Judgment Nand Lall Untwalia, J. 1. Petitioners Nos.1 and 2 in C. W. J. C.345 of 1969, who are respectively petitioners Nos.2 and 3 in C. W. J. C.158 of 1969, are the directors of Sri Hurdatroy Jute Mills Private Limited, petitioner No.3 in the former and petitioner No.1 in the latter case. I shall state the facts of both the cases together as at a certain stage they are common. I shall only refer to the relevant facts which are necessary to be stated for the disposal of the two points urged by Mr. S. B. Sanyal, learned Advocate for the petitioners. Hereafter in this judgment facts will be stated with reference to petitioner No.3 in C. W. J. C.345 of 1969 describing it as the petitioner-company. 2. The petitioner-company is registered under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 , and bears registration No. Bihar-PN/748 (C ). It is also registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act) bearing registration No. PN8 (R ). The Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Purnea, who is respondent No.1 and an officer of the State of Bihar, respondent No.2, claiming to realise the sales tax dues, presumably due under the Central Sales. Tax Act, issued a notice dated the 3rd of January, 1969, a copy of which is annexure 1, to the Agents of the Central Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and State Bank of India, Katihar, under Sec.21 of the Act. Respondent No.1 directed the Agents of the three banks, out of whom the Agent, Central Bank of India, and the Agent, Punjab National Bank, are respectively respondents Nos.4 and 5, to pay into the Government Treasury at Katihar any amount due from them to the dealer, namely, the petitioner-company stating in the notice (annexure 1) that a sum of Rs.1,18,313.75 is due from the dealer on account of tax assessed under the Act. It appears that on receipt of a copy of the notice, as such copy has got to be sent to the dealer under Sec.21 (1) of the Act, the petitioner-company filed an objection before respondent No.1, a copy of which is annexure 2; it is dated the 6th of March, 1969. It appears that on receipt of a copy of the notice, as such copy has got to be sent to the dealer under Sec.21 (1) of the Act, the petitioner-company filed an objection before respondent No.1, a copy of which is annexure 2; it is dated the 6th of March, 1969. In paragraph 4 of the objection petition, the figures of the tax assessed and the amounts paid were given, and it was claimed that the petitioner-company had made excess payment of Rs.38,280.83 and that the sum as claimed in the notice under Sec.21 of the Act was not due from the dealer. On the 6th of March, 1969, when the objection (annexure 2) was filed before respondent No.1 by the petitioner-company, the former issued a letter dated 6th March, 1969, a copy of which is annexure 3 to the writ application, to the Agents of the Central Bank of India, and the Punjab National Bank of India, withdrawing the notices issued to them under Sec.21 of the Act on 3rd January, 1969, and stated that a fresh notice was being issued for Rs.7,12,940.36. The petitioner-company was also served with a copy of the notice (annexure 3/a ). It filed its objection again on the 1st of April, 1960, a copy of which is annexure 4. In this objection also, the demand of the sales tax department to the tune of rupees seven lacs and odd was challenged as being wrong and imaginary. A grievance was made that by the wrong issuance of the notice under Sec.21 of the Act, the business of the petitioner-company was seriously being hampered. On 1st April, 1969, the same day when the objection (exhibit 4) was filed, respondent No.1 passed an order, a copy of which is annexure 5, stating therein merely that the dealer had prayed for withdrawal of the notice under Sec.21 of the Act but it appeared from the records that "there is still a due of Rs.3,33,752.27 and as such notice under Sec.21 of the Act cannot be withdrawn". The petition was accordingly rejected and a direction was given for issuance of a fresh notice under Sec.21 of the Act. for the aforesaid sum of rupees three lacs and odd only. The petition was accordingly rejected and a direction was given for issuance of a fresh notice under Sec.21 of the Act. for the aforesaid sum of rupees three lacs and odd only. It is, however, curious to find that the notice which was issued on 1st April, 1969, under Sec.21 of the Act, a copy of which is annexure 5/a, only to respondents Nos.4 and 5, was for a sum of Rs.5,33,465.56. 3. The petitioner had filed C. W. J. C.158 of 1969 on 11th February, 1969, challenging the notice dated 3rd January, 1969 (annexure 1 ). The case was admitted on 26th February, 1969. But there being no stay of the further proceedings, the matter was pursued before respondent No.1 by the petitioner-company, resulting finally in the issuance of the third revised notice on 1st April, 1969 (annexure 5/a ). The petitioner has challenged the last and final notice in C. W. J. C.345 of 1969 as the two previous ones stood withdrawn and superseded. 4. Mr. S. B. Sanyal, learned Advocate for the petitioners, has challenged the validity of the notice under Sec.21 of the Act on two grounds- (i) that Sec.21 of the Act is constitutionally invalid as it infringes Article 14 of the Constitution, and (ii) that in any view of the matter respondent No.1 has arbitrarily exercised his power under Sec.21 of the Act without mentioning in any of his order and without letting the petitioner-company know as to how any sum of money under the Act is said to be due from the petitioner-company. Arbitrarily, without any basis, different figures have been mentioned in the different notices and not only that, the last figure mentioned in the notice dated 1st April, 1969, varies substantially from the figure mentioned in the order of that date (annexure 5 ). 