A. A. DAVE, M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the State is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge Senior Division Mehsana awarding damages of Rs. 18 758 to the plaintiff in special civil suit No. 1 of 1962. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal in a nut shell are as under:- The plaintiff firm was doing business in the name of Messrs. Kantilal Shivlal at Patan in Mehsana district. The firm had purchased machinery from one Mehta Shantilal Avantiram of Patan for Rs. 14 500 as per sale deed Ex. 41 dated 4-4-1955. It transpires that the said Shantilal owed about Rs. 8 0 to Government by way of sales-tax dues. In response to the notice Shantilal had given an undertaking to the State not to dispose of his property by way of sale of mortgage till he was able to pay up all the arrears and had prayed for time. Subsequently when the said Shantilal failed to pay the said amount his properties including the machinery were attached and sealed by the Mamlatdar on 16th June 1966 under the orders of the Collector. Thereafter the plaintiff approached the Collector stating that the plaintiff had purchased the said machinery from the said Shantilal Avantiram and that Shantilal had no rights title or interest in the said property. The Collector thereupon by his order released the property on condition that the plaintiff gave a solvent surety for Rs. 15 0 The plaintiff however failed to do so and thereupon the property was put to auction sale. The plaintiff then after giving a notice filed a suit being regular civil suit No. 121 of 1955 against the State for a declaration that the property attached belonged to him and for possession of the same free from attachment and for an injunction that the defendant may not auction the same. The said suit was decreed and civil appeal No. 212 of 1958 filed by the State against the said decree was dismissed by the learned District Judge Mehsana by his judgment dated 4-8-1960. In view of the above judgment of the civil Court the Mamlatdar Patan removed the said property from attachment and handed over the same to the plaintiff on 8-6-1961 after making a panchnama.
In view of the above judgment of the civil Court the Mamlatdar Patan removed the said property from attachment and handed over the same to the plaintiff on 8-6-1961 after making a panchnama. It is alleged by the plaintiff that during the period the machinery remained unused and idle it was spoiled and had deteriorated as a result the plaintiff suffered great loss. According to the plaintiff he could not do business during the period and could not run the factory. He was required to pay rent of the building in which the machinery was placed. He therefore filed the suit claiming Rs. 20 693 paise in all as damages for various items as per particulars mentioned in the plaint including interest. ( 3 ) THE State by its written statement Ex. 17 resisted the suit Or the plaintiff. The State denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the property. The State denied that Shantilal had mortgaged the said property to the plaintiff and that subsequently the plaintiff had purchased the same for Rs. 14 500 as alleged by him. According to the State all the documents were bogus and without consideration and that they were executed in order to defraud and cheat Government. The State submitted that the said documents were not binding. The State admitted that the machinery was attached on 16th June 1955. However the State had to keep possession of the machinery because the plaintiff had filed the suit and obtained a stay order. The State therefore denied its liability for any loss sustained by the plaintiff during the period the civil litigation was going on. The State denied its liability to pay any damages to the plaintiff by way of loss of his business or by way of rent which was paid by him and for deterioration of property as claimed by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) ON the pleadings of the parties the learned Civil Judge framed issues at Ex. 17a. On the findings on these issues the learned Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit for Rs. 18 758 with costs. Against the said judgment and decree of the lower Court the State has preferred this appeal to this Court. ( 5 ) MR. Mehta learned Assistant Government Pleader raised several contentions before us. He urged that the decree passed by the learned Judge below was contrary to law.
