H. R. KHANNA ( 1 ) THE short question which arises for determination in this case is whether an accused person can be remanded to custody for a period beyond 15 days of his arrest in the absence of a police report commonly known as chargesheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein- after referred to as the Code ). According to the petitioner s counsel unless a chargesheet is submitted a criminal court has no power to remand an accused to custody after 15 days of his arrest and the accused in such an event must be released on bail. As against that the submission made on behalf of the State is that an accused can be remanded to custody by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter under Section 344 of the Code and it is not obligatory to release the accused on bail after 15 days of his arrest even though the charge-sheet has not been put in the Court. The question has arisen in the following circumstances: ( 2 ) THE dead bady of Sarjeevan Parkash alias Kaka was found in the field in the jurisdiction of Timarpur police post on the morning of September 5, 1969. Ajit Singh and Shankar petitioners were arrested by the police on September 17, 1969 under Section 302, read with Section 34, of the Indian Penal Code in connection with the murder of Satjeevan Parkash. The two petitioners were produced before the magistrate on September 18, J969 when they were remanded to police custody till September 25, 1969. Further orders remanding the accused to judicial custody were made from time to time till November 15, 1969 when another order for remand was made. ( 3 ) AN application for releasing the two petitioners on bail were rejected by the learned magistrate on October 14. 1969. An application for the release of the petitioners was then made to H the learned Sessions Judge who rejected the application by his order dated November 1, 1969. The petitioners then approached this Court. One of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that after the expiry of the period of remand. 1969. An application for the release of the petitioners was then made to H the learned Sessions Judge who rejected the application by his order dated November 1, 1969. The petitioners then approached this Court. One of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that after the expiry of the period of remand. for which the limit prescribed by Section 167 of the Code is 15 days in the whole, no further cider for remand could be passed unless a charge-sheet under Section 173, of the Code was forwarded to the magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. One of us (Hardy, 1.) then found that there was a serious conflict among the different High Courts on the above aspect of the matter He, accordingly expressed the view that the matter should be decided by a larger Bench. The case was then placed before a Division Bench consisting of Hardy and Misra, JJ who, in view of the sharp divergence of opinion, expressed the view that it should be decided by a Full Bench. Before dealing further with the matter it would be convenion to reproduce section 167, relevant part of section 173 and section 344 of the Code: "167. (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well- founded, the officer in charge of the police-station or the police-officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter rescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not junsdiction to try the casc, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not junsdiction to try the casc, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction : Provided that no Magistrate of the third class, and no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) If such order is given by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, he shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate. 173. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, officer in charge of the police-station shall (A) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police-report a report, in the form prescribed by the State Government setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, and stating whether the accused (if arrested has been forwarded in custody, or has been released on his bond, and, if so, whether with or without sureties, and (B) communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Govement, the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given, (2) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any cases in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer ic charge of the police-station to make further investigation. "344. "344. (1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiou:ly as possible and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (1a) If, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing staling the reasonstherefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody PROVIDED that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time : PROVIDED further that when witnesses are in attendance. no adjournment "or postporment shall be/granted. without examining them except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. (2) Every order made under this section by a Court other than a High Court shall he in writing signed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate. EXPLANATION. If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. " ( 4 ) ACCORDING to Section 61 of the Code no police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall not in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under