KRISHNASWAMI v. C. H. KANARAN — 1970 DIGILAW 182 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This Criminal Revision petition arises out of a private complaint filed by one C. H. Kanaran, Secretary, Kerala State Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Trivandrum, who is the petitioner herein against the respondent, one P. Krishnaswamy, Printer and Publisher of the Indian Express, which is an English daily published at Madurai, charging offences under Ss, 500 and 501 IPC., for publication of a news item in its issue dated 11-8-67. 2. The impugned news item marked as Ext. P1 (b) reads as follows: "C P I unit levels graft charges against Leftists Trivandrum, Aug. 10 (ENS) One of the units of the Right Communist Party in Kerala has come out with certain startling allegations against the 'Marxists. The Pathanapuram Taluk Committee of the CPI has, after listing the instances of alleged corruption indulged in by the Marxists, asked its State Committee to reconsider how long we are to bear this liability off defending their corruption." The 21-member taluk committee in a resolution adopted unanimously has also suggested to the State Committee "to seek the earliest opportunity to shake off this liability". Among the charges made by the taluk committee are: The Marxist Party has gained to the tune of about Rs. 4 lakhs as a result of levies made in individual wholesale traders in food who are being deliberately retained for ration distribution, even though the United Front had expressly recommended their elimination. For the grant of a foreign liquor licence to someone in Punalur, the party received a "donation" of Rs. 4.000. The resolution has also referred to a Rs. 25,000 "donation" to the Marxist Party General Secretary in connection with a top appointment. Appointment to the post of bus conductors is made only after receiving a "donation" of Rs. 1,000 from each of the applicants. (It may be mentioned here that recently a Marxist advocate was appointed Chairman of the State Road Transport Corporation displacing an IAS Official.) The Taluk Committee has also alleged "pressure and illegal interference by Marxists" in the reinstatement of a suspended officer which recently raised a storm in the Assembly." 3. The District Magistrate (Judicial), Trivandrum, who conducted the trial in the case on examination of pws.1 to 4 as well as Exts. The District Magistrate (Judicial), Trivandrum, who conducted the trial in the case on examination of pws.1 to 4 as well as Exts. P1 to P5 and Dl to D18 and after hearing the arguments of the respective counsel who appeared in the case, came to the conclusion under S.253(1) Cr. P. C, that no case against the revision petitioner has been made out, which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction and consequently the learned Magistrate discharged the revision petitioner under that Section. The 1st respondent, the complainant, filed Crl. R. P. in the first instance before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Trivandrum, against the order of acquittal. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge found that the 1st respondent is a person aggrieved of the false imputation contained in Ext. P1 (b) publication under S.198 Cr. P. C. and, therefore, he was competent to institute the complaint. Accordingly, the Additional Sessions judge set aside the order of acquittal passed by the District Magistrate and directed him to frame charges against the revision petitioner under S.500 and 501 IPC., and conduct further enquiry into the complaint. It was against that order by the Additional Sessions Judge that the present criminal revision petition is preferred by the accused in C. C. 82/67 on the file of the court of the District Magistrate, (Judicial) Trivandrum. 4. The imputation is Ext. P1 (b) can be classified into two categories. (1) Imputation against the "Marxist Party" or Marxists or Leftists generally. The imputation against these classes of persons contained is Ext. P1 (b) are: (i) that the Marxist Party had gained to the tune of Rs. 4 lakhs as a result of levies made on individual wholesale dealers in food, who are being deliberately retained for ration distribution even though the United Front has expressly recommended their elimination; (ii) for the grant of a foreign liquor licence to some at Punalur, the Party received a donation of Rs. 4.000/ (Hi) that appointment to the post of bus conductors is made only after receiving a donation of Rs-1,000/-from each of the applicants. (Within brackets it is further stated that recently a Marxist Advocate was appointed Chairman of the State Road Transport Corporation displacing an IAS official); and (iv) that there was pressure and illegal interference by Marxists in the reinstatement of a suspended officer which recently raised a storm in the Assembly. (Within brackets it is further stated that recently a Marxist Advocate was appointed Chairman of the State Road Transport Corporation displacing an IAS official); and (iv) that there was pressure and illegal interference by Marxists in the reinstatement of a suspended officer which recently raised a storm in the Assembly. (2) Imputation against the Marxist Party General Secretary: That he received a donation of Rs. 25,000/-in connection with a top