Gajraj Singh v. Jagatsingh — 1970 DIGILAW 2 (MP)

JUDGMENT P. K. Tare, J. (After stating the facts in paragraphs 1 to 4 the judgment proceeds-) The learned counsel for either of the side did not challenge any finding of fact, but confined their arguments to the question of law mentioned above. The learned Single Judge had allowed the appeal mainly on the consideration, that section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 was not attracted. As regards the applicability of section 185(1)(ii)(d) of the said Code, the learned Single Judge held that as Rughunathsingh was subject to a physical disability as contemplated under clause (v) of subsection (2) of section 168 of the said Code, it was sub-section (3) of section 185, of the Code, which was attracted and for that reason the present appellant Could not acquire the status of an occupancy tenant. For that position reliance was placed on the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal 1966 MPLJ 712 (SC) : AIR 1966 SC 1485 . The respondents 1 and 2, namely, Jagatsingh and Mansingh, filed the present suit for partition and separate possession of their 2/5th share in the property left by Raghunathsingh. That claim of theirs was contested by the defendants on the ground that Gajrajsingh became an occupancy tenant. It is not necessary to examine the reasoning of the trial Judge or the first appellate Judge. But we may mention one material fact which was not specifically pointed out to the learned Single Judge that Raghunathsingh died in the year 1957; and at the time the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force, Raghunathsingh not being alive, the position of Gajrajsingh would be that of a trespasser, as per section 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Therefore, the question arises whether Gajrajsingh could acquire occupancy rights under section 185 of the M.P. Land Revenue : Code, 1959. Before considering the development of the legislation about abolition of zamindari and regulations of tenancy rights, it is pertinent to note that the object of the Legislature was not only to abolish the vested rights of zamindars and Jagirdars, but also to abolish the intermediaries and to make the actual tillers of the soil Bhumiswamis, which object was ultimately achieved by enacting the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. This area, namely, District Vidisha, formerly formed part of the princely State of Gwalior, where the zamindari and jagirdari system was in force. Under the Qanoon Mal Gwalior State, Samvat 1983, a sub-lease of occupancy land by a tenant of the zamindar was permissible and was valid under the law. That situation obtained till the Madhya Bharat, as Part B State, was formed under the Constitution with effect from 26-1-1950. After the formation of Madhya Bharat, which was formerly known, as the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa, which was a federation of some princely States, the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (No. 66 of 1950) was passed. Sub-section (4) of section 1 of the Act provided that it would come into force one month after its publication in the Government Gazette. As the Act was published in the Madhya Bharat Government Gazette, dated 15-7-1950, it came into force with effect from 15-8-1950. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Act provided that the Act would extend to the whole of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat), but provisions of Part II of the Act shall not apply to villages which had been settled on zamindari system. The provisions of Part II, in which are contained the relevant sections 74, 75 and 76, which we propose to consider, were not applicable to villages situated in zamindari areas. However, the Madhya Bharat State Legislature afterwards passed another Act known as Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, Samvat 2008 (Act: No. 13 of 1951). Sub-section (3) of section I of the Act provided that it would come into force on and from such date as may be notified by the Government in that behalf. It was brought into force with effect from 25-6-1951, vide Madhya Bharat Government Gazette of the same date. As such, Part II of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950' became applicable to the zamindari areas after the abolition of zamindari from the date of vesting, i.e., 2-10-1951, vide section 41 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, which necessarily was subsequent to25-6-1951. Therefore, subsequent to the abolition of the zamindari system, sections 74, 75 and 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 became applicable to the villages which were formerly included in zamindari areas. Therefore, subsequent to the abolition of the zamindari system, sections 74, 75 and 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 became applicable to the villages which were formerly included in zamindari areas. Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, permitted a sub-lease by a disabled person. The former occupancy tenant of the zamindari village became a Pakka tenant by virtue of section 54 (vii) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. As such, Raghunathsingh under the said Act was a Pakka tenant of the suit lands; while the appellant Gajrajsingh by virtue of the Patta, dated 20-6-1951 (Ex. D/2) was a sub-tenant by virtue of section 54 (ix) of the said Act. It may be relevant to reproduce section 74 of the Act, which is as follows :- Section 74-Sub-lease by a disabled person-(1) A Pakka tenant who is a widow, a minor, a lunatic and idiot or a person incapable of personally cultivating by reason of blindness or other physical infirmity or because he is in the Military, Naval, or Air Force of the Indian Dominion or the United State or is under detention or imprisonment, may sub-let the whole or any part of his holding: Provided that where a holding is held jointly by more than one person the provisions of this section shall not be applicable unless all such persons belong to any one or more of the classes aforesaid: Provided also that any sub-lease made in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise and provided further that the rent payable by the sub-tenant shall not exceed twice the amount of revenue or rent payable by the Pakka tenant in addition to water cess or other water charges, if any. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act for the time being in force, a sub-lease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made either by registered instrument or as prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act for the time being in force, a sub-lease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made either by registered instrument or as prescribed. Therefore, as long as the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, was in force, the appellant Gajrajsingh could evidently not acquire the rights of a Pakka tenant on account of the fact that the sub-lease in his favour had been granted by a disabled person. Section 75 of the said Act provided for termination of sub-lease effected prior to the commencement of the Act, it was as follows:- A sub-lease of the whole or any part of the holding of a Pakka tenant effected properly and legally prior to the commencement of this Act shall terminate after the expiry of the period of sub-lease or 4 years after the commencement of this Act, whichever period is less. As the lease had been granted by Raghunathsingh prior to the coming into force of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, in the zamindari area, the question of termination of sub-lease, in our opinion would be governed by section 75 of the Act and not by Section 74 of the Act. Section 76 of the Act provided for the status of a sub-lease after the termination of the sub-lease. It may be relevant to reproduce the said section which is as follows;- Section 76.-Sub-lessee to be treated as trespasser after the expiry of the period of sub-lease.-(1) If the sub-lessee does not band over possession of the land sub-let to him after the sub-lease ceased to be in force under sections 74 and 75 to the lessor or his legal heir in case of his (lessor's) death, he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) On the dispossession of the trespasser under sub-section (1) the Pakka tenant, or if he is dead his legal heir shall under orders of the Tehsildar be placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. (2) On the dispossession of the trespasser under sub-section (1) the Pakka tenant, or if he is dead his legal heir shall under orders of the Tehsildar be placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. As section 75 of the Act governed the present case, the sub-lease made prior to commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, ceased to be in force four years after the date of vesting. As such, the sub-lease in favour of the appellant would end on 2-10-1955. After that date the appellant was to be treated as a trespasser; as provided by section 76 of the Act the legal heirs of Raghunathsingh, namely, the appellant and all the respondents would be entitled to evict the present appellant. In this connection we may observe that it is not only section 76 of the Act that is material, which defines the status of such a sub-lessee after the expiry of the period of sub-lease, but it would as per section 75 of the Act, put an end to that sub-lease. Therefore, the question may arise as to what will be the status of such a sub-lessee after the period of sub-lease and whether he could be considered to be a person entitled to the benefit of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which came into effect from 2-10-1959. After the sublease in favour of the appellant came to an end by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, the heirs of Raghunathsingh did not do anything either in ratification or in repudiation of the sub-lease. But the first and the second respondents filed the present suit on 27-2-1960, claiming partition and separate possession their own 2 /5th share. We may before considering the material question advert to the material portions in section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, which are as follows:- Sub-section (1)-Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a Pakka tenant of the land comprised in his holding from the date of vesting. We may before considering the material question advert to the material portions in section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, which are as follows:- Sub-section (1)-Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a Pakka tenant of the land comprised in his holding from the date of vesting. Sub-section (2)-Every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tehsildar within the period specified in sub-sections (3) and (4) the following amounts to be paid to the proprietor or tenant of sub-tenant, as the case mar be, shall be deemed to be a Pakka tenant of the land comprised in his holding. Till amount is deposited, his former status shall continue. The right of becoming a Pakka tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that to the tenant of the sub-tenant, if any, and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of the sub-tenant:- * * * * * * * * * * * * Provided that a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant shall remain a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant as before in case of disability mentioned in section 74 of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. He shall have no right to become a Pakka tenant by depositing the amount under this sub-section. Sub-section (3)-If the holding be in the possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within (eight) years of the date of vesting otherwise his right of becoming a pakka tenant shall lapse and the sub-tenant may within six months of the expiry of the paid (eight) years deposit in the Tehsil the amount mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), as the case may be, of the preceding sub-section. If he fails to deposit such amount within the said period the proprietor or the original tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the pakka tenant of that holding. Sub-section f4)-If the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within (eight) years of the date of vesting. On the expiry of (eight) years, the- original tenant or the proprietor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the pakka tenant of that holding. Sub-section f4)-If the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within (eight) years of the date of vesting. On the expiry of (eight) years, the- original tenant or the proprietor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the pakka tenant of that holding. Sub section (5)-If a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant fails to deposit the amount within the period specified in sub-sections (3) and (4) then, notwithstanding anything contained in his lease or contract, it shall be deemed that all his rights have ceased to exist and that he is a trespasser on that land, and the proprietor tenant or sub-tenant; as the case may ' be, get him ejected under section 90 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and' R(sic)otwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. Thus, by virtue of the said provisions, the appellant had no right to make any deposit so as to entitle him to a conferral of Pakka tenancy right. Sub-section (5) of the said section clearly indicates that on failure of a subtenant or a tenant of sub-tenant to deposit the amount, it would be deemed that all his rights ceased to exist and that he is a trespasser and the proprietor; tenant or sub-tenant, would be entitled to eject him under section 90 of the M- B. Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. Therefore, it is clear that as long as Raghunathsingh & was alive, the status of the appellant was that of a mere sub-tenant of Pakka tenant and from 2-10-1955, the sub-lease in favour of the appellant (Ex. D/2) came to an end. As such, the status of the appellant after the death of Raghunathsingh in the appellant after the death of Raghunathsingh in the year'1957 up to the date of commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code 1959, i.-e. 2-10-1959, was that of a former sub-lessee whose sub-lease had come to an end and who under section 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 was deemed to be a trespasser. We may then advert to the provisions of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, on the basis of which arguments were advanced with reference to the cases we presently proposed to discuss. We may then advert to the provisions of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, on the basis of which arguments were advanced with reference to the cases we presently proposed to discuss. The section is as follows :- Occupancy tenants-(1) Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds- i) in the Mahakoshal region- (ii) in the Madhya Bharat regional any Inam land as a tenant, or as a sub-tenant, or as an ordinary tenant; or Explanation-The expression 'Inam Land' shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, 1954 (32 of 1954), (b) any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955 (29 of 1955); or (c) any Jagir land as defined in the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (28 of 1951) as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant; or (d) any land of a proprietor as defined in the Madhya Bharat' Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951) as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant; or (We are not concerned with the provisions relating to the Vindhya Pradesh and the Bhopal regions) shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an accupancy tenant by or under this Code, (2) Where any land referred to in item (c) or 'd) or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) is at the time of coming into force of this Code in actual possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant, then such tenant and not the sub-tenant shall be deemed to be the occupancy tenant of such land. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force- of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more' of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 198. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force- of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more' of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 198. (4) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a sub-tenant or tenant of a such tenant' belonging to any of the categories specified in items (c) and (d) of clause (ii) -of sub section (1) to acquire the rights of a Pakltatenant in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 t28 of 1951 J, or of the Madhya' Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951) as the case may be. The governing portion contained in sub-section (1) clearly indicates that a person of the category mentioned in the following sub-Sections should hold that capacity at the coming into force of the Code i. e., on 2-10-1959. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant acquired the right of an occupancy tenant under sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) of sub-section (I) of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. That contention was rightly negatived by the learned Single Judge, as the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955, was clearly inapplicable to lands vested in the Government under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 and the Madhya Bharat Jagirs Abolition Act, 1951. The learned counsel frankly conceded before us that he could not have claimed any right under sub-clause (b) of clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 185 of the Code. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider that aspect, but the learned counsel claimed that right by virtue of sub-clause (d) of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 185 of the Act. We may again reproduce the said sub-clause (d), which is as follows :- any land of a proprietor as defined in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1931), as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a subtenant; It is this phrase the meaning of which we are required to gather. We may again reproduce the said sub-clause (d), which is as follows :- any land of a proprietor as defined in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1931), as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a subtenant; It is this phrase the meaning of which we are required to gather. The necessary ingredients of the sub-clause are that a person at the coming into force of the M\ P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 should hold land of a proprietor as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant. For this purpose it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, which are as under:- Section 2 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, defined the phrase as follows;- (a) "Proprietor" means, as respects, a village, Muhal or land settled on Zamindari system, a person owning whether in trust or for his own benefit such village muhal or land and includes- (1) A Malguzar as defined in sub-clause (12) of section 2 of Qanoon Mai, Gwalior State Samvat 1983; and (2) as respects a chak or block a chakdar