Section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate s Court. It would therefore follow that the maximum period for which an arrested person can be detained by the police in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate is twentyfour hours excluding the time requisite for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate s Court. It would therefore follow that the maximum period for which an arrested person can be detained by the police in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate is twentyfour hours excluding the time requisite for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate s Court. If the investigation of the offence, for which the accused is arrested, cannot be completed within twenty-four hours by the police fixed by Section 61 and there ore grounds for believing that the accusation or information against the accused is well founded the police is bound under Section 167 of the Code to forward the accused along with copies of the entries in the diary to the nearest Magistrate. Such a Magistrate can authorise the detention of the accused in the police custody from time to lime for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. An order for this purpose cannot be made by a Magistrate of third class or by a Magistrate of second clays not specially empowered in this behalf by the State government. It is, however, not essential that the Magistrate passing the order should have jurisdiction to try the case. While auhorising detention in the custody of police under Section 167 the Magistrate has to record his reasons for so doing and this fact would show that the remand is to be granted not as a matter of course but for reasons which have to be put in writing. It may be noticed that the word "remand" as such is not used in Section 167 and what is authorised by the Magistrate for making an order under that section is the detention of the accused in police custody. ( 5 ) IN some cases, specially those relating to murder, dacoity or conspiracy, it happens that the investigation is not completed within 15 days Question arises whether the accused in such a case can be kept in custody beyond that period. Section 344 of the Code provides an answer to that. The section deals with postponement and adjournment of proceeding as well as with remand. According to sub-section (1a) of that section, if, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it be comes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of. Section 344 of the Code provides an answer to that. The section deals with postponement and adjournment of proceeding as well as with remand. According to sub-section (1a) of that section, if, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it be comes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of. or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor from time to time. postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. The words "postpone the Commencement of liny inquiry or trial" indicate that an order under the above provision can be made at a stage preceding the commencement if inquiry or trial, the order under the above provision can be made by a Court which, according to Section 6 of the Code, includes Courts of Section and Magistrates, in case, however, an older for remand to custody is made by the Magistrate the proviso to sub-section (1a) makes it clear that the term of the remand shall not exceed 15 days at a time. Reasons have also to be recorded in writing for making an order of remand. The order has also to be signed by the Magistrate. It is further impetrative that the Magistrate making the order under Section 344 should have jurisdiction to take orgnizance of the offence for which the accused has been arres ed. ( 6 ) THE Explanation to Section 344 is of importance and, according to it, it would constitute reasonable cause for a remand if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand. In order to bring the case within the ambit of the above Explanation it would have to be shown that there is sufficient material already procured to create a suspicion that the accused has committed offence and that there is a likelihood of further evidence being obtained as a result of the remand. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Section 173 every investigation of an offence shall be completed without unnecessary delay. The provision in this respect underlines the importance of promptitude and diligence in the investigation of cases. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Section 173 every investigation of an offence shall be completed without unnecessary delay. The provision in this respect underlines the importance of promptitude and diligence in the investigation of cases. It hardly needs to be emphasised that slackness on the part of investigating agency can result in the disappearance of material evidence which might otherwise be available and thus prevent the effective detection of the crime. A duty is therefore cast upon the police by Section 173 of the Code to complete investigation without unnecessary delay. In order to provide a safeguard against any slackness on the part of the police it has been provided that the accused cannot remain in custody beyond a specific period without the order of the Magistrate. The police has therefore to give reasons and make out a case for the remand of the accused to custody. A Magistrate granting a remand under Section 344 lias to bear this in mind and has to be satisfied that there exist good grounds for making an order of remand