appointment. These imputations contained in a resolution passed by the Pathanapuram Taluk Committee of the Communist Party of India (Rightists) and the revision petitioner only reproduced that resolution in the present form in the daily issue of his newspaper dated 11-8-67. The Marxist Communist Party (C. P. M.) and the Communist Party of India (C. P. I.) were the two constituent units of seven political parties which formed the United Front, when they formed the Kerala Ministry sometime in March, 1967. So, at the time of the publication of the impugned news item, the representatives of both the CPI. and CPM. parties along with other parties had been running the administration of Kerala. It was in that context that the imputation contained in Ext. P1 (b) had to be taken into consideration. The news item showed that the CPI could not tolerate the corrupt practices pursued by the CPM. in the administration of the State. The resolution, which is reproduced in Ext. P1 (b) is an expression of the resentment of the Taluk Committee of Pathanapuram belonging to the Communist Party of India (CPI.) against the Marxist Communist Party, 5. Viewed Ext. P1 imputation in the above circumstances, we may say that the imputations are by one Party against another. The persons to have been defamed as a result of the imputation would be a'person as required by S.499 IPC. which reads: "Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases heresinafter excepted, to defame that person The imputation concerning a company or association or collection of persons as such forming another category of persons would "also constitute defamation if an imputation was intended to defame a company or an association or collections of persons as such. Explanation.2 of S.499 IPC., reads: "It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such." What is contended on behalf of the complainant in this case was that the Marxist Communist Party had been defamed on account of the publication and that the complainant being the Secretary of that Party in the State of Kerala, he is the aggrieved person, who is entitled to prefer the complaint against the revision petitioner who published the imputation. We have, therefore, to consider the case whether the complainant was defamed as an individual being a Marxist among the large number of Marxists, who formed the Communist Party of Kerala. Ext. P1 article as such did not refer to the Marxists of Kerala. But, the evidence that was brought to bear upon in this case established that it was the Marxists of Kerala, who were referred to by the publication of this news item. Pathanapuram Taluq Committee belonging to the Communist Party of India knew very well that the Marxist Party was one of the constituents which formed the United Front to form the Government and that the United Front was conducting the administration of the State. So. it could be said from the evidence on record that the attempt on the part of the author of the resolution was to defame the Marxists of Kerala. Then the question for consideration, is whether the complainant can institute the complaint as if he is a person aggrieved of the imputation contained in Ext. P1 (b) under S.193 Cr. PC. 6. The alleged imputation of defamation against the complainant can be considered in two different ways. One is that the complainant was defamed in his individual capacity described as the Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party. Secondly, the imputation of the complainant as a member of a class which in this case is designated as the Marxist Communist Party or Marxists or Leftists generally. If the complainant was the person referred to as a member of the large body of Marxists or Leftists, it may be said by virtue of the fact that he is the Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party, that he was the person defamod, or in other words that he is "a person aggrieved" by the offence contemplated under S.198 Cr. PC., so as to entitle him to maintain a prosecution. PC., so as to entitle him to maintain a prosecution. In that way, it may be argued that the imputation against the Marxist Communist Party comes directly within Explanation.2 of S.499 IPC. referred to above as giving the complainant the right to maintain the prosecution. On the strength of the above Explanation, there was said to be defamation of the Marxist Communist Party, namely, "a collection of persons as such". It is pointed out that in this view of the matter a collection of persons as such can be collectively defamed in the same manner as'a company". The general principles on which a company may be said to have been defamed would therefore, apply equally to the case, where it is alleged that "a collection of persons as such" has been defamed. The absurdity of allowing a Corporation or a company to sue in respect of a charge like murder or adultery was pointed out by B.B. Ghose, J. in Pratap Chandra Guha Roy v. King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Calcutta 1121. The opinion was expressed at page 1126. Though it was a minority opinion, it carried weight because it was never the intention under S.499 IPC., to make a company or Corporation liable for an offence under S.500 or S.501 IPC.. The observation is as follows: "A corporation or