor in Fabric Structure, Cloth Analysis, in Government Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, was created in the scale of Rs. 100-190/-. In January, 1960, this post was advertised in which qualifications were prescribed and persons possessing the requisite qualifications had applied for the post. Out of the applicants, twelve candidates were called for interview, but only five turned up. The interview took dace on the 23rd and 24th of August, 1960, before a Selection Committee. The petitioner had neither applied for the post nor did he possess the requisite qualifications in terms of the advertisement, and, obviously he had no occasion to appear at the interview held in August, 1960. Respondent no. 4, although he was serving at a different post, applied for being appointed to the post of Instructor, was called for interview and was recommended for appointment by the Selection Committee. This file was being dealt with by Section V of the Industries Department and was pending consideration there. In the meantime, the petitioner managed to obtain an order of temporary appointment on the 8th of March, 1961. This was done through Section III of the Industries Department, which had nothing to do with appointment to the post of Instructor in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the Government. The order of temporary appointment was obtained from the Additional Director of Industries in March, 1961. Again he managed to obtain, through an Assistant of Section III of the Industries Department, an order of confirmation on the 25th of November, 1961. The order of temporary appointment was obtained from the Additional Director of Industries in March, 1961. Again he managed to obtain, through an Assistant of Section III of the Industries Department, an order of confirmation on the 25th of November, 1961. He managed to obtain the order of confirmation only after working for about eight months, although there were persons at Patna Polytechnic who were senior to the petitioner and who had not been confirmed. On a representation of respondent no. 4, the facts were investigated and in supersession of the order contained in Annexure 6, which order had been fraudulently obtained or been issued by mistake the order contained in Annexure 7 was issued. The Principal of the Government Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, had allowed the petitioner to join the post conditionally, pending the decision of the Government. Some facts are stated in the counter-affidavit to show that the services of the petitioner were not satisfactory, but it is not necessary for me to mention them in any detail. 6. In the counter-affidavit of respondent no. 4, facts similar to the ones stated in counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 5, have been stated. The main grievance of respondent no. 4 is that great injustice was done to him, when the petitioner was surreptitiously appointed in March, 1961, although he was not qualified to be so appointed to the post of Instructor and this respondent had been selected for appointment to that post. It may be stated here that respondent no. 4 was officiating in the post of Instructor, Polytechnic, Gulzarbagh, during the absence on deputation of the petitioner. He could not be substantively appointed to that post until the matter was decided with reference to the contentious claims of the petitioner and respondent no. 4. It seems, after the petitioner was put on probation by the order dated the 27th February, 1962, contained in Annexure 7, no step was taken for confirming the petitioner or respondent no. 4, because, so long the petitioner was in Nepal, respondent no. 4 was officiating in the post of Instructor. The question became lively only on return of the petitioner from Nepal in 1967. Then the matter was considered by the Government which came to the conclusion that the petitioner's services were fit to be terminated and after terminating his services, it appears, respondent no. 4 was officiating in the post of Instructor. The question became lively only on return of the petitioner from Nepal in 1967. Then the matter was considered by the Government which came to the conclusion that the petitioner's services were fit to be terminated and after terminating his services, it appears, respondent no. 4 has been appointed to the post of Instructor on the 30th August, 1969. 7. In the affidavit in reply, the petitioner has not challenged the facts of advertisement of the post and selection of respondent no. 4 for appointment to that post. He has, however, stated some fact to show that his services under the Government in one post or the other were continuous and, therefore, it was not necessary for him to apply to be appointed to the post of Senior Instructor. He claims that he had the requisite qualifications to be appointed to the post and he was rightly appointed. 8. I may mention one more fact before I proceed further that in the petition the petitioner has stated that the Director of Technical Education had no authority to terminate his services, because he had been appointed by the Additional Director of Industries. In reply to this, it was stated in the counter-affidavit of the State that there has been a bifurcation in the Department of Industries and Technical Education has been put under the Director of Technical Education, to which the post of Senior Instructor belongs. All the powers which could be exercised by the Director of Industries can be exercised by the Director of Technical Education in relation to the incumbents holding post under his sub-department. The petitioner does not challenge this position in his affidavit in reply, nor any argument was advanced before us in this regard. 9. Mr. All the powers which could be exercised by the Director of Industries can be exercised by the Director of Technical Education in relation to the incumbents holding post under his sub-department. The petitioner does not challenge this position in his affidavit in reply, nor any argument was advanced before us in this regard. 9. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted three points in support of the rule :- (i) Once when the petitioner was confirmed in his post by the order dated the 25th of November, 1961 (Annexure 6), later on that order could not be superseded and especially without any notice to the petitioner and he could not be put on probation, as was done by the impugned Older dated the 27th February 1962, contained in Annexure-7, (ii) Even assuming that the order dated the 27th February, 1962, was a good order, on the expiry of the period of probation, in terms of the said older, or by necessary implication, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed on the 9th of March, 1963. (iii) Even if the petitioner be taken to have continued as a probationer, his services could not be terminated without giving a notice to him to show cause against the proposed termination. 10. On the facts, as I have stated in detail from the various affidavits it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Instructor not in a straightforward and plain manner, but he seems to have been appointed in an unfair manner. As against the advertisement made for the post, many persons had applied and respondent no. 4 had been selected, but the entire procedure, which was a legal and valid one, was given a go by in favour of the petitioner appointed to the post in a very unclean manner, to say the least. But that would not, in view of the later orders issued in his favour, affect the validity of his initial appointment. At this stage, while discussing point no. (i), it has again to be pointed out that the same Additional Director, who had given him the letter of appointment (Annexure 4), confirmed him on the 25th November, 1961, by Annexure 6. At this stage, while discussing point no. (i), it has again to be pointed out that the same Additional Director, who had given him the letter of appointment (Annexure 4), confirmed him on the 25th November, 1961, by Annexure 6. This was again not a just and legal confirmation, as the facts stated to the counter-affidavit, show that many persons senior to the petitioner had not yet been confirmed when the petitioner was confirmed, he had not completed his temporary officiation in the post even for one year and the mere fact that he was being deputed to Nepal did not justify his confirmation over the heads of others. In my opinion, therefore, by the next order dated the 27th February, 1962, the order dated the 25th November, 1961, was rightly superseded by the Director of Industries and the petitioner was put on probation. The defect of the issuance of any notice to the petitioner in this regard was cured and the grievance has no force in view of the petitioner's own representation filed on the 26th of February, 1964 (Annexure 8). He accepted the position of having been placed on probation for a period of two years and wanted the authorities to confirm him because the period of probation had expired on the 9th March, 1963. 11. Although, in view of the order dated the 27th February, 1962 (Annexure 7) and the petitioner's representation (Annexure 8), neither the petitioner's appointment can be said to be illegal nor can his being placed on a period of probation be characterised as unjust or illegal, in order to interpret the language of the order dated the 27th February, 1962, the background of the petitioner's appointment and his obtaining confirmation in November 1961, has got to be kept in view. Reading the order (Annexure 7) in that light, it is clear to me that the petitioner was appointed to the permanent post in a substantive manner, though his .initial appointment was on a temporary basis. But, he was placed on probation for a period of two years with effect from the date of his initial appointment, i.e. 9th March, 1961. Reading the order (Annexure 7) in that light, it is clear to me that the petitioner was appointed to the permanent post in a substantive manner, though his .initial appointment was on a temporary basis. But, he was placed on probation for a period of two years with effect from the date of his initial appointment, i.e. 9th March, 1961. I am not prepared to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the phrase "appointed substantively" in Annexure 7 and the expression that the petitioner "will hold lien on this post while on deputation" would mean that he was permanently appointed to the post giving a lien also to it and consequently on the expiry of the period of probation on the 9th March, 1963, he was automatically confirmed without any express order to the contrary. 12. Under Rule 28 of the Bihar Service Code. 1952, 'lien' means "the title of a Government servant to hold substantively either immediately or on the termination of a period or period of absence a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively." Referring to the similar definition of the term 'lien' in the Fundamental Rules, S.R. Das, C. J. has said at page 42, in the case of (1) Purshotam Lal Dhingra V. Union of India (A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 36) that 'lien' means "the title of a Government servant to hold substantively a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively." When a person has been appointed as a Government servant substantively and permanently, then the term 'lien' is to be understood in the sense as mentioned in Rule 28 of the Bihar Service Code, but, if there is no substantive appointment and if a person is appointed on probation, he has no title to hold substantively a permanent post. In Annexure 7, the word 'lien' was not used in that sense. It was used in the sense that the petitioner will have a title to his post on his return from .Nepal-such title or right as he may have at the time of his return, that is to say, if he continues to be a probationer on his return from deputation he will hold the post as a probationer. It was used in the sense that the petitioner will have a title to his post on his return from .Nepal-such title or right as he may have at the time of his return, that is to say, if he continues to be a probationer on his return from deputation he will hold the post as a probationer. If in the meantime he is made permanent, he will have a lien to the post as a permanent incumbent. So long he would have had a lien to the post either as a probationer or as a permanent Government servant, no other person could be appointed to that post in a substantive manner. But giving lien to the petitioner on his post, while be was on deputation, cannot mean that by necessary