( 1 ) THE appellant in M. F. A. 348/69 is the plaintiff in O. S. No. 11/69 in the court of the Civil Judge, Udipi, SK. In the said suit, he prayed for a declaration that the alleged appointment of the first defendant by the fourth defendant as his successor to the Palimar Mutt of Udipi was illegal and void, that the first defendant has not become one of the Swamiars of the ashta Mutts of Udipi and hence was not entitled to enter the 'garbha griha' or Sanctum Sanctorum and periorm the Puja to the idol of Lord krishna or to perform the Pariyayam of the Krishna Mutt for a period of two years commencing on or about 17th January 1970. He prayed that a permanent injunction be granted restraining the first defendant from doing all or any of the things and also for grant of an injunction against defendants 2 and 3 from allowing the first defendant in doing so. In the said suit, he also prayed for grant of a mandatory injunction against the third defendant either to ordain and appoint a suitable Bala-Brahmachari as per the custom and usage as the Matadhipathi of the Phalimar Mutt, or to take upon himself and perform the next Pariyayam; and if for any reason the third defendant fails to do so, to ask or permit defendants 5 to 8 or the plaintiff, to perform the same; and grant a permanent injunction, restraining defendants 1 to 3 from interfering in any manner with the party so chosen out of defendants 5 to 8 and the plaintiff, from duly performing the said Pariyayam. After filing the suit, the plaintiff filed I. A. No. I praying that a temporary injunction may be granted restraining the first defendant from entering the Garbha Griha and performing puja in the plaint Mutt and also from performing the Pariyayam commencing from 17-1-1970. The learned Civil Judge did not grant the order of temporary injunction prayed for. This appeal is directed against the said order of the learned Civil Judge refusing to grant the temporary injunction. ( 2 ) THE appellants in M. F. A. No. 349/69 are defendants 5 to 8 in the said suit. Respondents 1 to 6 are defendents 1 to 4 and 9 and the plaintiff. This appeal is directed against the said order of the learned Civil Judge refusing to grant the temporary injunction. ( 2 ) THE appellants in M. F. A. No. 349/69 are defendants 5 to 8 in the said suit. Respondents 1 to 6 are defendents 1 to 4 and 9 and the plaintiff. In this appeal also defendants 5 to 8 challenge the said order of the learned Civil Judge refusing to grant the temporary injunction prayed for in I. A. No. 1 in the said suit O. S. 11|69. ( 3 ) FOR the sake of convenience, during the course of this judgment, the parties will be referred to by the designations given to them in O. S No. 11/69. ( 4 ) AS both the appeals arise out of the same order passed on LA. No. 1, they are heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. ( 5 ) SRI H. B. Datar, learned counsel for defendant 1 (Respondent 1 in both the appeals) raised a preliminary objection that the said appeals cannot be heard as the notice issued to respondent 4 had not yet been returned. It is argued that on a Memo filed on behalf of the appellants, this Court passed a Judicial order that respondent 4 may continue in the appeals. It is contended that the said order is binding and the Court cannot go behind the said order and unless respondent 4 is served, these appeals cannot be heard. ( 6 ) AS respondent 4 was not served in both the appeals, a Memo was filed by the appellants that notice to respondent 4 may be dispensed with as he was not represented in the lower Court. On the said Memo, this court passed an order on 18-11-1969 directing that respondent 4' may continue. Thereafter, on 3rd December 1969 the appellant in MFA. 348/69 filed I. A. No. II stating that the order of the lower Court on LA. I was passed without service of notice on respondent 4 and he was not a party to the said order and hence it was not necessary for him to be impleaded in this appeal. It is also stated that no relief is prayed tor as against respondent 4. The appellant has further stated that he withdraws the appeal against the 4th respondent and the appeal as against him may be dismissed. It is also stated that no relief is prayed tor as against respondent 4. The appellant has further stated that he withdraws the appeal against the 4th respondent and the appeal as against him may be dismissed. No orders were passed on this application. When the appeals came up for hearing before me on 15-1-1970, the appellants in M. F. A. 349/69 also filed a Memo stating that the appellants are withdrawing the appeal against the 4th respondent and the appeal may therefore be dismissed as against the said respondent as not pressed. ( 7 ) IT is contended on behalf of the appellants that the appellants have a right to withdraw their appeal against any of the respondents unconditionally and reliance is placed on Bijayananda v. Satrughna Sahu. , AIR. 1963 SC. 1566. In the said decision in paragraph 7, their Lordships have observed as follows:-"it is unnecessary ior our present purpose to decide whether the absolute right of the appellant to withdraw an appeal unconditionally flows from S. 107 (2) or is an inherent right of the appellant on the analogy of Or. 23, R. 1 (1 ). But there can be no doubt that an appellant has the right to withdraw his appeal unconditionally and it he makes such an application to the court, it has to grant it. "i, therefore, permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeals as against the 4th respondent and took up the hearing of the said two appeals. ( 8 ) SRI Datar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent, raised another preliminary objection that M. F. A. 349/69 is not maintainable. It is argued by Sri Datar that defendants 5 to 8 who are the appellant in this appeal had earlier instituted O. S. No. 48 of 1969, a suit for permanent injunction, in the Court of the Munsiff at Udipi, restraining the first defendant from performing Puja in Sri Krishna Mutt. In the said suit, they also prayed for an order of interim injunction and the same was dismissed. The appeal filed against the said order is at present pending. They are now moving this Court to decide what is actually pending in the lower Court. It is also argued that defendants 5 to 8 are not persona aggrieved by the order passed on I. A. No. I in O. S. 11/69. The appeal filed against the said order is at present pending. They are now moving this Court to decide what is actually pending in the lower Court. It is also argued that defendants 5 to 8 are not persona aggrieved by the order passed on I. A. No. I in O. S. 11/69. It was only the plaintiff, who had applied for the interim order before the learned Civil judge who has got a right of appeal and not defendants 5 to 8 who are only formal defendants in the said suit. No