company could not sue in respect of a charge of corruption or of an assualt because a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption or of an assault although the individuals composing it may be. These observations are quite apposite to the question before us and in my opinion the police force as such cannot complain of any imputation as regards its personal reputation because it cannot be guilty of beastly conduct, or can the collective body be guilty of the offence of biting off the niple of the breast of a woman or of biting the cheek of a woman. The matter may be tested in another way. Suppose some body laid a complaint before a Magistrals in terms of the words of the charges in this case, would any Magistrate issue process against the police force as such or any member of the police force? 1 am sure no Magistrate would. In my judgment, therefore, the charges fail on the ground that they refer to the personal conduct of a collection of persons as such." 7. 1 am sure no Magistrate would. In my judgment, therefore, the charges fail on the ground that they refer to the personal conduct of a collection of persons as such." 7. However, the majority opinion was expressed by Buckland, J. at page 1129. It is read as follows: In a case in which the Explanation is properly called into use the identity of the company or association or collection of persons must be maintained throughout with reference to the imputation as such with the intention of harming their reputation so that thereby they are defamed. An imputation concerning a company or association of persons as such-and the last two words of the explanation are most material to its correct application - cannot by virtue of this explanation justify a charge of defaming an individual, and a charge cannot combine the explanation with the definition for such a purpose. Nor does it carry the matter any further to state, as has been done by the charges in this case, that the complainant was a member of the police force at Char Maniar." 8. These observations are germane to the question which arises for consideration in the instant case. In this case, we may say that the Marxist Communist Party as such cannot complain of any imputation as regards its personal reputation because it cannot be guilty of the offence of bribery. Putting the matter in another form, we may say that a corporate body cannot be guilty of an offence. But, if the complainant was able to point out that he was the person aimed at in Ext. P1 (b) news item, he might be entitled to say that he had been defamed. It is well-settled as pointed out in Deobrat Shastri vs. Rank Bahadur Singh, AIR (37) 1950 Patna 545 that a corporate body like co-operative societies functioning under the Co-operative Societies Act can maintain an action if the imputation was against a company or an association or collection of persons as such. That was a case where a newspaper published defamation against the members of the co-operative society in which it was held chat the Manager functioned as a statutory person under the Act and as such he was able to institute a complaint against the newspaper for and on behalf of the co-operative society. That was a case where a newspaper published defamation against the members of the co-operative society in which it was held chat the Manager functioned as a statutory person under the Act and as such he was able to institute a complaint against the newspaper for and on behalf of the co-operative society. The dictum, which was laid down in that decision was that the imputation against a company or association or collections of persons as such amounts to defamation. Therefore, the mere fact that the reputation of a Bank is sought to be affected by the publication does not take it away from the mischief of a defamatory publication. 9. In Municipal Board, Konch v. Ganesh Prasad Chaturvedi, AIR. (39) 1952 Allahabad 114, the following view was expressed regarding imputation of defamation against a corporate body. "Having regard to the provisions of S.499 read with Explanation.2 and the definition of the word 'person' in S.11, Penal Code, it cannot be said that a complaint for defamation is not maintainable at all by a corporation. But the scope of such a complaint by a Corporation is not the same as that by individuals. A Municipal Board per se has hardly reputation. If the management is good it will be said that the Board is being run efficiently. But if the management is bad there is bound to be accusation of inefficiency and nepotism etc. If a person makes any imputation so as to cause any special injury to the property of the Board, then the Board can maintain a complaint under S.500. But where the minority party in the Board attacks the majority party for inefficiency then such an attack does not amount to defamation." 10. In order to constitute an imputation concerning an association or collection of persons as such, an offence under S.502 T. P. C., Explanation II (same as S.500 IPC.) there must be some definite body of persons capable of being identified and to the whole of whom it can be asserted that the defamatory matter applies. (See Vol. XXX-XXXII of 1914-1916 Travancore Law Reports 48). 11. (See Vol. XXX-XXXII of 1914-1916 Travancore Law Reports 48). 