JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - In these three writ petitions an order of the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad dated October 31, 1968 is challenged. By this order the Commissioner has confirmed a sale, held in proceedings for recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue. 2. The Maheshwari Devi, Jute Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Jute Mills) was in arrears of the following dues : Sales Tax Rs. 8,14,660.17 Provident Fund Contributions Rs. 9,37,163.56 Employees State Insurance Dues. Rs. 2,54,112.67 Total Rs. 20,05,936.40 In respect of these arrears certificates were sent to the Collector, Kanpur, to recover the amounts as arrears of land revenue. On receipt of these certificates the Collector on March 3, 1966 issued a warrant of attachment of certain movables belonging to the Jute Mills. On April 25, 1966 the Collector issued an attachment warrant in respect of the immovable properties of the Jute Mills. On April 26, 1966 the attachment was affected. 3. The National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (herein- after referred to as the NIDC) had advanced a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- to the Jute Mills under an English Mortgage dated July 20, 1961. Under a second English Mortgage dated June 27, 1964 it advanced a further sum of Rs. 9.5 lacs. At the time the properties of the Jute Mills were attached the amount due under the two mortgages was Rs. 13,31,186.28. On June 8. 1966 the NIDC filed an objection before the Collector purporting to be one under Order XXI, Rule 58, C. P. C. asserting that it had a first charge over the properties mortgaged and that the Government dues could only be recovered after the payment of the dues of the NIDC. The prayer in this objection was : "It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to direct the release of the properties attached from the purported attachment and to hold that the said properties are not liable to attachment for the payment of the Government clues, unless the dues of the objector-claimant are paid". On September 15, 1966. The prayer in this objection was : "It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to direct the release of the properties attached from the purported attachment and to hold that the said properties are not liable to attachment for the payment of the Government clues, unless the dues of the objector-claimant are paid". On September 15, 1966. the Provident Fund Commissioner filed an additional written-statement to the objection of the NIDC which reads thus : "That the opposite party has no objection to the prior claim of the National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., but surplus after satisfying the claim of the Corporation may be adjusted towards the Provident Funds dues outstanding against the M. D. Jute Mills Ltd. Kanpur." A reply to this objection was filed by the Sales Tax Commissioner on November 2, 1966, The last paragraph of this reply is the following words : "That without prejudice to what has been stated above it is submitted that the property under attachment may be sold by the Hon'ble Court and the opposite party no. 2 (Sales Tax Officer) will have no objection to the prior claim of the National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. but the surplus after satisfying the claim of the Corporation be adjusted towards the sales tax clues outstanding against the N. D. Jute Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur." The Employees State Insurance Corporation also stated before the Collector that it would abide by his decision in this matter. Apparently no objections or written-statements were filed by the Jute Mills against the objections of the NIDC, On November 3, 1966 the NIDC filed another application before the Collector praying "Without prejudice to the rights of the National Industrial Development Corporation in terms of the mortgage deeds dated 20-7-1961 and 27-6-1964, it has no objection, if the properties attached be sold, subject to prior charge of the said Corporation, by the Collector and whatever monies are realised from sale of the properties or received otherwise shall first be utilised towards the payment of the dues of the Corporation". After considering the objection and the replies the Collector on November 7, 1966 passed an order, the operative portion whereof is as follows : "In view of what has been said by the learned counsel on behalf of the NIDC Ltd. and on behalf of the opposite parties 1 to 4, I hold that the properties attached could be sold but the claim of NIDC will have priority which would get effect in order of the receipt of recovery certificate of the respective dues by the Collector from Departments concerned". The operative portion of this order is not happily worded and much of the difficulty in this case has arisen on that account. 