relief has been claimed against defendants 5 to 8 in the said suit filed by plaintiff. Sri Datar hag relied on Nirmal Singh v. Zamir Uddinkhan, AIR. 1937 All. 368. in support of his contention. ( 9 ) SRI Krishna Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in M. F. A. 349/69, has contended that the scope of the two suits are different and the relief a claimed therein are also different. The earlier suit, O. S. 48/69 filed in the Munsiffs Court by defendants 5 to 8 was only a suit for permanent injunction restraining D-1 from performing the worship in Sri Krishna temple. In the later suit, O. S. 11/69 filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, the relief claimed is comprehensive and includes a prayer that defendant 1 may be prevented from performing the pariyayam for a period of two years. There is a further prayer for granting a mandatory injunction against the third defendant directing him to appoint a suitable Bala Brahmachari as the Matadhipathi of Phalimar mutt and also directing him to conduct the Pariyayam and if he fails to do so, to permit defendants 5 to 8 and the plaintiff to conduct the said pariyayam. In the suit before the Munsiff only defendants 1 and 2 had been made parties, whereas in O S 11/69 all interested persons have been made parties. the learned Munsiff has passed only an interim order refusing the injunction prayed for in the said suit and no decision has been given in the suit and the same is still pending It is not correct to say that defendants 5 to 8 are not interested in the order passed by the learned Civil Judge refusing to grant a temporary injunction Sri Krishna rao has relied on Venkata v Lingayya, ILR. 47 Mad 833. 47 Mad 833. and Sheodhan v Daryao, AIR. 1966 SC. 1332. in support of his contentions ( 10 ) IN Nirmal Singh v Zamir Uddibn Khan, ther Lordships have laid down that where in a suit no relief has been claimed by the plaintiff aginst the pro forma defendant, the pro forma defendant has no right of appeal against the decree when the suit is dismissed, inasmuch as he has no locus standi to appeal in the said case no relief had been claimed by the plaintiff against the pro forma defendant. the plaintiff had not filed any appeal; on the other hand the appeal was riled by the pro forma defendant praying that the claim of the plaintiff may be decreed with costs. The Court also held that the said defendant did not possess any right in the suit land in question and he had not asked for any relief for himself, and he had therefore no locus standi to appeal In the instant case, defendants 5 to 8 are Matadhipathis oi four Ashta Mutts of Udipi and are interested in the affair of Sri Krishna Temple Their contention is that the appointment of defendant 1 as the Matadhipathi of Phalimar Mutt is illegal and void and that he has no right to enter the "garbha Gnha" and do puja and to perform the Panyayam of the plaint Mutt They are as much interested as the plaintiff in the order of the learned Civil Judge refusing to grant a temporary injunction as prajed for in i A No. I In the counter to I. A No. I filed by defendant 5 he has stated in paragraph 3 as follows: -"it is absolutely just and necessary that the court be pleased to pass an order of temporary injunction to protect the time honoured customs and usages governing the suit religious institutions as correctly narrated in plaint paras 7 to 11. "in paragraph 5 thereof, he has stated as follows.-" This opponent under the circumstances prays that the Court be pleased to grant the protective relief prayed for in which even the shivalli Brahmin community as a whole is so keenly interested and has got very much at stake. "in paragraph 5 thereof, he has stated as follows.-" This opponent under the circumstances prays that the Court be pleased to grant the protective relief prayed for in which even the shivalli Brahmin community as a whole is so keenly interested and has got very much at stake. "in the counter filed by defendant 6 in respect of the said I. A No 1, m paragraph 5, it is stated as follows.-"the plaintiff and the respondents 4 to 8 will suffer irreparable injury and loss incapable of being compensated in money if this court should refuse the temporary injunction claimed by the Plaintiff the opponents 4 to 8 are deprived of the benefit of worshipping Lord sri Krishna. "i am therefore of opinion that defendants 5 to 8 are equally interested in the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, refusing to grant an interim injunction and, as they are persons aggrieved by the said order, they have got a right of appeal against the order passed on I. A. I and the appeal filed by them is maintainable. ( 11 ) NOW coming to the merits of the case Sri Karanth, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in M. F. A. 348/69, has contended that the order of the learned Civil Judge is unsound, contrary to law and arbitrary. He argues that the custom alleged by the plaintiff is admitted, but the contesting defendants have set up an exception to it and failed to prove the exception set up by them. The succession to a Mutt is governed entirely by the customs of the particular Mutt. In support of the same, he has cited Vital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR. 1954 SC. 606. and passages from Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust by Mukherjea, pages 316, 324, 331 and 332. The custom that at the time of the ordination, the person must be a Bala brahmachari has been judicially recognised by the decision in raghubhushana Thirthaswami v. Vidiararidhi Thirthaswamiar, AIR 1917 Mad 809. The lower court has misunderstood the question of 'defilement' of the idol and has failed to follow the decision in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of mysore, AIR. 1958 SC. 255. The lower court has misunderstood the question of 'defilement' of the idol and has failed to follow the decision in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of mysore, AIR. 1958 SC. 255. The lower Court was in error in refusing to grant an injunction on the ground that the defilement has already taken place, ignoring the fact that every act of worship which is not compelent is a recurring act of defilement and the principles governing the matter, and it is a grave injury to the institution and is a continuing one. The theory of factum valet put forward by the lower Court has no application if the appointment itself is invalid. With regard to the applicability of the said doctrine, he has relied on the passage in page 10 of Raghavachariar's hindu Law and also at page 38 in Mayne's Hindu Law. He has argued that the Swamiars of the Ashta Mutts of Udipi are joint trustees of the plaint Mutt, and this has received judicial recognition by the Madras High court in S. A. Nos. 614 ano 615 of 1951. In the written