JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - Petitioners are traders engaged in purchase of rice and paddy along with other articles within the Bargarh Regulated Market. Challenge in each of these writ applications is to the levy of the fee raised in respect of transactions outside the market yard, entrance fees, two sets of fees one for entrance and the other for sale and the fee raised on the basis of assused sale. Petitioners also challenge the vires of Bye-law 13, of the Market Committee and amendments to Rules 60 and 62 of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1958. 2. Under the provisions of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Act, (3 of 1957), the State Government have established a market for Bargarh known as "The Bargarh Regulated Market." Government have duly notified at Market area as provided in Section 2(1)(vii), a market yard as provided in Clause (ix) thereof. Under the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the State Government have framed a set of Rules known as the 'Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1958'. The Bargarh Regulated Market Committee has framed its Bye-laws in exercise of powers u/s 28 of the Act. Challenge to the vires of the Act and the Rules made thereunder was raised in the case of Jatadhari Misra v. Regulated Market Committee and Anr. 1973 (2) C.W.R. 1864. This Court sustained the Act but held that the Rules 48, 60, 61 and 62 of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Rules were ultra vires the Act. After the judgment, the State Government brought about amendment to these Rules in 1974. While Rule 48 was completely substituted in Rule 60, Sub-rule (1) and Rule 62, Sub-rule (1) and (4) in place of "Market area", 'market yard' was substituted. In several decisions of this Court including the one referred to above, as also the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad and Anr. v. Ishwarbhai Becharbhai and Ors. AIR 1952 S.C. 97 and Lakhan Lal and Others etc. Vs. The State of Bihar and Others etc., the scheme in the Act has been clearly indicated and in the letter of the Supreme Court decisions, it has been clearly indicated that the expression 'market' in the Act is used with reference to the' market" proper or the 'Market yard' and there is no separate market place. Vs. The State of Bihar and Others etc., the scheme in the Act has been clearly indicated and in the letter of the Supreme Court decisions, it has been clearly indicated that the expression 'market' in the Act is used with reference to the' market" proper or the 'Market yard' and there is no separate market place. Under the Orissa Act, the concepts are 'market place'. Under the Orissa Act, the concepts are 'market area' and 'market yard', u/s 11 of the Act, the Market Committee is entitled to levy fee subject to the prescribed maxima on sale of agricultural produce or on the entity of the same as also on storage in the market yard. It is conceded before us were appropriately by Mr. Ranjit Mohanty for the Market Committee that the levy authorised u/s 11 of the Act is not cumulative, but any of the three, namely the Market committee could levy fee on sale, entrance for sale or on storage. 3. There is no challenge to the Act before us. Three contentions have been advanced on behalf of the Petitioners: (i) Rules 60 and 62 having been declared ultra vires, it was open to the ruler making authority to bring in fresh rules free from the defects pointed out by this Court. Mere substitution of 'market yard' in place of 'market area' occurring in these rules was not permissible in view of the position that with the declaration of those rules as ultra vires the Act, the Rules were non-est. Merely saying 'market yeard' in place of 'market area', therefore, does not bring in any working rule into existence. (ii) Bye law 13 of the Regulated Market Committee authorising levy of fee with reference to 'market area, an entrance fee as also a fee on sales of cattle and an assumption of sale and charge of a fee where there is no sale, is bad. (iii) It is not open to the market committee to force the traders any or licensees to collect the fee on behalf of the committee and pay the same. 4. So far as Clause (1) of Bye-law 13 is concerned, it authorises the committee to collect fee on advalorem basis at the rate of 0.25 paise per cent on the notified agricultural produce brought into the market areas for sale. 4. So far as Clause (1) of Bye-law 13 is concerned, it authorises the committee to collect fee on advalorem basis at the rate of 0.25 paise per cent on the notified agricultural produce brought into the market areas for sale. In view of the provision in Section 11 of the Act authorising levy in respect of the market yard, Clause (1) of Bye-law 13 is ultra vires the statutory provision. The right to levy the fee has to be confined to the market yard, and the authorisation with reference to market area' is in competent. Clause (1) of Bye-law 13 has, therefore, to be struck down as bad. Clauses (2) and (3) of Bye-law 13 deal with levy anti collection of fee in regard to cattle, sheep and goats. Clause (2) authorises levy of an entrance fee in respect of cattle, sheep and goats at a prescribed rate while Clause (3) authorises that the fee