Judgment :- 1. The Additional Sessions Judge of Tellicherry made this reference after convicting the first accused under S.302 of the Penal Code and awarding him capital punishment and also convicting the third accused under the same section read with S.34 sentencing him to imprisonment for life and acquitting the second and the fourth accused persons. The first accused, the condemned prisoner, has filed Crl. Appeal No. 202 of 1970 and the third accused has filed Crl. Appeal No. 203 of 1970. 2. The counsel of the appellants had drawn our attention to Ex. P6 in the case, the mahazar for the recovery of M. Os.1 and 2. He has argued that no reliance should be placed on the recovery, because Ex. P6 refers to a joint statement given by accused persons 1 and 3 to the police when they were arrested.' Ex. P6 is only the mahazar for the recovery of M.Os.1 and 2: it contains no statement of the accused persons in their own words. Under S.27 of the Evidence Act, if any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Now, S.27 is an exception or proviso to S.25 and 26. This is clear from the language of the section itself. S.25 enacts that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. And S.26 lays down that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Evidently, S.27 is an exception to these provisions. And the Supreme Court has also said so in Ramkrishna Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1955 SC. 104). 3. Though the Supreme Court has not decided the question before us directly in this case, there are observations in the judgment which give a clue to the understanding of S.27. Evidently, S.27 is an exception to these provisions. And the Supreme Court has also said so in Ramkrishna Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1955 SC. 104). 3. Though the Supreme Court has not decided the question before us directly in this case, there are observations in the judgment which give a clue to the understanding of S.27. Bhagwati J, in delivering the majority judgment, has said that, when a fact is discovered in pursuance of information given by an accused person, the information would consist of a statement made by the accused to the police officer, and if such statement is made, the police officer is precluded from proving the information or any part thereof, unless it comes within the four corners of S.27. In other words, the police officer, if he wants to prove his information or any part thereof, should establish that the information or part thereof relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. It is in the light of this principle that we have to consider whether a joint statement given by two accused persons, which leads to the discovery of a fact, can come within the scope of S.27. 4. On this question, a few decisions have been brought to our attention by the counsel of the appellants. Some of them are In re Peria Guruswami Gounder (AIR. 1941 Mad. 765); Gurubaru Praja v. The King (AIR. 1949 Orissa 67); and Mathu v. State (AIR. 1958 All. 467). (We do not add to the citations.) The counsel has argued (that seems to be the argument advanced in one of the cases cited above also) that S.27 speaks of "a person", and therefore, the statement should not be a joint statement by more persons than one. This argument fails to appeal, because it is a common canon of construction that a singular includes a plural; and our General Clauses Act also accepts this. The question does not turn on whether the statement is by "a person": the more relevant question is whether both the accused persons can give statements at the same time relating to a fact. As pointed out by the Allahabad High Court in the decision cited above, when a fact is discovered from information given by one accused, there' cannot be any more discovery of that fact from information given by another accused: that will then be a rediscovery. As pointed out by the Allahabad High Court in the decision cited above, when a fact is discovered from information given by one accused, there' cannot be any more discovery of that fact from information given by another accused: that will then be a rediscovery. The information should relate distinctly to the fact discovered: and the information given in a joint statement may not so relate distinctly to the fact. Technically, it may be possible for two pesrons to give joint information which may lead to the discovery of a fact. But, it is always safer for the prosecution to record separate statements if the prosecution wishes to prove portions of the statements under S.27. As in this case, the joint information may lead to the discovery of different facts (MO.1 and MO.2 and their whereabouts); and then, it is all the more desirable and safe if the police officer records separate statements from the accused persons. The question really is not whether one person gives the information or two persons give the information. The importance lies in that the information should be precise in the sense that one particular accused gave a particular part of the information and the other accused gave the other part of the information, so that a definite portion of the information can be imputed to a particular accused person and proved against him. Otherwise, no portion of the joint statement can be proved under S.27. 5. Now about Ex. P6. Ex. P6, as already stated, does not contain any statement of either of the accused persons or any definite information as given by a particular accused person. It states that in pursuance of the information given by the two accused persons MOs.1 and 2 were recovered. The Public Prosecutor points out that it is possible to construe Ex. P6 as saying that MOs.1 and 2 were recovered in pursuance of information given by the first and the third accused persons respectively MO.1 was recovered in pursuance of information given by the first accused and MO.2 in pursuance of information given by the third accused. Still, the information cannot be proved unless the information is definite (in the actual words of the accused persons). 6. Here again, we go back to the Supreme Court decision already referred to. Still, the information cannot be proved unless the information is definite (in the actual words of the accused persons). 6. Here again, we go back to the Supreme Court decision already referred to. Bhagwati J. has considered an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court b Chagla C. J. and Gajendragadkar J. (Rex v. Gokulchand Dwarakadas Morarka). The argument before the learned judges of the Bombay High Court was that, if no part of the statement was sought to be proved, the joint statement was admissible and the joint statement should not be rejected. The learned judges rejected this contention advanced by the Advocate General. In the opinion of the learned judges, that would be an objectionable way of attempting to prove the statements made by the accused persons without actually proving them. The decision of Rankin C. J. of the Calcutta High Court in Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor (AIR. 1932 Cal. 297) was also brought to the notice of the learned Judges. Rankin C. J. stated in that decision that there was nothing in S.24 and 25 of the Evidence Act. "to prevent evidence being given: 'In consequence of something said by the accused I went to such and such a place and there found the boby of the deceased'. In cases under S.27 the witness may go further and give the relevant part of the confession." The learned judges of the Bombay High Court held that this observation of Rankin C. J. was obiter. The Supreme Court has pointed out that even in the Bombay case, for that matter, the opinion expressed by the learned judges was obiter. Ultimately, the Supreme Court has said that, if it came to that, the Supreme Court would accept the observation of Rankin C. J. in preference to the view expressed by the Bombay High Court. The' result is that, if no part of the alleged statement or information is sought to be proved under S.27, the evidence of the police officer that in consequence of something said or on information given by the accused the police officer discovered a particular fact or went to such and such place and there found a particular material object is admissible. This statement is innocuous and it does not connect the accused with the crime. This statement is innocuous and it does not connect the accused with the crime. What is proved is only that the particular fact was discovered in pursuance of information given by the accused, which cannot mean that the accused was the culprit or was connected with the crime. It can only mean that the accused knew of the existence of that fact: and courts should not attach any more weight to such discoveries than as indicated here. In other words, the connection of the accused with the crime, if any, should be proved by other evidence. 7. Ex. P6 contains no statement of the accused persons; nor is any portion of the statement alleged to have been given by the accused persons sought to be proved in this case. What is proved in this case is only that MOs.1 and 2 were recovered (or discovered) on information furnished by the accused persons. That cannot mean that the accused persons were themselves the culprits or they had anything to do with the crime. It can only mean that they knew of the whereabouts of the weapons: and we do not attach more importance to these recoveries than that. xx xx xx xx xx xx 8. We therefore alter the sentence of death imposed on the first accused into imprisonment for life. 9. With the above modification in the sentence of the first accused, the reference is accepted, and the appeals are dismissed.