statement filed by the 1st defendant in O. S. 48|69 in the Munsiffs Court, the contention that the Pariyavam Swami is the sole trustee has not been put forward. The joint rights of the Matadhipathis to participate in the management of Sri krishna Temple has been recognised in the order passed by the Collector (Ext. P-6) as early as in 1851. The said right has been recognised by the various decisions of the Courts. Sri Karanth also argues that after Lakshminarasimhaiah's case, (1965) 1 Mys L J. 370. this Court by lager decisions in Sakharam v. Vithal, 17 LR. 512. and Rangamma v. Krishna Rao, (1968) 1 Mys. L. J. 552. has laid down that the appellate Court has a right to interfere with the order of the lower Court with regard to the grant of interim injunctions, if the lower Court has ignored relevant facts and has adopted unjudicial approach. He has relied on the observations made by this Court in CRP. 1894|68, 1969 Mys. L. J. SNRD. 202 wherein this Court has held that an error which the Appellate Court is called upon to correct is an error in the conclusion. He has relied on the observations made by this Court in CRP. 1894|68, 1969 Mys. L. J. SNRD. 202 wherein this Court has held that an error which the Appellate Court is called upon to correct is an error in the conclusion. Tt is therefore argued that the reasons given by the ltarned Civil Judge for not granting an interim injunction are not sound and tenable and are contrary ot law and deserve to be set aside. ( 12 ) SRI Krishna Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellents in MFA. 349 of 1969. has contended that the order of the lower court refusing to grant an injunction is unsustainable. The exercise of discretion by the lower Court is unreasonable and unjust. The lower court has eried in holding that a prima fices case has not been made out by the plaintiff. In the written statement ot defendant 1, at paragraph 3, he has stated that the avermen's made by the plaintiff in paras 3 to 6 are substantially correct. In essential points there is agreement on what is stated in the plaint about the custom set up by the plaintiff. If there is a departure from the custom, It is for the 1st defendant to set up and prove the same A person initiated by somebody else does not become a disciple of the mutt in question. It is admitted by the defendants that the initiated boy must be brought to the Mutt and customary ceremonies held in the mutt. Defendant 1 has not been initiaed by the Phalimar Mutt Swamiji and he was not his Sishya or discile. A person unconnected with the mutt and a stranger cannot become a Matadhrpathi. Merely handing over the management of the Mutt by defendant 4 to defendant 1 is not sufficient; defendant 4 has not stated that he has abdicated the Pectam of the Matadhipathi of Phalimar Mutt. Defendant 1 has not become a 'sishya' of phalimar Mutt. Merely because he is a Sanyasi, he cannot be initiated. Unless special custom is pleaded and proved by defendant 1, he cannot succeed as the Matadhipathi of the Phalimar Mutt. The appointment of defendant 1 is invalid and illegrl It is admitted that any other Swamiar cannot touch the idol of Sri Krishna and it would amount to defilement of heidel. Even the trustees cannot alter the custom. Unless special custom is pleaded and proved by defendant 1, he cannot succeed as the Matadhipathi of the Phalimar Mutt. The appointment of defendant 1 is invalid and illegrl It is admitted that any other Swamiar cannot touch the idol of Sri Krishna and it would amount to defilement of heidel. Even the trustees cannot alter the custom. All the eight Mutts are interested in the worship and management of the suit temple and they are co-trustees in the liberal sense of the term. As the 1st defendant has been improperly appointed, his worship of the idol is a recurring act of defilement. The injury done is to the institution and cannot be computed in terms of money. He has relied on Tbimivenkata v. Venkatacharlu, AIR 1953 PC 47 in support of his contention. He argues that the learned Judge has forgotten the essential things and he is wholly wrong in not granting an interim injunction as prayed for in I. A. No. 1. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, have strongly supported the order of the learned Civil Judge and they contend that the learned Civil Judge was fully justified in the instant case in refusing to pass an order of interim injunction. Sri Krishna Murthy has argued that the plaintiff's suit is based on custom and it is well known that customs of different institutions vary and are different and it is dangerous to act on analogies. Defendants 1 and 2 have nowhere admitted the custom put forward by the plaintiff. Defendant 1, in his written statement, has contended that there are two distinct stages in the process of appointing a Matadhipathi in the Ashta Mutts; one is the initiation of a bala Brahmachari; the next is appointment of Swamiji to the Peetam. These are two different steps and it is possible to stop the ceremonies at any stage. The plaintiff has not established the custom pleaded by him by proper evidence. He has also not made out that there has been a breach of the said custom. The plaintiff having come to Court alleging that there is a particular custom, he must prove the same. The custom must be decided on the testimony in the case. The plaintiff has not established the custom pleaded by him by proper evidence. He has also not made out that there has been a breach of the said custom. The plaintiff having come to Court alleging that there is a particular custom, he must prove the same. The custom must be decided on the testimony in the case. Sri Krishna Muruty argues that the decision rendered in raghubhushno Thirthaswami v. Vidiavandhi Thirthaswami, is of no assistance in deciding the controversy in the case. It was a dispute between Bhandarikere Mutt and Bhimanakattai Mutt; these two mutts admittedly do not belong to the group of Ashta Mutts of Udipi. The said decision is not an authority in regard to the custom prevailing in Udipi mutts. The various affidavits filed on behalf of the defendants clearly show that neither the custom nor usage required that initiation into Sanyasa and ordination to the Peetam must be contemporaneous. The history of Ashta mutts abound in such instances and various instances have been given in the affidavits filed on behalf of the defendants. Sri Madhavacharya himself was given Sanyasa by his Guru first and after some days of his initiation into Sanyasa, his Guru established nim in the Peea. Sri madhavacharya appointed his own brother to the Peetam of Sri Subramanya mutt. Thereafter, he established the Ashta Mutts at Udipi and to the Peetam of Sode Mutt which is one of the Ashta Mutts, he appointed his brother though he was the Matadhipathi of Sri Subramanya Mutt. It is