JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Defendant is in appeal against a reversing judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Puri, in a suit for specific performance of a contract of lease. Admittedly, the disputed property belonged to one Kulamani Badapanda, the original Defendant whose legal representatives are the parties to the litigation now upon his death. It was alleged that on 3-1-1958 the Defendant agreed in writing to permanently lease out the disputed property on a premium of Rs. 468/- and it was stipulated that rent would be fixed at the prevailing rate in respect of the surrounding lands. The Plaintiff paid Rs. 68/- out of the premium that very day and it was stipulated that the balance consideration would be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on or before 3.3.1958 when the Defendant would execute and register the lease deed in favour of the Plaintiff. The Defendant passed on a receipt in token of his receiving Rs. 68/- and put the Plaintiff in possession of the disputed property pursuant to the contract. As the Defendant did not receive the balance consideration money as and when offered and deferred the matter, a notice was issued calling upon the Defendant to perform his part of the contract. Thereupon the Defendant denied the contract. The Plaintiff, hereafter came to Court asking for specific performance. 2. The defence was a total denial of the entire allegation in the plaint. The contract is denied in toto. The Defendant asserted that be never knew about any such arrangement nor did be receive any part of the premium. There was no occasion to put the Plaintiff in possession. 3. Ext. 3 was sent to an expert. The learned trial Judge examined the matter at great length and ultimately came to hold that there was DO contract for the lease of the disputed property as alleged by the Plaintiff. He also did not accept the Plaintiff?s case of his advancing Rs. 68/- to the Defendant out of the total premium. The learned trial judge further held that the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of contract in view of the provisions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act of 1871. He further found that the disputed property was a Debottar land and u/s 19(1) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments; Act, 80 permanent lease was not valid. The learned trial judge further held that the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of contract in view of the provisions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act of 1871. He further found that the disputed property was a Debottar land and u/s 19(1) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments; Act, 80 permanent lease was not valid. On these findings the learned trial judge dismissed the suit. 4. On Plaintiff?s appeal, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who ultimately disposed of the same came to hold, disagreeing with the learned trial Judge, that Ext. 3 was a valid document. He also found Re. 68/- to have been paid under the arrangement. He, however, reiterated the trial Judge?s finding on the question of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act. The bar u/s 19 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act was also utilised against the Plaintiff. The learned appellate Judge, therefore, allowed the appeal in part and called upon the Defendant to refund Re. 68/- being the part consideration paid by the Plaintiff to him. One of the legal representatives of the original Defendant came up in second appeal to the Court against this reversing judgment, impleading the other legal representatives as proforma Respondents. The Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 has preferred a cross objection. 5. Mr. Ranjit Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant contended that the expert to whom Ext. 3 had been referred to is really not an expert and as such, the leaned appellate Judge went wrong in relying upon his report to find that Ext. 3 was a genuine document. Mr. Mohanty also Bought to challenge the finding regarding passing of a part of the consideration money. Having heard the learned advocate for the Appellant at some length I am satisfied that in second appeal there is hardly any scope to reach 80 different conclusion from what has been arrived at by the lower appellate Court on the genuineness of Ext. 3 and the fact of passing of part consideration under it. These findings of the lower appellate Court are on questions of fact and I do not think in second appeal by reconsidering the evidence it is open to me to take another view of the matter. I would, therefore, uphold the finding of the lower appellate Court that Ext. 3 is genuine and under it Rs. These findings of the lower appellate Court are on questions of fact and I do not think in second appeal by reconsidering the evidence it is open to me to take another view of the matter. I would, therefore, uphold the finding of the lower appellate Court that Ext. 3 is genuine and under it Rs. 68/- had been, paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The direction for refund by the Defendant to the Plaintiff is, therefore, also to be upheld. 6. The appeal accordingly has to fail. 7. Let me now examine the contentions of Mr. S. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1. Mr. Mohanty contends that the two reasonings which have been sustained in the lower appellate, Court against giving the Plaintiff a decree are not valid and the Plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance on the finding that Ext. 3 is genuine and there was part performance under it. 8. The two objections which were sustained in the lower appellate Court against the Plaintiff are- (1) the non-compliance of the requirements of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act 1 of 1877 and, (2) the bar u/s 19(1) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act. 9. Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act provides as follows: Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where a contract to lease immoveable property is made in writing signed by the parties thereto or on their behalf, either party may, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, sue the other for specific performance of the contract if, (a) where specific performance is claimed by the lessor, he has delivered possession of the property to the lessee in part performance of the contract; and (b) where specific performance is claimed by the lessee, he has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property, or, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract, and has done some Act in furtherance of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. This section applies to contracts to lease executed after the first day of April, 193 (sic). This section applies to contracts to lease executed after the first day of April, 193 (sic). On an analysis of this section it would appear that the conditions for application of this section are three : (1) The contract must be in writing and signed by both the parties; (2) The contract is one which is required to be registered, but has not been registered; and, (3) If specific performance is claimed by the lessor, he must have put the lessee in possession in part performance of the contract; or if a specific performance is claimed by the lessee, he must have obtained possession in part performance of the contract and if he is already in possession, be has been continuing in possession and also had done some Act in part performance of the contract. 10. Ext. 3 admittedly is not signed by both the parties. It was a unilateral document by the original Defendant. In such circumstance, one of the conditions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act is not applicable. 11. Mr. S. Mohanty sought to place reliance on a Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court, in the case of Trivenibai v. Leelabail that Ext. 3 was admissible for the purpose of the suit for specific performance. In terms of Section 27-A which came to be statute book by an amendment, non-registration of the agreement is not a bar to ask for specific performance. The very decision in another part of it has clearly stated as follows: It has rightly been pointed out that the Plaintiff Respondent cannot take advantage of Section 27-A, Specific Relief Act mainly for two reasons, viz., (1) that the document has not been signed by the lessee or the proposed lessee, and, (2) that admittedly he has not to ken possession of the property in part performance of the contract. Thus, Section 27-A cannot be availed of by the Plaintiff in view of the fact that Ext. 3, the contract has not been signed by both the parties. Learned Counsel for both parties raised certain other contentions with reference to applicability of Section 27-A of the Act. I do not think it necessary to advert to the same as it is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to hold that Section 27-A of the Act cannot be applied on account of the aforesaid defect. 12. Learned Counsel for both parties raised certain other contentions with reference to applicability of Section 27-A of the Act. I do not think it necessary to advert to the same as it is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to hold that Section 27-A of the Act cannot be applied on account of the aforesaid defect. 12. The next point for examination is about the bat for leasing out. Endowment property in contravention of Section 19(1) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Mr. S. Mohanty for the Respondents contends that the disputed property is ?Amrutomonohi? of Lord Jagannath and is not an absolute Debottar of such a type which would not be transferable. Incidence of Amrutomonohi came to be determined in this Court on more than one occasion and this Court has taken the view that Amrutomonohi leaves sufficient interest in the holder thereof and he is entitled to make alienations. Whoever takes the property on alienation receives it with the burden to which the property is subject for the purpose of the deity. But the alienation is not vitiated. If it is property of the Lord Jagannath, admittedly, the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act has no application and instead, Orissa Act 11 of 1954 would apply. Thus, at any rate, Section 19 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act would have no application. I think, there is force in the contention raised by Mr. S. Mohanty that this reasoning given by the lower appellate Court to negative the Plaintiff?s claim is without any legal basis and is thus liable to be vacated. I would accordingly, in disagreement with the lower appellate Court, hold that the Plaintiff is not to suffer on this account. 13. In view of my finding recorded above that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the aid of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act, he is found to lose in the suit. He would not be entitled to specific, performance of the contract even though the bar u/s 19 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act would not stand in his way. I would therefore dismiss the memorandum of cross objection also. 14. The appeal and the memorandum of cross objection are dismissed. Both the parties do bear their own costs of this appeal. Final Result : Dismissed