JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - In a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, 14.82 acres of paddy land being the matter of the dispute had been attached and the Petitioner who is the Sarpanch of Kantilo Gram Panchayat was appointed as Receiver. The proceeding terminated in favour of the first party and in pursuance of the Court?s direction, the Petitioner on 25.10-1964 restored possession to the first party of the land with the standing crop thereon. The second party preferred revision against that order in this Court and the Court ordered that the previous arrangement should continue. Accordingly, the Sub-Divisional officer appointed the Petitioner as Receiver by his order dated 29-10-1964 which was served on him on 6-11-1964. By then, the first party bad already cut the crops from about 2 acres of land. Hence the Petitioner was put in possession of the rest of the disputed land measuring about a little less than 13 acres of land on 7-11-1964. He harvested the paddy crop standing on that land and then under the orders of the Court made over possession of the land to the A. S.I. of Police. By then mung and biri crops were standing on the land. Thereafter, under the direction of S.D.O., the Petitioner submitted his accounts showing the total yield from 12.82 acres of land to be 56 maunds which according to him, was sold for Rs. 570/-. He claimed Rs. 349.89p, as cost incurred by him in raising the crop and showed that he had a balance of Rs. (sic) with him. The Sub-Divisional Officer called upon him to explain the accounts. This matter was adjourned from time to time on some ground or other till 5-10-1967 when an ex parte order was passed by the S.D.O., who held that the net yield which the Petitioner realised from the 12.82 acres of land was Rs. 9986.00 By a notice served on the Petitioner on 6-12-1967, he was directed to deposit the amount in Court. The Petitioner applied on 8-12-1967 for a certified copy of the order and supplied folios on 22-12-1967. The copy was made ready on 26-12-1967 and was delivered to him. On the next day, he filed an application for review before the Sub-Divisional Officer which was rejected after hearing on 22-7-1968. The Petitioner applied on 8-12-1967 for a certified copy of the order and supplied folios on 22-12-1967. The copy was made ready on 26-12-1967 and was delivered to him. On the next day, he filed an application for review before the Sub-Divisional Officer which was rejected after hearing on 22-7-1968. Thereafter, on 2-9-1968, the present application for revision of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 5-10-1967 was filed. Along with his petition, the Petitioner also filed an application praying for excusing the delay in filing the revision petition on the ground that he was bona fide prosecuting the review application in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer and that the period from 26-12-1967 to 22-7-1968 should therefore be excluded from the period prescribed under Article 131 of the Limitation Act. 2. It is contended by the opposite party that the revision application is not maintainable and that the Petitioner is not entitled to condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. 3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21, Code of Civil Procedure, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the Applicant satisfies the Court that be had sufficient cause for not making the application during such period. "Period of Limitation" is defined in Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule and "prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The use of the words "after the prescribed period" "in Section 5 of the Limitation Act indicates that Section 5 would apply by virtue of its own force to matters for which limitation is prescribed by the Act. Article 131 of the Limitation Act prescribes 90 days as the period of limitation for preferring a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The starting point is the date of the order sought to be revised. Section 5, therefore, applies to such applications. The question is whether sufficient came has been made out to condone the delay. Although the order under revision was passed on 5-10-1967, it was an ex parte order passed in the absence of the Petitioner. The starting point is the date of the order sought to be revised. Section 5, therefore, applies to such applications. The question is whether sufficient came has been made out to condone the delay. Although the order under revision was passed on 5-10-1967, it was an ex parte order passed in the absence of the Petitioner. That it was not meant to be operative at once and before notice thereof was served on the Petitioner, is clear from the fact that on the date the order was passed, the S.D.O. directed that notice be issued to the receiver to pay the amount by 5-12-1967-vide order No. 44 dated 5-12-1967. This notice was actually issued on 1.12.1967 and was served on the Petitioner on 6-12-1967 (Page 45 of the file of the lower Court). There is nothing to show that before he received the notice, the Petitioner was aware of the adverse order passed against him. Immediately thereafter he made an application for a certified copy of the order which he received on 20-12-1967 and the very next day he filed an application for review on the advice of one of the seniormost Lawyers of the Nayagarh Bar. It is true that a party is not completely absolved of his responsibility and does not automatically become entitled to the protection u/s 5 of the Limitation Act merely by entrusting his work to a senior Advocate, but if the view taken by the legal adviser is quite a reasonable view, even though mistaken, and the advice could be given by any senior Lawyer inspite of due care and caution, they only the party is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and this must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Doubtless the power to review is not given to an inferior criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but Mr. Panda for the Petitioner argues that the lawyer in the Court below took the view, may be a mistaken view, that the power to determine the amount which the receiver is liable to pay is of a quasi-civil nature and that the Court in exercise of its inherent power, might review it when correct facts are placed before him. Panda for the Petitioner argues that the lawyer in the Court below took the view, may be a mistaken view, that the power to determine the amount which the receiver is liable to pay is of a quasi-civil nature and that the Court in exercise of its inherent power, might review it when correct facts are placed before him. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to hold that the advice given by the lawyer to the Petitioner was unreasonable or that the lawyer was guilty of palpable negligence in giving such advice. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to the exclusion of time occupied by him in prosecuting the review application. 4. That apart, the order passed by the learned Magistrate fixing the net yield from a little less than 13 acres of land in Nayagarh subdivision at Rs. 9986.00 appears on the face of it to be very high and it would be unreasonable to hold that after receiving such order, the Petitioner would not have been diligent to get the wrong redressed. In the circumstances, I would condone the delay in filing the application. 5. Now coming to the merits of the application, it is to be remembered that the Petitioner was not a litigant before the Court below but he had been appointed as a receiver by the Court, and that as such he was an Officer of the Court. After he submitted his accounts under the direction of the Court, he was called upon to explain the same. It is not correct to say that the receiver never appeared in Court to explain the accounts. I find from the order sheet that he was present on 20-12-1967, but on the application of the second party, the case was adjourned. One of the dates to which the matter stood adjourned was 15-6-1967 and a notice was sent to the receiver to be present on that date. He submitted an application enclosing thereto a medical certificate to the effect that he was ill and would "not be in a position to attend Court. One of the dates to which the matter stood adjourned was 15-6-1967 and a notice was sent to the receiver to be present on that date. He submitted an application enclosing thereto a medical certificate to the effect that he was ill and would "not be in a position to attend Court. This application was received by the S.D.O's. office on 14-6-1967 (page 18 of the file), but was not put up before the Officer when he passed the order on 15th directing that the case be posted to 25-6-1967 for hearing the second party on the accounts furnished by the receiver. Thereafter, 25th being a Sunday, the case was taken up on the 26th, but as the S.D.O. was on tour, it was adjourned to 10-7-1967. No fresh notice was issued to the receiver to be present on the 10th July. On that day, the second party was examined ex parte and the case was adjourned for passing of order which after some adjournments was passed on 5-10-1967. Having regard to the circumstances stated above, and the fact that the Petitioner would be greatly prejudiced if the order passed against him is allowed to stand, I feel that it is a fit case in which interference by this Court is called for in the interest of justice. 6. I would accordingly allow this application, set aside the order dated 5-10-1967 passed by the Sub-divisional Officer-cum-Magistrate, 1st Class, Nayagarh fixing the liability of the Petitioner at Rs. 9986.00 and remand the case back to him for disposal after giving opportunity to be Petitioner to explain accounts submitted by him. Final Result : Allowed