of the accused to custody. The Lagistrate has to keep a balance and should not be oblivious of the fact that an Older of remand to custody affects the liberty of an individual who has yet to he found guilty. At the same time the Magistrate has to see that the investigating agency is not deprived of a reasonable opportunity of procuring further evidence which is likely to be obtained as a result of the remand. In a number of cases it would indeed be essential to make an order of remand because of inability of the police to complete the investigation within a period of 15 days for a variety of causes. Not to do so, would have the effect of hampering the investigation and preventing the conviction of persons guilty of serious crimes like dacoity and murder for lack of full evidence. It may also, be mentioned that the accused has to be remanded under Section 344 not to police custody but to judicial lock-up. ( 8 ) I here is nothing, in our opinion, in Section 344 which makes it imperative that an order for rcinaml can only be madsafter a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code has been for- warded to the Magistrate. ( 8 ) I here is nothing, in our opinion, in Section 344 which makes it imperative that an order for rcinaml can only be madsafter a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code has been for- warded to the Magistrate. In the absence of any words in the section and in the absence of anything in i. he context, it would. in our view, be not permissible to read in the section a limitation on or con (?i:ion attached to the power of Magistrate to grant remand only in case a charge-sheet under Section 173 has been put in Court. As observed on page 33 of Maxwell on Interpreta- c tion of Statutes, Twelfth Edition: "it is a colollary to the general rule of literal coiistruclion that nothing is to be ^dded to or taken from a sta- tute unless there are adequate grounds to justify thi B inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear riec-issity it is a wrong thing to do . (Thompson vgc. oldand. Co. (1910) A. C. 409, at p. 420) (1 ). "we are not enii led, said Loid Lorelum L. C. , to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason fcr it is to he found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Vickers. Sens, and Maxim, Ltd v. Evans (1910) A. C. 444. at p. 445.) (2 ). A case no. provided for in a statutv is not to be dealt with merely because there sci ms no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission ap- pears in consequence to have been unintentional. (Lloyds Bank v. Elliot (1947) I All E. R. 79) (3 ). " ( 9 ) WE are fortified in the view which we have taken by the preponderance of authority. In The Suicnniendent and Remem- brancer of Legal Affairs. Govenirnent cf West Bengal v. Bidhindra Kumar Roy and others, AI. R (36) 1949 Calcutta 143 (4), Roxburgh ai-d Blank JJ. " ( 9 ) WE are fortified in the view which we have taken by the preponderance of authority. In The Suicnniendent and Remem- brancer of Legal Affairs. Govenirnent cf West Bengal v. Bidhindra Kumar Roy and others, AI. R (36) 1949 Calcutta 143 (4), Roxburgh ai-d Blank JJ. obsrrvcd : "section 167 which limits the rc iod of detention to 15 da -s is applicable both to a Magistrate having juris- diction to try the case and also to other Magistrate and limits "the total period of detention to 15 days. In the case of a Magistrate who has no jurisdiction to try the case he must within the period forward the accused to a Magistrate having jurisdiction. The section then applicable for for -further detention is Section 344 of the Code and the Explanation to that section indicates, in our opinion, that further remand may be granted before submissior of the chargesheet. Under Section 173 of the Code, the charge-sheet is to be submitted when the inverstigation is complete. The Explanation to Section 344 of the Code clearly contemplates a stage prior to submission of the charge-sheet and that time is wanted for further investigation; under it the Court having jurisdiction may grant remands in custody if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand. "bhola Nath Das v. Emperor, AIR (11.) 1924 Calcutta 164 (5) was cited before the learned Judges but they expressed the view that it had not been correctly decided. ( 10 ) IN Dukhi and another v. State and another. A. IR. 1955 Allahabad 521 (6), a Division Bench of the Couirt. (Desai and Beg JJ) held that where a person is arrested by the police without a warrant, it is not required that he must be released from custody on the expiry of 15 days if the police is still investigation the matter. A Magistrate, having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence can avail himself of the provisions of Section 344 without taking cognizance of the oftence or while the matter is still under investigation by the police. The learned Judges also overruled the view expressed in an eailier Single Bench case Kali Charan v. State. AIR 1955 Ahahnbad 462 (7 ). A Magistrate, having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence can avail himself of the provisions of Section 344 without taking cognizance of the oftence or while the matter is still under investigation by the police. The learned Judges also overruled the view expressed in an eailier Single Bench case Kali Charan v. State. AIR 1955 Ahahnbad 462 (7 ). ( 11 ) SHRILAL Nandram and another v R. R. Agrawal, A. I. R. 1960 Madhya Pradesh 135 (8), a Division Bench, consisting of A. H. Khan and Shiv Dayal JJ observed : THE only limit on the exercise of the