SRI SODE VADIRAJ MUTT v. THANYA PUJARY — 1970 DIGILAW 163 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE petitioners in all these cases are landlords and the respondents are the tenants in respect of the lands belonging to the petitioners. The petitioners in all these cases are Hindu Public Religious Institutions in the district of South Kanara to which the provisions of the Madras Hindu religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951, are applicable. The lands held on lease by the respondents belong to Hindu Public Religious Institutions governed by the aforesaid Act. These revision petitions have been filed under S. 18 of the Mysore Small Cause Courts Act, 1964. In all these cases, the trial Courts have directed the return of plaints for presentation to proper Court, principally on the ground that the suit lands are not exempt from the provisions of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961 under s. 107 of the said Act. The trial Courts have also taken the view that as fair rent has not been fixed under the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, the suits for recovery of arrears of rent are premature. The view of the trial Courts is that as the lands in question are not exempt from provisions of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act), the ordinary Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the suits and that the petitioners can resort to the remedy provided under S. 42 of the Act. S. 42 of the Act as was in force when these cases were disposed of by the trial Courts reads as follows:"42. Procedure for recovery of rent :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or in any law for the time being in force, no suit or other proceeding shall lie in any Court or before any other authority for recovery of any rent payable by a tenant, except as provided in this section. (2) A landlord claiming payment of rent by a tenant may apply to the Tribunal in the prescribed form for an order directing the tenant to pay the rent due to the landlord. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-sec. (2), the Tribunal shall, after holding an inquiry, pass such order thereon as it deems fit. (4) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 1963, an application under this section shall be deemed to be a suit for arrear of rent, but the period of limitation shall be one year. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-sec. (2), the Tribunal shall, after holding an inquiry, pass such order thereon as it deems fit. (4) For the purposes of the Limitation Act 1963, an application under this section shall be deemed to be a suit for arrear of rent, but the period of limitation shall be one year. "the Tribunal referred to in S. 42 of the Act is a Judicial Officer of the ranl of a Munsiff constituted as a Tribunal by the State Government under s. 111 of the Act. If no Tribunal is constituted for any area, the Munsiff. having jurisdiction over such area or any other Judicial Officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government was entitled to exercise the powers and perform all the duties and functions of the Tribunal under the Act. S. 42 was amended by Mysore Act 6 of 1970 with effect from 15th of January 1970. The effect of the amendment of S. 42 was that the word court' was substituted ior the word 'tribunal'. The word 'court' has been denned in S. 2 (9a) which was introduced by the Mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1970 to mean the Court of Munsiff within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situate. It is clear from the provisions of S. 42 that a special provision has been made prescribing the procedure for recovery of rent. All suits for recovery of arrears of rent are now required to be filed only in the 'court' as defined in S. 2 (9a) of the Act. Before the amendment, they were required to be filed only before the Tribunal constituted under S. 111 of the Act which has since been omitted. Such suits are not governed by the relevant articles of the Limitation act, 1963, but are governed by the special rule of limitation of one year prescribed under S. 42 (4) of the Act. S. 132 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts reads as follows:"132. Bar of jurisdiction.- (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the court, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the tahsildar, the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State government in exercise of their powers of control. Bar of jurisdiction.- (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the court, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the tahsildar, the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State government in exercise of their powers of control. (2) No order of the Court, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant commissioner, the Appellate Authority, the Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal, or the Tahsildar made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. "it is therefore clear that the suits contemplated under S. 42 of the Act have to be filed before the forum prescribed by the Act and in accordance with the procedure precribed under S. 42. No Court other than the one referred to in S. 42 can therefore entertain any suit for recovery of arrears of rent. If the Courts below are right in their view that S. 107 of the Act is not applicable to the lands in question, it is clear that the plaints which have been filed in Courts other than the Court referred to in S. 42 of the Act were rightly returned for presentation to the proper court. ( 2 ) THE principal question for consideration in all these cases, therefore, is as to whether the Courts below were right in their view that S. 107 of the Act is not applicable to the lands in question. The Act extends to the whole of Mysore State and is applicable to all agricultural lands. In chapter VIII of the Act, some provisions have been incorporated giving exemption to certain classes of lands from the operation of certain provisions. S. 103 of the Act provides that some of the provisions specified in that section shall not apply to leases obtained by industrial or commercial undertakings, co-operative societies, etc. S. 104 provides that some provisions of the Act shall not be applicable to regimental farms and plantations. Sec. 105 exempts lands leased by or to local authorities from the operation of some provisions of the Act. S. 106 provides that in respect of compensation payable to religious, charitable or other institution capable of holding property, the provisions of Ss. 47, 50 and 51 