5. Arbitrarily, without any basis, different figures have been mentioned in the different notices and not only that, the last figure mentioned in the notice dated 1st April, 1969, varies substantially from the figure mentioned in the order of that date (annexure 5 ). 5. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to attack the vires of Sec.21 of the Act is that over and above the procedure prescribed under Sec.20 (8) (a) which again, in its turn, is without any prejudice to any oilier mode of recovery of the amount of tax together with penalty due under the Act, a special mode of recovery has been provided under Sec.21 of the Act without indicating the principles or guide-line as to under what circumstances and in respect of what kind of dealers one or the other mode is to be taken recourse to. The power of recovery of the amount due under the Act by the special mode of recovery is unfettered and unbridled and is not circumscribed by any reason or principle for the exercise of the power. In other words, it has been left to the sweet and arbitrary discretion of the prescribed authority under the Act to recover the amount due under it either by suit or by taking recourse to the provision of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, or by issuing directly notices to the debtors of the dealers under Sec.21 of the Act. In the case of dealers who would be similarly situated, it is open to the prescribed authority to discriminate between one dealer and the other to adopt the method of recovery of the amount due under the Act as if it were arrears of land revenue or to issue notice to his debtor under Sec.21 of the Act. Counsel further submitted that the special mode of recovery provided under Sec.21 of the Act is more onerous and drastic than the method of recovery of the tax through suit or by taking recourse to the machinery of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, and in that view of the matter, the Section should be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. 6. 6. In support of the submission, learned counsel placed strong reliance upon an unreported decision of a Bench of this court in B. L. Vishwakarma V/s. The State Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966. In Sub-section (8) of Sec.20 of the Act two modes of recovery without prejudice to any other mode were prescribed in clauses (a) and (b ). Clause (a) authorised the recovery of the amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue and Clause (b) said that the amount could be recovered on an application to any Magistrate by such Magistrate as if it were a fine imposed by him, that is to say, under Sec.386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ramratna Singh, J. , with whom K. K. Dutta, J. , agreed held in Vishwakarmas case Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966. that the method of recovery as if the amount were a fine imposed by a Magistrate was too drastic and onerous to be left at the sweet will of the taxing authorities without any guide-line or principle engrafted in the Act for adoption of the one mode or the other. The various provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act and Sec.386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were compared and contrasted. It was held that the protection and safeguards which were available to a dealer against whom a proceeding is started under the Public Demands Recovery Act for recovery of the amount of tax or penalty due under the Act are not to be found when the procedure of realising the amount as if it were a fine imposed by a Magistrate is resorted to. The vital and major distinction apart from some minor ones as pointed out by the Bench in Vishwakarmas case Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966 is the one to be found in Sec.9 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. There a dealer gets an opportunity of denying his liability either in whole or in part. The matter is judicially determined by the various authorities, by the certificate officer in the first instance, and thereafter, in appeal and revision. But no such procedure is to be found under Sec.386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There a dealer gets an opportunity of denying his liability either in whole or in part. The matter is judicially determined by the various authorities, by the certificate officer in the first instance, and thereafter, in appeal and revision. But no such procedure is to be found under Sec.386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If an application were made to any Magistrate for recovery of any amount said to be due from a dealer under the Act, the dealer would have been in a helpless position and the amount could be recovered from him as if it were a fine imposed by a Magistrate by distress warrant or the like. It may be that even the dealer could have gone in suit for redress of his grievance if the proceeding started by the Magistrate were ultra vires and absolutely erroneous in the sense that either the tax or penalty said to be due under the Act was due under orders of the taxing authorities which were nullities or were for wrong or imaginary figures. But that apart, the dealer had no forum for immediate redress of his grievance if the proceeding before the Magistrate was started wrongly for an amount which was not at all due or was a wrong amount. But such a situation the dealer is not to face when notice is issued to his debtor under Sec.21 of the Act. It has already been stated that a copy of such a notice has to be given to the dealer also at his last address known to the prescribed authority, and it is then open to the dealer to come to that authority and object to the demand made against him by issuance of notice under Sec.21 of the Act. As was argued by Mr. Sarwar Ali, learned Government Pleader No.1, the power to investigate the objection of the dealer is