Judgment 1. THIS appeal is by the defendant it arises out of a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff respondent is the Mutwalli of the wakf estate in suit and for a permanent injunction, restraining the defendant (defendant No. 1) from interfering, inter alia, with the management of the disputed property by the plaintiff as Mutwalli. 2. THE plaintiff's claim to the mutwalliship was disputed by the defendant, who, in his turn; set up title to the same. The defendant also pleaded the bar of limitation and raised further the question of maintainability of the suit in its present form, namely, merely for a declaration and injunction, as aforesaid. The learned Munsif held in favour of the plaintiff on the question of Mutwalliship as, according to him, Kinder the relevant document, the same was hereditary or heritable and passed on to the plaintiff by inheritance. The learned Munsif, however, was of the opinion that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation and, further, that the suit was not maintainable, as the plaintiff, according to him, ought to have prayed for recovery of possession, either of the office of Mutwalliship or of the wakf properties from the defendant and, in the absence of such a prayer, the suit was bad under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. FROM the decree of dismissal, passed by the learned Munsif on the above grounds, the plaintiff's appealed to the learned District Judge and his said appeal was heard and allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge, who affirmed the learned Munsiff's finding in favour of the plaintiff on the question of title to the Mutwalliship but disagreed with the learned Munsif on the other two points, which were found by the learned Munsif against the plaintiff, namely, question of limitation and maintainability of the suit. In the result, the learned subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit. 4. FROM this decree, the contesting defendant appealed to this Court and, in the resultant Second Appeal (Second Appeal No. 664 of 1956), our learned brother K. C. Sen, J. affirmed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismissed the defendant's appeal. He, however, gave leave to the defendant to appeal from his decision under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, in pursuance of that leave, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed in this Court. Before us, Mr. He, however, gave leave to the defendant to appeal from his decision under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, in pursuance of that leave, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed in this Court. Before us, Mr. Dutt, who appears for the defendant appellant, or, to be more precise, for his heirs and legal representatives, who are the present appellants before us, they having been substituted in his place as such heirs and legal representatives upon the original defendant appellant's death, has repeated the three contentions, which were urged on behalf of his clients' predecessor as defences to the suit, namely, the question of title to the Mutwalliship in dispute, the question of limitation and the question of maintainability of the suit in its present form. 5. HAVING, however, given the matter our best consideration, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dutt on any of the above points. 6. ON the question of title to the Mutwalliship in dispute, the relevant document is Ext. 4 and the relevant provision has been quoted by our learned brother K. C. Sen, J. in his judgment under appeal. On a reading of the said provision, it is clear that the declarant there namely Dadali, who really created the wakf in question, definitely provided for the carrying out of the duties of the Mutwalli by himself and his heirs. It is true that, in the previous paragraph in the said Ext. 4, reference is made to the construction of the Masjid in question by Sk. Sobhani, who was, at the time, the Manager of the family of the three brothers, Sk. Sobhani, Sk. Gomani and Khadem Ali, but the above document Ext. 4) was a combined Deed of partition and Dedication to which the heirs and legal representatives of the above three brothers were parties, and, by which, this particular Masjid or, the building and the land, comprising the same, were allotted to the share of Sk. Dadali, who created the wakf, as aforesaid, and made the above declaration about Mutwalliship. Clearly, therefore, the Mutwalliship in dispute was heritable or hereditary office, belonging to the line of Sk. Dadali, and, upon that view, the plaintiff would, obviously, be entitled to the same to the exclusion of the defendant. Dadali, who created the wakf, as aforesaid, and made the above declaration about Mutwalliship. Clearly, therefore, the Mutwalliship in dispute was heritable or hereditary office, belonging to the line of Sk. Dadali, and, upon that view, the plaintiff would, obviously, be entitled to the same to the exclusion of the defendant. On the merits, therefore the plaintiffs claim to the disputed Mutwalliship must be held to have been rightly affirmed by our learned brother K. C. Sen, J. and his decision on the point must be accepted. On the question of limitation, it is clear from the findings, made by all the courts below, that, so far as the