JUDGMENT G.S. Lal, J. - This special appeal arises out of a writ petition relating to a service matter. The appellant Lajpat Rai Malhotra was Grade I Clerk in the Divisional Accounts Office, Lucknow. On 26-12-1958 a report was made to the Divisional Accounts Officer, Lucknow (respondent No. 4.) alleging wrongful withdrawal of Rs. 258 93 P. by Malhotra. By an order dated 8-1-1959 (of which copy is Annexure 1 to the writ petition) the appellant was suspended by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer (respondent No. 2). Thereafter a charge-sheet was served on the appellant on 4.5-1959 by respondent No. 4, copy thereof being Annexure 2 to the writ petition The enquiry however started on 21-7-1961 after more than two years. The enquiry was held by a committee of three members appointed by the Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer Northern Railway (Respondent No. 1 who was the appointing authority of the appellant The Committee submitted its report dated 2 .11-1962 holding that the charge of serious misconduct in the form of defrauding the Railway Administration to the extent of the amount mentioned above by producing a faked requisition after re-audit of unpaid wages was proved. Respondent No. 1 then issued a show cause notice oil 14-9-1963 to the appellant who submitted his explanation. However respondent No. 1 dismissed the appellant from service as per communication date. 18-4-1966 sent to the appellant The appellant preferred d an appeal but the same was dismissed on 6-9 1966 of the General Manager. Northern Railway Respondent No. 3). The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court praying that by the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari the order of suspension and the orders leading to his dismissal be quashed. 2. The writ petition was contested by the opposite parties to it. Several contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition. One was that the charge-sheet had not been issued by a proper authority That contention was however not accepted by the learned Single Judge. Another contention was that the order of suspension could have been passed only by the Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer and not by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. That contention was also repelled. One was that the charge-sheet had not been issued by a proper authority That contention was however not accepted by the learned Single Judge. Another contention was that the order of suspension could have been passed only by the Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer and not by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. That contention was also repelled. The third contention related to the enquiry itself The petitioner's case was that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as certain documents necessary for his defence were not given to him or produced before the enquiry. This case .Iso did not find favour with the learned Single Judge There was then the plea that the punishing authority had failed to record its finding on each charge as required by Rule 1713 of the Railway Establishment Code. The learned Single Judge held that though there was no compliance with rule 1713 that by itself did not, on the facts of the case entitle the petitioner either to have the show cause notice or the dismissal order struck down. 3. The last contention raised before the learned Single Judge was that the appellate authority did not comply with the previsions of Rule 1713 (2) of the Railway Establishment Code under which it had to consider whether the procedure prescribed in the rules had been complied with and if not, whether the non-compliance had resulted in violation in any provisions of the Constitution or any failure of justice and whether the finding'. were justified and also whether the penalty imposed was excessive, adequate or inadequate. The appellate authority had disposed of the appeal with only one sentence, namely. "I find no grounds for modifying the punishment given by F A. and Chief Accounts Officer, which will stand". Further the petitioner had asked for personal hearing in his appeal but the same not been allowed nor any reason recorded for not allowing it. The learned Single Judge found that the appellate authority had not recorded anything to show how the order was confirmed by it and it had also not given personal hearing without even disclosing any reason for not allowing it. The learned Single Judge found that the appellate authority had not recorded anything to show how the order was confirmed by it and it had also not given personal hearing without even disclosing any reason for not allowing it. Accordingly the writ petition was allowed in part and the appellate order contained in annexure 28 to the writ petition was quashed with the direction that the appeal be decided afresh in accordance with law and having in view the observations made in the body of the judgment. 4. The decision of the learned Single Judge was acquiesced in by the opposite parties to the writ petition but the petitioner filed the special appeal under decision, not being satisfied with merely the quashing of the appellate order. At the time of hearing of the special appeal an effort was made on behalf of the . appellant by his learned counsel to be able to question also the decision of the appellate authority given again in pursuance of the judgment of the learned Single Judge but he was not allowed to do so as that appellate order as something new and could be questioned only by a fresh writ petition. 