Judgment 1. THESE ten appeals arise out of an Award passed by the learned Land Acquisition Judge at Suri in the district of Birbhum. Different plots of c. s. plots Nos. 271, 272 and 256 of Mouza Shyambati were acquired under West Bengal Act II of 1948 and the notification was published on the 22nd of Oct., 1953. At the time of this notification the lands were already in the possession of the State having been under requisition and so possession on the basis of acquisition had also been taken on the 22nd of October, 1953. All the ten cases out of which these ten appeals arise are covered by the same Award of the learned land Acquisition Judge and all these appeals have been heard together as common questions of law and facts are involved. The appellants who are the landlords, are entitled to get the entire compensation by virtue of the agreements with their tenants. The Collector's Award was on the basis of Rs. 425/- per acre for puratan patit and Rs. 30 per acre for Dahart kandar lands. The owners were not satisfied with the same and prayed for references which were made. The learned Land Acquisition judge accepted the contention of the owners that all these three plots of lands were utilised for all practical purposes as building sites and they should be valued as building sites and not as dahar or puratan patit lands. He, however, held that the compensation is to be paid on the basis of the price of land prevailing on the 31st of December, 1946 and found that Rs. 2,940/- per acre would be the rate prevalent on that date and directed the payment of compensation on that basis. He overruled the contentions raised on behalf of the owners that the valuation is to be made on the basis of the prevalent price on the date of the notification as also that they are entitled to get the statutory allowance referred to in Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. Against this the owners have come up in appeal. 2. THE first point that is pressed by Mr. Amarendra Nath Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants is to the effect that the learned Judge erred in valuing the plots at the rate of Rs. Against this the owners have come up in appeal. 2. THE first point that is pressed by Mr. Amarendra Nath Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants is to the effect that the learned Judge erred in valuing the plots at the rate of Rs. 2,940|- per acre and that too as on the basis of 31st of December, 1946. Mr. Gupta's contention is that it must be with reference to the date of the publication of the notice, which, in this particular case, is the 22nd of October, 1953. On that date, prima facie, the second proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 7 of the Act under which the valuation was to be determined with reference to the 31st day of December, 1946 would govern. But it would appear that this proviso was struck down as void abinitio by this Court in (1) State of West Bengal v. Murari Mohan Biswas and ors. 64 CWN 714 and in (2) State of Wesi Bengal v bon Behari Mondal 64 CWN 722 as also in the (3)Midnapur Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal ILR 1960 (1) Cal. 228. It may further be noted in this connection that this second proviso was deleted from this Act by West Bengal Act VIII of 1954 which came into effect on the 31st of March, 1954. The appellants, prima facie, are not entitled to get the benefit of this amendment inasmuch as the notification was published before that date. But when that proviso had been struck down by this Court ab initio, their rights would be governed under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7 and under that proviso the market value is to be determined as on the date of the publication of the notice or, in other words, with effect from 21st of October, 1953. Now, as to the valuation of the lands on that date it would appear that the owners had filed a kobala which would show that the price in 1953 would be near about Rs. 10,000/- per acre. On the other hand there is Ext. 4 which is a judgment in another Land Acquisition case relating to this mouza which would show that an Award was passed at the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per acre or Rs. 3,600/- per bigha on the date of the notification which was 1950. 10,000/- per acre. On the other hand there is Ext. 4 which is a judgment in another Land Acquisition case relating to this mouza which would show that an Award was passed at the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per acre or Rs. 3,600/- per bigha on the date of the notification which was 1950. The acquired lands are contiguous to Santi Niketan separated byroad and these three plots are situated side toy side and have also been held to be fit for building purposes. In F. A. No. 212 of 1961 which we have disposed of in July last, we have valued 10. 67 acres of lands in this mouza at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per acre and that date of notification is also 22nd of October 1953. We have also to take into account the fact that the larger the area the lesser would be the total value thereof. Keeping in mind all these facts and circumstances, we are of opinion that the compensation for the value of these lands as on the 22nd day of October, 1953 should be worked out at the rate of Rs, 4,500/- per acre. 3. MR. Gupta's next contention is that the owners are entitled to get 15 per cent as solatium under Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. He has referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court to show that Section 7 (2) of the Act under which this statutory allowance was ruled out in such proceedings is ultra vires, we may note in this connection that the cases reported in (4) AIR 1968 SC 394 The Deputy Commissioner and Collector or, Kamrup v. Durganath Sarma and at page 1425 (5) Balammal and others v. State of Madras and others would indicate that this contention