or blockdar whose lease granted to him by the Government under any Act, Rules or Circular relating to chaka and blocks, -includes also, amongst its other conditions, a condition that he shall acquire the pre priority rights in respect of that chak or block when the condition of the lease are " fulfilled; (3) the heirs and successors (in) interest of a proprietor; (b) "Land" means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture,-pasture or animal husbandry; * * * * * * * * (c) "Pakka tenant" means a Pakka tenant as denned in clause (vii) of section 54 of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. The phrases 'tenant' and 'sub-tenant' have not been defined by the said Act. Sub-section (0) of the said section provided that 'words and expressions used in the Act, but not defined in it, shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in Qanooa Mal Gwalior State, Samvat 1983. It is only section 38 of the said Act which we have discussed that would be relevant. Sub-section (0) of the said section provided that 'words and expressions used in the Act, but not defined in it, shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in Qanooa Mal Gwalior State, Samvat 1983. It is only section 38 of the said Act which we have discussed that would be relevant. Therefore for finding out the meaning of 'tenant' and 'sub-tenant' we may have to look to the definition provided by the Qanoon Mai Gwalior State, Samvat 1983, or the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, which repealed the said Gwalior enactment. Section 2, sub-section (29) of the Gwalior Act described an occupancy tenant as a person whose right was heritable and who could not be ejected without the permission of a revenue officer. Sub-section (31) of the said section defined a sub-lessee of a tenant as a 'Shikmi'. We are required to see if section 54 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 throws any light on this aspect. Earlier we have already indicated that the words 'Pakka tenant' and 'sub-tenant' have been defined by sub-section (vii) and sub-section (ix) of section 54 of the Act and, in our opinion, it is these definitions which will matter. Looking to the definition of the words 'Proprietor' and 'Land' as provided by the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, it is only the land of a proprietor which should be held by a person claiming occupancy rights either as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant. Therefore, the position that emerges is that as long as Raghunathsingh was alive, he being a disabled person, the appellant could not have acquired the rights of a Pakka tenant by virtue of the bar provided by the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 read with section 74 (1) (a) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. But the same position did not obtain on 2-10-1959 when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 was made applicable to all the different regions, including the Madhya Bharat area. Before that date Raghunathsingh had already died in the year 1957. The first and the second respondents or the heirs of Raghunathsingh did not do anything either in ratification or in repudiation of the lease granted by Raghunathsingh to Gajrajsingh. Before that date Raghunathsingh had already died in the year 1957. The first and the second respondents or the heirs of Raghunathsingh did not do anything either in ratification or in repudiation of the lease granted by Raghunathsingh to Gajrajsingh. Gajrajsingh, however, became entitled to conferral of Pakka tenancy right after the death of Raghunathsingh by virtue of sub-section (4) of section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 and the limitation for that was eight years from the date of vesting. The date of vesting as mentioned in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 was 2-10-1951 and as such the deposit could be made by Gajrajsingh till 1-10-1959 on the next day of which date the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force in all regions of the present Madhya Pradesh; but Gajrajsingh having not made any deposit in order to acquire the right of a Pakka tenant and on account of the earlier developments Gajrajsingh continued to be a trespasser by virtue of section 75 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 and as the sublease granted by Raghunathsingh in his favour had come to an end with effect from 2-10-1955 by the operation of section 75 of the said Act, and, therefore the heirs of Raghunathsingh became entitled to evict Gajrajsingh under section 90 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, as provided by sub-section (5) of section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951. But the heirs also did not take any such steps and in the meantime the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 was brought into force with effect from 2-10-1959. At this stage we may mention that in respect of Muafi and Inam land and Ryotwari lands, two separate enactments were passed by the Madhya Bharat Legislature, namely, the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, 1954 (No. 32 of 1954) and the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955 (No. 29 of 1955). At this stage we may mention that in respect of Muafi and Inam land and Ryotwari lands, two separate enactments were passed by the Madhya Bharat Legislature, namely, the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, 1954 (No. 32 of 1954) and the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955 (No. 29 of 1955). Those Acts granted protection to all the sub-lessees against eviction in respect of the Ryotwari lands or the Muafi and Inam lands and consequently it was on the basis of the protection granted by the said Acts that a Division Bench of this Court in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramchandra 27 1963 M P L J 314 : 1963 MPLJ 318 and Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal (Second Appeal Nos. 68 and 70 of 1961, dated 18-2-1963-Indore-Benc.h), held that even a sub-tenant whose sub-tenancy had been terminated, but who continued in actual possession, would be entitled to the benefit of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Of course, that benefit may not be available to a sub-tenant who held land from a disabled person, as per section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. That would be by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. But the necessary thing