5. In the special appeal the grounds which were not upheld by the learned Single Judge have been reiterated and both sides have been heard on those points. They will be dealt with one by one. 6. Regarding the contention that the charge-sheet was not issued by the authority authorised to issue it, the appellant's case is that the charge-sheet should have been issued by the appointing authority as proceedings were being taken to impose the penalty of dismissal or removal. Now there is no rule which requires a charge-sheet in a case where a major penalty may possibly he inflicted to he signed or issued by the appointing authority. Rule 11709 only require-, that the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegation on which the enquiry is proposed to be held and such charges. together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based are required to be communised in writing to the concerned railway servant. 'Disciplinary Authority' has been defined in clause (ii) of Rule 170? as follows : (ii) "'Disciplinary Authority' in relation to the imposition of penalty on a Railway Servant means, the authority competent to impose on him that penalty. 'Disciplinary Authority' has been defined in clause (ii) of Rule 170? as follows : (ii) "'Disciplinary Authority' in relation to the imposition of penalty on a Railway Servant means, the authority competent to impose on him that penalty. provided that for imposing penalties of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal that authority shill be the 'Appointing authority, and in relation to the issue of charge-sheets etc. under Rules 1709 to 1712 and 1716 means, any authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 1707." it is clear that any authority which is competent to impose any of the penal- ties specified in rule 707 is comoerem to issue a charge-sheet. The learned counsel wants to draw a distinction between issuing of a charge-sheet and Framing of a charge-sheet. We find no justification for drawing any such distinction. There would be no point in defining the authority to issue a charge- sheet if by 'issue' was merely meant the clerical jab of passing on the Charge-sheet framed by some other authority to the railway servant, The undoubted intention is to define the authority which is to frame the charge- sheet under into the signature to be sent to the railway servant. The contention was therefore, rightly rep.-lied by the learned Single Judge, for there is no dispute on the point that the Divisional Accounts Officer who signed the charge-sheet was an. authority to impose one of the penalties mentioned in Rule 1707. 7. As to the contention that the suspension of the appellant was ordered by an authority not competent- to do it, there is again no substance in it. Rule 1705 provides that the authorities competent to place a railway servant under suspension will be as specified in Schedules 1, II and III appended to the rules. In item No. 10 of Schedule II a junior Administrative Officer has been empowered to s spend a member of class it t staff to which the appellant belongs. It is not disputed that respondent No 2 who passed the suspension order is in the class of Junior Administrative Officer. 8. Coming to the contention that reasonable opportunity for defence was not given, in order to appreciate the plea that the appellant "as prejudiced by non-supply of copies or non-production of certain documents at the enquiry. it is necessary to mention the charge and to clarify it. 8. Coming to the contention that reasonable opportunity for defence was not given, in order to appreciate the plea that the appellant "as prejudiced by non-supply of copies or non-production of certain documents at the enquiry. it is necessary to mention the charge and to clarify it. The charge levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet was in the following words : "Serious misconduct under Rule 1706 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, Vol. I in that you at Lucknow on the 18th and 19th day of December, 1958, while working as a Clerk Grade 1, defrauded the Railway Administration to the extent of Rs. 258 94 N.P by producing a faked requisition for re-audit of unpaid wages herring No. W13158 dated 27/10. You got it checked and pissed by your personal efforts and eventually drew the payment fraudulently. A brief statement of the allegations is annexed hereto." The statement of allegations annexed to the charge-sheet run into six paragraphs (vide annexure 2 to the writ petition). If the wages of a person hive been passed for payment but somehow remain unpaid then a requisition for unpaid wages is again required to be prepared and audited and then in the pay office the money is paid to the workman on the basis of such re-audited and passed requisition. According to the aforesaid statement the allegations against the appellant in very brief were that he was instrumental in the preparation of a faked requisition o" unpaid wages amounting to Rs. 258.94 prise in favour of one Prahlad, Ex-Gateman, with a bogus endorsement at its foot to the effect that the amount wag still lying unpaid and be re-audited if not already done The appellant is further said to have personally taken the requisition to the concerned persons and to have managed to get it passed fraudulently by using his influence and by giving out that Prahlad was known to him personally. It was further alleged that the appellant drew the money by presenting the requisition which he had , fraudulently got passed in active collusion with the pay office clerk, and on the basis of the thumb impression put on an un-current one anna stamp with false certificate of identification of payee and of his thumb impression and also of payment having been made to the payee in the appellants presence, It may he stated that there was a preliminary enquiry and on a perusal of the report of that enquiry a decision was taken by the concerned authorities to take disciplinary action against the appellant. 