of Mr. Gupta has to be given effect to. In the latter case the Supreme Court was considering a similar provision in the Madras city Improvement Trust Act 1950 which deprived the owners of the statutory right to solatium at the raie of 15 per cent on the market value of the lands, and held that this clause "is violative of the equality clause of the Constitution and is on that account void. "In reality there is no nexus between the object of this Act and this particular provision by which the statutory allowance was ruled out. "In reality there is no nexus between the object of this Act and this particular provision by which the statutory allowance was ruled out. The object of the Act is, "it is expedient to provide for the requisition and speedy acquisition of land for the purpose of maintaining supplies and. services essential to the life of the community and for providing proper facilities for transport communication, inrigation or drainage." We fail to understand as to how the withholding of this statutory allowance would lead to a speedy acquisition of the lands if the lands had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the owners would be entitled to get this compensation, whereas if the same are acquired under this act, this compensation would not have to be paid. There is no rational basis for this differentiation. The withholding of the statutory allowance under this particular Act would, therefore, be violative of Article 14, read with Article 13 of the constitution and similar provisions in other Acts have already been declared ultra vires as referred to above. We would, therefore, hold that the withholding of this allowance in this case is ultra vires and the claimants are entitled to get this statutory allowance of 15 per cent. 4. MR. Gupta, with his usual fairness, has further placed before us a decision of this Court in the (3) Midnapur zemindary Co.'s case referred to above where this particular point came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court which, however, held that this portion of clause of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act was not ultra, vires. With due respect to their Lordships we may say that we are not in a position to agree with the reasonings as laid out in that decision it may, however, be noted that this decision was given at a time when the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above were not available. Now, after the decisions by the Supreme Court referred to above, we are of the view that the decision of this Court in (3) Midnapur Zemindary Co.'s case on this point has been impliedly overruled. The last grievance which Mr. Gupta has urged before us is to the effect that the learned Judge erred in disallowing the claimants' claim to the interest. Now, as the Act originally stood, there was no express provision for the grant of interest. The last grievance which Mr. Gupta has urged before us is to the effect that the learned Judge erred in disallowing the claimants' claim to the interest. Now, as the Act originally stood, there was no express provision for the grant of interest. It is only when the Act was amended in 1954 by West Bengal Act VIII of 1954 that a proviso has been added to clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 providing for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation under the Award from the date of the publication of the notice until final payment. As on the date of the publication of the notification in this particular case this proviso was not there, the claimants are not entitled to get the benefit thereof and it may be rioted that this proviso has also not been given any retrospective effect. But Mr. Gupta contends that as the Act originally stood under sub-section (2) of Section 8 he was entitled to this interest. Sub-section (2) of Section 8, as it originally stood, runs as follows:- "the provisions of the Land Acquisition act 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any reference made to the court under sub-section (1)". In (G) Birendra Nath Ray ' Sarkar v. Union of India 57 CWN 283 and (7) Kazan Lal Agarwal v. Union of India 59 CWN 935 it was held by this Court that this cl. would apply only since the reference had been made to the Lard acquisition Judge. So on the basis of these two decisions it may be argued that the provision regarding interest as in the Land Acquisition Act, namely Section 28, would also apply. Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is in Part III and the heading of that part is reference to court and procedure thereof. Therefore, Section 28 would apply on the reference to Court. Moreover, it has been held by the Supreme Court in (8) Kazari Lal v. The Union of India AIR 1966 SC 1538 that, "in the context, what the clause means is that the provisions of the Central Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any reference intended, proposed or asked to be made, and not in respect of any reference already made. Having regard to the scheme of Section 8, considered in the light of the other provisions of the Act, it seems to us clear that the object of the Legislature in making the relevant provisions of the Central Act applicable to references was to take in all the relevant provisions of the Central Act which had reference to the making of references; and naturally, these provisions would begin with Section 18 of the Central Act which is the first Section in Part III of the Central Act dealing with reference to Court and procedure thereon. "it would appear from the observations of the Supreme court quoted above, that all the provisions of Chapter III of the Land Acquisition Act would apply in view of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of this Act. Accordingly, Section 28 which gives a discretion to the Court to pay interest on the excess amount would also apply to the facts of the present case and whether the appellants would be entitled to get interest would, be at the discretion of the Court. The learned judge was in error in holding that they were not entitled to any interest on the reading of the Act. 5. THE property had been acquired about 17 years back and the appellants have been deprived 01 the usufruct thereon since then. There is absolutely no reason, therefore, why they should not get the interest on the excess amount in accordance with Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (9) Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government AIR 1967 SC 465 , the interest for the Judge to use his discretion cannot be less than 6 per cent. We, therefore, hold that the appellants are entitled to get interest at 6 per cent per annum on the excess. 