JUDGMENT K. Sadasivan, J. This second appeal is by the respondents-defendants. The suit was for partition. The plaint schedule property was gifted in the year 1104, jointly by two brothers Sankaran and Govindan in favour of Devaki, the widow of their elder brother Sami, and her two children Madhavi and Kumaran. The parties are Marumakkathayee Thiyyas. After some time Devaki died and on her death her rights devolved on the two children Madhavi and Kumaran. As, Kumaran was not allowed to share the income from the property, the suit was instituted by him for partition. He claimed one half on the basis that by the death of Devaki the property devolved absolutely on himself and his sister Madhavi in equal shares. Defendants 2 to 7 are the children of Madhavi. The defendants contended that the property was intended to be enjoyed by the donees with the incidents of tarwad or tavazhi property, and as such the children of Madhavi are also entitled to share in the property. The learned Munsiff upheld the contentions of the defendants and passed a decree as if the property is an item of tarwad property, allowing partition on percapita basis, the plaintiff getting 1/8. The plaintiff appealed and the learned Subordinate Judge of Tellicherry set aside the decree of the court below and in its place passed a preliminary decree allowing partition into two equal halves as between the plaintiff and Madhavi. The defendants, have therefore come up in second appeal. The fact is not disputed that the donors Sankaran and Govindan were governed at the time, by the marumakkathayam system of inheritence and when a marumakkathayee executes a puthravakasom gift, the property gifted will have to be taken by the donees with all the incidents of tarwad property. In the present case, the donees (barring the widow who is dead) are the children of the donors' deceased brother. The Madras High Court in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee, I.L.R. 16 Mad. 201, stated the law of devolution of a puthravakasom gift thus: "The properties in question originally belonged to one Taruvai, and they were given after his death to his wife and his children in accordance with his orally expressed wish.. The Madras High Court in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee, I.L.R. 16 Mad. 201, stated the law of devolution of a puthravakasom gift thus: "The properties in question originally belonged to one Taruvai, and they were given after his death to his wife and his children in accordance with his orally expressed wish.. In the case before us the donor expressed no intention as to how the properties should be held by the donees, and in the absence of such expression, the presumption is that he intended that they should take them as properties acquired by their branch or as the exclusive properties of their own branch with the usual incidents of tarwad property in accordance with Marumakkathayam usage which governed the donees." In the case before us, the donors have expressed their intention that the property should be enjoyed by the three donees and the "santhanams" of Madhavi, the daughter. Thus, the line of succession has been indicated in the document itself. In construing the gift, the intention of the donors has to be given effect to. But according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the latter clause indicating the mode in which the property is to be enjoyed, is repugnant to the former clause giving away the property absolutely to the three named donees, and as such the latter clause should not be given effect to. This argument seems to have found favour with the learned appellate Judge; but we do not see much force in the contention. The argument is, that by the former clause, "MALAYALAM the property has completely vested in the donees and that, anything said thereafter in derogation of such vesting has only to be ignored. The restrictive clause, viz., " MALAYALAM" no doubt comes only subsequently. But the document has to be read and construed as a whole and the intention of the donors has to be gauged from such construction, and that intention has to be given effect to. "Ordinarily the intention of the executant of a document has to be ascertained from the instrument road as a whole and not by reading isolated passages therein without reference to the other passages, and the attempt should be to reconcile as far as possible the apparently irreconcilable clauses." Vide Janaki v. Krishnan Nambissan, 1958 K.L.T. 516. "Ordinarily the intention of the executant of a document has to be ascertained from the instrument road as a whole and not by reading isolated passages therein without reference to the other passages, and the attempt should be to reconcile as far as possible the apparently irreconcilable clauses." Vide Janaki v. Krishnan Nambissan, 1958 K.L.T. 516. On the above reasoning we have no doubt, in our mind, that the gift is perfectly valid and the donors were competent to execute it conferring the property on the donees as an item of tavazhi property. Basing on this court's decision in Thankappa Menon v. Kannamma, 1969 K.L.J. 475, learned counsel for the respondent argued that even if the property is treated as tarwad property, the division can only be on "stirpital" basis. We cannot agree. In that decision we had to consider the applicability of section 48 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act as amended by Act 26/58. We had observed in that case that: "A Marumakkathayee making provision for his wife or children or wife and children may intend that the same should be taken individually by the ''co-nomine'' parties mentioned in the document or by the natural marumakkathayam unit represented by such persons. Courts of law have to give effect to such intention. Section 48 of the Act enumerates only a rule of presumption in the matter of construction of documents of the type referred to in the section. But the proviso to Section 48 deals with the mode of partition of the property given by a person to his wife and children as tavazhi property. When it is found either by applying the presumption under section 48 of the Act or otherwise that a marumakkathayee has given property, to his wife and children as tavazhi property the division of such property among the members of the tavazhi has to be only in accordance with the proviso to that section which enjoins a per stirpes division different from the per capita division in respect of tarwad property dealt with under Chapter VI of the Act." In the present case, the proviso to section 48 does not come into play, because the property is gifted not to the wife and children of the donors. This is a puthravakasom or makkathayam gift in the normal or conventional sense and the devolution can only be as laid down in the marumakkathayam system and in the event of partition, the division can only be on per capita basis. The view taken by the trial court is hence correct. In the result, the decree of the learned appellate Judge is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. We order no costs in this appeal.