9 In reply to the charge-sheet the appellant at first simply stated that the charges had been concocted against him by fa irritating false evidence and that he would give his detailed statement before the Enquiry Committee. This was on 12-5. 1959, vide Annexure 3 to the writ Petition. Two days later he sent another communication (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) stating further that he be supplied with list of witnesses to be examined to prove the allegations against him along with copies of their statements given at the preliminary enquiry and copy of the preliminary report and also copies of all the other documentary evidence to he produced before the enquiry. It may be stated here that with the charge-street none of these thing, had been supplied to the appellant There was a full for nearly two years and it was only on 24-4-1961 that a reply was sent to the appellant (see annexure 5 to the writ petition). It was stated therein that the list of witnesses could not he given to him at that stage, nor a copy of the preliminary report. It was further stated that the paid vouchers etc which constituted the documentary evidence in the case could not he parted with and the appellant would he given an opportunity to examine them at the time of their production before the Enquiry Committee. Copies of statements recorded at the time of the preliminary enquiry were, however enclosed with the letter. Thereafter the first letter in chronological order to be found on the record is dated 31-10-1961 (see annexure 6 to the writ petitioner and is in reply to a letter dated 20 10- 1961 received by the appellant. Copies of statements recorded at the time of the preliminary enquiry were, however enclosed with the letter. Thereafter the first letter in chronological order to be found on the record is dated 31-10-1961 (see annexure 6 to the writ petitioner and is in reply to a letter dated 20 10- 1961 received by the appellant. It does not appear why the earlier letters exchanged between the appellant and the concerned authorities have not been filed. In the aforesaid letter the appellant prayed again for supply of a copy of' the preliminary enquiry report an J. in addition, prayed that certain records be kept ready as they would be retied upon in defence. Those records were duly specified. By another letter dated 28-12-1961 (Annexure (7) the appellant invited the attention of the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee to a Home Ministry Circular letter dated 25-8 1961, according to which copies of documents should have been supplied to him He again made a grievance of the fact that list of documents had not been supplied. nor copy, of the preliminary enquiry report. Some further correspondence followed which it is not necessary to detail since on 26-9-1961 he ultimately wrote in his letter to the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee (Vide Annexure A to the counter affidavit; that he be given a copy of the preliminary enquiry report and did nit require any other document on which the allegations against him were based. All the some it mas be stated that the attitude of the authorities was very unreasonable since the appellant could justly claim to know the names of witnesses who were going to be examined against him and the documents which were going to be relied against hint. If copies of documents could not conveniently be supplied he could have been given an opportunity to inspect those documents before the enquiry started In view of the aforesaid letter the appellant can, however, be heard only in respect of non-supply of a copy of the preliminary enquiry report till almost the fag end of the enquiry and the non-production for his defence of the documents specified in his letter dated 31.10-1961 (Annexure 6 referred to above)for which he went on repeating his request. The request was made in the aforesaid letter. Annexure A, also. 10. The request was made in the aforesaid letter. Annexure A, also. 10. As to the appellants grievance of late supply of the preliminary enquiry, we do not think that the appellant was prejudiced thereby in producing his defence. As a matter of fact supply of a copy of that report was not necessary since the report was meant only to bring the prima facie position before the disciplinary authority to form an opinion if there was any prima facie case against the appellant and disciplinary proceedings were called for. He had been supplied copies of statements of witnesses at that enquiry and that was enough to give him and indication of what the witnesses to be produced were expected to say and he could prepare himself for cross-examination tie was also no doubt entitled to have an idea of the documents to be relied upon against him The appellant has, however. not shown if and how he was prejudiced by not being shown those documents in advance. Of course he could have an idea of some of the documents from the statement annexed in the charge-sheet itself. Before he was called upon to produce his defence he had himself stated in Annexure A aforesaid that he did not require any other document on which the allegations against him were based except a copy of the preliminary enquiry report. After the it letter, no doubt, he pressed that he be told what documents Here relevant to each charge separately. It was, however, not incumbent it on the Administration or the Enquiry Committee to declare the relevancy of each document. 