inherent in the power to amend or revoke any notice issued under Sec.21 (1) of the Act as provided in Sub-section (2) of Sec.21. I am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned Government Pleader that even if no such power is conceded to the prescribed authority, still Sec.21 of the Act can be protected from the attack under Article 14 of the Constitution. I am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned Government Pleader that even if no such power is conceded to the prescribed authority, still Sec.21 of the Act can be protected from the attack under Article 14 of the Constitution. If no such power were to be culled out in the prescribed authority under Sec.21 of the Act, I have no doubt in my mind that this section also would have met the same fate as Clause (b) of Sub-section (8) of Sec.20 met in Vishwakarmas case Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966. We were informed by the learned Government Pleader that the State did not think it advisable to challenge the said decision by going to the Supreme Court. It is plain that a person who is affected by any demand under the Act, when proceeding for recovery of any amount of demand is taken against him, must have the opportunity of agitating his grievance before some authority that the amount for which the proceeding for recovery has been initiated is not due from him or it is wrong. When a suit is filed, he has ample opportunity in a civil court. He has adequate opportunity when a proceeding for recovery of the amount is started under the Public Demands Recovery Act. He has got this opportunity not only before the Certificate Officer but he can also agitate the matter in appeal as well as in revision and, finally, undoubtedly, before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. If such an opportunity were to be denied to a dealer when the special mode of recovery is resorted to, it is plain that it would have given an arbitrary handle to the prescribed authority to adopt one mode or the other against dealers placed under equal circumstances, that is to say, dealers who have got debtors. But in the case of one the attachment is made under the Public Demands Recovery Act and in the case of the other at the arbitrary will of the prescribed authority a notice under Sec.21 of the Act would have been sufficient for realising the money from the dealers debtor. But in the case of one the attachment is made under the Public Demands Recovery Act and in the case of the other at the arbitrary will of the prescribed authority a notice under Sec.21 of the Act would have been sufficient for realising the money from the dealers debtor. In the former case the dealer, if aggrieved by the amount endeavoured to be recovered through the Certificate Officer, would have gone to him to object while in the other he would have been helpless. In my opinion, therefore, on the well established principles of constitutional law, it is advisable, nay, imperative in this case to uphold the constitutional validity of Sec.21 of the Act by interpreting Sub-section (2) in a manner which would clothe the prescribed authority with the power to look into the grievances or the objections of the dealer to decide as to whether the notice issued by him under Sub-section (1) is correct or not and then to amend or revoke it as he may think fit and proper in accordance with law. Once this power is granted, I do not think that in any other manner the special mode of recovery is so onerous or drastic as to attract the principle of substantial discrimination as enunciated by the Supreme Court in various cases while interpreting Article 14 of the Constitution. For the amount due to the dealer from his debtor, an attachment under Sec.18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act can be made. There the forum of disputing the amount endeavoured to be recovered from the dealer will be under that Act. Here, it will be under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The objection will have to be decided by the prescribed authority under Sec.21 of the Act. He may refuse to amend or revoke the notice if the grievance of the dealer is found to be baseless and without any substance, but he has got to give effect to the objection of the dealer if it is found to be correct and amend or revoke the notice accordingly. Without deciding that question finally, I am inclined to think that the dealer will have a right of appeal under Sec.30 of the Act because the dealer will be a "person objecting to an order passed in respect of him under. . . Sec.21" within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act. Without deciding that question finally, I am inclined to think that the dealer will have a right of appeal under Sec.30 of the Act because the dealer will be a "person objecting to an order passed in respect of him under. . . Sec.21" within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Sec.30 of the Act. In any event, undoubtedly, it will be open to him to go in revision under Sec.31 of the Act from the order of the prescribed authority under Sec.21 if it is not appealable and if it is appealable, from the order of the appellate authority passed in appeal. And, finally, the dealer will have the. opportunity of coining to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my judgment, therefore, whether the amount due to the dealer is recovered from his debtor through the machinery of the Public Demands Recovery Act or directly by the prescribed authority under Sec.21 of the Act, it makes no difference to the dealer. If the amount is due from him, for the protection of the interest of the State and its exchequer, the amount must be recovered as quickly as possible. The special mode of recovery provided under Sec.21, undoubtedly, in many cases will be speedier and more effective from the point of view of the State without putting