contesting defendant is concerned, his claim of possession to the above office of Mutwalli or his alleged possession of the same extends only over a period of six or seven years before the suit. The learned Munsif, of course, tacked, to that adverse possession, the adverse possession of the previous possessor Din Mohd. and, on such tacking or addition, came to the conclusion that the requisite adverse possession for more than twelve years, as required by Article 124 of the Limitation Act, had been established in this case so as to defeat the plaintiff's claim on the ground of limitation. Between Din Mohd. and the contesting defendant, however, no connection could be established with regard to the possession or adverse possession of the disputed Mutwalliship, as, upon the defendant's own case, his entry as Mutwalli was under a separate and independent appointment by a local congregation after Din Mohd. 's death and he actually did not set up and could not set up any claim to the Mutwalliship by inheritance or otherwise from Din Mohd. or through any connecting line between them. In this situation, Din Mohd. and the contesting defendant must be held to have had no jural relationship between them and to have been independent and unconnected trespassers and, accordingly, on well-known principles vide (1), Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan, 61 IA 78 at p. 89, their adverse possession could not be tacked. Further, there was, obviously, an interval or interregnum between Din Mohd. and the contesting defendant must be held to have had no jural relationship between them and to have been independent and unconnected trespassers and, accordingly, on well-known principles vide (1), Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan, 61 IA 78 at p. 89, their adverse possession could not be tacked. Further, there was, obviously, an interval or interregnum between Din Mohd. 's death and the defendant's appointment as Mutwalli, as aforesaid, and, during the said interregnum or intervening period, the adverse possession in question ceased, thus causing a break, with the result that the constructive possession of the real or lawful Mutwalli, namely, the plaintiff revived or intervened to interrupt the necessary continuity of adverse possession vide, in this connection, (2) Janoki Nath v. Baikuntha Nath, 36 CLJ 140. Obviously, therefore, the defence plea of limitation must also be held to have been rightly overruled by our learned brother K. C. Sen, J. and his decision on the point must be affirmed. 7. COMING now to the last submission of Mr. Dutt, namely, the question of maintainability of the suit in the absence of a prayer for possession of the office of Mutwalli, or, for the matter of that, of the wakf properties concerned, it has to be remembered that the prayer for declaration of right to the office along with the prayer for injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering with his occupation of the same or exercise of rights thereunder, amounts, in essence, to a claim for recovery of the office itself and, as such, on the authority of the decisions, reported in (3) Kunj Bihari Prasadji Purshottam Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal and others, ILR 28 Bom. 567 and (4) (Surdar) Ali Shah v. Fateh mohanmad Mutwalli, AIR 1935 Lahore 657, the instant suit must be held to be maintainable. 8. IT must be remembered also that a Mutwalli, as such, has no right or interest in the wakf properties and the same do not vest in him but vest in God Almighty. From this point of view, the claim to the office, involving, as it does, in the present case, a claim to the possession of the same, would lie sufficient for maintaining the suit without a prayer for possession or recovery of possession of the connected properties. Reference in. From this point of view, the claim to the office, involving, as it does, in the present case, a claim to the possession of the same, would lie sufficient for maintaining the suit without a prayer for possession or recovery of possession of the connected properties. Reference in. this connection may be made inter alia to the decision of the Oudh Chief Court in (5) (Hakim Mirza) Mohammad Jafar Husain Khan v. (Mirza) Mohammad Tazi Khan and others, AIR 1933 Oudh 517. The same view would also be supported by the leading Privy Council decision, reported in (6) Ghanasambandu Pandara, Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram and anr 27 IA 69, where their Lordships pointed out that, in the case of a hereditary office, the endowed properties cannot be dissociated from the office and reference to one is sufficient to attract the other. The matter has, indeed, been clarified further and put beyond doubt in the recent decision of the Supreme Court, reported in (7) Balkrishna Savalran Pujari Waghmare and ors., v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and ors., AIR 1959 SC 798 1960 (1) SCA 104, where the scope, effect and intent of Article 124 of the Limitation Act was examined and explained exhaustively from this point of view. We are therefore, of the opinion that the instant suit would be perfectly maintainable in law and objection to its maintainability must be overruled. In the premises, this appeal will fail and it will be dismissed. There will be no order for costs in this appeal.