11. The appellant, however, very seriously contends that he has been greatly prejudiced by reason of certain documents required by him for his defence not being produced. However, ultimately his case became confined to three documents mentioned in his letter, Annexure 18 to the writ petition, since, as appears from the reply Annexure 19, from the Chairman. Enquiry Committee, those documents could not be supplied as they were not available. They were : (1) Office copy of the statement showing the position of supplementary bi is and unpaid requisition; in Accounts Office as submitted by DAO/Lucknow to Deputy CAO/G: Vol. Enquiry Committee, those documents could not be supplied as they were not available. They were : (1) Office copy of the statement showing the position of supplementary bi is and unpaid requisition; in Accounts Office as submitted by DAO/Lucknow to Deputy CAO/G: Vol. 5 (2) T.A. Journals and contingent slips of Lajpat Rai from, Jan./58 to Jan /59; (3) File of D.C.P.M./Lucknow of telegrams issued to pay clerks in Dec./58." The learned Single Judge observed that it was not necessary to go into the question as to how far those documents were material for the purposes of the petitioner's defence because of the conclusion that it was the petitioner and none else who was responsible for the non-supply of those documents This conclusion was arrived on the basis of the opinion that the very nature of those documents showed that they could not be kept permanently an.i if the petitioner thought that they were really necessary for the purpose of his defence he should have asked for them in his earliest letter dated 14-5-1959 which he wrote soon after the service of charges on him and that if he had then indicated that he would require those document,, the authorities could have been duty bound to see that those papers were preserved till the enquiry was concluded and were not allowed to be weeded out in due course. The learned Single Judge also referred to Rule 12l of the Indian Railway Code (in the Accounts department) which la's down that the destruction of records in Accounts Office will be carried out under the orders of the Financial Advisor and the Chief Accounts Officer subject to retention of certain records for minimum periods prescribed in Appendix IX. Anyhow we find ourselves unable to place the responsibility for the non- availability of the papers on the appellant. The petitioner had not been called upon in the charge-sheet or otherwise to indicate the witnesses he could like to examine and the documents he would like to rely upon in his defence. Soon after the receipt of the charge sheet he asked for a list of witnesses, COPY of preliminary report and copies of other documentary evidence to be produced appeal enquiry. That was naturally the first thing to which his attention could not be devoted. Soon after the receipt of the charge sheet he asked for a list of witnesses, COPY of preliminary report and copies of other documentary evidence to be produced appeal enquiry. That was naturally the first thing to which his attention could not be devoted. If he had received the document asked for he could have thought of the documents he would required in defence. But for almost two years nothing further happened in the enquiry and a reply to his letter dated 14-5-1959 cane only in the date 24-4 1961 and that too denying to him even thing he had asked for except copies of statements of witnesses examined at the preliminary enquiry The enquiry commenced on 21-7-1961 whereafter alone he could possibly have come to know of the documents which were being relied upon against him and the detailed case with evidence against him. Long before the stage of defence arriving he specified certain documents and informed that they he kept ready to serve his defence. There is no assertion in the counter affidavit that the documents had been weeded out by 31-10.1961 nor was it so said in any reply from the administration to the appellant's demand for those papers. Even on 22-10-1961 (vide Annexure 19) he was only told that the records were not available at that distant date. This was almost a year after the demand had been made. On behalf of the respondents no attempt has been made to show that the period provided for retention of the records under rule 121 aforesaid had expired before 31-10-1961. In any case under rule 121 the destruction of records after the period of retention prescribed in Appendix IX is to he carried out under the orders of the Financial Advisor and the Chief Accounts Officer and there is nothing to show that any order for destruction was made by the said authority The question does still arise whether the appellant has been prejudiced by the non-production of the said documents We need not enter into any discussion of that matter since we find that on another ground the order of dismissal is vitiated and if the punishing authority chooses to proceed again according to law it would be more appropriate for the authority to consider the effect of non-production of those documents on the defence of the appellant. 12. 12. Toe ground on which in our opinion the order of the punishing authority is vitiated is the non-observance of Rule 1713 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, the provision of the said rule being that the disciplinary authority if it is not the enquiring authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and record its finding on each charge As a matter of fact in this case it appears that the punishing authority did not only not record its findings but did not apply its mind to the matter and ostensibly dittoed the findings of the Enquiry Committee in routine. 