the dealer to any extra disadvantage. I shall illustrate my point. Suppose a sum of Rs.50,000 is due under the Act from a dealer. He has got to his credit in his current account with a bank a sum of Rs.50,000. The prescribed authority under the Act gets an information that the dealer is about to withdraw the said amount and go away. He can at once issue notice under Sec.21 of the Act to the bank and prevent it from handing over the money to the dealer. If the prescribed authority is obliged only to file a suit or to take recourse to the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act for realising the amount, the delay will frustrate the object of the Act. Money due to the State must be allowed to be recovered in the quickest possible manner provided it does not put a debtor of the State to any extra jeopardy if the money is sought to be realised by one mode or the other. 7. In Shree Meenakshi Mills Lid. Money due to the State must be allowed to be recovered in the quickest possible manner provided it does not put a debtor of the State to any extra jeopardy if the money is sought to be realised by one mode or the other. 7. In Shree Meenakshi Mills Lid. V/s. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri A. I. R.1955 S. C.13, Mahajan, C. J. , pointed out at page 15 (column 2) that Article 14 : not only guarantees equal protection as regards substantive laws but procedural laws also come within its ambit. The implication of the Article is that all litigants similarly situated are entitled to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief, and for defence with like protection and without discrimination. Here, it is to be seen that if protection is not extended to the dealer in the matter of procedure for the redress of his grievance against the amount sought to be recovered from him as being due under the Act, Sec.21 will have to be knocked down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. Under the Income-tax Act, 1922, the procedure prescribed for recovery of the income-tax dues was one to be found under Sec.46 (2) of the said Act which corresponds to Sec.222 of 1961 Act. The vires of that section was attacked before the Supreme Court in Purshottam Govindji Halai V/s. Shree B. M. Desai A. I. R.1956 S. C.20 on two grounds: (i) that there were two different modes prescribed in Sec.46 (2) of the Income-tax Act for recovery of the amount, and (ii) that the law for recovery of land revenue in the various States of India substantially varied from State to State and this variation in the State laws brought about discrimination between the various assessees equally situated in the matter of realisation of income-tax dues from them. Both the arguments were repelled by S. R. Das, Acting C. J. , as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the court. The first was repelled on the ground that the section did not prescribe two different methods of recovery and the second on the ground of reasonable classification on the territorial or geographical basis of each State. This case was followed by the Supreme Court in Collector of Malabar V/s. Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee A. I. R.1957 S. C.688. The first was repelled on the ground that the section did not prescribe two different methods of recovery and the second on the ground of reasonable classification on the territorial or geographical basis of each State. This case was followed by the Supreme Court in Collector of Malabar V/s. Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee A. I. R.1957 S. C.688. In this case the attack was on the power of the Collector to arrest the defaulting dealer under Sec.48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act in accordance with which arrears of income-tax could be realised. The power of arrest was held not to be discriminatory on the principle laid down in the case of Purshottam Govindji Halai A. I. R.1956 S. C.20. In Vishwakarmas case Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966, two decisions of the Supreme Court were referred to : one in Jagannath Prasad V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh A. I. R.1961 S. C.1245 and the other in State of Orissa V/s. Dhirendranath Das A. I. R.1961 S. C.1715. The latter case had been decided earlier with reference to two sets of Orissa rules, one being more drastic and prejudicial to the citizens; therefore, the former was knocked down as being unconstitutional. In the former case decided later, the Orissa case was distinguished and two sets of rules prevalent in Uttar Pradesh found to be substantially of the same character were upheld. In Kashiram Agarwalla V/s. Collector of 24-Parganas A. I. R.1958 Cal.524, the law seems to have been laid down in paragraph 6 of the judgment a bit too widely, if I may say so with respect. It has been stated that "where the law is the same for all, the provision of alternative procedure making it possible for the relevant authority to apply one procedure in some cases and the other procedure in other cases does not offend against Article 14 of the Constitution. " On the principle so stated even Clause (b) of Sub-section (8) of Sec.20 of the Act could have been held to be valid because it was meant for all classes of dealers and not for any particular class. But, in my opinion, that is not the test. " On the principle so stated even Clause (b) of Sub-section (8) of Sec.20 of the Act could have been held to be valid because it was meant for all classes of dealers and not for any particular class. But, in my opinion, that is not the test. The test is that if an authority is empowered by a statute to use one handle or the other against similarly situated persons at his caprice or whims without indication in the statute under what circumstances and against what class of persons one or the other handle is to be used, the method which is found to be more drastic or onerous, if used, against some can be knocked down as being discriminatory and not giving equal protection of law to all persons similarly situated. 