18 758 with costs. Against the said judgment and decree of the lower Court the State has preferred this appeal to this Court. ( 5 ) MR. Mehta learned Assistant Government Pleader raised several contentions before us. He urged that the decree passed by the learned Judge below was contrary to law. He submitted that the State would not be liable to pay any damages to the plaintiff for the acts of its servants. He urged that under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act the revenue authorities had to recover arrears of sales tax as arrears of land revenue and if in discharge of their duties enjoined upon them by a statute the servants did an act as a result even if the plaintiff was put to some loss the State would not be liable to pay any damages for the simple reason that for its sovereign act the State was completely protected and was immune from any liability whatsoever. On merits the learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that there was no evidence worth the name to show what was the value of the property on the date it was attached and the value of the property when it was released. He urged that the learned Judge had relied on the value of the property stated in two panchnamas which were made on the day the property was attached and on the day the property was released without examining the panchas. Besides he urged that the valuation put in the panchnamas cannot be taken as market value of the property and as no expert was examined by the plaintiff in order to prove the condition of the property on the day it was attached and on the day it was released the learned Judge below was clearly in error in holding that the property had deteriorated and on that basis the learned Judge was clearly wrong in awarding damages for deterioration of the property. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also urged that the learned Judge below clearly erred in law in awarding interest to the plaintiff by way of loss of business. He urged that in an action brought on tort no interest can be allowed. Lastly he urged that there was not clear cut evidence with regard to the rent paid by the plaintiff to his landlord.
He urged that in an action brought on tort no interest can be allowed. Lastly he urged that there was not clear cut evidence with regard to the rent paid by the plaintiff to his landlord. Under the circumstances he urged that the whole decree passed by the lower Court be set aside. ( 6 ) BEFORE considering various contentions raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader it may be noted that so far as title of the plaintiff to the suit property is concerned it is clearly established by the judgment of the civil Court obtained in the previous litigation. The decree obtained in civil suit No. 121 of 1955 confirmed by the decree of the appellate Court in appeal No. 212 of 1958 Ex. 45 would be binding on the State and would operate as res judicata. It is therefore not open to the State now to urge that the documents of sale produced by the plaintiff were fabricated in order to commit fraud on the State. In our opinion it is not open to us now to go into the question whether the said documents were genuine or not. For our purpose it is sufficient to assume that the plaintiff had become the owner of the machinery under the document of sale passed by the said Shantilal in his favour. ( 7 ) IN the instant case admittedly Shantilal had to pay Rs. 8 0 and odd to the Sales-tax department for past dues. Shantilal was not able to pay the same inspite of the undertaking Ex. 170 given by him. The Sales-tax department therefore was justified in asking the Collector to recover the said amount as arrears of land revenue. The Collector ordered the Mamlatdar Patan to attach the property of the said Shantilal and in pursuance of the said order the Mamlatdar Patan attached the property believing that the same was of the ownership of the said Shantilal. At the time the attachment was laid the Mamlatdar had no material before him to believe that the said property was already transferred by Shantilal to the present plaintiff by a sale deed. No public notice about the said sale was given in any newspapers nor was the Sales-tax department informed about it.
At the time the attachment was laid the Mamlatdar had no material before him to believe that the said property was already transferred by Shantilal to the present plaintiff by a sale deed. No public notice about the said sale was given in any newspapers nor was the Sales-tax department informed about it. It cannot therefore be said that when the Mamlatdar attached the property believing the same to be of the ownership of Shantilal he had acted in any way illegally or arbitrarily. The machinery purchased by the present plaintiff had remained in the premises where Shantilal used to keep the same. They were hired premises and in the absence of any other material before him the Mamlatdar was perfectly right in attaching the same on the ground that the same belonged to Shantilal. However as soon as the plaintiff gave an application to the Collector informing him that the property was purchased by him under a sale deed executed by Shantilal prior to the date of attachment the Collector passed an order permitting the plaintiff to take away the said property on furnishing the solvent surety to the tune of Rs. 15 0 The plaintiff however did not avail of the same and instead filed a suit against the State for a declaration of his title and for possession of the property and obtained a stay order from the Court till his suit was finally decided. The State therefore cannot be held responsible if the property remained under attachment for a long period. Till the civil litigation was finally decided the State could not dispose of the property by auction or otherwise. The plaintiff has been unable to show that the State had acted illegally or maliciously against the present plaintiff. ( 8 ) IT is true that under the provisions of the Sales-tax Act only property of an assessee can be attached for arrears of sales-tax. However the learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that if the entire business of the assessee was transferred it was open to the Sales-tax department to attach the property in the hands of the transferee also. The relied on sec. 26 (1) of the Bombay Sales-tax Act 1953 However it may be noted that as per the document of sale Ex.