shall have effect subject to the modifications specified in sub-sees. (2), (3) and (4) of that section. S. 106 provides that in respect of compensation payable to religious, charitable or other institution capable of holding property, the provisions of Ss. 47, 50 and 51 shall have effect subject to the modifications specified in sub-sees. (2), (3) and (4) of that section. S. 107 of the Act, with which we are concerned, states that subject to the provisions of S. I 10, none of the provisions in the Act, except s. 8, shall apply to lands belonging to or held on lease from the Government or lands belonging to or held on lease from religious or charitable institutions managed by or under the control of the State Government, or lands belonging to or held on lease from a public trust or a society for public educational purpose created or formed before the 18th November 1961, and in existence on the date of commencement of the Mysore Land reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965. S. 108 is similar to S. 107 exempting the lands taken under the management of the Courts of Wards, etc. , subject to the provisions of S. 110, from the operation of the provisions of the Act, except S. 8. S. 109 empowers the State Government to reserve any area for urban non-agricultural or industrial development and to direct that the land in such area shall be exempt from such of the provisions of the Act as may be specified in the Notification issued by the State government. S. 110 empowers the State Government to take away the exemption given under Ss. 103, 105, 107 and 108 of the Act. The exemption given in S. 107 is subject to the provisions of S. 110. S. 110 provides for taking away the exemption given to lands specified in S. 107 of the Act. It is not disputed in this case that S. 110 has not so far been invoked by the State Government to take away the exemption given by S. 107 of the act. It is not contended by the petitioners that the lands belonging to the petitioners are not governed by S. 8 of the Act. The petitioners' case is that except S. 8, none of the other provisions of the Act apply to the lands belonging to them as the petitioners are religious institutions under the control of the State Government. ( 3 ) SECTION 107 of the Act reads as follows:"107. The petitioners' case is that except S. 8, none of the other provisions of the Act apply to the lands belonging to them as the petitioners are religious institutions under the control of the State Government. ( 3 ) SECTION 107 of the Act reads as follows:"107. Act not to apply to certain lands.-Subject to the provisions of S. 110, nothing in the provisions of this Act except S. 8 shall apply to lands belonging to or held on lease from the Government or lands belonging to or held on lease from religious or charitable institutions managed by or under the control of the State Government, or lands belonging to or held on lease from, a public trust or a society for public educational purpose created or formed before the 18th november 1961 and in existence on the date of commencement of the mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1965. "explanation: For the purposes of this section- (a) 'public trust' means an express or constructive trust for public educational purpose; and (b) 'society' means a society established for a public educational purpose and which is registered or deemed to be registered under the mysore Societies Registration Act, 1960. "as already mentioned, no Notification has been issued under S. 110 taking away the exemption given under S. 107. As already mentioned it is not disputed that S. 8 of the Act is applicable to lands to which S. 107 applies. The only question for consideration, therefore, is as to whether the lands in question come under any one of the classes of lands mentioned in S. 107 of the Act. As already mentioned it is not disputed that S. 8 of the Act is applicable to lands to which S. 107 applies. The only question for consideration, therefore, is as to whether the lands in question come under any one of the classes of lands mentioned in S. 107 of the Act. If we analyse S. 107, it would be clear that, subject to the provisions of S. 110, none of the provisions of the Act except s. 8 shall apply to the following classes of lands: (a) lands belonging to the Government; (b) lands held on lease from the Government; (c) lands belonging to religious or charitable institutions managed by the State Government; (d) lands belonging to religious or charitable institutions under the control of the State Government; (e) lands held on lease from religious or charitable institutions managed by the State Government; (f) lands held on lease from religious or charitable institutions under the control of the State Government; (g) lands belonging to a public trust or a society for public educational purposes created or formed before the 18th of November 1961 and in existence on the date of commencement of the mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965. (h) lands held on lease from a public trust or society for public educational purposes created or formed before the 18th of november 1961 and in existence on the date of commencement of the Mysoore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1965. "we are not concerned in this case with lands belonging to or held on lease from the Government, nor are we concerned with the lands belonging to or or held on lease from a public trust or a society for public educational purposes created or formed before the 18th of November 1961 and in existence on the date of commencement of the Mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1965. We must therefore confine our attention only to lands belonging to or held on lease from religious or charitable institutions managed by or under the control of the State Government. The petitioners in this case do not claim that the lands belonging to them are managed by the State Government. Their only case is that the petitioners are religious institutions which are under the control of the State government. The petitioners in this case do not claim that the lands belonging to them are managed by the State Government. Their only case is that the petitioners are religious institutions which are under the control of the State government. ( 4 ) IT was contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners who are religious institutions would be entitled to claim exemption under s. 107 only if they are able to satisfy the court that the lands belonging to them are under the control of the State Government. What is urged is that the control contemplated under S. 107 has