9. I can refer with some advantage to the decision of P. B. Mukharji, J. , as he then was, sitting singly, in Tangail Textiles Ltd. V/s. The Union of India A. I. R.1965 Cal.220. In that case a question arose as to whether the special remedy provided for the State creditor who advanced money to the displaced persons, which, undoubtedly, was more onerous and stricter could be knocked as being violative of Article 14. The learned Judge upheld the constitutional validity on the ground that when a borrower who borrows money on the basis of the special terms could not complain that the remedy of the creditor, namely, the Rehabilitation Finance Administration -a Corporation created by a State statute-was stricter than the remedy of the other creditors who are outside the Act. A public administration creditor needs special protection and there is a reasonable classification with intelligible and rational differentia in the case of such creditors to distinguish them from other ordinary creditors. What I want to emphasise here with reference to this case is that although the speedier and more effective remedy like the one provided under Sec.21 of the Act be not available to an ordinary creditor, for the protection of the State and its exchequer, it is necessary to provide for this special mode of recovery of the dues under the Act. 10. The provision like the one under Sec.21 of the Act was to be found in Sub-section (5a) of Sec.46 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The provisions were almost identical. 10. The provision like the one under Sec.21 of the Act was to be found in Sub-section (5a) of Sec.46 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The provisions were almost identical. The constitutional validity of the said Sub-section was challenged before a Bench of the Assam High Court consisting of C. P. Sinha, C. J. , and Mehrotra, J. , as he then was. The latter delivering the judgment on behalf of the court upheld the constitutional validity. The case is reported in Murlidhar Jalan V/s. Income-tax Officer, Dibrugarh [1961] 41 I. T. R.80. The same kind of argument as the one advanced before this court was advanced before the Assam High Court that the the Income-tax Officer had been given naked and arbitrary power to single out any defaulting assessee to subject him to stricter and more effective mode of recovery as provided under Sub-section (5a) than the one provided for under Sub-section (2) of Sec.46 of the said Act. After elaborate consideration of the various authorities with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution, Mehrotra, J. , said at page 110: if the tax has been validly imposed, there is a liability to pay up the tax. If the debtors of the assessee are directed to pay up the tax dues they are only asked to discharge the liability of the assessee. Whether the liability is discharged by attachment or other modes of recovery provided under the Land Revenue Act or by simply issuing direction to the debtor of the assessee to pay up the amount of debt due from them, does not, to my mind, amount to any substantial discrimination. That in some cases it may result in hardship to the assessee, is no ground for holding the law as stibstantially discriminatory. Although agreeing with the conclusion of the learned Judge, I would venture to add with respect that the reasoning is not quite sound. If the tax has been validly imposed, there is the liability to pay up the tax, no doubt. If the assessee challenges the assessment orders as being ultra vires or nullities, he has to take recourse to suit or Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the demands based upon such orders. So long the orders stand, the dues can be recovered by the prescribed authority. If the assessee challenges the assessment orders as being ultra vires or nullities, he has to take recourse to suit or Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the demands based upon such orders. So long the orders stand, the dues can be recovered by the prescribed authority. The question of challenge, however, in regard to the amount which is sought to be recovered still has got to be mooted out at some stage or the other. If the departmental authorities think that a particular sum is legally due from a dealer but if the dealer objects to it and says to the contrary, he must have opportunities of being heard in the matter whether the mode of recovery is the one or the other. If he is deprived of such opportunities in one of the methods and without indicating as to why he is being so deprived, it is plain that such procedure which would be more stringent would be substantially discriminatory also. But relying upon the decision of the Assam High Court in Murlidhar Jalans case [1961] 41 I. T. R.80, I hold that Sec.21 of the Act, for the reasons stated above, does not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. In Mohamedaly Sarafaly and Co. V/s. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle III, Madras [1968] 68 I. T. R.128, the argument before the Madras High Court was that without taking recourse to Sec.222 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the special procedure prescribed in Sec.226 (which is equivalant to Sub-section (5a) of Sec.46 of 1922 Act) cannot be taken recourse to. This argument was repelled by Veeraswami, J. , as he then was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench. 12. In India Mica and Micanite Industries Ltd. V/s. The State of Bihar C. W. J. C.532 of 1966, decided by a Bench of this court on the 7th of September, 1967, the argument was that Sec.13 of the Industries Act was ultra vires as it violated Article 14 of the Constitution because the same type and class of debtors or loanees to whom State loan was given from time to time could be dealt with by the State Government which had two options for recovery of the amount- (i) to file a suit in the civil court and the other through a certificate proceeding under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. On a careful consideration of the various authorities on the point, Taikeshwar Nath, J. , with whom B. P. Sinha, J. , agreed, held that the procedure prescribed in Sec.13 of the Industries Act could not be said to be more onerous, stringent or prejudicial to the debtor and, therefore, could not be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The earlier Bench decision of this court in Vishwakarmas case Criminal Revisions 837, 839 and 841 of 1965 decided on 16th December, 1966 was distinguished on that ground. 13. Apparently there seems to be one thing in Sec.21 of the Act which may indicate that the provisions contained therein are more onerous and stringent. If recourse is taken to the remedy of certificate proceedings, such moneys as are not attachable under Sec.18 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act will not be attached and recovered for satisfaction of the demand of the dues under the Act. But there is no such exemption given in Sec.21. It may be pointed out that no such exemption had been provided for in Sub-Section (5a) of Sec.46 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and the exemption provided in the proviso appended to Sub-section (2) of Sec.226 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is of a limited character. Yet I am inclined to think that the discrimination is not inherent in the statute as it is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide as to whether any exemption should be provided in the special mode of recovery. After all, the dealer owing money to the State under the Act has got to pay the money. If the same is to be recovered through the special mode of recovery, the only disadvantage to which the dealer is put is that he is not able to claim any exemption which he would have been able to claim under Sec.18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act or Sec.60 of the Code of Civil Procedure if a suit: would have been filed. But, in my opinion, such cases would be few and far between. In any event, the case of the petitioners is not such as to invalidate on this ground the issuance of the notice under Sec.21 of the Act. But, in my opinion, such cases would be few and far between. In any event, the case of the petitioners is not such as to invalidate on this ground the issuance of the notice under Sec.21 of the Act. The matter may have to be considered if a discrimination is made between two such dealers who may have some money which is not attachable under Sec.18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act but the prescribed authority discriminately or mala fide proceeds against one dealer under the Public Demands Recovery Act and allows him to have the benefit of Sec.18 and against the other under Sec.21 of the Act debarring him of such advantage. 14. I have, therefore, after due consideration, no difficulty in rejecting the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. On the second ground he is on a sound footing. The facts of the case demonstrate how it was necessary for respondent No.1 to look into the objection and grievance of the petitioner-company. At one stage he issued the notice under Sec.21 of the Act for rupees one lac and odd. When the petitioner-company objected and said that nothing was due from it, which could be recovered under Sec.21 by notices to the banks, the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Purnea, without passing any order, seems to have issued a fresh notice for a sum of rupees seven lacs and odd. Even in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, this thing has not been explained as to how the amount of rupees seven lacs and odd was said to be due from the petitioner-company. On the second occasion when that company filed a petition, respondent No.1 passed a cryptic order merely stating that the record showed that a sum of rupees three lacs and odd were due from the petitioner-company; he did not give any facts and figures to indicate as to how the said sum was arrived at. To crown all, it is not explained as to how the notice issued in pursuance of the said order was for a sum of rupees five lacs and odd. Even this matter has not been explained in the counter-affidavit. It is, therefore, clear that on the facts and in the circumstances of this particular case the order dated 1st April, 1969, passed by the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes as contained in annexure 5 must be quashed. Even this matter has not been explained in the counter-affidavit. It is, therefore, clear that on the facts and in the circumstances of this particular case the order dated 1st April, 1969, passed by the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes as contained in annexure 5 must be quashed. C. W. J. C.345 of 1969 is accordingly allowed and the said order is quashed. The case is remitted back to the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Purnea, for rehearing of the objection filed by the petitioner-company and for deciding it afresh in accordance with law in the light of this judgment. It will be open to the petitioner-company to file a new objection petition with reference to the last notice dated 1st April, 1969 (annexure 5/a ). Respondent No.1 is directed thereafter to pass a fresh order and take action under Sec.21 (2) of the Act, if necessary, and to amend or revoke the notice dated 1st April, 1969 (annexure 5/a ). Since the notice under challenge in C. W. J. C.158 of 1969 (annexure 1) was withdrawn, this case has become infructuous; it is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs in either.