JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Petitioner gave intimation of temporary discontinuance of use of his vehicle O.R.D. 324 u/s 9-A of the B & 0 Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the 3rd & 4th quarters of 1965. As he did not give further intimation of such temporary discontinuance for the succeeding quarter from 1-1-66, to 31-3-66, though he did not use or intend to use the vehicle, a notice was served on him on 4-4-1966 by the Regional Transport Officer to show cause why tax and penalty for that quarter should not be realised from him. He showed cause but the R.T.O. without considering it passed on order making him liable to pay the tax of Rs. 450/. and levied a penalty of Rs. 900/-, in all amounting to Rs. 1,350/-. The appeal filed by the Petitioner to the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority was dismissed. There I fore, the present application has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders passed by the transport authorities on the ground that the levy of penalty is illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. The application is resisted on the ground that the order for realising of tax and levy of penalty for the quarter in question is in accordance with law and not open to challenge. 3. The only point urged by learned Counsel for Petitioner is that the order levying the penalty is contrary to law, and as such, liable to be quashed. The legality or otherwise of the order levying penalty will depend on a proper construction of Section 12A(1) of the Act which runs as follows: 12-A.- Penalty for failure to pay tax : (1) without prejudice to any other liability that may be incurred under any of the provisions under this Act or the rules made thereunder the licencing officer may, on default in payment of the tax within fifteen days from the due date of payment, (Italics is mine) impose a penalty on the person liable to pay the tax, of an amount equal to, in the Case of a default for the first time twice the amount of tax remaining unpaid and in the case of any subsequent default, four times such tax. Provided that no such penalty shall be imposed without giving the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Provided that no such penalty shall be imposed without giving the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Explanation:-For the purpose of this sub-section (i) the expression "due date of payment" shall be the date on which the vehicle had started being used without the tax having been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and (ii)xx xx xx 4. Learned Counsel for Petitioner urges that on a plain construction of the aforementioned provision, the licensing authority gets jurisdiction to levy penalty only when default in payment of tax is committed within a particular period "from the due date of payment" which expression means the date on which the vehicle has started being used without the tax having been paid. J n the present case, there being no allegation or finding that the vehicle had started being used on any date during the 1st quarter of 1966 the licensing authority had no jurisdiction to levy the penalty. On the other band, the contention of learned Standing Counsel appearing for opp. party is that Section 12-A is not to be construed independent of the other provisions and scheme of the Act, but the intention of the legislature is to be ascertained by examining the scheme of the Act as a whole. According to him, Section 6 creates the liability to pay tax by a person who keeps a motor vehicle for use irrespective of his actually using It or otherwise, and Section 9-A is enacted to give relief to an owner where he does not intend to use a vehicle for a temporary period. Therefore, if an intimation u/s 9-A is not given, the liability to pay the tax arises as the vehicle will be deemed to have been kept for use and hence the licensing authority gets jurisdiction to levy penalty where such intimation is not given and there is default in payment of the tax within the grace period of fifteen days allowed u/s 12-A. In support of this contention, he relies on the following observations in a decision of this Court reported in Sk. Dilzan and Another Vs. State of Orissa, A period of grace is however given u/s 12-A which is for fifteen days from the date due of payment as defined in the Explanation. If the tax is paid within the period of grace, no penalty is to be paid. Dilzan and Another Vs. State of Orissa, A period of grace is however given u/s 12-A which is for fifteen days from the date due of payment as defined in the Explanation. If the tax is paid within the period of grace, no penalty is to be paid. If the tax is paid beyond the period of grace, the owner is liable to pay penalty at the rate prescribed. Payment of penalty however, does not ex operate the owner from other liabilities under the Act. In that case, Petitioner was convicted u/s 12(1)(a) for use of a motor vehicle during the 4th quarter of 1964 which user was detected on 18-12-1964. The owner sought exoneration on the ground that he had deposited the tax for the quarter on 5-12-1964. Even assuming that he bad made such payment on 5-12-1964, admittedly, there was user of the vehicle from 1-10-1964 to 5-12-1964, without payment of tax. Therefore, his plea was negatived and in that contact, the aforementioned observations were made. The scope and interpretation of Section 12-A(1) of the Act did not arise for consideration in that case. 5. In the present case, it is not necessary to consider what other liabilities, if any, an owner incurs for keeping a vehicle without payment of tax and without giving an intimation u/s 9-A. The only provision empowering a licensing authority to levy penalty ill contained in Section 12-A Therefore, Section 12-A which is self-contained is to be construed independent of the other provisions. Section 12-(l) empowers the licensing authority to impose penalty on default of payment of the tax within fifteen days from the due date of payment. In the Explanation the meaning of the expression "due date of payment" for the purpose of Sub-section (1) as given as the date on which the vehicle had started being used without payment of tax. The plain meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 12-A is that the licensing authority gets jurisdiction to impose penalty only where there is default in payment of the tax within fifteen days from the date the vehicle had started being used. Whatever "due date of payment" may mean in the context of other provisions of the Act, for the purpose of; Sub-section (1) of Section 12-A its meaning is to be strictly restricted 8.8 given in the Explanation. Whatever "due date of payment" may mean in the context of other provisions of the Act, for the purpose of; Sub-section (1) of Section 12-A its meaning is to be strictly restricted 8.8 given in the Explanation. This being so, in the present case, when there is no allegation or finding that the vehicle had started being used at any time during the 1st quarter of 1966 and the default to pay the tax occurred within fifteen days thereafter, the levy of penalty by the licensing authority u/s 12-(1) was without jurisdiction, and, as such, the order to the extent of imposing a penalty is liable to be quashed. 6. Accordingly, we allow the writ application in part and order that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the orders passed by the transport authorities to the extent they purport to levy a penalty of Rs. 900/- on the Petitioner. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs of this Court. S.K. Ray, J. 7. I agree. Final Result : Allowed