Judgment B.D.Singh, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree, dated the 30th March, 1968 of the lower appellate court in Title Appeal No. 5/48 of 1963 confirming those of the trial court, dated the 30th November, 1962 in Title Suit No. 235 of 1959. 2. In order to appreciate the point urged in this appeal, it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. The plaintiff-appellant instituted the said title suit for partition of one-third share in two plots of land, bearing Plot Nos. 335 and 337 which contain a total area of 4 bighas, 4 kathas and 15 dhurs appertaining to Khata No. 81 situated in village Shampur, Police Station Mirganj, District Saran, Plaintiffs case, in brief, was that the suit land was bakast land of Narain Dubey, Prasad Dubey and Nand-lal Dubey, They being the three sons of one Thakur Dubey, each had one-third share in the property in dispute. Prasad Dubey sold his one-third share, that is, 1 bigha, 8 kathas and 5 dhurs out of the said two plots, to the plaintiff, for a consideration of Rs. 500.00 on the 4th July, 1959, and put the plaintiff in possession over the same. His further case was that Suria Kuari, widow of Narain Dubey, Ramdeo Dubey and Ram Naresh Dubey, heirs of Nandlal Dubey sold their two-third shares in the disputed plots to the defendants and put them in possession. Since the plaintiff found it difficult to remain in possession of the lands jointly with the defendants, he instituted the said suit for partition. The defendant-respondents resisted the suit and inter alia pleaded that just after the revi-sional survey Narain Dubey, Prasad Dubey and the sons of Nandlal Dubey partitioned and separated their properties. By the said partition, the suit land fell exclusively to the share of Narain Dubey and sons of Nandlal Dubey. Prasad Dubey, the vendor of the plaintiff had no concern with the suit land after the said partition. They also pleaded that the land under dispute, was given in mortgage by two zerpeshgi deeds (Exts. B and B/1) executed by Narain Dubey and Rajrup Dubey sons of Nandlal Dubey in respect of the same plots including the disputed plots. Prasad Dubey, the vendor of the plaintiff had no concern with the suit land after the said partition. They also pleaded that the land under dispute, was given in mortgage by two zerpeshgi deeds (Exts. B and B/1) executed by Narain Dubey and Rajrup Dubey sons of Nandlal Dubey in respect of the same plots including the disputed plots. The further case of the defendants was that the suit lands were settled with the defendants by two separate Pattas, dated the 9th February, 1949, and they were in possession over the suit land. The defendants also pleaded adverse possession. According to them, the plaintiff had acquired no title to the suit land as his vendor Prasad Dubey had no title over it. Both parties led evidence both oral and documentary. The trial Court found that there was a previous partition and the suit land fell exclusively to the share of Narain Dubey and Nandlal Dubey. Prasad Dubey, the vendor of the plaintiff, had no right, title and interest in the suit land after the partition. Therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to partition. He also found that the defendants were in possession of the suit land on the basis of the settlement as pleaded by the defendants. Thus, the suit for partition instituted by the plaintiff, was dismissed. On appeal the appellate court also confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court as mentioned above. 3. Mr. Yogendra Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has raised two points for consideration in this appeal; they are (i) the appellate court has erred in construing Exhibits B and B/1; and (ii) that the appellate court has altogether failed to consider the oral evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff. In order to support his contention under point No. (i) he drew my attention to Exhibits B and B/1. He urged that the appellate court has committed an error of record in holding that Narain Dubey and Nandlal Dubey had mortgaged the entire lands under Plot Nos. 335 and 337. A perusal of Exhibits B and B/1 clearly indicates that they had mortgaged their two-third shares only. This contention of the learned counsel appears to be correct and it has also been conceded by Mr. Janardan Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, but Mr. 335 and 337. A perusal of Exhibits B and B/1 clearly indicates that they had mortgaged their two-third shares only. This contention of the learned counsel appears to be correct and it has also been conceded by Mr. Janardan Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, but Mr. Singh submitted that the appellate court has not based its conclusion only on Exhibits B and B/1. There was other evidence on the record justifying the conclusion which the appellate court has reached. Therefore, he urged that the concurrent findings of facts of the court below should not be disturbed in the second appeal. I would have accepted the submission made by Mr. Singh, but the way in which the appellate court has dealt with the oral evidence, I have no option left than to remit the case to the appellate court for re-consideration of the evidence on the record. This brings us to the consideration of point No. (ii) urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 4. Mr, Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, drew my attention to the discussion of oral evidence by the appellate court in paragraph 11 of its judgment. It will be useful to quote the said paragraph :- - "The oral evidence regarding possession adduced by the defendants is also much more reliable than that adduced by the plaintiff-appellant and is supported by the documents and circumstances discussed above. The learned Munsif has given good reasons in his judgment for believing such evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants and I do not think there is any necessity