However the learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that if the entire business of the assessee was transferred it was open to the Sales-tax department to attach the property in the hands of the transferee also. The relied on sec. 26 (1) of the Bombay Sales-tax Act 1953 However it may be noted that as per the document of sale Ex. 41 in favour of the plaintiff he had not purchased the entire business but he had purchased only the machinery in lieu of his mortgage amount and therefore in the civil suit filed against the State he was declared to be the owner of the machinery only and not a transferee of the business. In our opinion therefore sec. 26 would not be applicable in the instant case. But there is not a single circumstances to show that initially the act of the Mamlatdar in attaching the property for sales tax dues was in any way illegal or invalid. The Collector also had acted promptly in passing an order permitting the plaintiff to remove the property on his furnishing proper security. One cannot therefore say that merely because the property ultimately turned out to be of the plaintiff the act of the State in attaching the same was in any way illegal. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that even if for arguments sake it was held that the act of the State in attaching the property of the plaintiff who was a third party was not valid the State could not be held liable for damages in an action brought on tort. When the learned Assistant Government Pleader raised this point of law it was opposed by the learned advocate for the respondent on the ground that this point was not taken in the lower Court. He urged that the appellant should not be permitted at this stage to raise this point as it was a mixed question of law and fact. In our opinion the question whether the State would be liable for tortuous acts of its servants or not is a pure question of law and it can be agitated at any stage. Besides in the instant case we have permitted the appellant to argue this point only on the assumption that certain facts were admitted or established.
In our opinion the question whether the State would be liable for tortuous acts of its servants or not is a pure question of law and it can be agitated at any stage. Besides in the instant case we have permitted the appellant to argue this point only on the assumption that certain facts were admitted or established. ( 9 ) THE learned Assistant Government Pleader referred to us to the case of M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in A. I. R. 1965 Supreme Court 1039 wherein a distinction was made by the Supreme Court between acts committed in the discharge of sovereign powers of the State and the acts of its servants while acting in the discharge of their duties. It was observed by the Supreme Court thatthere is material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortuous act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages the question to ask is:- was the tortuous act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to and ultimately based on the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant ? If the answer is in the affirmative the action for damages for loss caused by such tortuous act will not lie. On the other hand if the tortuous act has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is in this category of cases an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose. This distinction which is clear and precise in law is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the States liability arising from tortuous acts committed by public servants. It was further observed that.
This distinction which is clear and precise in law is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the States liability arising from tortuous acts committed by public servants. It was further observed that. THE power to arrest a person to search him and to seize property found with him are powers conferred on the specified officers by statute and in the last analysis they are powers which can be properly characterised as sovereign powers; and so the act which gave rise to the present claim for damages had been committed by the employee of the State during the course of its employment; but the employment in question being of the category which can claim the special characteristic of sovereign power the claim could not be sustained. WITH respect we are in agreement with the above proposition of law. Relying on the observations of the above case the learned Assistant Government Pleader referred to sec. 16 (6) and 17 (6) of the Bombay Sales tax Act 1953 Sec. 16 (6) says:-ANY amount of the tax together with the penalty if any which remains unpaid after the date specified in the notice issued under sub-sec. (5) shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. Sec. 17 (6) says -ANY amount of money which a person is required to pay to the Collector or for which he is personally liable to the Collector under this section shall if it remains unpaid be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. UNDER sec. 187 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 read with relevant provisions of sec. 152 to 158 it is open to the Collector to attach property of the defaulter for realising the tax as an arrear of land revenue. It is not disputed before us by the learned advocate for the respondent that the Collector had no authority to attach the property of the assessee who had committed default in payment of tax. He however submitted that the revenue officers had no authority to attach property of a third person in order to recover sales-tax dues of Shantilal.