11. Again in Maung Chit Tay v. Maung Tun Nyuh, AIR 1935 Rangoon 108, the opinion is expressed as follows: "A Corporation may maintain a prosecution or an action for a libel affecing its property, but not for libel merely affecting personal reputation, is a corporation has no reputation apart from its property or trade. The words complained of must reflect on the management of its business and must injuriously affect the corporation, as distinct from the individuals who compose it. The alleged libel must attack the corporation in its method of conducting its affairs, must accuse it of fraud or mismanagement, or must attack its financial position. It cannot bring a prosecution for words which merely affect its honour of dignity. Moreover it cannot maintain a prosecution for words which reflect, not upon it as a body, but upon its members individually unless special damage has thereby been caused to it: Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co., (Ltd) v. Hawkins (1859) 4 H& N 87, Mayor, Aldermen and citizens of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q B 94, South Helton Coal Co. Ltd., v. Narth-Eastern News Association, Ltd. (1894) LR. I QB 1351, Slazengers, Ltd, v. C. Gipps & Co., (1916) 33 TLR. 35." 12. So, if a person complains that he has been defamed as a member of a class, he must satisfy the court that the imputation is against him personally and that he is the person aimed at before he maintained a prosecution for defamation. This is the line of reasoning adopted in Dhirendra Nath Sen and another v. Rajat Kanti Bhadra, AIR. 1970 Calcutta 216. See the following remarks in that decision: 'If a person complains that he has been defamed as a member of a class he must satisfy the Court that the imputation is against him personally and he is the person aimed at, before he can maintain a prosecution for defamation. In short, the grievance of the complainant should not merely be the one shared by every member of an organised society. In short, the grievance of the complainant should not merely be the one shared by every member of an organised society. Where, therefore, the editor of a paper writes an editorial which is highly defamatory of the spiritual Head of a certain Community, an individual of that community is not an aggrieved person within the meaning of S.198, Criminal P. C. The mere fact that the feelings of a defamatory statement made against his religious head, affords him no ground under the law to prosecute the accused for defamation." It is a well-known principle that when an indefinite and indeterminate body of men are defamed, it would not be safe to single out one person to say that he was the person defamed. In this regard, the observation at page 8 of the Law of Defamation and Malicious Prosecution by V. Mitter„ 4th Edition, 1965, may be seen: "An action for defamation would not lie at the instance of unincorporated collection of individuals such as a political party or members' club. Such groups are merely classes of persons and there can be no libel on a class. In Eastwood v. Hamles, (1858) IF. & F. 347 Willes, J. said: 'If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual which there is nor here." The statement that there is no libel on a class is really governed by the rule that the plaintiff must prove that the libel refers to him." 13. There are cases to show that a Corporation was capable of comitting a crime and that decisions have gone to the extent of holding up the members of the Corporation if any defamation was found to have been committed by the members within the sphere of the corporate capacity in certain cases. On the aspept, there is a passage which occurs at page 1157 of The Law of Slander and Libel by Newell, Third Edition, which, is as follows: "At one time it was generally considered that a corporation was incapable of committing a crime. By slow degrees, and following upon the extension of the practice of organizing corporation for the purpose of avoiding conclusion until the present rule has come to be recognised as that enunciated by Mr. By slow degrees, and following upon the extension of the practice of organizing corporation for the purpose of avoiding conclusion until the present rule has come to be recognised as that enunciated by Mr. Bishop in his New Criminal Law, S.417, as follows: 'But within the sphere of its corporate capacity, and to an undefined extent beyond, whenever it assumes to act as a corporation it has the same capabilities of criminal intent and of act-in other words of crime-as an individual man sustaining to the thing the like relations'." 