4. On January 24, 1967, the immovable properties which had been attached were valued at a sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- by the Government Expert. Thereafter a sale proclamation was issued for the sale of the immovable properties. A copy of the sale proclamation is annexure E to the writ petition no. 387 of 1969. The proclamation purports to be one wade under Order XXI Rule 66 C. P. C. and is in Form No. 29 of Appendix E to the first Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. In the schedule of properties at the end of the proclamation in the column for details of encumbrances to which the property is liable the mortgage debt of the NIDC was specified-Principal Rs. 13,31,186.28 with interest. The United Auctioneers, Kanpur, were appointed auctioneers to sell the properties of the Jute Mills. The auctioneer issued a general letter, a copy of which is Annexure I to the writ petition no. 357 of 1969, regarding the sale of these properties inviting purchasers to the auction. On September 27, 1967 the auction was held and the immovable properties were sold to Messers Jaipur Udyog Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- and the movable properties for Rs. 15,000/-. Thereafter the Collector reported the sale of the immovable properties to the Commissioner for confirmation. The NIDC filed an application before the Commissioner drawing his attention to the order of the Collector dated November 7, 196d and pointed out that the NIDC was entitled to be paid first out of the sale amount realised. 15,000/-. Thereafter the Collector reported the sale of the immovable properties to the Commissioner for confirmation. The NIDC filed an application before the Commissioner drawing his attention to the order of the Collector dated November 7, 196d and pointed out that the NIDC was entitled to be paid first out of the sale amount realised. By this application it prayed that the Com- missioner may he pleased to pass an order for the payment of the dues of the NIDC out of the sale proceeds deposited by M/S Jaipur Udyog Ltd. If the sale was confirmed, on October 23, 1967 the Jute Mills filed an application before the Commissioner pointing out certain irregularities alleged to have been committed in the sale and in the sale 'proclamation' and prayed that the sale be set aside. It also alleged that the properties had been sold for a grossly inadequate consideration. On October 26, 1957 the Employees State Insurance Corporation also filed an application for the setting aside of the sale. In this application it was alleged that the sale had been affected for a grossly inadequate consideration and that after paying the dues of the NIDC which had a prior claim no amount would be left to be paid to the Employees State Insurance Corporation. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner also filed an application on similar grounds for setting aside the sale. On December 1. 1967 the Sales Tax Officer also filed an application on similar ground for setting aside the sale. It appears that at some subsequent stage the applications made by the Employees State Insurance Corporation, the Provident Fund Commissioner and the Sales Tax Officer were withdrawn and they took the stand that they would have no objection if the sales were confirmed subject to all the encumbrances and claims of the secured creditors on the properties in question and the Government claims were paid out of the sale proceeds. By his order doted October 31, 1968 the Commissioner rejected the application of the Jute Mills for setting aside the sale, holding that no substantial irregularity or mistake in publishing and conducting the sale had been established. The Commissioner further held that the immovable properties had been sold subject to the encumbrances. of the NIDC. By his order doted October 31, 1968 the Commissioner rejected the application of the Jute Mills for setting aside the sale, holding that no substantial irregularity or mistake in publishing and conducting the sale had been established. The Commissioner further held that the immovable properties had been sold subject to the encumbrances. of the NIDC. He further held that the order of the Collector dated November 7, 1966 was without jurisdiction and illegal and that the NIDC could not be paid out of the sales proceeds, and that the NIDC could recover its dues by enforcing its mortgages. He further held that the properties were worth about Rs. 40,00,000/- and that since they were sold for Rs. 20,00,000/- subject to the encumbrances of the NIDC the sale could not be said to be for an inadequate amount. The NIDC has filed writ petition no. 344 of 1969 challenging the order of the Commissioner. It feels aggrieved by that portion of the order which says that the dues of the NIDC cannot be paid out of the sales proceeds. The Jaipur Udyog Ltd., the auction purchaser, has filed writ petition no. 357 of 1969 against the order of the Commissioner. The grievance of the auction purchaser is against the finding of the Commissioner that the auction sale was subject to the encumbrances in favour of the NIDC. The contention of the auction purchaser is that the sale was free of all encumbrances. The Jute Mills has filed writ petition no. 387 of 1969 against the order of the Commissioner refusing to set aside the sale and confirming the sale. Since the questions raised in the three writ petitions are inter connected the three petitions will be disposed of by a common judgment. 