It is not disputed before us by the learned advocate for the respondent that the Collector had no authority to attach the property of the assessee who had committed default in payment of tax. He however submitted that the revenue officers had no authority to attach property of a third person in order to recover sales-tax dues of Shantilal. He also urged that the decision in Kasturi Lals case referred to above cannot be said to be good law in the light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta reported in A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 997. He urged that the rule of construction that the Crown is not bound by a statute unless expressly named or brought in by necessary implication which was accepted by the Privy Council in interpreting statutes vis- -vis the Crown is inconsistent with and incongruous in the present set up. The learned advocate referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court :-WE have no Crown; the archaic rule based on the prerogative and perfection of the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic it is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of equality. It introduces conflicts and discrimination. There is no justification to accept the English canon of construction for it brings about diverse results and conflicting decisions. On the other hand the normal construction namely that the general Act applies to citizens as well as to State unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation steers clear of all the anomalies. It prima facie applies to all States and subjects alike a construction consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in our Constitution. The natural approach avoids the archaic rule and moves with the modern trends. This will not cause any hardship to the State. The State can make an act if it chooses providing for its exemption from its operation. Though the State is not expressly exempted from the operation of an Act under certain circumstances such an exemption may necessarily be implied. Such an Act provided it does not infringe fundamental rights will give the necessary relief to the State.
The State can make an act if it chooses providing for its exemption from its operation. Though the State is not expressly exempted from the operation of an Act under certain circumstances such an exemption may necessarily be implied. Such an Act provided it does not infringe fundamental rights will give the necessary relief to the State. The said canon of construction was not the law in force within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution and should not be applied for construing statutes in India. IN our opinion the observations made by the Supreme Court in this case will not apply to the facts of the present case. The facts in the instant case will be governed by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kasturi Lals case referred to earlier. The said case does not seem to have been referred to in this case. That apart the question before the Supreme Court in the above case was not directly on the point whether the State would not be liable for the tortuous acts of its servants. In the above case the State of West Bengal was running a market and as required under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act a person was required to obtain licence. The State of West Bengal however had not obtained any licence and thereupon the Corporation of Calcutta filed a complaint against the State of West Bengal in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate in which defence was taken that it was not necessary for the State to obtain any licence and that the State was not bound by the provisions of the Act. The learned Magistrate accepted the said contentions and acquitted the State. on appeal the High Court of Calcutta held that the State was carrying en business of running a market and therefore it was as much bound as a private individual to take out a licence. Against that an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court wherein on the facts of that case the Supreme Court held that the State was bound to take out a licence and that if the State claimed any exemption a provision should have been made in the Act itself. But the State by its prerogative of being a State cannot say that it was not bound by the provisions of a particular statute.
But the State by its prerogative of being a State cannot say that it was not bound by the provisions of a particular statute. In our opinion therefore even though there are certain observations in this case which certainly go counter to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kasturi Lals case the said case is still good law on the point whether the State can be held liable for tortuous acts of its servants It has been clearly stated that if a State servant has acted in discharge of duties enjoined by a statute the State would not be liable for the tortuous acts which are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers of the State. In the instant case the act of attaching property by the Mamlatdar to realise sales-tax dues of the State could certainly be said to have been done in the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to him. Under the circumstances if property even of a third person was attached inadvertently under a bona fide belief that the same belonged to the assessee the State cannot be said to be liable for any loss sustained by the person as a result of attachment of his property. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate for the respondent then referred to the case of the State of Gujarat v. Memon Mahmad Haji Hasam reported in A. I. R. 1967 Supreme Court 1885 In our opinion this case also would not help the respondent. In that case the question of Government being not liable for tortuous act of its servant was not considered material and on the facts of the case before it was observed that if the State was bound to return the property to the person concerned under the provisions of the statute it should be returned in its original condition and if it was not possible to return the property its value should be given. The case of M/s. Kasturi Lal Raliha Ram Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in A. I. R. 1965 Supreme Court 1039 was referred to but it was not considered relevant as the question of liability of the State for the tortuous act of its servant was not directly in issue and on the facts of its case orders were passed by the Supreme Court.