reference to the lands and not to the religious institutions. I find considerable difficulty in acceding to this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. The language of S. 107 is quite clear and leads to the only inference that what is contemplated is the control of the State Government over the religious or charitable institution and not the control of the lands belonging to or held on lease from the religious or charitable institutions. The construction put forward by the respondents would have been possible if the legislature had used the expression 'lands managed or under the control of the State Government belonging to or held on lease from religious or charitable institutions'. If the Legislature intended that the control contemplated under S. 107 should ue over the lands belonging to or held on lease from the religious or charitable institutions, one would have expected a phraseology to be used as indicated above. If the lands are managed by or under the control of tne btate Government, it is clear that they would be exempt from the operation of the Act in view of the first part of S. 107 which exempts lands belonging to or held on lease from the Government. In my opinion, the language of S. 107 is clear and unambiguous and leaves no scope to put a construction to the effect that what is contemplated is the management or control of the lands themselves and not of the religious or charitable institutions. It is enough to claim exemption under S. 107 if the petitioners establish that the religious institutions in question are either managed or under the control of the State Government. The lands belong to the petitioners who are religious institutions. It is enough to claim exemption under S. 107 if the petitioners establish that the religious institutions in question are either managed or under the control of the State Government. The lands belong to the petitioners who are religious institutions. It is not the petitioners' case that the lands in question are managed by or are under the control of the State Government. The only endeavour of the petitioners is to establish that the petitioners who are religious institutions are under the control of the State Government. ( 5 ) AS already mentioned, the petitioners in these cases are religious institutions. The petitioners seek to establish that they are under the control of the State Government in view of the provisions of the Madras hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the H. R. E. Act), which is applicable to these religious institutions. The fact that the petitioners are religious institutions governed by the H. R. E. Act was not disputed in the trial Court. The arguments in the trial court proceeded on the basis that these religious institutions are governed by the H. R. E. Act and that the said provisions have in fact been made applicable to these religious institutions. It cannot now be disputed that all these religious institutions are governed by the provisions of the H. R. E. Act. The petitioners rely on the provisions of the H. R. E. Act to demonstrate that they are under the control of the State Government. It is therefore necessary to examine in brief the scheme of the Act in order to ascertain as to whether these institutions are under the control of the State Government as contended by the petitioners. ( 6 ) THE object of the HRE. Act as indicated in the preamble is to amend and consolidate the law relating to the administration and governance of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions and Endowments in the state of Madras (The HRE. Act is in force in the district of South kanara in view ol S. 119 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 ). Chapter ii of the H. R. E. Act deals with the Commissioner and the other controlling authorities. Sec. 7 provides that the Commissioner, the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners and the Area Committees shall be the authorities under the H. R. E. Act. Chapter ii of the H. R. E. Act deals with the Commissioner and the other controlling authorities. Sec. 7 provides that the Commissioner, the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners and the Area Committees shall be the authorities under the H. R. E. Act. Under S. 8, it is the State government that has the power to appoint the Commissioner, the Deputy and the Assistant Commissioner. Under the Commissioner are the Deputy commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the Area Committees. The Commissioner with the approval of the State Government has to divide the State into areas and each area is placed in charge of a Deputy commissioner to whom the powers of the Commissioner can be delegated. S. 11 provides that the State has also to be divided into a number of divisions and an Assistant Commissioner has to be placed in charge of each division. The Commissioner may delegate to an Assistant Commissioner some of the powers or duties specified in S. 11 subject to such restrictions and control as the State Government may by general or special order lay down. Below the Assistant Commissioner, there shall be an Area Committee in charge of the temples situated within a division or part of a division. It is clear from S. 13 that the members of the Area committee have to be appointed by the Government. S. 15 provides that the Government may make rules regarding the convening of meetings of area Committees, quorum for and the conduct of business at such meetings and all matters relating to the transaction of their business. Under s. 18, the Commissioner is empowered to examine the records of any deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or Area Committee or of any trustee not being the trustee of a math, in respect of any proceeding under the Act, to satisfy himself as to the regularity, correctness or propriety of any decision or order. Chapter III contains general provisions relating to all reluigious institutions. S. 20 provides that the administration of religious endowments is placed under the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner and empowers him to pass any orders which he deems necessary to ensure that such endowments are properly administered and that their income is properly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or existed. S. 20 provides that the administration of religious endowments is placed under the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner and empowers him to pass any orders which he deems necessary to ensure that such endowments are properly administered and that their income is properly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or