also contended that the worship of Lord Krishna is governed by the rituals prescribed in 'tantra Sara Sangraha', a treatise composed by Sri madhavacharya himself. As seen from SI okas 138 to 140 in Chapter III therein, the Vigraha of Lord Shri Krishna would be defiled only if thieves, chandalas, pathitha, dog, women in menses and the like enter the Garbha grriha. It is therefore clear that if a prson who is not entitled to perform puja does Puja, the idol cannot be defiled. It is also stressed by sri Krishna Murthy that no member of the public is aggrieved and has filed a suit. There is also no irreparable injury as the Pariyayam is being conducted by defendant 1 from 18th January 1970. It is also stressed by sri Krishna Murthy that no member of the public is aggrieved and has filed a suit. There is also no irreparable injury as the Pariyayam is being conducted by defendant 1 from 18th January 1970. Defendant 1 has also been offering worship from 3-2-1969 and the plaintiff has kept quiet and filed the suit only on 13th May 1969. The plaintiff has acquiesced for more than three months and did not regard that he was damnified. It is clear from his own statement that he had come to Udipi on 3-3-1969. Having regard to the complexity of the matter, the learned Civil Judge has taken one view and it is a reasonable view. Unless the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court is unreasonable, capricious or whimsical, the appellate Court will not be justified in interfering with the order of the trial Court. ( 14 ) SRI Datar has referred to the various decisions of this Court and has pointed out that this Court will not be justified in appeal in interfering with the order of the trial Court unless the exercise of discretion by the trial Court is unreasonable or capricious He has contended that defendant 1 has filed several affidavits of eminent and distinguished sanskrit Scholars, Philosophers, authors, and purohits, who have opined that the appointment of defendant 1 is perfectly legal and not opposed to the custom. The bona fides of these various distinguished persons have not at all been challenged by the plaintiff. He has stressed that the balance of convenience is in favour of defendant 1 who has gone and collected some lakhs of rupees from various persons for conducting the Pariyayam. Defendant 1 is now the Pariyayam Swami and the Pariyayam has commenced from 18th January 1970. He argues that the judgment of the learned Civil Judge satisfies every requirement and the learned Judge has applied all the tests necessary and the order cannot be said to be unreasonable or whimsical. ( 15 ) SRI Raghavendra Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant 2, has drawn my attention to the various passages in muhkharjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. ( 15 ) SRI Raghavendra Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant 2, has drawn my attention to the various passages in muhkharjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. He argues that Pariyaya swamy alone is responsible for conducting the Pariyayam and performing puja in Sri Krishna Mutt for two years and there is no question of the other Matadhipathis being joint trustees. Pariyayam Swamy alone is responsible to pay off the debts incurred for the performance of the pariyayam. The founder of the Mutt is competent to appoint his successor and the appointment of defendant 1 by defendant 4 in this case is perfectly legal. He argues that the appointment of the plaintiff himself is irregular as he has admitted that when he was ordained, he was past 17 years and not a Bala Brahmachari below 16 years Irreparable loss and injury will be caused to defendant 1 if injunction is issued and no irreparable loss or injury will be caused to the plaintiff if the injunction is refused, as his term as Pariyaya Swamy commences some years later and there is no imminent danger Defendant 1 has been performing Puja from 3-2-1969. Plaintiff and other Matadhipathis have not been prevented from performing Puia in the Sri Krishna Mutt by defendants 1, 2 or 3. Plaintiff has not placed concrete material about the custom and the custom set up by them has to be proved by evidence. If an order of interim injunction is granted it would result in utter confusion and not only put a stop to the conduct of the Pariyayam, but also bring to a standstill the administration of the Phalimar Mutt. None of the tests laid down by the Court for the issue of temporary injunction has been satisfied in this case and the learned Civil Judge was justified in refusing to grant an interim injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff. ( 16 ) THE law with regard to the grant of temporary injunctions by courts is well settled. In the Law Relating to Injunction by John George woodroffe, at page 101, the learned Author states as follows: '" The power which the Court possesses of granting injunctions whether interlocutory or perpetual, should be very cautiously exercised, and only upon clear and satisfactory grounds; otherwise it may work the greatest injustice. In the Law Relating to Injunction by John George woodroffe, at page 101, the learned Author states as follows: '" The power which the Court possesses of granting injunctions whether interlocutory or perpetual, should be very cautiously exercised, and only upon clear and satisfactory grounds; otherwise it may work the greatest injustice. The plaintiff is bound to make out a case showing a clear necessity for its exercise; it being the duty of the court rather to protect acknowledged right than to etablish new and doubtful ones. Moreover, a temporary injunction is a restrictive or prohibitory process designed to compel the party against whom it is granted to maintain his status merely until the matters in dispute shall by due process of the Courts be determined. As such, an injunction is in its operation somewhat like judgment and execution before trial; it is only to be resorted to from a pressing necessity; to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be repaired under any standard of compensation. In the case of temporary injunction the applicant must show a fair prima facie case in support of the right claimed and an actual or threatened violation of that right, productive of irreparable or at least serious damage; his conduct must be such as not to disentitle him to assistance; it should be fair and honest, and in particular there must be no acquiescence or delay; there must be a greater convenience in granting than refusing the injunction and lastly equally efficacious relief must not be obtainable by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust. The subject matter of a temporary injunction is the protection of legal rights pending litigation. Its object is to prevent future injury, leaving