Judgment Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. In land Acquisition Case No. 64 of 1966, an award was passed by the land Acquisition Judge in favour of two persons, Somar Mahto and Lakhan Mahto. The State Government deposited the compensation money. Somar Mahto, one of the awardees, died; and his widow made an application for being substituted in place of Somar Mahto and for permission to withdraw the compensation money in deposit. A joint application by Lakhan Mahto and the widow of Somar Mahto for payment was also filed in proper form. By the impugned order, the court below has disallowed the prayer of the widow of Somar Mahto to be substituted in his place on the ground that the award amounts to a decree; and, after an award had been passed there was no question of any substitution. Her prayer for the withdrawal of the compensation money in deposit has been refused on the ground that she did not produce a Succession Certificate as required by Sec.214 of the Indian Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Being aggrieved by the said order, Lakhan Mahto and the widow of Somar Mahto have preferred this application under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Mr. Mundrika Prasad Sinha, appearing for the petitioners, has not challenged that part of the order of the Court below by which it has refused the prayer of the widow of Somar Mahto for substitution in place of her deceased husband; but he has contended that Sec.214 of the Act was not applicable to this case and the prayer for withdrawal of the compensation money in deposit should not have been refused on that ground. 3. 3. Sec.214 (1) of the Act runs as follows: "No Court shall-- (a) Pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) Proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming of (I) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or (II) a certificate granted under Sec.31 or Sec.32 of the Administrator Generals Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein, or (III) a succession certificate granted under part X and having the debt specified therein, or (IV) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, or (V) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein." It is not disputed by Mr. Katriar, who appeared for the State of Bihar, that Clause (a) of this section does not apply to this case inasmuch as the award which amounts to a decree has already been passed in this case and there is no question of the court passing any further decree. He has, however, contended that Clause (b) of the section applies to this case, because, according to him, the application for payment of the money should be treated as an application for execution. On deposit of the compensation money by the State of Bihar, the award (Decree) stood satisfied, and there was no question of executing it. The application for withdrawal of the money already in deposit cannot be treated as an application for execution of the award, and there is no substance in this contention of Mr. Katriar. He has next contended that Clause (b) also debars a court from passing an order for the payment of the debt of the deceased. He has placed reliance in support of this contention on the words "or order for the payment of his debt" in Clause (b). The clause read as a whole does not support this contention either. Katriar. He has next contended that Clause (b) also debars a court from passing an order for the payment of the debt of the deceased. He has placed reliance in support of this contention on the words "or order for the payment of his debt" in Clause (b). The clause read as a whole does not support this contention either. It merely debars the Court to entertain an application for execution of a decree or order against a debtor of deceased person. The expression "order" means an order already passed in favour of a deceased which is sought to be executed. This interpretation also finds support from a Bench decision of this court in Raghubir Narain Singh V/s. Raj Rajeshwari Prasad Singh, ( AIR 1957 Pat 435 ), where it has been held that Sec.214 (1) (b) of the Act only bars the institution of execution proceedings by a person claiming on succession and does not bar the continuance of the proceedings which had been instituted by the original decree-holder, and that execution proceedings having once been instituted by the original decree-holder his heirs can continue them without the production of the succession certificate irrespective of whether they are heirs by the principle of inheritance or by survivorship. In the circumstances, it is manifest that the court below was wrong in insisting upon the production of a Succession Certificate before passing a decree for withdrawal of the amount in favour of the petitioners. 4 In the result, the application is allowed and that part of the order by which the court below has refused the prayer of withdrawal of the compensation money in deposit is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.