existed. S. 23 which is an important section provides that the trustee of a religious institution shall be bound to obey all lawful orders issued under the provisions of the HRE. Act by the government, the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Area Committee or the Assistant Commissioner. S. 24 provides that the trustee of every religious institution should administer its affairs and apply its funds and properties in accordance with the terms of the trust, the usage of the institution and all lawful directions which a competent authority may issue in respect thereof and as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such affairs and properties as if they were his own. S. 25 deals with the preparation of registers of all religious institutions. S. 26 provides for verification of such register. S. 27 is another important section which imposes a duty on the trustee to furnish to the Commissioner the accounts, returns, reports or other information relating to the administration of the institution, its funds, property or income, or moneys connected therewith, or the appropriation thereof, as the Commissioner may require and at such time and in such form as he may direct. The same powers may also be exercised by the Assistant Commissioner in the case of religious institutions subject to his jurisdiction. Power is given under S. 26 to the commissioner or any other officer authorised by him to inspect all movable and immovable property of any religious institution. S. 29 is another important provision which prohibits alienation of immovable properties belonging to the trust except leases for a term not exceeding five years without the sanction of the Commissioner. The power of the trustee to lease the lands belonging to the religious institution for a period longer than five years is directly controlled by the Commissioner. S. 29 is another important provision which prohibits alienation of immovable properties belonging to the trust except leases for a term not exceeding five years without the sanction of the Commissioner. The power of the trustee to lease the lands belonging to the religious institution for a period longer than five years is directly controlled by the Commissioner. Though a trustee may incur expenditure for making arrangements for securing the health and comfort of piligrims or worshippers and other people, S. 30 provides that where there is a surplus left after making adequate provision for the purposes specified in S. 70 (2), he shall be guided by such general or special instructions that may be issued by the Commissioner or the Area Committee. S. 45 empowers the Deputy Commissioner as in the case of any religious institution over which an area Committee has jurisdiction and the Commissioner in the case of any other religious institution to suspend, remove or dismiss any hereditary or non-hereditary trustee or trustees thereof- (a) for persistant default in the submission of budgets, accounts, reports or returns, or (b) for wilful disobedience of any lawful order issued under the provisions of the Act by the Government, the Commissioner or Deputy commissioner, the Area Committee or the Assistant Commissioner, or (c) for any malfeasance, misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty in respect of the trust, or (d) for any misappropriation of, or improper dealing with, the properties of the institution, or (e) for unsoundness of mind or other mental or physical defect or infirmity which unfits him for discharging the functions of the trustee. A trustee may challenge the order of a Deputy Commissioner before the commissioner and the order of the Commissioner before the Government by way of appeal. S. 47 provides for filling up of vacancies in the office of hereditary trustee. It also empowers the Deputy Commissioner to appoint, a fit person to discharge the functions of the trustee of an institution, in certain circumstances, specified in Sec. 47. Sec. 48 provides for appointment of office-holders or servants in religious institutions by the trustee. Any person affected by an order of the trustee may challenge the decision of the trustee by an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner. S. 49 provides that the trustee may after following the procedure prescribed inflict punishment on the office-holders and servants of the religious institution. Any person affected by an order of the trustee may challenge the decision of the trustee by an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner. S. 49 provides that the trustee may after following the procedure prescribed inflict punishment on the office-holders and servants of the religious institution. But, the action of the trustee is subject to an appeal to the Deputy commissioner. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is in turn subject to a further appeal to the Commissioner. S. 50 is another important provision which in a way controls the income of the religious institutions. The power to fix fees for archanais and determining their apportionment by the trustees of a temple is subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may by general or special order direct. S. 51 of the Act is another important provision which in a way controls the expenditure of the religious institutions. The trustee is required to submit to the Area Committee and to the Commissioner if the institution is subject to the jurisdiction of such a Committee and to the Commissioner in other cases, proposals for fixing the dittam or scale of expenditure in the institution and the amounts which should be allotted to the various objects connected with such institution or the proportion in which the income or other property of the institution may be applied for such objects. The persons interested have a right to object or to make suggestions to the Area Committee or the Commissioner as the case may be. After considering the objections, the Area Committee or the Commissioner, as the case may be shall pass such orders as they deem fit having regard to all relevant factors. This provision is intended to control the expenditure by the trustees. Chapter iv of the H. R. E. Act makes provision for maths. S. 52 provides for institution of suits for the removal of the trustee of a math or a specific endowment attached to a math. S. 53 provides for filling of vacancies that occur in the office of the trustee of a math or specific endowment attached to a math. In certain circumstances, the Assistant Commissioner is empowered to take steps and to pass such orders as he thinks proper for temporary custody and protection of the endowments of the math