matters as far as possible in status quo until the suit in all its bearings can be heard and determined. The Court upon an application for a temporary injunction will deal with the injunction upon the evidence before it, and will confine itself strictly to the immediate object sought, and as far as possible abstain from prejudging the question in the cause. The Court upon an application for a temporary injunction will deal with the injunction upon the evidence before it, and will confine itself strictly to the immediate object sought, and as far as possible abstain from prejudging the question in the cause. " ( 17 ) THIS Court in Lakshminarasimhiah v. Yalakki Gowda, has laid down as follows:" The granting or refusing of injunction is a matter resting in the sound discretion with the trial Court and consequently no injunction will be granted whenever it will operate oppressively, or inequitably or contrary to the real justice of the case. In exercising the discretionary power, the Courts should be guided by the following guiding principles. There is no power which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction. It is the strong armof equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury where Courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurable remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. But that will not be awarded in doubtful cases, or new ones not coming within well established principles; for if it issues errroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted for which there can be no redress, it being the act of a Court, not of the party who prays for it. It will be refused till the Courts are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting injury about to be done by an illegal act. In such a case the Court owes it to its suitors and its own principles to administer the only remedy which the law allows to prevent the commission of such act. The discretionary power must be exercised with extreme caution and applied only in clear cases; otherwise, instead of becoming an instrument to promote the public as well as private welfare, it may become a means of an extensive and perhaps an irreparable injustice. The discretionary power must be exercised with extreme caution and applied only in clear cases; otherwise, instead of becoming an instrument to promote the public as well as private welfare, it may become a means of an extensive and perhaps an irreparable injustice. " ( 18 ) A series of decisions of this Court have also laid down as to when the appellate Court is justified in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court granting or withholding the grant of temporary injunctions. In Lakshminaraismhaiah's case, mentioned above, this court has observed as follows:" An appeal lies from the order of a trial Judge granting or refusing to grant an interim injunction, but what the Court of appeal has to consider is simply whether or not the Judge who dealt with the matter has properly exercised the discretion which he undoubtedly possesses. The question for the decision of the Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, was whether the Munsiff did not properly exercise his judicial discretion. The appellate Judge is not to approach the case as if he were the trial Judge. " ( 19 ) SRI Karanth has strongly relied on some of the subsequent decisions of this Court. In CRP. 1894/68 (11), this Court has stated that it is not a correct proposition of law to say that in an appeal against an order of interim injunction, the appellate Court has to confine itself to the question of the exercise of discretion by the trial Court. An error which the appellate court is called upon to correct is an error in the conclusion, contribution to which is made from two sources, (1) a prima facie erroneous decision as to where possession lies, and (2) the propriety or otherwise of. the discretion in favour of making or refusing to make an order of injunction. The order of the trial Court should not ordinarly be interferred with if the appellate Court finds that the opinion of the trial court regarding possession is fairly possible on the material placed before it and that on the said finding the discretion has been rightly exercised in all the circumstances of the case. ( 20 ) IN Sakharam Nanasaheb Patel v. Vithal Stddappa Chalaewadi, this Court has stated that to grant or refuse to grant interim injunction is within the discretion of the trial Court. ( 20 ) IN Sakharam Nanasaheb Patel v. Vithal Stddappa Chalaewadi, this Court has stated that to grant or refuse to grant interim injunction is within the discretion of the trial Court. It is a matter of judical discretion and if the Court which either grants the injunction or refuses to grant it, rightly appreciated the facts and applied to those facts the well known principle that the Court must first see that there is a bona fide contention between the parties, and then consider on which side, in the event of success, will lie the balance of inconvenience if the injunction does not issue, then such an order must be held to have been properly made by the trial Court in exercise of its judicial discretion. The appellate Court has not power to set aside the discretion order of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court in its view has not correctly appreciated the materials placed before it. ( 21 ) IN Khan Saheb Abdul Gam v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shakoor, 20 LR. 464. this Court has observed that the grant or refusal of an interim injunction would depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. At the stage of granting an interim injunction, the Court is not expected to embark upon a detailed investigation on the relative merits of the contentions of the parties. It would be enough if the plaintiff raises questions of a substantive character calling for decision after an examination of all the facts. and the law arising in the case. At the interlocutory stage the Court has to consider the nature and the merits of the rival contentions bearing on the limited question as to whether or not the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. In granting an interim injunction the Court has to consider whether the party seeking injunction has made out that the injury complained of is so serious and irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of injunction is necessary. In dealing with this question the court must have due regard to the conduct and dealing of the parties before the application is made to the Court by the plaintiff to preserve and. protect his right. Since the jurisdiction to interfere is purely equitable; it is largely governed by equitable principles. In dealing with this question the court must have due regard to the conduct and dealing of the parties before the application is made to the Court by the plaintiff to preserve and. protect his right. Since the jurisdiction to interfere is purely equitable; it is largely governed by equitable principles. ( 22 ) IN Rangamma v. Krishnappa, this Court has stated that granting or refusal of temporary injunction rests on the sound exercise of discretion by the Court. Such exercise of discretion cannot be lightly interfered with by the appellate Court, unless it is shown that such exercises of discretion is unreasonable or capricious. That a different view was possible on the facts and circumstances of the case by itself will not be sufficient to interfere with the order. This Court quoted the decision of the Supreme Court in 17. P. Co-op. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros. , AIR. 1967 SC. 249. wherein the Supreme Court has laid down that it is well established that the appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would be open to the appellate Court to interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion. ( 23 ) BEARING in mind the principles laid down by this Court in the abovementioned decisions, I will consider whether the learned Civil Judge has exercised his discretion properly. Before the plaintiff can ask for grant of a temporary injunction, he must establish (1) that he has a prima facie case, (2) that protection is necessary from the species of injury known as irreparable before the legal right can be established, and (3) the mischief or inconvenience that is likely to arise from withholding an injunction is greater than by granting it. ( 24 ) THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. ( 24 ) THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. It is the contention of the appellants that there is a well established custom and usage which has obtained for the last several centuries in the eight Mutts of Udipi, that the Matadhipathi should choose a Bala Brahmachari belonging to Shivalli Thulu brahmin community, as his successor. The initiation to Sanyasa and the ordination to the Mutt must be contemporaneous. It is contended by the appellants that this custom has been admitted by defendant 1 in his written statement. As defendants plead deviation in this custom, it is for the defendants to prove the same. In paragraph 3 of the written statement of defendant 1, it is stated that defendant 1 is willing to accept the averments in paras 3 to 6 of the plaint as substantially correct. The custom pleaded by the plaintiff is well established and has received judicial recognition by courts. In Raghubhushana Thirthaswami v Vidiavaridhi Thirthaswami, the Madras High Court has held that there was such a custom. In the various affidavits- filed on behalf of the plaintiff, the persons concerned have referred to this well established custom. At the time of ordination, defendant 1 was not a Bala Brahmachari but in fact he was senior to defendant 4 by about 20 years. He was not connected with Phalimar Mutt but was the head of Bhandarikere Mutt which is not one of the eight udipi Mutts. A person unconnected with Phalimar Mutt cannot be ordained and become a Matadhipathi of the said Mutt. ( 25 ) DEFENDANT 1 in paragraph 3 of his written statement, has stated that he is willing to accept the averments in paras 3 to 5 of the plaint as substantially correct. Paras 3 to 5 of the plaint refer to the establishment of the Mutt by Sri Madhavacharya and the history of the Mutts. It states how the eight Mutts were established and subsequently grouped into four pairs, each pair being called 'dwandwa'. In paragraph 4 of the written statement, defendant 1 has clearly stated that the averments in paragraph 7 of the plaint are not correct. Para 7 of the plaint refers to the well established custom mentioned above. It states how the eight Mutts were established and subsequently grouped into four pairs, each pair being called 'dwandwa'. In paragraph 4 of the written statement, defendant 1 has clearly stated that the averments in paragraph 7 of the plaint are not correct. Para 7 of the plaint refers to the well established custom mentioned above. In the said paragraph, defendant 1 has stated that there are two distinct stages in the process of appointing a succesor to the Matadhipathi Peetam One is the initiation of a Bala Brahmachari into Sanyasa and the next is the ordination to the Peeta. Thesa two stages are entirely different. In paragraphs 6 and 7, defendant 1 has denied the custom set up by the plaintiff. It is also pointed out that the plaint loses sight of the distinction between initiation and ordination and the fact that unless ordination is completed there is no accrual of the privileges of Matadhipathi. ( 26 ) THERE is considerable fores in the contention of Sri Krishna murthy that the decision of the Madras High Court in Raghubhushana thirthaswami v. Vidiavandhi Thirthaswami, will not be of much assistance to the plaintiff to show that the custom set up by the plaintiff has been judicially recognised by the Courts. The question that arose in that case was whether the nomination by the head of Bhimanakattai Mutt to the headship of Bhandankere Mutt was valid. It may be pointed out that both Bhimanakattai and Bhandarikere Mutts do not belong to the group of the eight Mutts of Udipi Bhimanakattai Mutt is not situated in south Kanara District, but lies in the territory of old Mysore. Their lordships have also pointed out that the custom set up in a case is dependant upon the evidence adduced in the case. In that case, their Lordships were not called upon to decide whether there was such a custom with regard to the eight Udipi Mutts. Their Lordships m the said decision have clearly stated that there is no rule of law pertaining to succession to the headship of Mutts generally; the rule must be made out m the case of each particular mutt by proof of custom. Their Lordships have also pointed out that in appreciating evidence of custom, no general rule applicable to all cases can be laid down other than that the custom must be proved by clear and cogent evidence. Their Lordships have also pointed out that in appreciating evidence of custom, no general rule applicable to all cases can be laid down other than that the custom must be proved by clear and cogent evidence. ( 27 ) IN Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, at page 316, the learned Author states as follows: " In a Mutt on the other hand it is the custom or practice of a particular institution which determines as to how a successor is to be appointed. " It was laid down by the Privy Council m the case of Greedharee doss v. Nundo Kishore (11 MIA. 405) as early as in the year 1867 that the only law as to these Mohunts and their offices, functions and duties is to be found in custom and practice which is to be proved by testimony '. By customs or uages are not meant any general customary law by appeal to which these questions have to be decided. They refer to the usage of the particular institution or Mutt in regard to which the question arises. As the Privy Council observed in Rajah Muttu ramalinga v. Perianayagam Pillai (LR 1 IA 209) the constitution and the rules of religious brotherhood amongst the Hindus are by no means uniform and what the Court should try to ascertain is the special laws and usages, if any, of the particular institution whose affairs have become the subject of litigation. "again, at page 318 it is pointed out that " the custom relating to the appointment of Mohunts vary greatly from each other in different institutions and it is not possible to enumerate them exhaustively. " ( 28 ) THE plaintiff has produced affidavits of a number of persons in support of the custom alleged by him. Sri Annaji Rao, Sri Narayana tantri, Sri Gururaja Tantri and Sri Venkataramana Upadhyaya have ail sworn that there was such a well established custom so far as the eight mutts are concerned. They have slated that the appointment of defendant 1 is opposed to the custom. ( 29 ) AS against these affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff, defendant 1 has produced a number of affidavits from different persons, in support of the contention that the appointment of defendant 1 is not opposed to the custom. They have slated that the appointment of defendant 1 is opposed to the custom. ( 29 ) AS against these affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff, defendant 1 has produced a number of affidavits from different persons, in support of the contention that the appointment of defendant 1 is not opposed to the custom. Sri Seetharama Udupa has stated that neither the custom nor usage requires that initiation into Sanyasa and ordination to the Peeta must be contemporaneous. The history of Madhwa Mutts abounds in such instances and he has given six well known instances. He has mentioned that Sri Madhavacharya himself was given Sanyasam by his Guru and after some days of his intialion into Sanyasam his Guru established him in the Peetam. Further, Sri Madhvacharya himself had later appointed eight Yatis as the heads of the Ashta Mutts established by him. In those cases also, the initiation and ordination were not simultaneous or contemporaneous. He has further stated that Sri Madhavacharya appointed his own brother to the Peetam of Subramanya Mutt and thereafter established the Ashta Mutts at Udipi and to the Peetam of Sode Mutt, he appointed his brother, who was already a Matadhipathi of Sri Subramanya Mutt. Similarly, Sri Annaji alias Venkatakrishna Ballal and Sri Ramakrishna tantri have stated that the appointment of defendant 1 was in consonance with the custom prevailing in the eight Mutts. Sri Lakshminarayana upadhayaya has also stated that initiation into Sanyasam and ordination to the Peetam need not be at the same time and by same person and that one Matadhipathi can be the head of two different Mutts, and has mentioned various such instances. ( 30 ) IN paragraph 22 of his order, the learned Civil Judge has summarised the effect of the conflicting affidavits, as follows:" It would not be proper to give any finding, whether varior customs and usages set out by the plaintiff in the plaint have been proved or not. For, they are matters to be gone into after taking evidence in the suit. For, they are matters to be gone into after taking evidence in the suit. At this stage, we are only concerned with the fact whether the plaintiff has made out prima facie case and whether there has been any invasion or infraction of the legal right of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that the injury is an irreparable one or is of such a nature as to justify the issue of injunction against the defendants 1 and 2. "again, in paragraph 35, he has stated as follows:" From the above affidavits, which have been filed by eminent sanskriit Scholars and Pandits, there is no scope to infer, that any custom and usage have been violated, by the appointment of first defendant as Matadhipathi of Phalimar Mutt. No doubt the affidavits filed for the plaintiff would indicate that appointment of first defendant is contrary to longstanding custom and usage. As contended by mr. Karanth, the custom and usage could be proved by general evidence given by the members of community without proving specific instances. In Panne Lal v. Chiman Parkash (AIR. 1947 Lah. 54) justice Mahajan as he then yas) observes that- ' A custom can properly be proved by general evidence given by members of a community without proof of specific instances. ' in the instant case, the custom and usage set up by the plaintiff will have to be more satisfactorily proved by adducing general evidence and that could be done only during the trial of the suit. Now, we are having only affidavit evidence. One set alleging the custom and usage have been violated and the other set alleging that the custom and usage have not been violated. Unless the plaintiff is able to establish the custom, which he could do, only during the trial of the suit, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has established the custom and usage pleaded. Unless that is made out, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has made out prime facie case in his favour. "the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be unreasonable. ( 31 ) EVEN assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, as has been pointed out by this Court in g. M. Gopalakriishna v. A. S. Machayva, (1969) 1 Mys. "the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be unreasonable. ( 31 ) EVEN assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, as has been pointed out by this Court in g. M. Gopalakriishna v. A. S. Machayva, (1969) 1 Mys. L. J. 328. even if the plaintiff has a prime facie case, it does not necessarily follow that an order of temporary injunction should be granted. The Court must further consider the question whether the injury is irreparable and imminent and the question of balance of convenience. ( 32 ) AS has been pointed out by Woodroffe, in the Law relating to Injunctions, at page 101, in the passage quoted above, an injunction is in its operation somewhat like a judgment and execution before trial; it is only to be resorted to from a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be repaired under any standard of compensation. As has been pointed out in Lakshminarasimhaiah's case, a temporary injunction will be refused till the Courts are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting injury to be done by an illegal aci. In Khan Saheb Abdul Gani v. Khan Sareb Abdul Shakoor, this Court has pointed out that in granting an interim injunction the Court has to consider