13. The show cause notice dated 14-1-1963 issued under the signature of the Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer (opposite party no. 1) to the petitioner contains the following matter in its first two paragraphs: "I have considered your written defence in reply to charge-sheet dated 4-5-1959 and the findings of the Departmental enquiry ordered by Mr. T. S. Sub-ramanian, then F.A. & C.A.U. into the matter. I have, therefore, come to the provisional decision that you should be dismissed from service." It will appear that even the show cause notice does not assert that the F.A. & C.A.O. had formed the opinion that the charge, had been substantiated. The above quoted paragraphs will only indicate that he was only considering the question as to what punishment was to he imposed having regard to the reply of the appellant to the charge-sheet and the findings of the departmental enquiry The learned counsel appearing for the apposite parties was given an opportunity to produce any findings or order which might have been recorded by the F A. & C.A.O. in pursuance of which the show cause notice (Annexure 20) was issued, but he did not produce any such findings or order. It appears that even the draft of the show cause notice was prepared by someone else and was signed in routine by the F.A. and C.A.O for even if he had carefully per- used the contents of the draft, he would have noticed the commission therein of the mention of the fact that he was in agreement with the findings of the depart- mental enquiry or had come to the conclusion that the charges had been proved. The learned Single J edge was of the opinion that Rule 1713 was not mandatory and the failure on the part of F.A.&C A.O to record his findings on the charges did nit vitiate the order of dismissal. He proceeded to consider if the same had, however, prejudiced the petitioner otherwise and came to the conclusion that no such prejudice had been caused. He was of the opinion that from the show cause notice with which a copy of the report of the Enquiry Committee was attached, the petitioner must have known that the F. A. & C. .. O. was agreeing with the findings in that report and the petitioner was therefore in a position to make what submissions he liked against the findings in his explanation to the show cause notice and the petitioner actually made submissions. We are unable to reconcile ourselves to this line of reasoning. In our opinion Rule 1713 is mandatory and contains a very salutary principle and is non meant to be a nit re ceremony The present case is itself an illustration of the necessity of enjoining upon the punishing authority to record its own findings. The principle embodied under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India that a civil servant cannot be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by any authority lower than the appointing authority does not merely mean that the orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank should issue under the signatures of the appointing authority. The requirements is that the decision should actually be the decision of the appointing authority after a consideration of the fact whether the charges levelled against the civil servant have been proved or not. The function of any Enquiry Committee is only to assist the appointing authority in conducting the proceedings after which the conclusions about proof of charges are to be arrived at. The enquiring authority may be permitted also to give its findings, putting the material for and against each charge, but these findings are to be no substitute for the appointing authority's own conclusion which may be similar to or different from the findings of the enquiring authority. When the appointing authority proceeds to record its own findings it is bound to apply its mind which it may otherwise omit or shirk to do. When the appointing authority proceeds to record its own findings it is bound to apply its mind which it may otherwise omit or shirk to do. Rule 1713 provides a safeguard against the appointing authority not discharging its responsibility and adopting the findings of the enquiring authority without aprly its own mind. That such things can happen is obvious from the instant case in which highly placed officers like the F. A. & C. A. O and the General Manager failed to observe the obvious and specific provisions of the rules relating to their duties and dealt with the appellant's case in a routine matter and in disregard or their responsibilities, amounting to playing with the fact of the appellant. The final order passed by the F A. and C. A. 0. is also not before us and we do not know if even at that stage the defence of the appellant was really considered by that authority, that being before us merely the letter issued by a lower authority communicating to the appellant the decision r.f the F. A and C. A. 0. to award the punishment of dismissal to the appellant Had there been a detailed order instead of a cryptic phrase or sentence a copy of the order must have been produced in the case in an attempt to make up for the want of findings required under Rule 1713. The order of dismissal, therefore, stands vitiated for the abo%e reasons. Since the said order is not under consideration before the appellate authority now and stands in tact it must be quashed. 14. We accordingly allow the special appeal with costs and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge by which he dismissed the writ petition. We allow the writ petition and quash the show cause notice as per annexure 20 which was issued without observance of the provisions of rule 1713 and the order of dismissal as appearing from the communication (Annexure 22) thereof to the petitioner The relief regarding quashing of the suspension order (is per annexure 1) is, however, disallowed. Having regard to the partial success we order that the costs at the Single Judge stage shall be borne by the parties themselves.