In our opinion both the cases referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent do not in any way negative or overrule the principle laid down in the case of Kasturi Lal referred to earlier. ( 11 ) IN order to appreciate the principle underlying Kasturi Lals case it will be worthwhile to refer to Article 300 (1) of the Constitution. It reads as under:-THE Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of such State enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding provinces or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted. THUS as stated in the above article when a question arises as to whether a suit can be filed against the Union Government or Government of a State one has to inquire whether such a suit could have been filed against the Dominion of India or a corresponding Province if the Constitution had not been framed. As Parliament or the Legislature of a State has not yet passed any law containing appropriate provisions in regard to the topic covered by Article 300 (1) one has to refer to sec. 65 of Government of India Act 1858 sec. 38 of the Government of India Act 1915 and sec. 170 of the Government of India Act 1935 in order to find out the circumstances in which Secretary of State for India in Council or a corresponding Province could sue or be sued. We need. not quote the relevant provisions of the said sections. Law then existing has been succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court of Calcutta in 1861 in the case of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India in Council reported in 5 Bom. H. C. R. App.
We need. not quote the relevant provisions of the said sections. Law then existing has been succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court of Calcutta in 1861 in the case of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India in Council reported in 5 Bom. H. C. R. App. A-I. Peacock C. J. observed :-THERE is a great and clear distinction between acts done in the exercise of what are usually termed sovereign powers and acts done in the conduct of undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals without having such powers delegated to them. Where an act is done or a contract is entered into in the exercise of powers usually called sovereign powers by which we mean powers which cannot be lawfully exercised except by sovereign or private individual delegated by a sovereign to exercise them no action will lie. THIS decision has been uniformly followed by Courts in India and quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Kasturi Lals case referred to above. It is thus clear that Secretary of State for India in Council of a Province could not be sued for damages for the tortuous acts of their servants in the exercise of sovereign powers. Thus in the absence of any enactment passed by Parliament or State Legislature as provided in article 300 (1) of the Constitution the old position still persists and therefore in the instant case the suit for damages cannot lie against the State for the tortuous acts of its servants in the exercise of sovereign powers. ( 12 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent next urged that even if it was assumed for the sake of argument that the State would not be held liable for the tortuous act of its servant in the discharge of its sovereign power in the accepted sense the sovereign power did not authorise the State servant to attach property of a third person. He urged that under the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen in our Constitution the property of a third person was protected and therefore the citizen would have a remedy in a Court of law if any act derogatory to his fundamental right was done by the State servant even in pursuance of a duty enjoined by the statute.
He urged that under the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen in our Constitution the property of a third person was protected and therefore the citizen would have a remedy in a Court of law if any act derogatory to his fundamental right was done by the State servant even in pursuance of a duty enjoined by the statute. He urged that under articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution he had a right to hold property or to deal with it in any manner he liked and it cannot be taken away without proper and adequate compensation. He therefore urged that if his property was attached wrongfully by the State servants and if he was prevented from doing business it cannot be said that the servants of the State were acting in the discharge of their sovereign powers. In our opinion if the State servants are acting in the discharge of duties enjoined by a statute they would not be liable for the tortuous acts even to a third party. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the District Collector Visakhapatnam v. Pinisetti Ankanna reported in A. I. R. 1967 Andhra Pradesh 41 it was observed that collection of land revenue is sovereign function. It is no doubt delegated to certain specified authorities under the Revenue Recovery Act. But merely because such a delegation is made under a statute the function will not cease to have the essential character of a sovereign function. That being so it is a complete defence for the State to say that whatever was done was in the exercise of the sovereign powers of the State. Thus the State is not liable for the illegal and malicious acts of revenue officers. In that case a cart of a third person was attached by revenue authorities for realising arrears of land revenue inspite of his protest. In an action brought for damages a plea was taken by the State that the State would not be liable for the tortuous acts of its servants. Upholding the said contention the said observations were made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the present case it is not necessary for us to go to the extreme length of holding that the State would not be liable for malicious act of its servants.