6. TO conclude, we, therefore, allow these appeals in part and modify the judgment and decrees passed by the learned Land Acquisition Judge and direct that compensation be paid to the appellants on the basis of Rs. 4,500/- per acre. We, therefore, hold that the appellants are entitled to get interest at 6 per cent per annum on the excess. 6. TO conclude, we, therefore, allow these appeals in part and modify the judgment and decrees passed by the learned Land Acquisition Judge and direct that compensation be paid to the appellants on the basis of Rs. 4,500/- per acre. The learned Judge in the court below will work out the compensation on this basis and we also direct that he shall add to this sum 15 per cent of the value of the lands, and shall pay interest on the excess over the Collector's Award at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 22nd October, 1953 to the date of payment of such excess in court. If any amount had already been paid over and above the Collector's or the Judge's Award, that will also be taken into account and will be deducted from the compensation payable now and the interest will run at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the outstanding up to the date of payment. The State will deposit the excess amount in the court of the learned land Acquisition Judge below, within six months from date. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals. Salil Kumar Datta, J. : I agree that the appeals should be allowed to the extent and in the manner provided in the judgment of my Lord just pronounced. I would, however, like to add a few words on the points of law involved. 7. THE lands in these proceedings, it appears, were under requisition under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, (West Bengal Act II of 1948), and subsequently a notification was published on October 22, 1953 for acquisition of the said lands under Section 4 of the said Act. On the publication of such notice, the lands vested absolutely on the State Government. 8. ON the ten proceedings arising from the said acquisition, the Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 425/- per acre for puratan patit lands and Rs. 30|- per acre for Dahar lands. On reference, the District Judge of Birbhum, in all the ten references heard together, by the same judgment, raised the value of all lands to Rs. 2,940 - per acre on the basis of price prevailing in December, 1946. 425/- per acre for puratan patit lands and Rs. 30|- per acre for Dahar lands. On reference, the District Judge of Birbhum, in all the ten references heard together, by the same judgment, raised the value of all lands to Rs. 2,940 - per acre on the basis of price prevailing in December, 1946. The claim for statutory allowance of 15 per cent on the amount of compensation and also for interest on the amount of compensation was however rejected by the District Judge and ten decrees were passed accordingly. The ten appeals against the said ten decrees have been preferred by the claimants landlords who, there is no dispute, are alone entitled to the same, and they have been heard together before us. Act II of 1948 provided in its sub-section (1) of Section 7 that compensation shall be payable for the acquisition of land the amount whereof is to determined in accordance with provisions of Section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act i. e. the market value on the date of notification for acquisition. The words "so far as they may be applicable" were added to the said sub-section by West Bengal Act VII of 1951, with effect from March 21, 1951. There is a reservation by a second proviso attached thereto in the Act as originally enacted that if such market value exceeds by any amount the market value of land on the 31st day of December, 1946, on the assumption that the land had been at that date in the same state in which it in fact was on the date of the publication of notification, the amount of such excess shall not be taken in consideration. This provision was however omitted by the West Bengal Act VIII of 1954, with effect from March 30, 1954, in view of the judicial decisions referred to later. In sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act it was provided that the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out in Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but no amount, referred to in subsection (2) of Section 23 of that Act shall be included in the award. In sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act it was provided that the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out in Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but no amount, referred to in subsection (2) of Section 23 of that Act shall be included in the award. In the original Act there was no express provision for payment of interest, but by the Amending Act VIII of 1954, a proviso was added to that sub-section renumbered as Clause (a) to subsection (2) of Section 7, providing for interest on the amount of compensation under the award at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of publication of notification until payment. This provision came into force