JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti., J. 1. The question for decision is one of limitation. That turns on the question whether the period for recovery of mortgage money claimed as due under S.68(1)(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is six years or 12 years. 2. The facts are simple. On 9-12-1955 a mortgage of the suit property was taken by the plaintiff under a deed of Otti the copy of which is Ex. P-1. First defendant purchased the equity of redemption directing Ex. P-l mortgage to be redeemed. On the date of the sale deed itself he paid a part of the mortgage money to the plaintiff. The balance is still due. Plaintiff's case is that though the plaintiff did not put the defendants in possession on the same day, namely 16-7-1957 first defendant took forcible possession of the suit property and, therefore plaintiff lost the enjoyment thereafter. The suit is for recovery of the balance mortgage money due, on the allegation that, by the trespass committed by the first defendant plaintiff has lost the enjoyment of the mortgage security from 16-7-1957. The suit is filed on 13-11-1964, more than six years after the date of trespass, but within 12 years thereafter. If the suit is to be treated as one for recovery of money charged on immovable property, then Art.62 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and the suit will not be barred. The suit would not have been barred even on the date the limitation Act of 1963 came into force, asunder the corresponding Art.132 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the period is the same. But the defendant contend that the suit is barred since the claim for recovery of the balance mortgage money on the allegation in the plaint is really on for compensation and the Article applicable would be Art.120 of the Limitation Act of 1908. If that be the case, the period for filing the suit would have expired before the commencement of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore the suit would be barred. 3. The appellant before me is the plaintiff in the suit against whom both the courts found concurrently that the suit was barred as he ought to have instituted the suit within a period of six years from 16-7-1957, the date when admittedly he lost the mortgage security. 3. The appellant before me is the plaintiff in the suit against whom both the courts found concurrently that the suit was barred as he ought to have instituted the suit within a period of six years from 16-7-1957, the date when admittedly he lost the mortgage security. The claim to recover the mortgage money was considered as arising under S.68(1)(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. The case urged by the plaintiff in this appeal is that on the allegations in the plaint the suit should be considered as one for recovery of mortgage money by sale of the mortgage property, and for such a suit the period of limitation would be 12 years under Art.132 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908. The starting point is contended to be 18th July 1970. 5. S. 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter called the Act) recognises the right of the mortgagee to foreclose or sell the mortgaged property under certain circumstances. This is in exercise of the right of foreclosure or sale of the mortgaged property. It is not disputed that the period for a suit for sale would be 12 years, but such right of sale will not be available in respect of a usufructuary mortgage. A usufructuary mortgagee is put in possession of the mortgage security with a right to enjoy the same until the mortgage money is paid off. A usufructuary mortgage, pure and simple, does not enable the mortgagee to seek enforcement of the mortgage by the sale of the mortgaged property. Ex. P-l is an Otti which is a well known tenure in the erstwhile Travancore State area, wherefrom this case arises. In addition to the usual incidents of a usufructuary mortgage, the tenure of Otti implies a personal convenant to pay. This is well settled by decisions. If so, Ex. P-l is to be treated as a usufructuary mortgage with an implied convenant enabling the mortgagee to demand the mortgage money as against the mortgagor. 6. Ex. P-1 mortgagee could demand the mortgagor to pay the mortgage money after the expiry of the term, if any, in Ex.P-1. But there is no term therein. Therefore, in exercise of the personal covenant to pay, the mortgagee could have sued for the mortgage money within a period of six years from the date of the mortgage. 6. Ex. P-1 mortgagee could demand the mortgagor to pay the mortgage money after the expiry of the term, if any, in Ex.P-1. But there is no term therein. Therefore, in exercise of the personal covenant to pay, the mortgagee could have sued for the mortgage money within a period of six years from the date of the mortgage. The Article of the Limitation Act applicable to sue in-exercise of such implied covenant, would be 116 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Forgetting for a moment the provisions of S.68 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it could be said that a usufructuary mortgagee has no right to demand the mortgage money (unless it be on the Covenant implied in tenures like Otti). S.68(l)of the Act provides that a mortgagee has a right to sue for the mortgage-money in certain cases and in no others. One of the cases so provided is that under S.68(1)/(a)and that is where the mortgagor binds himself to repay the same. S.68(b),(c) and (d) deal with cases where the mortgagee does not get the benefit, of the mortgage security or has been deprived of the whole or part of the mortgage security due to the conduct of the mortgagor which may be in breach of the contract entered into by him or may be by a wrongful or tortious act or defualt of the mortgagor. In such cases the mortgagee is entitled to seek recovery of the mortgage money. The cause of action would arise in such cases, on the date the mortgagee loses the benefit of the mortgage security or having been entitled to obtain the benefits of such security fails to obtain the same. The nature of the claim is really one of compensation for the wrongful act of the mortgagor. Consequently what the mortgagee can seek in such a suit is a decree for the amount covered by the mortgage remaining due as against the mortgagor. There is no question in such cases of the mortgagee seeking to recover the mortgage money by sale of the mortgage, property. 