would be that the person should be holding land from a disabled person at the time when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force. The view as expressed by the said Division Bench was affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal, It was for that reason that the right of a sub-lessee whose sub-lease might have been terminated to acquire occupancy status under section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, was upheld. There is a distinction between that sub-clause and sub-clause (d). What is necessary under sub-clause (a) is that any person at the commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 should hold any Inam land as a tenant or a sub-tenant or as an ordinary tenant. If these requisites are fulfilled, such a person would be entitled to conferral of occupancy status. What is necessary under sub-clause (a) is that any person at the commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 should hold any Inam land as a tenant or a sub-tenant or as an ordinary tenant. If these requisites are fulfilled, such a person would be entitled to conferral of occupancy status. However, in respect of sub-clause (d), such a person should hold land of a proprietor either a sub-tenant or as a tenant or a sub-tenant and in that event only he can claim occupancy status and not otherwise. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to some other decisions in which a similar view has been taken, as was done by the Division Bench sitting at Indore in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramchandra (supra) and Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal (supra). However, we do not find it necessary to discuss all those cases, as in our opinion, the matter stands concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal (supra). The decision of the Division Bench in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramchandra (supra) and in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal (supra) was influenced by the fact that in respect of Muafi and Inam lands, the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, 1954 (No. 32 of 1954) had been enacted so as to protect the sub-tenants from dispossession, whose sub-tenancy may have been duly terminated, but who continued in possession. Section 4 of the said Act specifically prohibited eviction and dispossession of such tenants and directed stay of all suits and proceedings relating to eviction. Similarly, the same kind of protection was given to Ryotwari sub-lessees, by the enactment of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955 (No. 29 of 1955). Section 4 of the said Act made almost identical provision. However, in respect of Jagirdari and Zamindari areas no such protection was necessary, as lo sub-tenants in those areas. Section 20 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition ACT, 1951, provided for conferral of Pakka tenancy rights to every tenant of a Jagirdar or a Zamindar, including Shikmi in respect of land cultivated by the tenant or the Shikmi. However, in respect of other lards, section 21 of the said Act provided for acquisition of pakka tenancy rights by a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant. However, in respect of other lards, section 21 of the said Act provided for acquisition of pakka tenancy rights by a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant. In the present case we are not concerned with a Jagirdari village, but with a Zamindari village. The relevant provision of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, namely, section 38, has already been reproduced earlier. Sub-section (2) of section 38 of the said Act clearly provides that every subtenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tahsildar within the period specified in sub-sections (3) and (4), the following amounts to be paid to the proprietor or tenant of sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a pakka tenant of the land comprised in his holding. Till amount is deposited, his former status shall continue. The right of becoming a pakka tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant, if any, and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of the sub-tenant. The proviso excluded conferral of Pakka tenancy rights in respect of land leased or subleased by a disabled person. Sub-section (3) provides for a period of 8 years within which the deposit could be made. That period of 8 years expired on 1-10-1959, and therefore any person who had the right to make a deposit would become a Pakka tenant, after such deposit, but the Act clearly provided that till such time the deposit was made, the former status of the sub-tenant will continue. Thus, although section 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, might have made a deeming provision about treating such a person as a trespasser, yet sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 clearly put a stop to that and restored his status as a sub-tenant till the expiry of 8 years. As such, the same object was achieved in the Zamindari area by enacting section 38 (2), as was achieved in respect of the Mua6, Inam and Ryotwari lands by passing the two different protection Acts of the years, 1954 and 1955. As such, the same object was achieved in the Zamindari area by enacting section 38 (2), as was achieved in respect of the Mua6, Inam and Ryotwari lands by passing the two different protection Acts of the years, 1954 and 1955. Thus, it is clear that the deeming 'provision as provided by section 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 cannot be operative as long as the period of 8 years provided by section 38 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, does not expire. It was exactly at the end of that period that the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 intervened and conferred on such tenants the status of an occupancy tenant by enacting sub-clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. In this view of the matter, there can be no doubt that on the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, the appellant, whose status as a subtenant continued till the commencement of the said Code, became an occupancy tenant at the commencement of the Code and when the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, and the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950 and the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 stood repealed. Therefore, differing from the learned Single Judge, I am of opinion that the appellant is entitled to contend that on the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, he became an occupancy tenant with effect from 2-10-1959 and as such, the former Pakka tenant, namely, the heirs of Raghunathsingh, who would become the Bhumiswamis under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, cannot claim to evict the appellant. Thus, there can be no doubt that the appellant after the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, is an occupancy tenant of the Bhumiswami-holders, namely, the heirs of Raghunathsingh, which will include the present appellant and the respondents as well. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs-respondents would have no right to claim a partition of the suit lands as long as the occupancy status of the appellant is not terminated under the law. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs-respondents would have no right to claim a partition of the suit lands as long as the occupancy status of the appellant is not terminated under the law. The right of the plaintiffs-respondents will at the most be that of Bhumiswamis, who may recover the rent or lease money, whatever it may be along with the other co-Bhumiswamis. But their suit for a partition so as to dispossess the occupancy tenant would not be tenable in law. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, the decree passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the one passed by the first appellate Court is restored, for altogether different reasons. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs-respondents' suit for partition and separate possession is dismissed. In view of these circumstances and the complicated questions of law arising in the case, it is, however, directed that costs throughout shall be borne as incurred. Shiv Dayal, J.-This letters patent appeal is from the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 124 of 1966, whereby he reversed the decree passed by the first appeal Court and restored that parsed by the trial Court. The only questions for determination is whether Gajrajsingh is an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter called "the M. P. Code)'', having acquired those rights on the date of the commencement of the Code. The facts which are not in dispute are these. Raghunathsingh was An occupancy tenant in respect of the suit lands which are situated in a village in district Vidisha when it was a Zamindari village governed by the Qanooti Mal of the erstwhile Gwalior State. On June 20, 1951, Raghunathsingh granted a sub-lease by virtue of a Patla (Ex. D-2) in favour of Gajrajsingh for the period from Samvat 2008 to Samvat 2020, Vikram (corresponding to the years 1951 to 1963 A. D.). Raghunathsingh was invalid. Raghunathsingh died in 1957. Gajrajsingh right from June 1951 continued to hold the land without interruption right upto the enactment of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, Raghunathsingh in his lifetime did not take any proceedings against Gajrajsingh for his dispossession. Raghunathsingh was invalid. Raghunathsingh died in 1957. Gajrajsingh right from June 1951 continued to hold the land without interruption right upto the enactment of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, Raghunathsingh in his lifetime did not take any proceedings against Gajrajsingh for his dispossession. Nor did the heirs of Raghunath take any proceedings under section 58 read with section 76 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (No. 66 of 1950), Jagatsingh and Mansingh, who brought the suit from which this appeal arises, were related to Raghunathsingh as his father's father's sons sons (that is, first cousins). They claimed partition and separate possession of their two fifth share from Gajrajsingh and other defendants. Gajrajsingh resisted the suit on the ground that he had become the occupancy tenant under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The trial Judge passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. The first appeal Court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit. In Second Appeal No. 124 of 1966 the learned Single Judge reversed the decree of the first appellate Court and restored that of the trial Court. He, however, declared the case to be fit for Letters Patent appeal. The basis of the learned Single Judge's decision is that Raghunathsingh was admittedly a disabled person within the meaning of section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 1950. At the hearing of this Letters Patent appeal we were told that the learned Single Judge missed to take note of the significant fact that Raghunathsingh had died in the year 1957, that is two years before the M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force. We shall now examine the status of Gajrajsingh as it developed to be according to the provisions of the law which came into force from time to time during the entire period from June 20, 1951 and October 2, 1959 : (i) In the erstwhile Gwalior State there was the Zamindari system and the lands in suit were situated in a Zamindari village. Under the Qanun Mai an occupancy tenant had the restricted right to sub-let. This sublease which was granted by Raghunathsingh by virtue of the Patta (Ex. D-2) dated June 20, 1951 was undisputedly lawful and valid. Under the Qanun Mai an occupancy tenant had the restricted right to sub-let. This sublease which was granted by Raghunathsingh by virtue of the Patta (Ex. D-2) dated June 20, 1951 was undisputedly lawful and valid. (ii) By virtue of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act (13 of 1951), which came into force on October 2, 1952, the Zamindari was abolished, and, by virtue of that Act, on the same date, Part II of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (No. 66 of 1950, hereinafter called the Act) became applicable to the Zamindari lands and the rights and liabilities of the tenants and sub-tenants were then governed by the Act. (iii) The following provisions of the M. B. Tenancy Act, 1950 are material: Sub-leases-(sic) Pukka tenant shall sub-let for any period whatsoever any land comprised in his holdings except in the cases provided for in section 74. Sub-lease by a disabled person.