14. But, in such cases, it is highly necessary that the imputation should be capable of being brought home to a particular individual or collection of individuals as such. This is the view expressed in Government Advocate v. Gopal Bandu, AIR. 1922 Patna 101. The opinion expressed is as follows: "However reprehensible and morally unjustifiable the words complained of may be, they must, to be actionable, contain an imputation concerning some particular person or persons whose identity can be established. An imputation against an association or collection of persons jointly may also amount to defamation within the meaning of the S.499 IPC. but at the same time it must be an imputation capable of being brought home to a particular individual or collection of individuals as such." 15. A class of persons as such cannot be defamed as a class, nor could an individual be defamed by a general reference to a class to which he belongs. This is the view expressed in Para.6 of page 5 of the Laws of England by Halsbury, Third Edition, Vol. 24. It reads as follows: "Group defamation: A class of persons cannot be defamed as a class, nor can an individual be defamed by a general reference to the class to which he belongs (Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd. (1944) A. C. 116, H. L. at p. 124). A plaintiff may be able to show however, that, though the statement reflected on a class of persons, he was the person aimed at and defamed; in such a case an action will lie at his instance. (Fox-croft v. Lacy 1613), Hob. 89). A plaintiff may be able to show however, that, though the statement reflected on a class of persons, he was the person aimed at and defamed; in such a case an action will lie at his instance. (Fox-croft v. Lacy 1613), Hob. 89). If the judge holds that the words complained of are reasonably capable of being understood to refer to the plaintiff (Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd-.quoted above), the further question, whether they do refer to the plaintiff (KnupfFer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., quoted above), is a question for the jury (Le Fanu v. Malcomson (1848). I H. L-, Cas. 637). 16. Again, in Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th Edition by J. W. Cecil Turner at page 235, the following passage is seen under the Head "Libel against a class of persons, no tort". "There is no civil action for libelling a class of persons, if. as must usually be the case, its members are too numerous and unascertainable to join as plaintiffs in a litigation. But since, technically speaking, it is not by the persons injured, but by the Queen, that criminal proceedings are carried on. an indictment will lie, provided only that the class defamed be not an indefinite (e. g. 'the men of science', 'the Socialists') but a definite one (e. g, 'the clergy of the diocese of Durham', R. v. Williams (1882) 5 B. and Ald. 595. Cf. 2 Swanston 503, 'the justices of the peace for the county of Middlesex') 17. If a well-defined class is defamed, each and every member of that class can file a complaint. So, it follows that the defamatory words must reflect or refer to some ascertained and ascertainable person and that person must be the complainant. Where the words reflect on each and every member of a certain number or class, each and all can sue. But, this principle depends upon the determination of the number of persons of the class. A large body of men, the numerical strength of which is not known, nor could it be computed with any amount of precision, it cannot be said that each and every member of that group of persons constituting, such as a political party, each member of that party can be said to be defamed if the political group, such as the Marxist Communist Party is imputed with any libellous imputation. In this regard, I may cite another decision reported in Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Limited (1944) A, C. 116, H. L., at p. 116. That was a case, where a Party known as 'Young Russia' was defamed under a publication which came in the London Express Newspaper in England during the second world war. That was a Pro-German Party, which was imputed to have followed the precepts of Hitler during the war and the members of the Party existed in Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Their membership was about 2000. The complainant in that case was a Russian resident in London. It was found that the imputation could not be fastened upon the Russian resident in London as the party was an indefinite and indetermined body, which was found to have lived in different parts of Europe and England. However, the observation in that judgment is of valuable use for use is appreciating the contention in the present case. Lord Atkin stated as follows at page 122 in the above judgment. "There can be no law that a defamatory statement made of a firm, or trustees, or the tenants of a particular building is not actionable, if the words would reasonably be understood as published of each member of the firm or each trustee or each tenant. The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some general name generally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement, for the habit of making unfounded generalisations is ingrained in ill-educated or vulgar minds, or the words are occasionally intended to be a facetious exaggeration. Even in such cases words may be used which enable the plaintiff to prove that the words complained of were intended to be published of each member of the group, or, at any rate, of himself." Lord Russel stated as follows at page 123:. "The newspaper article makes allegations about a body of persons some thousands in number. It makes no reference of any kind to the appellant or even to England. There is nothing in it which would enable anyone to identify any person as being a member of the body. "The newspaper article makes allegations about a body of persons some thousands in number. It makes no reference of any kind