ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit decreed for the arrears of rent and eviction of a tenant from accommodation in his possession. The decree passed by the learned Munsif was affirmed by the lower appellate court. Three questions have been raised in this Court on behalf, of the tenant. They are firstly, that the Plaintiff-Respondent, Mahmood Medhi, was not entitled to sue as the landlord which is either a waqf or God Almighty; secondly, that, in any case, the Plaintiff Respondent, not being the sole mutwalli of the waqf in question, could neither serve a notice on behalf of the waqf nor sue singly; and thirdly, that the accommodation in dispute was used for industrial purposes so that a six months' notice was required u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and not merely a months' notice which had been given here. 2. The last mentioned point, which does not seem to be seriously advanced now, may be disposed of first. The accommodation in question was used as a shop for carrying on the business of book-binding. It was shown to have been taken on a rent of Rs. 20/- per month, the tenancy commencing on the first day of every calendar month. The mere fact that the tenant had installed a machine used in the process of bookbinding could not convert the tenancy into a lease for manufacturing purposes. There is nothing here to indicate that the lease itself was taken for manufacturing purposes and the contract having been proved to be clearly one of month to month tenancy, there is no question of there being a year to year tenancy requiring six months' notice. The provision in Section 3 of UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) requires a month's notice of demand in cases where the tenants are in arrears of rent for more than three months. It is well established that the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act can be combined with the notice u/s 3(a) of the Act See: Musthaq Husain v. Mohd. Saddiq 1967 AWR 573 . There is no force whatsoever in the contention that six months' notice was needed in this case. 3. The first and second points raised, objecting to the Plaintiff's competence to sue, may be considered together. Saddiq 1967 AWR 573 . There is no force whatsoever in the contention that six months' notice was needed in this case. 3. The first and second points raised, objecting to the Plaintiff's competence to sue, may be considered together. The Defendant tenant was under no misapprehension about the nature of the rights which the Plaintiff was asserting or capacity in which the suit was filed. It was not a suit in the capacity of an individual owner of the accommodation in question. The statement of the Plaintiff's case in the plaint and Plaintiff's evidence make it clear that he was not asserting any right adverse to the waqf, of which he claimed to be the mutawalli and beneficiary with regard to his specific share in which the accommodation in question fell. Indeed, the Defendant tenant has himself impleaded Mahmood Mehdi "Mutawalli" as a Respondent in this second appeal. The decree has also been passed in favour of the mutawalli. The mere fact that he may have been wrongly described as mutawalli owner, also in some parts of the pleadings or evidence does not really alter the legal position or change the real character of the suit which was filed by a manager of the waqf property against a tenant of the waqf property. The plaint, read as a whole, is by a mutawalli- cum-beneficiary of a waqf suing in his managerial capacity. 4. The waqf mentioned above was a waqf alal-aulad created by Shrimati Sayeeda Bibi who had appointed her husband, Molvi Raziuddin, a well known lawyer of the Allahabad district, as the mutawalli. It was, however, provided in the deed (Ex. 6), that, on the death of Molvi Raziuddin, the three sons of the waqif, namely, Mahmood Mehdi and Ahmad Mehdi and Moham mad Mehdi, would become mutawallis of their respective shares in the properties which could be divided between themselves for purposes of management. It is, therefore, clear that the waqif had given a right to the three mutawallis-cum-beneficiaries of the next generation to divide up the properties as mutawallis-cum-beneficiaries and to manage and enjoy the benefits in that state of separation. It is, therefore, clear that the waqif had given a right to the three mutawallis-cum-beneficiaries of the next generation to divide up the properties as mutawallis-cum-beneficiaries and to manage and enjoy the benefits in that state of separation. Subject to certain limitations, such as the inability of the waqif to deprive the Kazi (whose powers vest in Courts now) of his right to interfere for enforcing the waqf, "the conditions laid down by the waqif are equivalent to the commands of the Lawgiver." (See: Amir Ali's Mahommedan Law, 3rd Ed. Vol. I, p. 335). So the waqif's power to lay down such a condition could not be questioned. 