Upholding the said contention the said observations were made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the present case it is not necessary for us to go to the extreme length of holding that the State would not be liable for malicious act of its servants. We would confine our consideration only to the facts of the case before us wherein there is no allegation of any malice against the State officers. The evidence on record clearly shows that the property in question formerly did belong to the assessee who had given an undertaking Ex. 170 to the revenue officer promising not to transfer the property by way of sale or mortgage only a few months before the actual attachment was levied. The property was confined in the hired premises. No new rent note was taken by the present plaintiff in his name. After purchase of the machinery from the said Shantilal no notice was given to the State intimating that the property was purchased by the plaintiff. Under the circumstances the Mamlatdar Patan was justified in attaching the said property believing the same to be of the ownership of Shantilal. If under the circumstances ultimately the said property turned out to be of the plaintiff the State officers cannot be held liable to pay damages for the said act of attachment. As soon as the plaintiff brought to the notice of the Collector that he had purchased the same suitable orders were passed permitting him to remove the property on furnishing sufficient security. If the plaintiff for the reasons best known to him did not choose to give any security and instead filed a suit and obtained a stay order the State cannot be held responsible if the property remained idle for a long period. The plaintiffs suit therefore to recover damages for the tortuous acts of the State servants could not lie. We therefore agree with the submissions made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the suit would be barred on the principle that the State would not be liable for the tortuous acts of its servants committed in the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to them.
We therefore agree with the submissions made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the suit would be barred on the principle that the State would not be liable for the tortuous acts of its servants committed in the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to them. ( 13 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent referred to the case of the Lasalgaon Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Lasalgaon v. M/s. Prabhudas Hathibhai and others reported in A. I. R. 1966 Bombay 134 In that case the goods of the assessee were pledged with the back when the same were attached. Subsequently they were removed and kept in a godown and because of want of proper care the goods deteriorated. In an action brought by the bank to recover damages it was observed that:-WHERE a circle officer whether he was acting under the Orders of his superiors or not attaches the goods of an income-tax assessee lying in a godown in the custody of a Bank with whom they are pledged under a certificate issued by I. T. O. under sec. 46 (3) of the Income-tax Act for arrears of income tax the Circle officer acts in excess of his authority and the attachment is illegal and not merely irregular. WHERE the goods are damaged while in the custody of the Government and the Bank files a suit against the Revenue officers in their official as well as private capacity for an amount due from the pledgor which he could not recover due to the illegal action of the officers which deprived the plaintiff of the goods pledged the grave men of the charge is the illegal action of the defendants and not the negligence committed by Government officers or the Government the plaintiffs cause of action is not supplied by the damage caused to the goods on account of the decay which took place after the heavy rains but it is based upon the illegal seizure of the goods from his possession. IT may be noted that this case was decided by a single Judge before the decision in Kasturi Lals case was published. In the light of the Supreme Court decision in Kasturi Lals case the observations made by the single Judge of the Bombay High Court cannot be said to be a correct proposition of law.
IT may be noted that this case was decided by a single Judge before the decision in Kasturi Lals case was published. In the light of the Supreme Court decision in Kasturi Lals case the observations made by the single Judge of the Bombay High Court cannot be said to be a correct proposition of law. In our opinion the State would not be liable in tort for the tortuous acts of its servants done in pursuance of duties enjoined by the statute. . . . . . . .