implication, the intention of the order contained in Annexure 7 was to confirm the petitioner on the expiry of the period of probation. Supposing, the petitioner would have been recalled or would have returned due to any other reason before the 9th of March, 1963, undoubtedly he would have held lien to his post as a probationer and could not have been heard to say that even before the expiry of his period of probation, because of his lien, he had a title to the post as if he was a confirmed Government servant. In the same way, I am inclined to interpret the phrase "appointed substantively" to mean that the petitioner's appointment was on a substantive basis in the same that he was not being appointed on a temporary basis; it was on a permanent basis, but this appointment was subject to the next clause of putting him on probation of two years. There is nothing in the order to indicate that this period of two years could not be extended. If the petitioner would not have been found suitable for the post, it is unreasonable to hold that he could not be put on probation for a further period to give him a further chance of proving his worth to the post, By necessary implication, therefore, as against the argument made on behalf of the petitioner, I hold that the period of probation mentioned in Annexure 7 could be attended by an express order. If that could be so, the period will be deemed to have been extended when no such express order was made. If that could be so, the period will be deemed to have been extended when no such express order was made. It is not possible to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that in absence of any express order, on the expiry of the period of probation of two years, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed in his post. 13. On a consideration of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of (2) Sukhbans Singh V. State of Punjab (A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court 1711 -Paragraph 9), (3) G. S. Ramaswamy V. Inspector General of Police, Mysore State (A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 175 - Paragraph 8) and (4) the State of Uttar Pradesh V. Akbar Ali (A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 1842-Paragraphs 5 and 6), it has been held in the case of (5) the State of Punjab V. Dharam Singh (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1210) that, if under the rules or the order of appointment it can be called (Sic) out that a probationer on the expiry of his period of probation will be deemed to have been confirmed by necessary implication, then and then only, there will be automatic confirmation. In other cases it would not be so. A person placed on probation remains as a probationer when his period of probation is extended by an express order or in absence of any such order, by necessary implication, if the case is not covered by the type just indicated above. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not confirmed automatically on the expiry of his period of probation fixed by Annexure-7. He remained a probationer. On the Expiry of his period of probation, he asked for an express order of his confirmation by Annexure 8. Such an order was never passed. He continued on probation. That being so, his services could be terminated at any time with a notice, as observed by S. R. Das, C. J. in (1) Dhingra's case (A. I. R. 1958 Supreme Court 36) and that notice does not mean a notice to show cause as argued on behalf of the petitioner, but it means a notice of termination of the services. The Government cannot terminate the services even of a probationer by passing an order in its file only. The order must be communicated to the incumbent. In other words, notice of termination must be given to the incumbent. No period of notice of termination is necessary, as the service of a probationer or a temporary servant can be terminated without giving him any period of notice or pay for that period. In that view of the matter, I have no difficulty in rejecting the third submission made on behalf of the petitioner. I may also say that learned counsel for the petitioner did not pursue this point and had to concede that the correct position of law is as has just been mentioned by me. 14. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed, but, I shall make no order as to costs. 15. Before I part with this case, I would like to observe that the petitioner has served the Government for quite a long period in different capacities. Since 1961 he was serving as an Instructor and was deputed to Nepal, where he served for about six years. Even on his return, he was allowed to serve in his post for about two years. Perhaps, finding that it was not entirely the fault of the petitioner that he had obtained his appointment in an unclean manner in the year 1961, but it was the fault of the office assistants and the other officers of the Government to have issued the letter of appointment, the Government condoned the illegality and appointed him on a substantive basis in 1962, by placing him on a period of probation, which period was never terminated in express language. That being so, although in accordance with law, I have delivered the judgment against the petitioner, I do hope that the Government will sympathetically consider the case of the petitioner and would try to accommodate him in a similar or suitable post so that the petitioner may not be thrown out of employment. The fact that the petitioner has filed a writ application in this Court or an application for a proceeding in contempt against the respondents, it is again hoped, will not stand in the way of his case being sympathetically considered at the hands of the authorities. The fact that the petitioner has filed a writ application in this Court or an application for a proceeding in contempt against the respondents, it is again hoped, will not stand in the way of his case being sympathetically considered at the hands of the authorities. The application filed by the petitioner for proceeding against the respondents for contempt was not pressed at the time of the hearing, nor, it is obvious, it can have any substance, especially when the writ application has failed in this Court. It is accordingly also dismissed. I agree. Application dismissed.