power of the remand under Section 344 is that the Court cannot give a remand for a term exceeding 15 days at a time. This limit for 15 days is for the purpose of enabling the Court to see as to what progress has been made in Obtaining further evidence. Each order of remand must be intelligently made and the Magistrate must give reason s for a further postponement of the enquiry or trial. In this view of the matter, I fail to see how the provision of Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a condition precedent to a remand under Section 344 (IA) of the Criminal Procedure Code. " THE above-mentioned three cases were relied upon and similar view was expressed by P. Govinda Menon J. in State of Kerala v. Madhavan Kuttan, AIR 1964 (9) Kerala 232. The learned Judge further observed : "the explanation makes it clear that it relates to a stage where the offence is still under investigation by the police. No investigation can be held after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and the the explanation must, therefore, necessarily refer to the cirmustances existing before the taking of cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate. There is nothing to be done by the Magistrate after cognizance is taken a police report and before the commencement on an enquiry of trial. So postponing commencement of an enquiry or trial may include postponing of taking cognizance of the offence. "the Judicial Camrpissioner of Tripuia also look the same view in Rab Noaz and others v. The State, AIR Tripura 6 (10 ). ( 12 ) ON behalf of the petitioners reference has been made to Kali Charan v. State, A. T. R. 1955 Allahabad 462. "the Judicial Camrpissioner of Tripuia also look the same view in Rab Noaz and others v. The State, AIR Tripura 6 (10 ). ( 12 ) ON behalf of the petitioners reference has been made to Kali Charan v. State, A. T. R. 1955 Allahabad 462. As stated above, the view expressed in this case by the learned Single Judge was overruled in the latte Division Bench case of Dukhi. Perusal of the facts, of this case gees to show that Kali Charan applicant was remanded to custody by City Magistrate. Farrukhabad According to the police report, Kali Charan was also involved in cases under Section 420 and other sections of the Indian Penal Code in Uttar Pradesh. Madhya Pradesh, Bombay, Madras and other States It was held that the City Magistrate. Farrukhabad, who had no jurisdictaion to try cases relating to the offences committed in Madras and other places, had no power to remand the accused to custody for a period exceeding 15 days in the whole. Although there were some general observations in that case, the above facts would go to show that they were in the context of the peculiar facts of that case. Be that as it may, a latter Division Bench expressed its disagreement with the view taken in above case. ( 13 ) ANOTHER case referred to on behalf of the petitioners is Artatran Mahasuara and others v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 Orissa 129 (11 ). decided by Mohapatra and P. V. B. Rao JJ. The learned Judges in this case held that Section 344 applied onlyto cases of which the Magistrate bad taken cognizance. The learned Judges dissented from the view expressed in Bidhindra Kumar Roy s and Dukhi s cases. ( 14 ) WE are unable to subscribe to the proposition laid down by the earned Judges in the above case as we do not find anything in Section 344 which makes it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence before remanding the accused to custody. ( 14 ) WE are unable to subscribe to the proposition laid down by the earned Judges in the above case as we do not find anything in Section 344 which makes it obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence before remanding the accused to custody. A Magistrate lakes cognizance of an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by a police-officer and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed. The expression taking cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. It can, however, be said that before any Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Section 190 he must have applied his mind for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicatd in the subsequent provisions. When a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections but for taking action of some other kind, for example, ordering investigation under Section 156 (3), or issuing such a warrant for the purpose of such investigation, lie cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. See in this connction R. R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1951 S. C 207 (12), Kania C. J. , who spoke for the Court in the above case, also referred to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 and observed that the police report, referred to in that clause, was evidently one in a cognizable case when the police have completed their investigation. It would therefore, follow that the cognizance of an offence in a cognizable case under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 190 can be taken by the Magistrate after the police have completed the investigation. The question of taking cognizance under the above clause when further investigation has still to l"e carrier out would, therefore, not normally arise. We have already held above that it would not be permissible to read in Section 344 a limitation on the power of Magistrate to grant remand only in case a charge-shset under Section 173 has been put in Court. Likewise, we cannot subscribe to the proposition