or of the specific endowment and to report the matter to the Commissioner. In certain circumstances, the Assistant Commissioner is empowered to take steps and to pass such orders as he thinks proper for temporary custody and protection of the endowments of the math or of the specific endowment and to report the matter to the Commissioner. The Commissioner is empowered either to affirm the arrangements made or to make such other arrangements as he thinks fit. S. 54 provides for fixing of standard scales of expenditure in respect of maths and specific endowments and is similar to S. 51 already referred to above. It is clear from this provision that the expenditure of the maths and specific endowments attached to the maths is subject to the control of the Commissioner and the Government. Chapter V of the H. R. E. Act deals with inquiries, power of Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and matters and of the Deputy Commissioner to frame schemes. S. 59 makes provision for the application of the 'cypres' doctrine when the specific objects of the trust have failed. S. 60 provides for determination and application of properties and funds of defunct religious institutions. S. 61 provides for appeals in regard to matters provided in Chapter V. S. 62 provides for suits and appeals in certain cases. Chapter VII deals with budgets, accounts and audit. S. 70 provides that the trustee of every religious institution shall before the end of March in each year submit in such form as may be fixed by the Commissioner, a budget showing the probable receipts and disbursements of the institution during the following fasli year to the Area Committee if the institution is subject to the jurisdiction of such a Committee and to the Commissioner in other cases. The area Committee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, have power to make such alterations, omissions or additions in the budget as they deem fit after following the procedure prescribed. This is an important provision which empowers the Area Committee and the Commissioner to control the income and expenditure of the religious institutions. S. 71 provides for the maintenance of regular accounts and receipts and disbursements and for the audit of the said accounts. S. 72 provides that the audit report should be sent to the Area Committee or the Commissioner as the case may be. S. 71 provides for the maintenance of regular accounts and receipts and disbursements and for the audit of the said accounts. S. 72 provides that the audit report should be sent to the Area Committee or the Commissioner as the case may be. S. 74 provides for rectification of defects disclosed in the audit and passing of order of surcharge against the trustees. S. 99 which occurs in Chapter X pertaining to miscellaneous matters is an important provision which empowers the State Government to examine the record of the Commissioner or any Deputy Commissioner or Assistant commissioner or any Area Committee or of any trustee in respect of any proceeding, not being a proceeding in respect of which a suit or an appeal to a Court is provided by this Act, to satisfy themselves as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and to pass such order as the Government deems fit. The proviso to S. 99 (1) provides that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he had a reasonable opportunity of making his representations. This provision gives an overall control over the actions of the trustees of religious institutions. The religious institutions are also controlled by the Area Committee, the assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner as provided in the Act. The Government is empowered to scrutinise their actions and to pass such orders as it deems fit. It is, therefore, clear that the Government exercises direct as well as indirect control over the religious institutions governed by the H. R. E. Act of 1951. The religious institutions are administered and managed by their trustees. The religious institutions can, therefore, be controlled by controlling the actions of the trustees of the religious institutions. The various provisions summarised above clearly indicate that the action of the trustees are controlled at all important stages of the management and administration of the religious institutions. There is an effective control of the religious institutions in matters pertaining to income, expenditure, budgeting, maintenance of accounts, alienation of immoveable properties, disciplinary action against trustees, appointment of trustees in certain cases, appointment of officeholders and employees and taking disciplinary action against them etc. There is an effective control of the religious institutions in matters pertaining to income, expenditure, budgeting, maintenance of accounts, alienation of immoveable properties, disciplinary action against trustees, appointment of trustees in certain cases, appointment of officeholders and employees and taking disciplinary action against them etc. The entire scheme of the H. P E Act is to ensure better administration and governance of the religious institutions to which the Act applies. The oobject of the H. R. E. Act cannot be achieved without controlling the actions of the persons in charge of the administration and management of the religious institutions. Elaborate machinery has been provided to control the actions of the trustees through the instrumentality of the Area committees, the Assistant Commissioners, the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner. The Government itself is also empowered to control the actions of the trustees directly by invoking their power under S. 99 of the H. R. E. Act. The Area Committee, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, as seen from the summary of the provisions of the Act, effectively control the actions of the trustees in regard to management and administration of the religious institutions. S. 23 provides that the trustee of a religious institution shall be bound to obey all lawful orders issued under the provisions of the Act by the Government, the, commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the Area Committee. The actions of the Area Committee, the Assistant commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner are themselves liable for scrutiny and correction by the Government either in exercise of the relevant appellate powers conferred on the Government under the relevant provisions of the H. H. E. Act or in exercise of the general power conferred on the Government under S. 99 (1 ). It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the only controlling