5. There is always a separation of the property made waqf of from that belonging to a beneficiary, whether he be a mutawalli or not, whenever the income of a waqf reaches the hands of a beneficiary. In the hands of the beneficiary, the income becomes his absolute property which can be utilised by the beneficiary in any way he likes. The corpus of the waqf remains tied up in the ownership of God Almighty. It was pointed out by that Privy Council in AIR 1948 134 (Privy Council) , that while Muslim law does not recognise any distinction between legal and equitable estates or other similar estates recognised by English law, what it "does recognise and insist upon is the distinction between corpus (ayn) and the usufruct in the property (manafi)." Hence, even when the corpus is tied up and becomes the property of God Almighty, the 'Munafa' or benefit or right to receive it belongs to the beneficiaries. For the recovery of Munafa, if this consists of rent of property in the possession of a tenant, even a beneficiary may file a suit to realise it if it is of property falling in his share. 6. The right to sue third persons, who are strangers to the waqf, vests in and is ordinarly exercised by the mutawalli, who represents the waqf for these strangers. But, in exceptional circumstances, even the beneficiary may assert that right. This rule of law was laid down by the Privy Council in AIR 1939 185 (Privy Council) in the following words: Wakfs are made of very different kinds of property and the beneficial interests may be infinitely various. But, in exceptional circumstances, even the beneficiary may assert that right. This rule of law was laid down by the Privy Council in AIR 1939 185 (Privy Council) in the following words: Wakfs are made of very different kinds of property and the beneficial interests may be infinitely various. It is, therefore, possible for one or more beneficiaries in some circumstances to sue tenants or others directly to recover moneys as income of the wakfs payable to them. 7. It is probably because, in certain texts, the Munafa is dealt with as the absolute property of the beneficiary of a waqf that we find in Tyabji's Muslim Law (3rd Edn. page 530) that ownership of waqf property itself in a Shia waqf is shown in a table as vesting in the beneficiaries which is not quite correct. Such observations could only be correct with regard to the Munafa accruing from the waqf property which is distinct from the corpus. The position has been recently clarified, by a Full Bench of this Court, in Moattar Raza v. Joint Director of Consolidation 1969 AWR 905 , where, after a survey of authorities from Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar AIR 1922 PC 123 to Thakur Mohd. Ismail Vs. Thakur Sabir Ali, AIR 1962 SC 1722 , it was held that the ownership of the corpus vests in the God Almighty whether the waqf is by a Shia Muslim or by a Sunni Muslim. It may be mentioned here that the waqf with which we are concerned in the instant case is a waqf by a Muslim lady of the Shia sect. The distinction between the corpus and usufruct is, however, common to Sunni and Shia schools of law. It is well established that the ownership of the corpus and of the usufruct--"ayn" and "munafi"--are viewed separately in Muslim law. The ownership of each can even vest in; separate persons. 8. There has been some argument in this case before me whether a waqf or God Almighty could be said to constitute a juristic entity and if so, whether the suit for rent due to the waqf should not have been filed in the name of the waqf itself or by God Almighty through the mutawalli. 8. There has been some argument in this case before me whether a waqf or God Almighty could be said to constitute a juristic entity and if so, whether the suit for rent due to the waqf should not have been filed in the name of the waqf itself or by God Almighty through the mutawalli. A Division Bench of this Court observed, in Ahmad Husain v. Kallu Mian (1929) 27 ALJ 460 with regard to a waqf, that, even assuming that the dedication is in favour of God, it would still be a transfer governed by the Transfer of Property Act, as God is a juristic person. Hence, it was contended that a mutawalli cannot sue in his own name, but the suit must be by the waqf or by God Almighty acting through the mutawalli. 9. In AIR 1940 116 (Privy Council) the Privy Council, after observing that the question of competence to sue on behalf of a religious institution was one of procedural and not of personal law, did examine the position from the point of view of Muslim law also. It doubted whether an institution such as a mosque could be invested with juristic personality. It observed: The right of suit by the mutwalli or other manager or by any person entitled to a benefit (whether individually or as a member of the public or merely in common with certain other persons) seems hitherto to have been found sufficient for the purpose of maintaining Mahomedan endowments. At best the institution is but a caput mortuum and some human agency is always required to take delivery of property and to apply it to the intended purposes. Their Lordships, with all respect to the High Court of Lahore, must not be taken as deciding that a 'juristie personally may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions, generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion; but they think it right to decide the specific question which arises in the present case and hold that suits cannot competently be brought by or against such institutions as artificial persons in the British Indian Courts. 