to the appellant or even to England. There is nothing in it which would enable anyone to identify any person as being a member of the body. All that can be said is that a person who read it and who knew that the appellant was a member of the body would know that he was one of the numerous individuals from whose ranks Hitler hoped at some time to nominate a puppet fuehrer in Russia. Nothing more than that. That is really all that I can attribute as the meaning of the answers given by the appellant's friends to the carefully worded and stereotyped question of the appellant's counsel, viz., "To whom did your mind go when you read that article?" In my opinion, it is impossible to construe the article in any way which would justify the view that it contained defamatory matter published of and concerning the appellant." Lord Proter at page 124 stated as follows: "The question whether the words refer in fact to the plaintiff or plaintiffs is a matter for the jury or for a judge sitting as a judge of fact, but as a prior question it has always to be ascertained whether there is any evidence on which a conclusion that they do so refer could reasonably be reached. In deciding this question the size of the class, the generality of the charge and the extravagance of the accusation may all be elements to be taken into consideration, but none of them is conclusive. Each case must be considered according to its own circumstances. I can imagine it being said that each number of a body, however arge, was defamed where the libel consisted in the assertion that no one of the members of a community was elected as a member unless he had committed a murder." 18. On a review of the above decisions, it would be difficult, in the circumstances of the present case, to say that the complainant, Sri C. H. Kanaran had been defamed on account of the present publication. It is sure that pws. 2 to 4 have deposed that when they read the news item they understood it that it referred to Sri C.H. Kanaran. That is because pws. It is sure that pws. 2 to 4 have deposed that when they read the news item they understood it that it referred to Sri C.H. Kanaran. That is because pws. 2 to 4 knew the complainant as a member of the Marxist Communist Party and not because he was a person referred to in Ext. PI (b). If an indefinite and indeterminate body as the Marxist Communist Pary or Marxists or Leftists as a collection of persons as such are . defamed, the fact that the collection of persons as such being an indeterminate and indefinite collection of body, it could not be said that each and every member of that body could maintain an action under S.500 IPC., unless the complainant was referred to as a person who had been defamed under the imputation. Ia the relevant imputation, apart from the fact that the Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party had been defamad, the consequence of which will be considered by me at a later stage, it could be said on the evidence on record that there had been no defamation of the complainant as a member of a large body of the Marxits or Leftists belonging to the Marxist Communist Party, either of India as a whole, or much less of the Kerala State. Therefore, Sri C. H. Kanaran is not competent to file a complaint as a member of the Marxist Communist Party on the basis that the Party or the Marxists had been defamed as he was not able to point out that he was the person against whom the imputation was levelled in Ext. PI (b) news item. 19.: The next point that falls to be decided is whether Sri. C. H. Kanaran was the person referred to as the General Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party in Ext..PI (b) news item. It is admitted by all the witnesses in the case that Ext. PI(b) refers to the "General Secretary 'who was one Sri. P. Sundarayya. The finding by the District Magistrate in this regard may be seen at Para.14 of his judgment. It is as follows: "It is not disputed that the correct designation of the complainant C. H. Kanaran is only Secretary, Kerala State Committee ...is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxists). PWs. P. Sundarayya. The finding by the District Magistrate in this regard may be seen at Para.14 of his judgment. It is as follows: "It is not disputed that the correct designation of the complainant C. H. Kanaran is only Secretary, Kerala State Committee ...is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxists). PWs. 2 to 4 have deposed that when they read the news item, they understood it as refering to the complainant C. H. Kanaran. PWs. 2 and 3 have, however, admitted that the term "General Secretary" is applied to the All India Party Secretary Sundarayya. PW. 4 would say that he realised this distinction only after this case was filed. Ext. D-15 is an issue of the "Deshabhimani", wherein C.H. Kanaran is referred to as, Communist Party (Marxists) Kerala State Committee Secretary", and Ext. D-16 is another issue of the 'Deshabhimani' wherein Sundarayya is referred to as "Communist Party General Secretary"- PW. 3 has deposed that 'Deshabhimani' is the mouth-piece of the Marxist Party, which is not disputed." 