to be charged and collected from the seller both in respect of agricultural produce as also cattle, sheep and goats would be charged and collected from the buyer. The Act in clear terms casts the burden on the seller. The Bye-law placed the incidence on the buyer which is clearly without authority. Under Clause (1) of By-law 13, a fee on sale of cattle, sheep and goats has been provided. Such a fee having already been provided, an entrance fee on the same could not have been authorised. u/s 11 of the Act, three alternate modes have been provided for levy of fee and they are mutually exclusive. Fee on sale having been provided in Clause (1), fee at the point of entry is not authorised Bye-law 13(2) are thus bad and cannot be sustained. Mr. Mohanty for the Market Committee emphatically contended that Petitioners are not traders in goats, cattle and sheep and as such at their instance this grievance should not be entertained. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, and the judgment of this Court in Smt. Ananga Manjari Devi v. Ramgopal Agarwal O.J.C. No. 890 of 1978-D/6-10-1978. The background in which the competency to maintain a writ application had been adjudged in those cases on the basis of person aggrieved cannot be raised in the instant case. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, and the judgment of this Court in Smt. Ananga Manjari Devi v. Ramgopal Agarwal O.J.C. No. 890 of 1978-D/6-10-1978. The background in which the competency to maintain a writ application had been adjudged in those cases on the basis of person aggrieved cannot be raised in the instant case. The delegated authority was acting beyond the statute and any person who was likely to get affected even if there be no present grievance would be entitled to question the competence of the authorisation. We do not think. Mr. Mohanty's objection should be entertained. Clause (4) of Bye-law 13 provides that market fee shall be collected by the traders, adatiyas and buyers as per sale slip and shall be handover to the paid servants of the committee. This Court has already decided that such an obligation cannot be imposed on the licence Mr. Mohanty, however, suggests that we need not read Clause (4) as casting an obligation generally on licences and it can be confined to cases where fee had been collected voluntarily. There can be no objection to Clause (4) providing an obligation in respect of voluntary collections to be deposited and construed that way, Clause (4) is not objectionable. We make it clear that it would not be open to the market committee to cast on obligation on every licensee to work as the collecting agent on behalf of the committee. Clause (5) of bye-law 13 provides that if within thirty days, any agricultural produce brought from outside into the market area for export is not exported or removed, it would become exigible to fees on the basis of on assumed sale. No real objection can be taken to Clause (5) in as much as the Market Committee is entitled to even levy a fee on storage. Whether there be sale or not, on the expiry of thirty days, storage, fee is exigible. Mr. Mohanty for the committee has agreed to bring insuitable modification to treat the fee contemplated under Clause (5) to be storage fee. 5. The next question for consideration is as to the validity of the amendments of Rules 60 and 62. We do not think, to the facts of the case, the doctrine of still-born legislation can be applied. Mr. Mohanty for the committee has agreed to bring insuitable modification to treat the fee contemplated under Clause (5) to be storage fee. 5. The next question for consideration is as to the validity of the amendments of Rules 60 and 62. We do not think, to the facts of the case, the doctrine of still-born legislation can be applied. This Court had struck down those Rules as being in excess of statutory competence and not as being totally without jurisdiction. The rule making authority has now removed the vice and brought the Rule in accord with the statutory provisions. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Mohanty that the Rules have been appropriately amended and the amendment is not open to attack. We must indicate here that Petitioner's counsel had not ultimately pressed this aspect of the submission with any vehemence. 6. Mr. Mohanty for the Market committee placed before us the amended Bye-law 13 which seems to have been affective from 2-8-1977. As some of the writ applications have been filed after the amendment came into force, we have to refer to the amendment. In the amendment, in place of 'market area', 'market yard' has been introduced, Therefore, the vice in the old bye-law does not continue. The Bye-law, however, still authorises levy of two sets of fees one on sales and one on entry, or the reasons already indicated that would be bad. We have already dealt with the question of storage and no further references necessary. 7. Each of the writ application is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. The Market committee is directed to confine the levy of fee within the ambit prescribed u/s 11 of the Act. Bye-law 13 is declared as ultra vires to the extent indicated. There will be no order for costs. N.K. Das, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Allowed