authorities are those mentioned in S. 7 of the HRE. Act, and that the State Government not having been specified in S. 7 is not a controlling authority under h. R. E. Act. In view of Ss. 23, 99 and other provisions which provide for an appeal to the State Government against orders of the authorities specified in S. 7, it is clear that the Government has the ultimate and final control over the authorities specified in S. 7 of the H. R. E. Act, and consequently over the religious institutions themselves. In view of Ss. 23, 99 and other provisions which provide for an appeal to the State Government against orders of the authorities specified in S. 7, it is clear that the Government has the ultimate and final control over the authorities specified in S. 7 of the H. R. E. Act, and consequently over the religious institutions themselves. If the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the Area Committees have control over the religious institutions and if, as held by me, the actions of these authorities are liable to be interfered with by the Government, it cannot be contended with any amount of justification that it is only the authorities specified in S. 7 that have some control over the religious institutions and not the Government itself. It is difficult to accede to the contention of the respondents that the control, if any, under the H. R. E. Act is only of the authorities specified in S. 7 and not that of the Government. ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court in the Commr. , H. R. E. v. Sri Lakshmindra thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 was dealing with the constitutional validity of the provisions of the H. R. E. Act. Adverting to the scheme of the Act, this is what the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 24 of its judgment:"s. 20 of the Act describes the powers of the Commissioner in respect to religious endowments and they include power to pass any orders that may be deemed necessary to ensure that such endowments are properly administered and that their income is duly appropriated. for the purposes for which they were founded. Having regard to the fact that the Mathadhipati occupies the position of a trustee with regard to the Math, which is a public institution, some amount of control or supervision over the due administration of the endowments and due appropriation of their funds is certainly necessary in the interests of the public and we do not think that the provision of this section by itself offends any fundamental right of the Mahant. "it is clear from this observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the provisions of the H. R. E. Act are intended to control the due administration of the endowment and due appropriation of the funds. "it is clear from this observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the provisions of the H. R. E. Act are intended to control the due administration of the endowment and due appropriation of the funds. When, again, the same Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255 , this is what the Supreme Court has observed with reference to the power vested in the State Government under the provisions of the H. R. E. Act:"it is now necessary to refer to another litigation inter parties, the result of which has a material bearing on the issues which arise for determination before us. In 1951, the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras Act XIX of 1951) vesting in the State the power of superintendence and control of temples and Mutts. The Act created a hierarchy of officials to be appointed by the State, and conferred on them enormous powers of control and even management of institutions. "it is clear from this observation of their Lordships of the Supreme court that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Act has vested in the State the power of superintendence and control of temples and mutts. It is also clear that the State Government is empowered to exercise control and superintendence over these institutions through a hierarchy of officials to be appointed by the State. ( 8 ) IT was urged on behalf of the respondents that the 'control' contemplated under S. 107 of the Act is absolute control. It was contended that the control if any under the H. R. E. Act over the religious institutions is limited control and not absolute control. The word 'control' used in S. 107 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, is not defined. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 18, the word 'control' when broadly used may embrace every form of control, actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or affirmative. The word 'control' used in S. 107 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, is not defined. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 18, the word 'control' when broadly used may embrace every form of control, actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or affirmative. It has been further observed as under :-"in its primary sense, "to control" has been said to import a check by a countercheck or registered or duplicate account; but gradually an enlarged meaning, with the connotation of restraint over the subject of control, has been given to the term, and so it has been variously defined as meaning to check, curb, hold from action, hold in, restraint or check, keep under check, or to restrain; to counteract, or hinder; to direct, or guide; to dominate, overpower, subdue, or subject; to exercise a directing, restraining, or governing influence over; to govern, regulate, or rule; to have authority or power over or have under command, to manage, to subject to authority. The observations further go to state that under certain circumstances the word 'control' implies the power to prohibit. "in the absence of the definition of the expression 'control' one has to give the ordinary meaning of the word, depending upon the context in which the said expression occurs. The control contemplated being of the religious institutions, the enlarged meaning connoting restraint over the subject of control has to be given. S. 107 of the Act does not say that the control should be an absolute control. The context does not warrant an inference that the control must be an absolute one. What is contemplated under s. 107 of the Act is a control of religious institutions. The control of religious institutions can only be effected by controlling the actions of the trustees of the religious institutions pertaining to the administration and governance of the religious institutions. The scheme of the H. R. E. Act, as can be seen from its several