that the taking of cognizance of. We have already held above that it would not be permissible to read in Section 344 a limitation on the power of Magistrate to grant remand only in case a charge-shset under Section 173 has been put in Court. Likewise, we cannot subscribe to the proposition that the taking of cognizance of. an offence is a condition precedent to the passing of an order of remand of the accused to custody under Section 344 of the Code. ( 15 ) RCFERSNCE has been made on behalf of the petitioners to Section 170 of the Code and it is submitted that a report in the nature of an incomplete charge-sheet should be forwarded under that section by the police before an order of remand under Section 344 is made. There is notthing in the language of Section 170 which warrants such a conclusion. Indeed the said section contains no reference to the submission of the report in the nature of an incomplete charge-sheet. Apart from that, we find that according to the dictum laid down in the case of Artatran Mahasuara, on which case reliance has been placed by the petitioners, sections 170 and 173 are to be read to gether and contemplate a simultaneous action. ( 16 ) ANOTHER case to which reference has beer. made on behalf of the petitioners is Tara Singh The State. AIR 1951 S. G. 441 (13 ). What was held in that case, apart from other matters with which we are not concerned, Was that wlere the First Report made by the police to a Magistrete, though called incoraplete challan, contains all the particulars required by Section 173 (1) (a) and a second report with a supplementary challan is filed subsequently, giving the names of Some formal witnesses. the first report is in fact a complete report as required by Secion 173 " (1) (a) of the Code and it is not necessarily vitiated by the mere fact that asupplementary challan is sub-sequently filed. The dict um laid down in the above case dealt with a matter which was essentially different and in our opinion the petitioners cannot derive any assistance from that. ( 17 ) ARGUMENT has then been advanced on behalf of the petitioners that Section 344 finds its place in chapter XXIV of the Code, the heading of which is "general Provisions as to Inquiries and Trials". ( 17 ) ARGUMENT has then been advanced on behalf of the petitioners that Section 344 finds its place in chapter XXIV of the Code, the heading of which is "general Provisions as to Inquiries and Trials". It is urged that as Chapter XXIV relate-, to inquiries and trials, an order for remand under that Section can only be made during the pendancy of an inquiry and trial and not at a stage prior to that. this contention. in our opinion, is not well-founded. The headings pretixed sections or sets of ,sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute, but they may explain ambiguous words (See in this connection Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition p. 11.) There is no ambiguity in Section 944 on account of which it may become necsssary to refer to the heading of Chapter XXIV of the Code for the construction of the above section. On the contrary there aic indicatlers that all the sections under Sect ion 344 do not necessarily relate to a stage after the commencement of inquiry or trial. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 337 which is also a part of Chapter XXIV. According to this Section a pardon may be tendered by the authority concerned to a person at any state of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of the offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of such person. The grant of pardon to a person at the stage of investigation would normally be before the commencement of inquiry and trial. It would (hf^c". f" -. follow that all the matters that are dealt with in the Sections under Chapter XXIV of the Code are not those at the stage of inquiry and trial but can also be at the stage of investigation. ( 18 ) REFERENCE has also been made on behalf of the petitioners to Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court, Volume III, Chapter 11-B, Paragraph 10, according to which if a remand is granted under Section 344, Criminal procedere Code, the case is brought on to the Magistrate s the and the accused if detention is necessary, will remain in magistrial cusiuody. The above prov ision can be of no assistance to the petiticners because it does not follow from it that a charge-sheet must be submitted or the cognizance of an offence must be taken by a -Magistrate before he can remand an accused to custody under Section 344 (if the Code. The fact that the case is brought or. to the Magistrates file only indicates that the papers on which the order for the. remand of the accused is made, would become a part. of the Court file so that they can be put up for hearing on the next date. Our attention has also been invited to Paragraph 25. 56 of the Punjab Police Rules. Volume III, Reprint Edition, acording to which an incomplete charge-sheet can be put in Court. The above paragraph contains instructions for the police and would not affect the procedure to be followed by a Criminal Court for which purpose we have necessarily to look to the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 19 ) THE two accused were, on consideration of the facts of the present case, released on interim bail by the Division Bench before the reference of this case to the Full Bench. Keeping in view all the facts we confirm the interim order and direct that the petitioners may remain on bail during the pendency of the case against them.