5. The NIDC and the auction purchaser contend that the order of the Collector dated November 7, 1966 was a valid and binding order and that the auction sale was free of encumbrances. They have further contended that to view of the order of the Collector the NIDC was en- titled to priority in the payment of its dues out of the sale proceeds. They do not challenge the confirmation of the sale. The objections of the NIDC and of the auction purchaser are opposed by the Sales Tax Officer, the Provident Fund Commissioner, and the Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation. They do not challenge the confirmation of the sale. The objections of the NIDC and of the auction purchaser are opposed by the Sales Tax Officer, the Provident Fund Commissioner, and the Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation. In its writ petition the Jute Mills has challenged the order of confirmation of the sale and has contended that the sale should have been set aside as there were irregularities in the publication and conduct of the sale. It has supported the finding of the Commissioner that the sale was subject to the mortgages of the NIDC. This petition is opposed by the auction purchaser. The Sales Tax Officer, the Provident Fund Commissioner, and the Regional Director of the Employees State Insurance Corporation were not made parties to this writ petition and a preliminary objection has been raised that the petition is not maintainable as necessary parties have not been impleaded. 6. The main question which has been argued before me is whether the sale was subject to the mortgages of the NIDC or was free of these encumbrances. The answer to this question depends upon the provisions of the law applicable to the recovery proceedings and on the legality as well as the interpretation of the order of the Collector dated November 7, 1966. Before the Commissioner a controversy was raised whether the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, or the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, was applicable to the recovery proceedings and the Commissioner has held that the former Act was applicable. Counsel for all the parties before me have accepted that the Commissioner's view in this regard is correct. I am therefore, relieved of the necessity of entering into this controversy. 7. The relevant provisions of the Land Revenue Act may now be examined. The provisions regarding the collection of land revenue are contained in Chapter VIII from Section 141 to Section 188. Section 146 lays clown the various processes for recovery of arrears of revenue. Clause (g) of sub-Sec. (1) provides for the sale of the specific areas of patti or whole Mohal in respect of which the arrear is due. Clause (h) provides for the attachment and sale of other immovable property of the defaulter. The detailed provisions for recovery by sale of immovable property are contained in Sections 160 to 165. Clause (g) of sub-Sec. (1) provides for the sale of the specific areas of patti or whole Mohal in respect of which the arrear is due. Clause (h) provides for the attachment and sale of other immovable property of the defaulter. The detailed provisions for recovery by sale of immovable property are contained in Sections 160 to 165. Section 160 provides for the sal., of the area, patti or Mohal in respect of which the default has been made Section 161 (1) provides that land sold under Section 160 shall be sold free of encumbrances. Sub-Sec. (2) makes certain exceptions to sub- Sec. (1). Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 161 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Sec. (1) the authority sanctioning the sale may, direct that it be made subject to such interests or rights in the land cleared by the proprietor or any person through whom he claims, as he thinks fit. It follows that under Section 161 the land may be sold either free from encumbrance or subject to encumbrance. Section 152 provides for the sale of immovable property of the defaulter other than the land in respect of which the default has been made. The proviso to sub-Sec. (1) lays down that where such property is sold the provisions of Section 161 shall not apply to such sale. Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 162 provides that sums of money recoverable as arrears of revenue but not due in respect of any specific land may be recovered by process under this section against any immovable property of the defaulter. It is by virtue of this provision that The recovery proceedings by way of the sale of the immovable property of the Jude Mills were taken by the Collector. Section 163 provides that the Collector shall issue a proclamation of the intended sale, specifying the property to be sold, and the revenue (if any) assessed thereon, the arrears for which it is to be sold, the time and place of sale, whether or not the land is to be sold free from encumbrances under Section 161, and any other particulars the Collector may think necessary. The next relevant Section is Section 171 which provides that every sale of land or other immovable property under the Land Revenue Act shall be reported by the Collector to the Commissioner. The next relevant Section is Section 171 which provides that every sale of land or other immovable property under the Land Revenue Act shall be reported by the Collector to the Commissioner. Section 172 makes provision for setting aside of the sale on the deposit of the arrears etc. Section 173 provides for the making of an application to set aside a sale on the ground of material irregularity or mistakes in publishing or conducting the sale where substantial injury has been caused by reason of such irregularity or mistake. Section 174 empowers the Commissioner to either confirm the sale or to set it aside. Section 