10. Now, in Muslim law, a "waqf" is, strictly speaking, only a transaction just as a gift is a transaction. It is not even an institution as a mosque or "madarsa" can be said to be. 10. Now, in Muslim law, a "waqf" is, strictly speaking, only a transaction just as a gift is a transaction. It is not even an institution as a mosque or "madarsa" can be said to be. If a mosque does not, merely because it implies a dedication, become an abstractor juristic person, which could sue, could a "waqf" be treated as a juristic person?" I think not. The most that could be said is that a suit by God Almighty as a juristic entity, acting through the mutawalli of the property to which a suit relates, is legally maintainable. But, it does not follow that a suit by the mutawalli, entitled to manage a waqf, is not maintainable unless he brings it in the name of God Almighty. It is enough if a claim in respect of waqf property is made by the mutawalli in his capacity as the mutawalli of the waqf and not as an owner setting up a claim hostile to the waqf. It is the substance of the capacity and right to sue set up and not the form of the suit or the technical vesting of ownership of waqf property in God Almighty which could be said to be decisive on the question of competence to sue. The procedural law of the land enables every person who has a right or enforceable claim to sue for it in a court of law. The Muslim personal law is relevent here only to determine the character and extent of the claim which a Plaintiff may put forward. 11. In the case before me, the Plaintiff became entitled to manage and appropriate the rent or income which was separately placed under his control by reason of a clause in the waqf deed providing for such a method of private partition for the purpose of management and enjoyment of benefits under the waqf between beneficiaries-cum-Mutwallis. Hence, the division was made. Such a division for the purpose of management and enjoyment of benefits, as laid down in the waqf deed itself, was not a fresh transfer, as was suggested on behalf of the Appellant, requiring a registered deed. The transfer of ownership of the corpus to God Almighty had taken place at the time when the waqf was created. The subsequent division for the purpose of separate management and enjoyment of benefits among Mutwallis-cum-beneficiaries was not a retransfer. The transfer of ownership of the corpus to God Almighty had taken place at the time when the waqf was created. The subsequent division for the purpose of separate management and enjoyment of benefits among Mutwallis-cum-beneficiaries was not a retransfer. There is only one vesting and transfer involved in a waqf. There is no divesting or revesting or transfer when the conditions of the waqf are being carried out. 12. On the facts of the instant case, as found by the courts below, showing that the Plaintiff-Respondent was Mutwalli-cum-beneficiary of the property from which the eviction of the Defendant tenant was sought, there is no need to consider the application of any rule which may be applicable between cotrustees in cases where cotrustees are required to act jointly for the simple reason that this is not such a case at all quite apart from the fact that the position of Mutawalli cannot legally be equated with that of a trustee. Therefore, the case of AIR 1945 23 (Privy Council) and other similar cases cited before me on behalf of the Defendant are not applicable here at all. The position would have been different if the waqf deed relating to the property in question itself had appointed more than one Mutwalli of the same property and they were required to act jointly. 13. There is another reason why a consideration of any question of Muslim personal law, apart from the right of the Plaintiff to receive rent of the accommodation in question separately and singly, which has been established, is not material here at all. It is that the suit before me is governed by the provisions of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947. Section 2 Sub-section (c) of this Act reads as follows: "Landlord means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person." Hence, either a Mutwalli or a beneficiary to whom rent of a particular accommodation is payable under the terms of a waqf can serve notices and sue tenants for eviction and arrears of rent from that accommodation. Such a mutwalli or beneficiary is the "landlord" by statutory definition. The Plaintiff Respondent' is both the mutwalli and the beneficiary to whom rent of the accommodation in question is payable. Such a mutwalli or beneficiary is the "landlord" by statutory definition. The Plaintiff Respondent' is both the mutwalli and the beneficiary to whom rent of the accommodation in question is payable. Therefore, nothing, beyond this question needed determination here. However, as other questions were raised and argued in a form not raised earlier in any case of this Court brought to my notice, I have dealt with them also. 14. There is no force in this second appeal which is, there fore, dismissed with costs.