-(\) A Pakka tenant who is a widow, a minor a lunatic and idiot or a person incapable of personally cultivating by reason of blindness or other physical infirmity or because he is in the Military, Naval or Air Service of the Indian Dominion or the United State or is under detention or imprisonment, may sub-let the whole or any part of his holding: Provided that where a holding is held Jointly by more than one person the provisions of this section shall not be applicable unless all such persons belong to any one or more of the classes aforesaid: Provided also that any sub lease made in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall cease to be in force after his year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise; And provided further that the rent payable by the sub-tenant shall not exceed twice the amount of revenue or rent payable by the Pakka tenant in addition to water-ecu or other water charges, if any. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act for the time being in force, a sublease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made either by registered instrument or as prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act for the time being in force, a sublease for a term exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made either by registered instrument or as prescribed. Termination of sub lease effected prior to the commencement of this Act-A sublease of the whole or any part of the holding of a Pakka tenant effected properly and legally prior to the commencement of this Act shall terminate after the expiry of the period of sub-lease or 4 years after the commencement of this Act, whichever period is less. Sub-lessee to be treated as trespasser after the expiry of the period of sub-lease.- (I) If the sub-lessee does not handover possession of the land sub-let to him after the sub-lease ceases to be in force under sections 74 and 75 to the lessor or his legal heir in case of his (lessor's) death, he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) On the dispossession of the trespasser under sub-section (I) the Pakka tenant, or if he is dead his legal heir shall under orders of the Tehsildar be placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. All trespassers to pay a penalty.-Any person who occupies land without lawful authority shall be regarded as a trespasser, and may be dispossessed by the Tehsildar at any time but he shall be liable to pay, as penalty for each year during the whole or part of which he has been in such occupation, a sum equal to twice the revenue or rent which would have been assessed if the land would have been allotted to any other person. The Tehsildar may impose a fine, in addition, not exceeding Rs. 50 in any case. Section 73 prohibits the grant of a sub-lease. But this section, being prospective, has no application to the present case, as the sub-lease had already been granted before part II of this Act was applied to Zamindari lands. As we shall presently see such a sub-lease was governed by sections 75 and 76 of the Act, (iv) Section 74 of the Act is an exception to section 73. But this section, being prospective, has no application to the present case, as the sub-lease had already been granted before part II of this Act was applied to Zamindari lands. As we shall presently see such a sub-lease was governed by sections 75 and 76 of the Act, (iv) Section 74 of the Act is an exception to section 73. It was enacted for the benefit of disabled persons (a widow, a minor, a lunatic and idiot or a person incapable of personally cultivating the land by reason of blindness or other physical infirmity, etc.). Such a disabled person was given a right to sub-let the whole or any part of his holding. However, that section too, being prospective in operation, did not govern a sub-lease granted before October 2, 1951. (v) Then we come to section 75. It clearly gave recognition to a sub-lease which had been effected properly and legally prior to the commencement of the Act but fixed the period for which such a sub-lease would continue to be effective. Such a sub-lease was to terminate on the expiry of the period for which it had been granted or four years after the commencement of the Act, whichever period was less. Applying this section to the present case it must be said that the sub-lease in favour of Gajrajsingh terminated on October 2, 1955, without waiting up to 1963 upto which the sub-lease could otherwise have continued under the Patta (Ex, D-2) of June 20, 1951. (vi) The effect of the termination of the sub-lease is to be found in section 76. Since Gajrajsingh did not hand over possession of the land to Raghunathsingh after the lease ceased to be in force on October 2, 1955 Gajrajsingh was deemed to be a trespasser and he was liable to ejectmen; in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The forum for such proceedings for ejectment was contained in section 58 of the Act. No other provisions of the Act were pointed out to us which had reference to the expression "in accordance with the provisions of the Act" in section 76. Admittedly Raghunathsingh did not take any proceedings against Gajrajsingh for his dispossession. If he had and Gajrajsingh had been dispossessed when by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 76 Raghunath would have been placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. Admittedly Raghunathsingh did not take any proceedings against Gajrajsingh for his dispossession. If he had and Gajrajsingh had been dispossessed when by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 76 Raghunath would have been placed in possession of the land on payment of arrears, if any. To put it differently, Gajrajsingh continued in possession in the capacity of a sub-lessee whose sub-lease had expired by efflux ion of time. It is also the admitted position that after the death of Raghunathsingh his heirs also did not take any proceedings against Gajrajsingh for dispossession under section 58 read with section 76. (vii) The result of this discussion is that right upto October 2, 1959, Gajrajsingh continued to hold the land as a sub-lessee whose sub-lease had expired in 1955 by efflux of time. As already pointed out, section 74 did not apply to the sub-lease granted by Raghunathsingh to Gajrajsingh, so that it cannot be said that the sub-lease expired in 1958 by virtue of the second proviso to section 74 (1). However, it makes no difference for the practical purposes of the present case. For the reasons to be stated presently it is immaterial whether that sub-lease expired in 1955 or 1958. (viii) The M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came in to force on October 2, 1959. The relevant portion of section 185 of the Code reads thus:- Occupancy tenants.