179, which lays down how the sale proceeds are to be applied, is in these words : "179. Application of proceeds of sale-When a sale of land under this Act has been confirmed, the proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the first place to the payment of any arrears, including costs incurred for the recovery thereof, clue to the Government from the defaulter at the date of the confirmation of the sale, whether the arrears are of revenue, or of sums is recoverable as arrears of revenue; and in the second place, if the sale took place for the recovery of an amount recoverable was an arrear of revenue, but not clue to Government, to the payment of that amount including costs as aforesaid and the surplus (if any) shall be paid to the person whose land has been sold or, if the land sold was held in shares, then to the co-sharers collectively, or according to the amount of their recorded interests, at the discretion of the Collector". It thus appears that the provisions for the sale of immovable property, though not identical with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are similar to those provisions. 8. Under the Code of Civil Procedure the law is quite clear as to when a sale will be subject to an encumbrance and when it will be free of encumbrance. Generally speaking, if there is a valid and subsisting mortgage on the attached property then the sale will be subject to the mortgage, except when the court has the power either to wipe out or to liquidate the mortgage and to direct the sale from encumbrance and does se in express words. Under Or. Generally speaking, if there is a valid and subsisting mortgage on the attached property then the sale will be subject to the mortgage, except when the court has the power either to wipe out or to liquidate the mortgage and to direct the sale from encumbrance and does se in express words. Under Or. XXI, R. 62, C. P. C. the court may determine whether a mortgage on the attached property is subsisting or not, and if it makes such a determination it is binding on the mortgages and the purchaser if no suit challenging the order is filed within the period of limitation. It is only when the court determines under this rule that the mortgage is not subsisting that it can sell the property free of that mortgage. In a proclamation under Or. XXI, Rule 66, C. P. C. the court is not required to determine whether the mortgage is subsisting or not, or to state therein whether the sale is subject to the mortgage or is free of it. If there is any mortgage on the property attached then it is required to be shown in the sale proclamation. If the mortgage is valid and subsisting the sale will be subject to it whether it is shown in the sale proclamation or not. The only effect of not showing the mortgage in the sale proclamation is that the person affected may make an application to get the sale set aside on ground of irregularity or mistake in the publication of the sale. But if the sale is confirmed that it will be subject to the mortgage. Sections 282 and 287 of the old Code which are equivalent to Rules 62 and 68 of Order XXI of the present Code came up for interpretation before a Bench of this Court in Shib Kunwar Singh v. Sheo Prasad Singh, I.L.R. 1928 Alld. 418. The learned Judges observed. "As for the second point, it is clear that the Court did not sell the property subject to a mortgage as contemplated by Section 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All that it did was to mention in the sale proclamation the fact that there was an alleged mortgage on the property. It was not therefore incumbent on the judgment-debtor to bring a suit under Section 283 to have it declared that no mortgage existed on the property. All that it did was to mention in the sale proclamation the fact that there was an alleged mortgage on the property. It was not therefore incumbent on the judgment-debtor to bring a suit under Section 283 to have it declared that no mortgage existed on the property. The object of specifying the mortgage in the sale proclamation was to give to intending purchasers all the information which it was necessary for them to knew in respect of the property advertised for sale. The fact that the applicant purchased the property with notice of the alleged mortgage does not estop him from questioning the mortgage. The Code of Civil Procedure clearly makes a distinction between a case in which property is sold subject to a mortgage and a case in which notice of an alleged mortgage is given in the proclamation of sale. The former is provided for by Section 282 and the latter by Section 287. In the former case the court after being satisfied of the existence of the mortgage sells only the judgment-debtor's right of redemption, so that the purchaser does not acquire any greater rights than those of redeeming the mortgage. In the latter he buys the property with notice of the mortgage and subject to such risk as the notice might involve. The court does not decide whether the mortgage subsists or not. If there is in reality a subsisting mortgage the purchaser has to redeem it. If, on the other hand, the mortgage specified in the proclamation of sale is a fictitious mortgage, or did not subsist at the date of the sale by reason of its having been previously discharged by payment, the purchaser acquires the property free from liability for the mortgage." Therefore, as earlier stated, if there is any valid and subsisting mortgage on the attached property, and the court either has, no power to wipe out or liquidate the mortgage and sell the property free from mortgage or if it has the power it does riot expressly state in the sale proclamation that the property will be sold free from the mortgage then the sale must be deemed to be subject to the mortgage. Though there is no provision like Order XXI, Rule 62, C. P. C. in the Land Revenue Act there also the position is the same as stated above so far as the sale of immovable property other than land covered by Section 160 is concerned. 9. The contention of the NIDC and the auction purchaser is that the Collector had the power, in the present case, to liquidate the mortgages of the NIDC, to sell the immovable property of the Jute Mills free Dom the mortgages of the NIDC and to direct that the dues of the NIDC be paid first out of the sale proceeds. There is nothing in the provisions of the Land Revenue Act to support this contention but reliance is placed on the provisions of Section 69 (1) (a) which is said to confer this power is in these words : "69 (1) A mortgagee, or any person acting on his behalf, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, have power to sell or concur in selling the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, in default of payment of the mortgage-money, without the intervention of the court, in the following cases and not others, namely : (a) Where the mortgage is an English mortgage, and neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee is a Hindu, Mohammadan or a Buddhist or a member of any other race, sect, tribe or class from time to time, specified in this behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette ; x x x x 10. This provision empowers an English mortgagee to sell by private sale or to concur in selling the mortgaged property. There is no doubt that this provision empowered the NIDC to sell the mortgaged properties of the Jute Mills by private sale to concur in selling these properties. The NIDC did not itself sell the mortgaged property by any private sale. It is urged that the NIDC when it filed its objection on June 8, 1966 to the attachment of the properties of the Jute Mills and tiled the application dated November 3, 1966 agreeing to the sale by the Collector provided the sale proceeds were utilised first towards the pay ment of its dues it "concurred" in selling the mortgaged property will- in the meaning of Section 69(1). The question which arises for consideration is whether this power of concurring in selling the mortgaged property conferred by Section 69(l) upon an English mortgagee can be exercised in a court. sale or in a sale in proceedings for the recovery 61 arrears of land revenue. The Commissioner has held that Section 69 is not applicable to recovery proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, From the language of Section 69(1) it does not appear that this power of concurring in the sale of the mortgaged property can be exercised in respect of a court sale or a sale in recovery proceedings under the Land Revenue Act. Leaving out unnecessary words Section 69(l) (a) reads thus : "A mortgagee ...... shall ...... have power to sell or concur in selling the mortgaged property ...... without intervention of the court ...... where the mortgage is an English mortgage". It thus appears that the power to sell as well as the power to concur in selling the mortgaged property is a power which is to be exercised without the intervention of the court. It is difficult to accept that when an executing court is putting some property to sale in execution of a decree it can be called upon by an English mortgagee, who is not a party to the decree or execution proceedings, to realise its dues also by the sale of the mortgaged property, and to satisfy his dues first before satisfying the decree of the decree-holder. Likewise, it is difficult to accept that where the Collector is selling some immovable property for realising some dues as arrears of land revenue in respect of which certificates have been transmitted to him, he can be called upon by a person who holds an English mortgage in respect of the attached property to sell the property for his benefit also and to first pay his dues out of the sale proceeds before satisfying the debts in respect of which the certificates were issued to him. There is nothing in the provisions of Section 69 itself to support the contention that the power to concur in the selling of the mortgaged property can be exercised in a court sale or in a sale for recovery of arrears of revenue. Whatever indication there is, is against this contention. There is nothing in the provisions of Section 69 itself to support the contention that the power to concur in the selling of the mortgaged property can be exercised in a court sale or in a sale for recovery of arrears of revenue. Whatever indication there is, is against this contention. Even if one were to accept the contention that the power to concur in the sale of the mortgaged property under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act can be exercised in respect of a court sale the provisions of the Land Revenue Act negative the exercise of this right in a sale of immovable property thereunder for the recovery of arrears of land revenue. Section 179 which has been quoted above clearly lays down how the sale proceeds are to be applied. It specifically lays down that the sale proceeds are first to be applied towards the payment of the dues for the recovery of which the proceedings were started and Ill? surplus, if any, is to be paid to the defaulter. Section 180 further provides that the surplus shall not, except under an order of a Civil or Revenue Court, be paid to any creditor of the person whose land has been sold nor shall it (except under like order) be retained by the Collector. Sees. 179 and 180 thus bar the Collector from paying any amount out of the sale proceeds to any creditor of the defaulter other then the creditor as for whose clues the recovery proceedings were initiated and make it incumbent upon the Collector to pay, out of the sale proceeds only the dues in respect of which the recovery proceedings were taken and to refund the surplus to the defaulter. In view of these provisions it is not open to the Collector to sell the immovable property for the realisation of the dues of any other creditor or to pay him any amount out of the sale proceeds. It, therefore, follows that the provisions of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be availed of for concurring in a sale by the Collector in recovery proceedings under the Land Revenue Act. That being so the view taken by the Commissioner is correct. 11. It, therefore, follows that the provisions of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be availed of for concurring in a sale by the Collector in recovery proceedings under the Land Revenue Act. That being so the view taken by the Commissioner is correct. 11. Since Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the Collector did not have any power to liquidate or wipe out the mortgages of the NIDC and consequently he had no power to sell the property free of these mortgages. The order of the Collector dated November 7, 1966 is very unhappily worded and the utmost that one can make out of it is that it decides two things, viz. (1) that the attached properties could be sold, even though they were mortgaged to the NIDC and (2) that the claim of the NIDC will have priority over the Government dues. So far as (2) goes, admittedly a secured creditor has priority over unsecured dues of the Government or of other persons and the order merely reiterates this. The application of the NIDC of November 3, 1966, inter alia, prayed that the sale should be subject to its prior charge. The order of the Collector does not expressly or by necessary implication direct that the sale shall be free of the mortgages. It does not show that the Collector was even considered this question. There is no statement in the sale, proclamation that the property would be sold free of encumbrances. On the other hand, it clearly specifies the mortgages of the NIDC. There is thus no basis whatsoever for the argument that the sale was free of the mortgages of the NIDC. It was contended by the Auction Purchaser before the Commissioner that at the time of the sale the Auction and the Sale Officer had made it clear that the sale was to he free from all encumbrances. The Commissioner after examining the material before him, for and against this contention, gave a finding that no such clarification was, in fact, made. This finding is binding upon the auction purchaser as it is based Upon relevant material and is not vitiated by any error of law. The Commissioner after examining the material before him, for and against this contention, gave a finding that no such clarification was, in fact, made. This finding is binding upon the auction purchaser as it is based Upon relevant material and is not vitiated by any error of law. That apart, the Auctioneer, or the Sale Offence, appointed by the Collector, did not have any power to add to the conditions of the sale mentioned in the sale proclamation issued by the Collector. For the reasons given above, the contentions of the NIDC and of the auction purchaser that the sale was free of the mortgages of the N. I. D. C. and that the N. I. D. C. was entitled to the payment of its debt out of the sale proceeds have to be rejected. 12. In the writ petition filed by the Jute Mills, the only question, which arises for consideration, is whether the finding of the Commissioner that there was no substantial irregularity or mistake in publishing and conducting the sale is vitiated by any manifest error of law. No such error has been pointed out to me by the learned counsel for the Jute Mills. What he has attempted to do, is to attack the findings of the Commissioner on merits. Since the findings are riot vitiated by any manifest error of law, they cannot be challenged on merits in a writ petition cinder Art. 226 of the Constitution. The main grievance of the Jute Mills is that there was some conflict between the order of the Col- lector dated November 7, 1966, and the sale proclamation on account of which there was uncertainty whether the sale was to be held subject to the mortgages of the N. I. D. C. or free of them and that this uncertainty has resulted in the property being sold for a grossly inadequate price. I have already held that the Collector did not by his order dated November 7, 1966 either decide or direct that the sale would be free of the mortgages of the NIDC. The sale proclamation specifically set out the debt of the NIDC as an encumbrance on the property to be sold which clearly learnt that the sale was subject to the mortgages. There was no justification on basis for the alleged uncertainty in the minds of the contending purchasers. The sale proclamation specifically set out the debt of the NIDC as an encumbrance on the property to be sold which clearly learnt that the sale was subject to the mortgages. There was no justification on basis for the alleged uncertainty in the minds of the contending purchasers. They had only to see the sale proclamation for the terms and conditions of the sale and that made it quite clear that the sale was subject to the mortgages of the NIDC. So far as the sale price is concerned the Commissioner has held that the property was sold for an adequate price. On the material produced before him he has given a finding that the valuation of the property was Rs. 40,00,000/-. This finding is binding on the parties as it is not vitiated by any error of law. On this finding the Commissioner was fully justified ill holding that the price fetched at the auction was adequate as the sale was subject to the mortgages of the NIDC. There is thus no substance even on merits in the contention of the Jute Mills. 13. Learned counsel for the Jute Mills also contended that the sale proclamation was not drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Section 163 of the Land Revenue Act. According to the learned counsel Section 163 requires that every sale proclamation must specifically state whether the property is to be sold subject to or free of encumbrances. This contention does not seem to be correct. What Section 163 requires to be specified is "whether or not the land is to be sold free of encumbrances under Section 161." This provision applies only to the sale of agricultural land and not to the sale of other immovable property. Since under Section 161 the Collector has to sell the land free of encumbrances in cases covered by Sub-Sec. (1) and subject to the encumbrances in cases covered by sub-Secs. (2) and (3) he is required to mention specifically in the sale proclamation whether or not the: land is to be sold free of encumbrances. There is not such requirement in the case of a sale of other properties, obviously because the Collector has no power to sell those properties free of encumbrances if there are valid and subsisting encumbrances thereon. This complaint of the Jute Mills is also without substance. There is not such requirement in the case of a sale of other properties, obviously because the Collector has no power to sell those properties free of encumbrances if there are valid and subsisting encumbrances thereon. This complaint of the Jute Mills is also without substance. Learned counsel also urged that the letter issued by the Auctioneer, a copy of which is Annexure F to the writ petition no. 387 of 1969 filed by the Jute Mills, did not give a proper description of the properties to be sold and on account of this many intending purchasers did not turn up. Any infirmity in the letter issued by the Auctioneer cannot amount to an irregularity or mistake in the publication or conduct of the sale. The irregularity or mistake contemplated under Section 173 of the Land Revenue Act is one committed by the Col- lector in publishing the sale proclamation or in the actual conduct of the sale. There being no irregularity or mistake in the sale proclamation or in the actual sale proceedings the Jute Mills was not entitled to ask the Commissioner to set aside the sale on the ground of the alleged irregularity or mistake in the notice issued by the Auctioneer. Learned counsel also urged that no sale proclamation whatsoever was issued in respect of the sale of the movable property and, therefore, the sale of the movable property was wholly illegal. In the present case we are not concerned with the sale of the movable property. The sale of movable property is not required to be confirmed by the Commissioner. Section 171 of the Land Revenue Act requires the Collector to report to the Commissioner every sale of land or other immovable property only and the Commissioner is required to confirm or set aside such a sale. In the present case the Collector had, by his letter elated November 8, 1967, (Annexure J to the writ Petition no. 357 of 1969) reported only the sale of the immovable property and the Commissioner has, by his order, confirmed the sale of the immovable property. Even if the Jute Mills has a legitimate grievance in respect of the sale of movable property that cannot be looked into in these writ petitions. There, thus, appears to be no substance in any of the contentions raised by the Jute Mills. Even if the Jute Mills has a legitimate grievance in respect of the sale of movable property that cannot be looked into in these writ petitions. There, thus, appears to be no substance in any of the contentions raised by the Jute Mills. The writ petition of the Jute Mills must fail also for the reason that the Sales Tax Officer, the Provident Fund Commissioner and the Regional Director of the Employees State Insurance Corporation who are necessary parties have not been impleaded in this writ petition. If this writ petition were allowed then the persons who would he most affected would be these three. 14. The three writ petitions are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of these cases there will be no order as to costs.