ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - This an application for a certificate of fitness of the case, Under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, for an appeal to the Supreme Court of India. 2. The three Applicants had been convicted by a Civil and Sessions Judge, Etah, of offences punishable Under Sections 326 and 326/34 IPC on the strength of evidence given by three eye witnesses as well as of a supposed dying declaration of the victim Shaitan Singh who died nearly fortnight after the occurrence. The medical evidence also fitted in with the prosecution case of an attack with a "gandasa" and not with the defence suggestion that the victim, Shaitan Singh, was attacked at his own house during the night with lathis. 3. On an appeal to this Court, it was held that the learned Civil and Sessions Judge had erred in holding that the death of Shaitan Singh, which was due to tetanus, could be attributed only to the injuries during the attack and not to some other possible cause supervening after the injuries. It was, therefore, held that the first information report was not admissible as a dying declaration which is a piece of substantive evidence. The evidence of the three eye witnesses was subjected to close scrutiny and it was held by this Court, in agreement with the trial court, that their evidence was acceptable. The mainstay of the attack by the defence upon the credibility of the three eye-witnesses was the statement of a defence witness, Bhojraj, DW 1, who was found to be dishonest and untruthful by this Court. Other grounds advanced for disbelieving the three eye witnessess were also considered and rejected. It was then observed that two pieces of corroborative evidence could also be used to support the version given by the three eye witnesses. One of the two pieces of corroborative evidence relied upon was the above mentioned first information report which was, according to the contention of the learned Counsel for two of the Appellants, admissible u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, although, according to the learned Counsel's contention, it could not be used for any purpose falling outside Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act. These sections could not apply in this case as the maker of the F.I.R. had died long before the trial. These sections could not apply in this case as the maker of the F.I.R. had died long before the trial. The distinction between admissibility and use of a piece of evidence, sought to be made by the learned defence counsel, was not accepted as correct by this Court. 4. The view taken by this Court was that, although, the F.I.R. was not admissible as a dying declaration, which is a piece of substantive evidence, yet, those parts of it were admissible which explained and were merged with the conduct of the victim in making the complaint to the police contained in the F.I.R. No direct authority was cited on this question by either side. Reliance was, however, placed on illustrations (j) and (k) to Section 8 of the Evidence Act for the view taken in this Court that the nature of the offence, the identity of the offenders and the time and place of the occurrence were so blended with the victim's conduct and were so necessary to explain it as to be parts of it. 5. In support of the application before me Mr. G.P. Tandon has cited a passage from the comments of Mr. Justice Monir, on Section 8 of the Evidence Act, where it was observed: When the conduct of a person in making a complaint is given in evidence, the conduct merely shows that the complainant complained of the act having been done; the further fact that he or she charged a certain person with the criminal act is not a necessary explanation or accompaniment of such conduct. The complaint is not, therefore, evidence of the fact that the person charged in the complaint did the act complained of. Illustration (j) shows that the complaint, is admissible on the question 'whether A was ravished?' and not on the question 'by whom?' Similarly, illustration (k) shows that the complaint is admissible on the question 'whether A was robbed' and not on the question 'by whom?' The above mentioned comments contained a view which is certainly at variance with that expressed by this Court. A question of law, therefore, does arise in this case. But, Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution does not lay down that a certificate of fitness for an appeal to the Supreme Court must be granted whenever a question of law arises. A question of law, therefore, does arise in this case. But, Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution does not lay down that a certificate of fitness for an appeal to the Supreme Court must be granted whenever a question of law arises. It requires this Court to be satisfied of the fitness of the case for an appeal to the Supreme Court. The strictness of the test of such a fitness has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court in : Sunder Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411 , Sidheswar Ganguly Vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 SC 143 , Achyut Adhicary Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 SC 1039 , Babu and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1467 . In Babu's case (supra), however, their Lordships observed : "No rules Under Article 145 regulating generally the practice and procedure of this Court for the grant of certificate by the High Court have been framed. The power which is granted is no doubt discretionary but in view of the word, 'certifies' it is clear that such power must' be exercised with great circum-(sic) and only in a case which is really fit for appeal." This observation was relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Applicants. 6. It does not seem to me that a case becomes fit for certification merely because another view is possible on a question of law decided by this Court in the course of its judgment. It may be that, on that question, no other authority exists. But, it seems to me that these are matters for the Supreme Court itself to consider Under Article 136 of the Constitution where the power to entertain an appeal is wider than the power of this Court to certify Under Article 134(1)(c). It appears to me that if a piece of evidence, of which admissibility is questioned, does not affect the ultimate decision of the case, a necessary condition for certification of the case Under Article 134(1)(c) is absent. If the parts of the F.I.R. held admissible in evidence in the case under consideration had been excluded, a piece of corroborative evidence, which gave added support to the conclusions reached on the strength of credible and unshaken evidence of three eyewitnesses, would have been removed. If the parts of the F.I.R. held admissible in evidence in the case under consideration had been excluded, a piece of corroborative evidence, which gave added support to the conclusions reached on the strength of credible and unshaken evidence of three eyewitnesses, would have been removed. But, the basis of the conclusions and with it, the conclusions would have been still left intact. The fitness to be certified is of a particular case before the Court and not of some point in the case which, although one of law, could not affect the conclusions reached. In other words, if a point of law arises in a case but its decision either way would not, having regard to findings given on all the facts and circumstances of the case, have affected the result, I do not think that the particular case can be certified as a fit one for an appeal to the Supreme Court of India Under Article 134(1)(c) of our Constitution. 7. I, therefore, dismiss this application. A copy of this order will be issued to the Applicants' counsel by tomarrow. Application dismissed.