7. As I said earlier, a usufructuary mortgagee has no right to seek recovery of the mortgage money under any circumstances unless it be by covenant in the mortgage deed express or implied. There is no question in such cases of the mortgagee seeking to recover the mortgage money by sale of the mortgage, property. 7. As I said earlier, a usufructuary mortgagee has no right to seek recovery of the mortgage money under any circumstances unless it be by covenant in the mortgage deed express or implied. The right to recover having been conferred only by S.68, the incidents of that right would depend upon the provisions of the Act. [f the right is only in the nature of a compensation, there is no basis for considering that a charge is created on the mortgaged property. If the mortgagor does not deliver possession to the mortgagee, the remedy is to recover the mortgage money as against the mortgagor. He has no right to sue for sate of the mortgaged property. If the mortgagor trespasses upon the mortgaged property and thereby the mortgagee loses the mortgage security the right of the mortgagee is only to seek recovery of possession which right he can enforce even against any other trespasser. He may also sue in the alternative, to claim the amount of the mortgage remaining due from the mortgagor, as compensation. 8. If that be the case, Art.132 of the Limitation Act would have no application. It will only be the residuary Art.120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that would apply. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would urge that S.68(1) confers a right to claim the mortgage money and once such right is conferred, the right is to be worked out by sale of the mortgaged property. I am afraid this is not a correct understanding of S.68. If what is conferred by that Section is only a right in the nature of claim to compensation, there is no question of either a charge on the mortgaged property being available or a right, of sale of the mortgaged property being conferred by that Section. I feel there is support to my view in the observations of the Supreme Court in Manimala Devi v Indu Bala ( AIR 1964 SC 1295 ). Referring to S.68(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Shah J., said: "The section does not deal with the period of limitation for filing a suit or extension of the period prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit. Referring to S.68(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Shah J., said: "The section does not deal with the period of limitation for filing a suit or extension of the period prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit. The right conferred by S.68 is again not a right to enforce the mortgage but a right to sue for the mortgage money on the personal covenant or to claim compensation when the mortgagee is deprived of his security A suit for enforcement of the personal covenant to pay the mortgage money when mortgagor has bound himself to repay the same is governed by Art.116 of the Limitation Act. Similarly the right to sue where the mortgagee is deprived of the mortgage security or where he is not secured in his possession of the mortgaged property or where possession is not delivered to , him as agreed, the claim maintainable by the mortgagee is one for compensation and the period of limitation for a suit to recover the mortgage money is governed by Art.120 of the Limitation Act from the date of destruction or deprivation of the mortgage security possession and not from the date when the mortgage money is repayable." 9. It is true that the Supreme Court did not expressly hold that the mortgagee is not entitled to a decree charged on the mortgaged property. I am referring to that only because that is the ground on which learned counsel for the appellant seeks avoidance of the application of that decision to the present case. In fact, learned counsel would point out that in a recent case the High Court of Mysore has considered S.68 and held that in a suit for money secured by a usufructuary mortgage where the cause of action to sue was treated as arising under S.68(1)(d) of the Act, the Article of the Limitation Act applicable was held to be 132. It has been assumed in that case that a suit by a mortgagee to whom possession has not been delivered is one where he could obtain a charge on the mortgage property, with the result that Art.132 will be attracted. On this assumption what is considered is whether the starting point is the date on which possession was not delivered by the mortgagor though on the date he was bound to deliver the same. On this assumption what is considered is whether the starting point is the date on which possession was not delivered by the mortgagor though on the date he was bound to deliver the same. I think, Somanatha Iyer J., (as he then was) was not right in applying Art.132 to such a case, nor was he right in assuming that a suit by a mortgagee for money due under a mortgage when the mortgagor failed to deliver possession is a suit for recovery of money charged on immovable property. The fact that the Supreme Court has considered Art.120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 as applicable to a suit for claiming mortgage money under S.68(1)(b), (c) and (d)and the further fact that the Supreme Court has considered the nature of the suit as one for compensation are certainly relevant in this context, As I said earlier, the right of the mortgagee will be what is expressly conferred by S.68 of the Act and that certainly is not one of sale of the mortgaged property. 10. I am also aware that there are number of earlier decisions where the right of a mortgagee who can sue for mortgage money under S.68(1)(b), (c) and (d) has been taken to be one to claim such money charged on the mortgaged property and Art.132 has been assumed to be applicable to such a case. I need only refer to two decisions just to indicate that such a view has been taken. Lallubhai v Shamaladas (AIR 1934 Bom. 407) and Ramanatha v Annamalai Chettiar ( AIR 1963 Mad. 342 ) are cases in which this has been so assumed. But in view of what have stated as to the nature of the right of a mortgagee in a suit for mortgage money under S.68(1)(b)(c) and (d) of the Act, I must disagree with the view as to limitations expressed in these decisions. If it is Art.120 of the Act that is to apply to the present case, it is not disputed that the suit will be barred by Limitation. It has been so held by the courts below. I, therefore, dismiss this Second Appeal with costs.