on March 30, 1954 and was not made retrospective. It was also provided in subsection (2) of Section 8 that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any reference made to the Court against an award under Section 8 (1). Mr. Amarendra Nath Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellants in all these appeals has contended that the appellants are entitled to compensation calculated on the basis of the market: value of the lands acquired prevailing at the time of the notification for acquisition, together with 15 per cent statutory allowance on such market value as may be determined. In addition the compensation shall include interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of acquisition until payment. It was pointed out that though by the Amendment Act VIII of 1954 which came in force on March 30, 1954, the second proviso to Section 7 (1) was omitted, the provision therein was not made retrospective. None the less, the said proviso was held to be void since inception being violative of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution and it is also void being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as to statutory allowance, Mr. Gupta in the light of the Supreme Court decisions, contended that the original sub-section (2) of Section 7 renumbered in the principal act as Clause (a) of sub-section 2 of the Section by the Amending Act of 1954, regarding statutory allowance, was void being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As to interest, Mr. Gupta in the light of the Supreme Court decisions, contended that the original sub-section (2) of Section 7 renumbered in the principal act as Clause (a) of sub-section 2 of the Section by the Amending Act of 1954, regarding statutory allowance, was void being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As to interest, Mr. Gupta contended that though the provision for interest was inserted without retrospective effect by the Amending Act VIII of 1954 after the acquisition, the appellants were entitled to interest on principles of equity and law under Section 28 of Act 1 of 1894. 9. THE second proviso to Section 7 of the Act came up for consideration in (1) State of West Bengal v. Murari Mohan Biswas and others, 64 CWN 714 and following the interpretation given to the word "compensation", in (10) State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170 it was held : ". . . . the market value in December 1948 no matter when the acquisition is made, that is without reference to the time of acquisition which, in the present case, was the year 1949, would not be compensation within the meaning of either Section 299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The impugned proviso to section 7 (1) of the West Bengal Act II of 1948 would, therefore, be invalid prior to the Constitution and would remain so after the Constitution also unless validated by some other provision." 10. IT was further held that Clause 5 of Article 31 would give no validity or protection to the impugned proviso which is otherwise plainly invalid in view of Section 299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, as no Legislature had power to make a law contrary to its terms and the Provincial Legislature had no power to enact the impugned proviso. In (2) State of West Bengal v. Bon Behari Mondal, 64 CWN 722, following the above case it was held that the second proviso to Section 7 (1) of West Bengal Act II of 1948 was void from its very inception and the West Bengal Legislature did the right thing in omitting this void provision from the statute by Act VIII of 1954, which came into force on March 30, 1954. The lands in the present proceeding were acquired on October 22, 1953, and as such were not affected by the amendment by Act VIII of 1954 : none the less, in view of the above decisions, as the second proviso to Section 7 (1), which would otherwise govern the proceeding, was void since its inception, the claimants were entitled to the market value as prevailing on the date of publication of the notification for acquisition. It may be noted here that in the above cases, the impugned proviso was struck down as having violated the provisions of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution as it stood before the Fourth Amendment which came into force on April 27, 1955. Apart from the fact that the impugned proviso is violative of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution before the fourth amendment, it is now to be considered as to whether it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees that all persons should be treated alike in like circumstances. The article however permits reasonable classification and differential treatment based on substantial difference having reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved. In (11) P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition and another, AIR 1965 SC 1017 , the court was concerned with the validity of the provisions of Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961 which provided a compensation for lands acquired under it, calculated at the market rate prevailing on the date of notification or the average market value of land during five years immediately preceding such date whichever is less. Though the potential value of the land as a method of ascertaining compensation was excluded in the said Act, which resulted in the inadequacy of compensation none the less the Amending Act was held not to have violated Art. 31 (2) of the constitution, as it was held not to be a fraud on the powers of the legislature providing illusory compensation or principles irrelevant to the value of the property at about the time of acquisition. As to Article 14, it was seen that the object of the Amending Act was to acquire land for housing schemes which again could have been done by the principal Act after paying the market value of the land. As to Article 14, it was seen that the object of the Amending Act was to acquire land for housing schemes which again could have been done by the principal Act after paying the market value of the land. It was also held that differences between people owning lands or lands themselves had no reasonable relation to the objects of the Amending Act. It was observed as follows:- "the object (of the Amending Act) is to acquire lands for housing scheme at a low price. For achieving that object any land falling in any of the said categories can be acquired under the Amending Act. So, too, for a public purpose any such land can be: acquired under the principal Act. We, therefore, hold that discrimination is writ large on the Amending Act and it cannot be sustained on the principle of reasonable classification. We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act clearly infringes article 14 of the Constitution and is void. " 11. IN (12) Dy. Commissioner Kamrup v. Durganath, AIR 1968 SC 394 , the Court noticed that while the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was in force in Assam, the State Legislature passed the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act (Assam Act 6 of 1955) with effect from April 11, 1955, which provided for acquisition of land for public purposes on payment of compensation assessed on the basis of a multiple of annual land revenue. It was laid down as follows:- "In our opinion, the classification of land required for works and other measures in connection with flood control and prevention of erosion and land required for other public purposes has no reasonable relation to the object sought to the achieved, viz acquisition of land by the State in either case, the owner loses his land and in his place the State becomes the owner. There is unjust discrimination between the owners of land similarly situated by mere accident of some land being required for purposes mentioned in Assam Act 6 of 1955 and some land being required for other purposes. We hold that Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 is violative of Article 14". There is unjust discrimination between the owners of land similarly situated by mere accident of some land being required for purposes mentioned in Assam Act 6 of 1955 and some land being required for other purposes. We hold that Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 is violative of Article 14". Again in (9) Balammal and others v. State of Madras and others, AIR 1988 SC 1425, it was held that sub-clause (2) of Clause 6 of the Schedule to Madras City Improvement Trust Act (37 of 1950) in so far as it deprived the owners of the lands of the statutory addition to the market value of lands under Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative of the equality clause of the Constitution and is on that account void. It was observed as follows : "compensation awardable for compulsory acquisition of property must be a just equivalent of the value of the land of which a person is deprived. When compensation payable to the owner is to be based on the market value prevailing on different dates, according as it is awardable under the Land Acquisition Act or under some special provision when the compensation awardable to the owners of the lands under the Land Acquisition act is reduced by a special provision, unless the distinction is supported by any rational classification having reasonable relation to the subject matter or to the object sought to be achieved by the special provision and is founded on some intelligible differontia the special provision must be held to be void as infringing the guarantee under Article 14. "In (13) State of Gujarat v. Shantilal,' AIR 1969 SC 634 the Court observed that the acquisition was struck down in (11) P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case (supra) "because the State Government could resort to one of the two methods of acquisition- the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment), 1961-and no guidance was given by the Legislature about the statute which should be resorted to in a given case of acquisition for a housing scheme. Power to choose could therefore, be exercised arbitrarily". The Bombay Town Planning Act was upheld as constitutional as there was no option to the local authority to resort to one or the other of the alternative methods which resulted in acquisition. 12. Power to choose could therefore, be exercised arbitrarily". The Bombay Town Planning Act was upheld as constitutional as there was no option to the local authority to resort to one or the other of the alternative methods which resulted in acquisition. 12. ON a consideration of the provisions of Act II of 1948, I have no doubt in my mind that the impugned provisions of the Act II of 1948 in so far as it provides for compensation at rates lesser than the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and does not provide at all for statutory allowance u/s. 23 (2) are discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Act II of 1948 is for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for the purposes of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage. Acquisition for the aforesaid purposes could as well be done by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and for speedy acquisition, there are adequate provisions under section 17 of the said Act. The classification of lands required for the purposes of Act II of 1948 and of lands for other public purposes has no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by H. he Act viz. the acquisition of lands by the State. As was held in the case of Assam Act 6 of 1955, in either case the owner loses his land and the State in his place becomes its owner. There is thus an unjust discrimination between the owners of land similarly situated by mere accident of some land being acquired under West Bengal Act II of 1948 and some land acquined under the Land Acquisition Act and no guidance was given by the Legislature about the statute which should be resorted to in a given case of acquisition such power to choose being open to arbitrary exercise of power. We do not find that the differential treatment of the two categories of acquisition of lands is based on any substantial difference having reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, viz. the acquisition of land. We do not find that the differential treatment of the two categories of acquisition of lands is based on any substantial difference having reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, viz. the acquisition of land. If that is the position in law, the onerous provisions in the 1948 Act depriving the expropriated owners of the market value of land at the time of notification as provided in second proviso to Section 7 since deleted as also of the 15 per cent additional allowance on the market value of land as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 7 must be held as void being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. IN the (3) Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd v. State of West Bengal, ILR 1960-1 Calcutta 228, placed before us by Mr. Gupta which according to him has been overruled, it was held that in view of the object and purpose of the statute which was for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for purpose mentioned in the statute, the omission of the statutory allowance of 15 per cent considered by the legislature as necessary and expedient, satisfied the requisite tests of a reasonable differentiation bearing a rational relation to the object and purpose of the statute. In the decisions however referred to above, which were subsequent to the decision in the Midnapore zemindary case, it was held, as noted already that if the State Government could resort to one of the two methods of acquisition, which is really the objects of either statute, in absence of any guidance consistent with the objects and purposes of the particular statute, it could not be said that there is any reasonable differentiation between the lands or their owners bearing a rational relation to the objects and purposes of the statute. There is no escape from the conclusion as a consequence that in such circumstances there will be unjust discrimination between the owners of land similarly situated by mere accident of some lands being acquired under West Bengal Act II of 1948 while some others being acquired under Act I of 1894 and as such, the provision regarding compensation for acquisition in Act II of 1948 being more onerous, but be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision in the Midnapore Zemindary case must therefore be held to be overruled by implication by the above decisions of the Supreme Court and we feel no longer bound by the said decision. 14. AS a result, the contentions of Mr. Gupta must prevail and accordingly it is held that the appellants in the connected appeal will be entitled to compensation calculated at the market value of the lands prevailing on the date of notification for acquisition together with the statutory allowance thereon as provided in Section 23 (2) of the Act I of 1894. It must also be held that the Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Act II of 1948, providing for omission of the statutory allowance of 15 per cent from the compensation payable for the acquisition, is void as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As to the claim for interest, the appellants contended that they are entitled to interest on the excess amount awarded by the Court as compensation for the lands acquired. The Act as it originally stood made no provision for interest though by the Amending Act of 1954, express provision for interest was made by insertion of a proviso to Section 7 (2) (a) of the Act as thereby amended. The provision for inclusion of interest from date of publication of notification for acquisition till payment was made in the said proviso, following the principle as it appears, laid down in (14) Satindar Singh v. Umrao Singh AIR 1961 SC 908 . The appellants however cannot take any benefit of this proviso, as it came into effect after the acquisition in these proceedings. Mr. Gupta, in support of his claim for interest on the excess amount awarded over the amount awarded by the Collector, relied on Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was included within Part III dealing with reference to Court and Procedure therein. In (8) Kajari Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1538 , the Supreme Court in effect held that by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of West Bengal Act II of 1948, all Sections from 18 to 28 of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are applicable to a reference made or proposed to be made to Court in acquisition proceedings under the said Act. Section 28 gives a discretion to the court for directing the Collector to award interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the excess amount as may be awarded. There is no reason why the discretion should not be exercised in favour of the appellants when they have been kept away from the due compensation for a long period of about 17 years. In (9) Raghubans Narain v. Uttar Pradesh Government, AIR 1967 SC 465 , it was held that where the Court exercises its discretion and grants interest, the interest has to be at the rate of 6 per cent per annum The appellants are therefore entitled to interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the excess outstanding amount over the Collector's award, as claimed. 15. I agree with the valuation of land arrived at by my learned brother, as also the statutory allowance there on and interest as provided in the judgment. I agree that the appeal should be allowed without any order as to costs in this Court, as proposed.