JUDGMENT G. S. Lal, J. - Three writ petitions arising in connection with proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 were disposed of by a learned Single judge of this Court by means of a common judgment. Writ Petition No. 7 of 1966 filed by the appellants in this special appeal was dismissed. The other two writ petitions were allowed in part and the Deputy Director of Consolidation, whose order in revision was partly quashed, was directed to rehear the revision and decide it in the light of the observations in the judgment. The parties who had filed those two writ petitions or who were directly affected by the allowing of those two writ petitions in part have not challenged the order by filing any special appeal. The petitioners of writ petition No. 7 of 1966 have, however, come up in special appeal and reiterated the grounds on which the writ petition was filed to question the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 2. On the death of one Kazim Husain certain persons made conflicting claims to his estate. They secured an award which gave some right to each set of the contestants. The appellants were no parties to the award. In the mutation proceedings the concerned authorities upto the Board of Revenue did not accept the rights given by the award but made mutation in favour of the present appellants. Before those proceedings became final one suit was however filed by respondents Nos. 7 and 8 Smt. Jaddan and Nazakat Husain. The villages in which the property in suit lay came under consolidation operations. The mutation being already in favour of the appellants, their names were recorded in the preliminary records prepared during the consolidation operations. Objections were however taken by all those claimants who had secured the award. 7 and 8 Smt. Jaddan and Nazakat Husain. The villages in which the property in suit lay came under consolidation operations. The mutation being already in favour of the appellants, their names were recorded in the preliminary records prepared during the consolidation operations. Objections were however taken by all those claimants who had secured the award. The appellants laid claim to the property of Kazim Husain by giving out that they were the next heirs and this plea was based on the allegations that Smt. Jaddan who claimed to be the widow of the deceased was not his legally married wife and that consequently Nazakat Husain who claimed to be the son of the deceased was not his legitimate son; that Riazul Hasan, respondent No. 4 and Smt. Nafis Bano, respondent No. 5, who claimed to be the son and daughter of the sister of the deceased were excluded from inheritance by family custom; and lastly, Smt. Mubarak Jahan Begum who also claimed to be the widow of the deceased was a divorced wife and, therefore, not entitled to claim inheritance. The final decision of the consolidation authorities was that there was no such custom as was pleaded by the present appellants and therefore Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano were the legal heirs of the deceased as Smt. Jaddan and Nazakat Husain were not the legally wedded wife and legitimate son respectively of the deceased though on account of a Patta they had no doubt become Sirdars of some land. Smt. Mubarak Jahan Begum was held to be a divorced wife. 3. Aggrieved by that decision the appellant filed the aforementioned writ petition from the decision of which this special appeal has arisen. The other two writ petitions were filed by Riazul Hasan and Nafis Bano as they questioned the rights of Sirdari accepted by the consolidation authorities in favour of Smt. Jaddan and Nazakat Husain. 4. The decision of the consolidation authorities that no custom of exclu- sion of sister's son and daughter had been proved by the appellants was a finding of fact. However the appellants questioned the finding on two grounds. 4. The decision of the consolidation authorities that no custom of exclu- sion of sister's son and daughter had been proved by the appellants was a finding of fact. However the appellants questioned the finding on two grounds. One was that in an earlier suit in which the question had arisen as to who was the legal representative of the deceased Kazim Husain, it had been decided that the appellants were his legal representatives and not Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano or Mubarak Jahan Begum and the consolidation authorities failed to take into account the legal position that that decision operated as res judicata and that Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano could not be held to be the heirs of Kazim Husain. The second point raised was that the objection under Section 9 filed on behalf of Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano had been filed before the Consolidation. Officer and not the Assistant Consolidation Officer as required under section 9 and that the consolidation authorities were accordingly wrong in entertaining that objection which was beyond jurisdiction. There was yet a third point which related to the right of Sirdari granted to Smt. Jaddan but that point could arise only in case the appellants could succeed in showing that the decision of the consolidation authorities so far as their claim to heirship of Kazim Husain was concerned was wrong. That point was no doubt also raised in the writ petitions of Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano and was actually decided by the learned Single judge. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, reliance had been placed on behalf of the appellants before the learned Single Judge on a Bench decision of the Court in Raj Bahadur v. Narayan Prasad, A.I.R. 1926 Allahabad 439 in which it had been laid down that once the question as to a legal representative is decided by a Court under Order 22, Rule 5, C. P. C., it cannot be re-adjudicated upon in a regular suit separately. Even as it is, this decision goes no further than laying down that the decision arrived at by a court under Order 22, Rule 5, C. P. C. as to who is the legal representative of a deceased party to a suit before it is final for the purpose and a regular suit cannot be filed and adjudicated upon to decide the same point as to who is the legal representative of the deceased party to a pending suit. The case is wholly distinguishable for the purposes of the proceedings in which this decision is sought to be relied upon. The consolidation authorities were not called upon to determine as to who was the legal representative of Kazim Husain for the purposes of the suit in which it had been decided that the appellants were his legal representatives and not some other claimants. The learned Single Judge has cited a number of decisions of this very Court as also one Full Bench decision of the erstwhile Chief Court of Oudh, in all of which it had been clearly laid down that a decision under Order 22, Rule 5, C. P. C. did not operate as res judicata for the purposes of any other suit in which a similar question might arise or for the purpose of inheritance. The position, in our opinion is quite clear and admits of no doubt for its to reconsider the matter. Rule 5 of Order 22, C. P. C. lays down that where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant such question shall be determined by the Court. Under Order 22 if a party to a suit dies and the right to site does not survive to the surviving plaintiffs or plaintiff alone in the case of the death of the plaintiff or it does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone where a defendant dies and, again, where the sole plaintiff or the sole defendant dies, necessity arises of bringing on the record the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or the deceased defendant as the case may be. For that purpose Rule 5 confers power on the court before which the suit is pending to determine as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff or the defendant. For that purpose Rule 5 confers power on the court before which the suit is pending to determine as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff or the defendant. The determination is obviously meant to he for that limited purpose and is not the determination of the claims of persons to be the heirs of a deceased person for all time to come and for all purposes. It may here be also pointed out that under the definition of legal representative as given in clause (11) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even a person who intermediates with the estate of the deceased is included in the definition and even such a person may be held to be a legal representative under Rule 5 of Order 22, C. P. C. even though he may not be an heir at all. Learned counsel for the appellants has cited also be- fore us a decision of the Supreme Court which was not cited before the learned Single Judge. It is Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujrat, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1153. What is laid down in this decision is that a decision in an earlier writ petition on merits operates as res judicata on the general principles of res judicata for the purposes of his subsequent suit between the same parties involving the same questions and the same reliefs. The very.qualification that the suit should be for the same reliefs limits the application of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. The proceedings before the consolidation authorities were not for the same reliefs which were the reliefs claimed in the proceedings under Rule 5 of Order 22, C. P. C. in the suit filed by Kazim Husain. It will thus appear that nothing new has been brought before us to hold contrary to the view taken by the learned Single judge on the first point. 6. On the second point, namely, that the objection of Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano was not filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer but before the Consolidation Officer, the learned Single judge took the view that this point was not raised before any of the three consolidation authorities and that for that reason it could not be entertained for the first time in the writ petition. Learned counsel for the appellants has cited before us a decision of this Court in Vidya Bhushan v. Parag, 1964 A.L.J. 487, in which, in special appeal, it was laid down that an objection under Section 12 can only be filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and not before the Consolidation Officer. In the instant case an objection to the entries in favour of the appellants had been filed by some of the claimants before the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and the same has already been referred to the Consolidation Officer when the objection of Riazul Hasan and Smt. Nafis Bano was filed. This objection was filed before the Consolidation Officer and not the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer was the authority seized of the matter at that time and even if the objection had been filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer it was bound to be referred to the same Consolidation Officer and he would have had the jurisdiction to decide it. It cannot, therefore, be ruled that the entertaining of the objection by the Consolidation Officer in the above mentioned circumstances and deciding it were without jurisdiction and his decision was a nullity. Accordingly there was every good reason for not entertaining this plea on behalf of the appellants as a good ground for interfering with the decision of the consolidation authorities when the objection had not been raised before any of them and was raised for the first time in the writ petition and on a mere technicality. In our opinion they objection which related to a procedural technicality was rightly not entertained in the back-ground of failure to raise that ground before the concerned authorities. 7. As already stated, the third point does not arise for consideration now at the instance of the appellants who have otherwise failed to make out a case for questioning the decision of the consolidation authorities so far as their claim to heirship of deceased Kazim Husain is concerned. In this situation we also need not pass any order on the civil miscellaneous application No. 58 (W) -70 made by respondents Smt. Jaddan and Nazakat Husain who have prayed in that application for being allowed to rely on two documents relating to some proceedings in the suit which they had filed and which has been referred to earlier. 8. In the result the special appeal is dismissed with costs.