whether the party seeking injunction has made out that the injury complained of is so serious and irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of injunction is necessary. In dealing with this question the Court must have due regard to the conduct and dealing of the parties before the application is made to the Court by the plaintiff to preserve and protect his right. Since the jurisdiction to interfere is purely equitable, it is largely governed by equitable principles. It is therefore clear that before the Court grants an order of temporary injunction it must be satisfied that the Court's interference is necessary to protect the plaintiff from injury or mischief which is imminent and is at the same time irreparable The plaintiff should make out that the injury is so serious and irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of the Court is necessary even before his rights are established at the trial. It is not disputed that defendant 1 after he was appointed as the Swamiar of Phalimar Mutt by defendant 4 conducted Puja in Sri krishna Mutt on 3-2-1969. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant 1 has stressed that the plaintiff has kept quiet for about three- and-a-half months and has filed the suit only on 13-5-1968. In answer to the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that he was away in Haridwar, the respondent's Counsel has poined out that on 27-2-1969, he was in udipi and filed a verified statement. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that defendant 1 was the head of Bhandarikere mutt and is a person of great learning, high character and merely by his offering worship to Lord Krishna, the idol cannot be defiled. Sri Madvacharya himself has laid down in what cases the idol of Lord Krishna is defiled, and if a head of another Mutt offers worship, it cannot be said that the Idol is defiled. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that as defendant 1 has not been properly appointed, he has no right to enter the sanctum sanctorum and this would result in defilement of the idol. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents that defendant 2 who was then the Pariyaya Swami and defendant 3, the Swamlyar of admer Mutt which is the Dwandwa Mutt have accepted the appointment of defendant 1 to the Phalimar Mutt as regular and have permitted him to enter the sanctum sanctorum and perform the Puja of Lord Krishna. ( 33 ) I am of opinion that it is not necessary to decide this question at this stage. The fact remains that defendant 1 had entered the sanctum sanctorum on 3-2-1969 and has been thereafter offering Puja. Plaintiff does not seem to have taken prompt steps and matters have proceeded thus, for nearly a year. It cannot be said that the injury complained of is so serious and irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of injunction is necessary. Plaintiff does not seem to have taken prompt steps and matters have proceeded thus, for nearly a year. It cannot be said that the injury complained of is so serious and irreparable and imminent that an immediate order of injunction is necessary. It may be mentioned that though the plaintiff, after filing this appeal, applied by I. A. No. 1 for an order of temporary injunction to this Court, on 15th October 1969, he did not press the same and agreed to the appeals being posted for a hearing in the first week of December 1969, as is seen from the order of this Court dated 31-10-1969 passed on the said I. A. No. 1. Under the circumstances mentioned above, the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, that if an injunction is not issued, irreparable injury would not be caused to the plaintiff, cannot be said to be unreasonable. ( 34 ) TAKING the question of balance of convenience, it must be stated that it is again in favour of defendant 1. Defendant 1's Counsel has pointed out that defendant 1 is the Pariyaya Swamiar and the Pariyayam has commenced from 18th January 1970. Elaborate arrangements have been made by Defendant 1 for conducting the said Pariyayam and if the same is stopped, there would be utter confusion and thousands of worshippers of Lord Krishna would be inconvenienced and the worship in Sri Krishna temple will come to a standstill. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has not disputed that the Pariyayam has commenced on the 18th January 1970. The learned Civil Judge has also pointed out that if an injunction is issued, more injury and harm will be done to Phalimar mutt of which defendant 1 has become the Matadhipathi, and the day-today function of the Mutt would be hampered and everything would come to a standstill. It is also represented by the lerned Counsel on behalf of defendant 1 that the suit in the lower Court is ready for hearing and may be heard and disposed of within a short time. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, I agree with the learned Civil Judge that the balance of convenience is moat certainly in favour of defendant 1 and that the mischief or inconvenience that is likely to arise from granting the injunction is greater than by withholding the same. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, I agree with the learned Civil Judge that the balance of convenience is moat certainly in favour of defendant 1 and that the mischief or inconvenience that is likely to arise from granting the injunction is greater than by withholding the same. In para 41 of his order, the learned Civil Judge has summarised the position as follows:" On a review of the entire evidence, placed before me, I have no hesitation to conclude, that the plantiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. Further, it has not been established that if the injunction is not issued irreparable injury would be caused or plaintiff's legal right would be infringed. Since the first defendant had already performed pooja after 3-2-1969, question of further defilement of idol of lord Krishna would not arise. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent any danger, much less imminent danger. The balance of convenience, is most certainly, in favour of the first defedant who has been appointed by the quondam Swamiar of Phalimar Mutt as his successor to the said Mutt. " ( 35 ) AFTER giving anxious consideration to the various points urged before me by the learned Counsel, I am of opinion, it cannot be said that the learned Civil Judge has exercised his judicial discretion improperly. It cannot be said that he has exercised his discretion unreasonably or capriciously There are no good grounds to interfere with the order of the learned Civil Judge. The lower Court is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously. ( 36 ) IN the result, these appeals fail and are dimissed. The costs of the appeals will be costs in the cause. --- *** --- .