provisions, is to keep in check or restrain the trustees from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the religious institutions. Whenever an occasion arises, the State Government, either by itself or through the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the Area Coommittees, can effectively control the actions of the trustees in regard to the administration and governance of the religious institutions. Whenever an occasion arises, the State Government, either by itself or through the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner or the Area Coommittees, can effectively control the actions of the trustees in regard to the administration and governance of the religious institutions. It is no doubt true that the control contemplated under S. 107 must be a real or substantial control and not an illusory or nominal control. But, it is not possible, having regard to the scheme of the Act discussed above to hold that the control exercised by the Government directly or indirectly is illusory or nominal. The control is real and substantial. ( 9 ) IT was next contended that the expression 'control' means only administrative and executive control and not the control of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. It was urged by the respondents that the power of control conferred under S. 99 of the H. R. E. Act is of a quasi-judicial nature analogous to a revisional power which can be exercised against the trustees as well as other authorities constituted under the H. R. E. Act. It was urged that the control by the other provisions of the Act is not substantial. It was urged that only effective control that can be contemplated is under S. 99 of the H. R. E. Act, which is of a quasi-judicial character. I do not agree that it can be inferred from provisions other than s. 99 of the H. R. E. Act, that there is no real or substantial control of these religious institutions under the H. R. E. Act. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents found it very difficult to contend that S. 99 (1) of the H. R. E. Act does not give the State government the power to control the religious institutions. But, what was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the control which the State Government can exercise under S. 99 (1) is of a judicial character. It was further urged that the control of the religious institutions contemplated under S. 107 of the Act is not a control by the Government of a judicial character, but an administrative or executive control over the religious institution. It was further urged that the control of the religious institutions contemplated under S. 107 of the Act is not a control by the Government of a judicial character, but an administrative or executive control over the religious institution. It was submitted that the proviso to S. 99 (1) of the H. R. E. Act provides that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he is given a reasonable opportunity of making his representations. Because of this obligation cast on the Government while exercising its powers under S. 99, it was contended that the power conferred by S. 99 (1) is a revisional power of a judicial character. It is no doubt true that the Government while exercising its power under S. 99 is required to give a reasonable opportunity of making representations to the person against whom the Government proposes to pass an order. The fact that the Government is required to follow such a procedure does not mean that the Government does not exercise control over the religious institutions. The only effect of the proviso to s. 99 (1) is that the power of control which the Government can exercise under S. 99 (1) has to be exercised only in the prescribed manner, i. e. , after giving an opportunity to the person likely to be affected of making his representations. The manner of the exercise of the power by the Government, in my opinion, does not in any way affect the character of the power conferred on the Government. The power conferred on the Government is one of controlling the religious institutions to which the H. R. E. Act applies. The whole object of the Act is to ensure better administration and governance of such religious institutions. Such a wide power has been conferred on the Government under S. 99 to ensure this objective. It is necessary to note that under S. 99 (1), even the decision of the trustee is liable to be interfered with by the Government. The actions of the trustees would be those pertaining to the administration and governance of the religious institutions. Such a wide power has been conferred on the Government under S. 99 to ensure this objective. It is necessary to note that under S. 99 (1), even the decision of the trustee is liable to be interfered with by the Government. The actions of the trustees would be those pertaining to the administration and governance of the religious institutions. It is not possible to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that because the power is required to be exercised by the Government in a manner in which quasi-judicial power is exercised, that the religious institutions governed by the h. R. E. Act are not under the control of the State Government. ( 11 ) IT was urged that if the control is of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, it is really no control within the meaning of the expression occurring in S. 107 of the Act. I do not find any warrant for giving such a restrictive meaning to the expression 'control' occurring in S. 107. The word 'control' an definied in Corpus Juris Secundum is wide enough to include within its ambit the control by a judicial or a quasi-judicial process. In the context in which the expression 'control' occurs, it is not possible to give it a narrow meaning so as to exclude from its ambit the judicial or quasi-judicial control. The expression 'control' which occurs in S. 56 of the Mysore Stamp Act (2 f 1900) came up for interpretation in the decision of this Court reported in C. R. Gopala Setty v. Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal, (1963)1 Mys. L. J. 175. This is what this Court has observed while construing the expression 'control' occurring in S. 56 (1) of the Mysore Stamp act, 1900: "the only question, therefore, which remains to be considered is whether the chief Controlling Revenue Authority had the power to revise the order made by the Sub-Division Officer in this case. If he had, it follows that under S. 56 (1) of the Stamp Act since the Chief controlling Revenue Authority had the power to revise that order and that power resided in the Revenue Appellate Tribunal when it disposed of the revision petition, it was not possible for the Revenue appellate Tribunal to decline to exercise that jurisdiction. If he had, it follows that under S. 56 (1) of the Stamp Act since the Chief controlling Revenue Authority had the power to revise that order and that power resided in the Revenue Appellate Tribunal when it disposed of the revision petition, it was not possible for the Revenue appellate Tribunal to decline to exercise that jurisdiction. S. 56 (1) of the Mysore Stamp Act, 1900 reads: "the powers exercisable by Deputy Commissioner under chapter IV and Chapter V (and under clause (a) of the first proviso to S. 26) shall in all cases be subject to the control of the chief Controlling Revenue Authority. . . . . . " the order made by the Sub-Division Officer in this case was made under S. 40 (1) (b) of the Act which is contained in Chapter IV. The power exercised by the Sub-Division Officer under S. 40 (1) (b) was therefore subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue authority. The question is whether such control which was exercisable by the then Controlling Revenue Authority included also the power to revise an order made under any or the provisions contained in Chapters IV and V of the Act. The question whether the Chief controlling Revenue Authority possessed under S. 56 (1) (b) power to revise an order made by a Deputy Commissioner under Chapter IV and V would depend upon the interpretation to be placed upon the word 'control' occurring in S. 56 (1) of the Act. The word 'control' is an expression of wide and ambiguous import and its ordinary meaning is the power to regulate, to govern, to have under command and authority and the power of superintendence. But that word has to be given the meaning which should properly be given to it having regard to the enactment in which it occurs taking into consideration the purpose, the scheme and the intendment of the statutory provision in which it is contained. So tested, it seems to me, particularly having regard to the words "in all cases'" occurring in sub-sec. (1) of S. 56, that the word 'control' occurring in that sub-section not only has reference to administrative control which may be exercised by the Chief Controlling revenue Authority but also to the judicial control which he may exercise in the exercise of jurisdiction which may be compared to the revisional jurisdiction of a Tribunal. (1) of S. 56, that the word 'control' occurring in that sub-section not only has reference to administrative control which may be exercised by the Chief Controlling revenue Authority but also to the judicial control which he may exercise in the exercise of jurisdiction which may be compared to the revisional jurisdiction of a Tribunal. " this Court while construing the expression 'control' occurring in S. 56 (1) of the Mysore Stamp Act, 1900, came to the conclusion that the said expression includes not only administrative control, but also judicial control analogous to the revisional jurisdiction. ( 12 ) FROM the context in which the expressopm 'control' occurs in s. 107 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, I am of the opinion that it embraces within its ambit not only administrative or executive control, but also control of judicial or quasi-judicial character. It is therefore not possible to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that because the control is of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, it is not a control within the meaning of that expression occurring in s. 107 of the Land Reforms Act. ( 13 ) HAVING regard to the scheme of the H. R. E. Act, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the religious institutions to which the HRE. Act applies, are under the control of the State Government. Therefore, the petitioners in all these cases are entitled to claim exemption from all the provisions of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, except S. 8 in view of S. 107 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961. The findings of the trial Courts to the effect that these religious institutions are not under the control of the State Government and, therefore, not entitled to claim exemption under S. 107 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, are set aside. ( 14 ) THE trial courts have further come to the conclusion that as no fair rent has been fixed under S. 8 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, the suits for recovery of arrears of rent are premature and not maintainable. In the first instance, it is necessary to note that S. 8 of the Act does not contemplate fixation of any fair rent. S. 8 speaks of the maximum rent payable by the tenant. In the first instance, it is necessary to note that S. 8 of the Act does not contemplate fixation of any fair rent. S. 8 speaks of the maximum rent payable by the tenant. A procedure has been prescribed for determining the maximum rent payable by the tenant as well as its cash equivalent. The average yield is required to be determined under subsection (3) of S. 8 of the Act and is also required to be published in the prescribed manner. It is the average yield thus determined and published that has to be taken into consideration for determining the rent payable by the tenant under S. 8. The cash equivalent is to be determined on the basis of the prices notified by the prescribed authority under S. 9 of the act. If, in any case, the average yield is not determined and published in the prescribed manner, or the cash equivalent is not notified as required by S. 9 of the Act. it does not mean that the suit of the landlord for recovery of arrears of rent is either premature or not maintainable. The suit has to be entertained by the court even if the average yield is not determined as required by S. 8 (3) or even when the prices of the produce have not been notified by the appropriate authority as required by S. 9 of the act. In such a case, the court may have to wait for the appropriate determination in that behalf to enable it to pass a decree. But, merely because there is no determination as mentioned above, the suits cannot be dismissed either on the ground that they are not maintainable or on the ground that they are premature. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the orders passed by the lower courts in all those cases directing the return of the plaints for the presentation to the proper forum are hereby set aside. The trial courts are directed to hear and dispose of the suits on merits and in the light of the observations made in the Course of this order. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .