JUDGMENT B.P. Jha, J. The petitioner has moved this Court against his conviction in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The prosecution case is that on the 10th December, 1964, Rash Bihari Rai (P.W.3) a Civil Court peon, had gone to village Jadia, within Tribeniganj police station, in the district of Saharsa, to execute a writ of attachment of moveables of the petitioner, in execution of money decree of Jai Narain Yadav, issued by the Subordinate Judge. The peon (P.W.3) attached four heads of cattle of the petitioner. In the meantime hulla was raised and thereupon the petitioner rushed towards the peon (P.W.3) with a Dabia. He, however, did not assault P.W.3, when the latter disclosed that he was a peon of the Civil Court. It is said that the petitioner assaulted Jai Narain Yadav, the decree holder. In this connection two case were instituted, one by Jai Narain Yadav before the Police by lodging a first information in respect of the offences under section 324 and 324/l09 of the Indian Penal Code, and the other by the Subordinate Judge, Madhipura, who filed a complaint on the same facts before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Supaul, in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code. The facts of both the cases are the same and most of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution in both the cases are the same. 3. The case instituted on the basis of the information lodged before the police by Jai Narain Yadav was tried by Shri Jagdish Narain Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Supaul, who by his judgment and order dated the 26th June, 1967, acquitted the petitioner on the ground mentioned in paragraph 9 of the judgment, where he held as follows: "9. On a careful scrutiny of the entire facts, circumstances and the evidence on record I am satisfied that the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the guilt against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. That being so, the accused persons are acquitted u/s 251A (11) Cr.P.C. They are forthwith discharged from their bail bonds. " 4. Subsequently, the petitioner was tried on the same facts by another Magistrate on the basis of the complaint filed by the Subordinate Judge. That being so, the accused persons are acquitted u/s 251A (11) Cr.P.C. They are forthwith discharged from their bail bonds. " 4. Subsequently, the petitioner was tried on the same facts by another Magistrate on the basis of the complaint filed by the Subordinate Judge. Both the courts below convicted the petitioner in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the magistrate while trying the petitioner in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code was precluded from receiving the evidence to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by Shri Jagdish Narain Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, First class, Supaul, in his judgment dated the 26th June 1967 in the earlier trial. In this connection he relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Manipur Administration v. Thokchem, Bira Singh1 and Lalta and others v. The State of U.P.2 In 1970 Supreme Court 1381, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows : "Where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding of fact has been reached in favour of accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of section 403 (2) Criminal P. C. Section 403 does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue estoppel." 6. Rule of issue of estoppel is quite different from the rule of res judicata. Section 403 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner could have been tried subsequently in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code in accordance with the provisions of section 403 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a trial is not barred. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner could have been tried subsequently in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code in accordance with the provisions of section 403 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a trial is not barred. On the basis of the rule of estoppel, the prosecution will be precluded from leading evidence to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence had already been led and specific finding recorded on it in an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction. The rule of estoppel will only preclude the receiving of the evidence in the subsequent trial. The rule of estoppel does not prevent the subsequent trial. It prevents the receiving of evidence in the subsequent trial. In other words, in order to apply the rule of estoppel, the facts of both the cases must be the same, The object of the rule of estoppel is that a finding of face arrived at by a competent Court on an earlier occasion will not be disturbed in the subsequent trial. In other words, the verdict of acquittal is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. 7. In the present case, the rule of estoppel will apply because on the same facts the trial court on an earlier occasion held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. This finding of fact would not be disturbed in the subsequent trial of the petitioner in respect of the offence under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code and the prosecution will be precluded from leading evidence to that effect. The fact in issue in both cases was that the petitioner offered resistance to the seizure of the cattle by the civil court peon. In the earlier trial, the petitioner was acquitted. In this circumstance, I acquit the petitioner on the ground that the evidence regarding the fact that the petitioner offered resistance to the Civil Court peon (P.W.3) in seizing the cattle was inadmissible in evidence in view of the earlier verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court. Reception of such evidence was barred in subsequent trial in view of the principle of issue estoppel. 8. The application is, accordingly allowed and conviction and the sentence imposed on the petitioner are set aside. Application allowed.