20. So, the allegation as well as the evidence established beyond doubt that Sri C-H. Kanaran was only the Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party, Kerala State, while Sri P. Sundarayya was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the India (Marxists). So, the complainant, Sri C. H. Kanaran did not come into the picture when in Ext. PI (b) the person aggrieved was the General Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party of India. For an ordinary man, who reads Ext. PI (b) article, when confronted with the news item had to consider whether the article referred to the General Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party of India (Sri. Sundarayya) or the Secretary of the Kerala State Marxist Communist Pary (Sri. Kanaran). When there is uncertainty as to whether the imputation,would reflect either this man or that man, it could not be said that one particular man was meant in the imputation alleged. It is relevent in this regard to point out a decision reported in Subbaraya v. Batuk Prasad, AIR-1937 Allahabad 677. The observation is as follows: "If a well defined class is defamed, each and every, member of that class can file a complaint. In other cases, the defamatory words must refer to some ascertained and ascertainable person and that, person must be the complainanj. The observation is as follows: "If a well defined class is defamed, each and every, member of that class can file a complaint. In other cases, the defamatory words must refer to some ascertained and ascertainable person and that, person must be the complainanj. Where the words reflect each and every member of a certain number or class, each or all can sue. If the words reflect impartially on either A or B, or on someone of a certain number or class, and there is nothing to show which one was meant, no one can sue. If therefore a person complains that he has been defamed as a member of a class, he must satisfy the Court that he is the person aimed at before he can maintain a prosecution for defamation." In that case, the imputation was against, one Gangaputra belonging to the Brahmin community. It was found that there was another section of Ganpaputras, though they did not belong to the Brahmin community. So, it was not possible to ascertain whether any member of the Gangaputras of the Brahmin community was defamed. Therefore, the word reflected either on A or B and there was nothing to show which one was meant in which case it would not be possible to specify that it was a particular person, who was defamed. In the same way, this court in Raman Namboodiri v. Govindan,1962 KLT. 538, the opinion is expressed at Para.3 of the decision, which is as follows: "If the words complained of contain no reflection on a particular individual or individuals, but may equally apply to others belonging to the same class, an action for defamation will not lie. The defamatory matter to be actionable must be such that it contains ah imputation concerning some particular person or persons whose identity can be established. It is unnecessary that the person whose conduct is called in question should be described by name. It is sufficient if on the evidence it can be shown that the imputation was directed towards a particular person or persons who can be identified." 21. On a consideration of the above decisions, I am of the opinion that it would not be possible to say whether the imputation is alleged against Sri C. H. Kanaran or Sri P. Sundarayya. On a consideration of the above decisions, I am of the opinion that it would not be possible to say whether the imputation is alleged against Sri C. H. Kanaran or Sri P. Sundarayya. When there was another person of the description of the person in the imputation, it would not be possible to say who was the person referred in the news item referred to above. The evidence showed that Sri P. Sundarayya was as much involved as Sri Kanaran in the activitie of the Marxists Party in Kerala. On a consideration of the evidence on record, I am of the opinion that the case of the complainant would not improve even if the proceeding is sent back to the trial court for continuation of the trial. Assuming that the allegation in Ext. P1 (b) is against the Marxists or Leftists of Kerala, even then I am of the opinion that the complainant. Sri. Kanaran cannot be pointed out as one among the large body of Marxists or Leftists of Kerala to have been defamed on account of the instant publication. It was not also possible for him to show conclusively that he was the person referred to as the General Secretary, when it was conceded by all the witnesses in the case that there was another person, who has satisfied the description of a General Secretary of the Marxist Communist Party of India, who had been defamed, it would not be worthwhile for remanding the case to the trial Magistrate to frame charge against the revision petitioner. I find, therefore, that no case against the 1st respondent, Printer and Publisher of the Indian Express was made out so as to frame charges under S.500 and 501 IPC. 22. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The direction by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Trivandrum to frame charges against the revision petitioner is set aside and the order of the trial Magistrate is, therefore restored confirming the discharge of acquittal passed under S.253(1) Criminal Procedure Code.