of repeating the same." In my opinion, the appellate court has failed to consider the oral evidence. In the case of Bhagwan Singh V/s. Ujagir Singh, AIR 1940 Pat 33, Rowland, J. (as he then was) while dealing with the duty of the first appellate court, observed that the legislature has thought fit to entrust to the first appellate court the final decision of all matters of fact on which the disposal of the suits turns. Every officer in this position should realize that the confidence thus reposed in him implies a corresponding duty and trust, that he will to the best of his power weigh and balance the evidence, facts and considerations appearing on both sides. Every officer in this position should realize that the confidence thus reposed in him implies a corresponding duty and trust, that he will to the best of his power weigh and balance the evidence, facts and considerations appearing on both sides. He should endeavour so to decide his cases that his judgment may carry a conviction if not or its correctness, at least of a fair endeavour to place a correct valuation on the merit of the cases of both sides. He should never let it appear either to the public or to a superior Court that he has chosen to accept the evidence of one side or the other without due consideration of the salient facts established and contrary to the conclusion to which the outstanding, facts point, arbitrarily or on patently inadequate grounds. In the case of Lal Suraj Prasad V/s. Ram Charitar Singh, AIR 1950 Pat 298 , Reuben and Jamuar, JJ. (as they then were) observed that a judgment of an appellate Court should contain the grounds on which its decision is based. It is not sufficient for the appellate Court to state in general terms that it agrees with the reasoning of the subordinate Court; although in a judgment of affirmance it is not necessary that the appellate Court should repeat all that has been said by the subordinate Court, there must be a sufficient discussion to show that it has applied its own mind to the evidence. Similar view was taken by Reuben and Narayan, JJ. ia the case of Sailajanadan Pandey V/s. Lakhi-chand Sao, AIR 1951 Pat 502 . Mr. Singh, however, contended tbat it was not necessary for the appellate Court to give an elaborate judgment. If he would have discussed the evidence it would have been mere repetition. In order to support his contention, he relied in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 , where their Lordships held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge bad not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate Court. Their Lordships further held that the finding of the lower appellate Court could be said to be perverse or not supported by any evidence. In my judgment the observation made by their Lordships in that case do not lend support to the contention made by Mr. Singh in the instant case. It is true that this Court is not justified under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) to interfere merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court is not as elaborate as that of the trial Court, but that does not mean that the appellate Court should not apply its own mind to the evidence. In the present case the appellate Court in Paragraph 11 of its judgment which has been quoted earlier, has not at all discussed the oral evidence which clearly indicate that it did not apply its own mind to the evidence. Mr. Singh further referred to the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das Sharma V/s. Gaya Sah, AIR 1967 Pat 254 where U. N. Sinha, J. (now Chief Justice), while dealing with the provisions contained under Sections 100 and 101 of the Code, held that the mere fact that the lower appellate Court has made specific reference in its judgment to only some of the witnesses examined by the parties cannot lead to the inference that it was unmindful of the other evidence let in by them, especially when the judgment refers to their respective contentions and cases, which should mean the evidence let in by them. His Lordship further observed that its factual conclusions, reached on scrutiny of evidence on record, oral and documentary, cannot be set aside in second appeal. In my view, that observation of his Lordship is also of no avail in the present case. It may be noticed that in that case the appellate Court had made reference and there was discussion at least of some of the evidence led by the parties. In that background his Lordship in Paragraph 6 at Page 257 observed that the judgment of the Court of appeal below gave a clear indication of the fact that the Court had come to its conclusions after a scrutiny of the evidence on record, oral and documentary. In that view of the matter his Lordship held that the Judgment could not be set aside. In that view of the matter his Lordship held that the Judgment could not be set aside. In the present case there is complete absence of discussion of oral evidence by the appellate Court even of some of the witnesses examined by the parties. 5 In my view, the summary of all the authoritative decisions referred to above on the point of the duty of the appellate Court regarding appreciation of the evidence is that the appellate Court is not required to write elaborate judgment nor it is required to discuss each and every evidence examined by the parties, but he must discuss at least some of the important and relevant evidence in order to give expres-sion that the appellate Court applied its mind to the evidence and has come to its conclusion after scrutiny of the evidence on record, oral and documentary. In the light of the above discussions the Judgment and decree of the appellate Court cannot be sustained. 6. In the result, I set aside the Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and remand the appeal for fresh disposal in the light of the above observations on the basis of the evidence already on record. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.