JUDGMENT Gursaran Lal, J. - This special appeal has been preferred against the order of brother Lakshmi Prasad, J. on a Writ Petition which was filed by Respondent No. 1 in this appeal, viz., Gandhi Vidyalaya Intermediate College Bachhrawan. The writ petition was allowed and the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation which was impugned by the Petitioner was quashed. The Appellant Smt. Jagdei in whose favour the Dy. Director's order had been passed and who was opposite party No. 2 in the writ petition has filed this special appeal. 2. The facts which led to the filing of the writ petition are briefly these. Consolidation proceedings under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were started in village Bachhrawan district Rae Bareli. The college aforesaid possessed some agricultural land in the village. The Appellant and Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 possessed some agricultural land situated within the Town Area Bachhrawan in which the College is also located. The college was utilising its agricultural land for teaching Agriculture to the students. As its land was situated on the other side of the road, it arranged with Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and the Appellant for an exchange. An application dated 24-1-1964 purporting to be one u/s 53 of the Act was made before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by the parties who wanted to exchange the land for necessary permission. The permission was granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated 18-3-1964 which ran: Exchange permitted u/s 53 of the C.H. Act. C.O. II (Sadar) will take n.a. The order was passed after certain enquiries and preparation of a chart which was made part of the order. It appears that effect was given to the exchange in the form of entries in the records in regard to the land of the College situated in the village of Bachhrawan. However, on 12-8-1966, the Appellant Smt. Jagdei filed a revision application before the Dy. Director of Consolidation against the aforesaid order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), impleading however only the College as an opposite-party. The revision was heard by the Dy. Director of Consolidation and was allowed and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) granting the permission to exchange was set aside in so far as it related to the Appellant. Director of Consolidation against the aforesaid order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), impleading however only the College as an opposite-party. The revision was heard by the Dy. Director of Consolidation and was allowed and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) granting the permission to exchange was set aside in so far as it related to the Appellant. The College thereupon filed the Writ Petition which has given rise to this special appeal. The order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation was impugned in the writ petition on a number of (grounds. One of them was that no revision lay from the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the revisional order was without jurisdiction. Another ground was that the revision had been filed after more than two years of the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the revision was entertained and allowed even though there was no application for condoning the delay. Objection was also taken to the Dy. Director's observation that the revisionist was not a party to the application for exchange. The writ petition was contested by Smt. Jagdei on whose behalf a counter-affidavit was filed by a person styling himself as a Pairokar. A counter-affidavit was also filed on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 to the writ petition (Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to this special appeal). They also attacked the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation on the ground that they were not made parties to the revision. 3. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition on the sole ground that no revision lay. He was of the view that though the permission purports to have been granted u/s 53 of the Act, it could not possibly be referred to that provision and it could only be a permission u/s 5(1)(c)(ii). He next considered the question whether a revision lay against an order under that section and was of the opinion that such permission was not within the meaning of the expression used in Section 48. With all respect to our learned brother, we find ourselves unable to fall in line with his reasoning. The sanction was expressly asked for u/s 53 of the Act and the order granting the sanction expressly mentioned that section. With all respect to our learned brother, we find ourselves unable to fall in line with his reasoning. The sanction was expressly asked for u/s 53 of the Act and the order granting the sanction expressly mentioned that section. Whether that section was applicable or not was a matter to be considered in the revision but the revision could not be treated as a revision against an order u/s 5 of the Act when, as already stated, it had been expressly asked for and granted, u/s 53. The question the-refore arises whether the grant of sanction u/s 53 was an order passed by a subordinate authority in a case or proceeding as contemplated u/s 48 of the Act. The proceeding arising from the application u/s 53 was both a proceeding land when it came to an end amounted to a case decided. It had also a direct bearing upon the consolidation proceedings. Section 53 of the Act states that it shall be lawful for the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), at any stage of the Consolidation proceedings but before the preparation of the final record u/s 27, to allow mutual exchange of Chaks or part thereof by agreement between the tenure-holders in certain circumstances. The effect of allowing mutual exchange would be to make corresponding changes in the Chaksand in the final records. We are therefore definitely of the opinion that a revision lay from the order u/s 48 of the Act. In fact, even if it had been an order u/s 5, we are inclined to think that a revision would have laid still because Section 5(1)(c)(ii) also has a bearing upon consolidation proceedings. Transfer of part of his holding by a tenure holder has been banned except by permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in order that the Consolidation proceedings could be carried on expeditiously and not be delayed or confusion created therein by frequent transfers by tenure-holders of parts of their holdings. 4. Transfer of part of his holding by a tenure holder has been banned except by permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in order that the Consolidation proceedings could be carried on expeditiously and not be delayed or confusion created therein by frequent transfers by tenure-holders of parts of their holdings. 4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has tried to support the order of the learned single Judge by arguing that this was a case governed by the Act as it was before its amendment in 1963 since u/s 47 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963, where on or before the date of commencement of the aforesaid Amendment Act statement of proposals u/s 29 of the unamended Act had already been published, then all work in regard to or connected with consolidation operations beyond the stage of publication of those proposals was to be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the unamended Act. A revision from an order of grant of permission for exchange u/s 53 or even u/s 5(1)(c)(ii) was not something in regard to or connected with consolidation operations beyond the stage of publication of the statement of proposals. In any case the application for exchange itself had been given after the amendment of the Act by the aforesaid amending Act of 1963. Section 48 in the present form was therefore very much in force and applicable to the order which was impugned in the revision. 5. The question next arises whether if a revision lay, as it did in our opinion, the Dy. Director of Consolidation passed a proper and valid order in setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in part, that is to say, in so far as it affected the revisionist Smt. Jagdei We notice that a joint application had been made by the College and certain other persons including Smt. Jagdei. The whole of the land of the College was going to be exchanged with certain persons, part going to each and in turn the land belonging to those persons separately was to come to the College as a consolidated block. The Dy. Director of Consolidation failed to notice that the passing of his order was likely to frustrate the very object of the exchange and if the exchange as such was not made the parties might even like to have no exchange at all. The Dy. Director of Consolidation failed to notice that the passing of his order was likely to frustrate the very object of the exchange and if the exchange as such was not made the parties might even like to have no exchange at all. Smt. Jagdei herself should have impleaded the other persons as opposite parties to her revision application and if she failed to do, the learned Dy. Director of Consolidation should have ordered her to implead those persons and then should have decided the matter as a whole and either maintained the order or quashed it as a whole. We further find that without investigation he took it as a fact that Smt. Jagdei was not really a party to the application for exchange. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had acted on the basis that she was a party and if the Dy. Director of Consolidation had any doubts he should either have investigated the matter himself or remanded the case for investigation being made into the matter at the lower level. For all these reasons, we find that the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation was not valid and proper and that it does need to be quashed though the quashing should be accompanied by a further direction to the Dy. Director of Consolidation to decide the revision afresh in the light of the observations made in this order. 6. In the result, we allow the special appeal to this extent only that while maintaining the order of the learned single Judge quashing the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation, we direct the Dy. Director of Consolidation to re-hear the revision and decide it according to law in the light of the observations in this order. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of this special appeal.