-(1) Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds- X XX X (ii) In the Madhya Bharat region- X X X X (b) any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955 (29 of 1955); or X XX X (d) any land of a proprietor as defined in the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951), as a sub-tenant or as a tenant of a sub-tenant; Shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code. X XX X (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 168. X XX X (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 168. (4) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a sub-tenant or tenant of a subtenant belonging to any of the categories specified in items (c) and (d) of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) to acquire the rights of a Pucca tenant in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (28 of 1951), or of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951), as the case may be." Now, sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) is not applicable because this was not a Ryotwari sub-lease. The suit land originally belonged to the Zamindari village. Therefore, it is sub-clause (d) which applies. It is plain enough that in the said sub-clause the requirements of section 185 are only two:- (i) that the person holds the said land on October 2, 1959; and (ii) that he holds the land as a sub-tenant or as a tenant or a subtenant. If these two conditions are satisfied, the person acquires the rights of occupancy tenant by force of the statute; the acquisition was automatic, and came into effect on October 2, 1959. (ix) Admittedly Gajrajsingh held the land on October 2, 1959. The only question which remains to be seen is whether he held the land "as a sub-tenant". It is quite clear that the words "sub-tenant" in the said section 185 of the Code includes a sub-tenant whose rights as tenant had come to an end but who was still holding the land on the dated when the M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force. This is the only possible interpretation, otherwise clause (d) will be otiose. As said above, every contract of sub-lease between a tenant (of a proprietor as defined in the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951) and his sub-tenant came to an end on October 2, 1955, latest. Therefore, if a "sub-tenant" in this clause means a sub-lessee between whom and his lessor there was a contract of sub-letting subsisting on October 2, 1959, then clause (d) will not apply to any case. Then, for whose benefit was clause (d) enacted? Therefore, if a "sub-tenant" in this clause means a sub-lessee between whom and his lessor there was a contract of sub-letting subsisting on October 2, 1959, then clause (d) will not apply to any case. Then, for whose benefit was clause (d) enacted? The answer is that only two elements are to be satisfied for the application of clause the and they stand at the two extremities: (1) That the person was initially inducted as a sub-tenant in the land of a proprietor as defined in the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act (that is, whether the sub-lease was lawful and valid). (2) That such sub-tenant actually held the land on October 2, 1959. This view is fully fortified by the ratio of Laxmi Kumar v. Bam Bihari Mishra and others and Rao Nihalkaran v. Bam Gopal. In Laxmi Kumar v. Bam Bihari Mishra and others (supra) Bishambhar Dayal C.J., speaking for the Full Bench said: The question, therefore, depends upon a determination of the meaning of the word 'sub-lessee' as used in section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, if the word 'sub-lessee' there means a person whose sub-tenancy rights still subsist on the passing of the M. P- land Revenue Code, the contention of the learned counsel would be right. But this cannot be the meaning assigned to the word 'sub-lessee1 as used in that section. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted, the result would be that no person would be entitled to get the rights of an occupancy tenant under clause (ii) (b) of section 185(1), The M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force after the expiry of more than 4 years from the date when the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act had come into force, and therefore the rights of the sub-tenants of all pucca tenants had come to an end under section 75 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act. Therefore, there would be no person who was a sub-tenant of pucca tenant under the Madhya Bharat Act on the date when the Madhya Pradesh Code came into force. It cannot be said that the framers of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code usefully made this provision which would not benefit any person. Therefore, there would be no person who was a sub-tenant of pucca tenant under the Madhya Bharat Act on the date when the Madhya Pradesh Code came into force. It cannot be said that the framers of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code usefully made this provision which would not benefit any person. The obvious intention of section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code is to give occupancy rights to those sub-tenants whose rights as sub-tenants had come to an end but who were still holding the lands on the date when the M. P. Code came into force. See; observations in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ram Gopal. In Rao Nihal Karan v. Ram Gopal, their Lordships, after a critical examination of the scheme of the relevant provisions and after construing the relevant sections, reached the following conclusion:- Unless a ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in Act 29 of 1955 included a sub-lessee whose tenure was terminated before the commencement of the Code that clause would not apply to any concrete case. The Court would not unless compelled by unambiguous language ''impute to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision which was ineffective. In reaching this conclusion, their Lordships summed up the provisions contained in sections 73, 74, 75 and 76 of the Act and then by referring to the definition of a ryotwari sub-lessee in section 2 (b) of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act (No. 29 of 1955), made the following illuminating observations :- If the expression 'ryotwari sub-lessee' were to be construed to mean a ryotwari sub-lessee between whom and his lessor there was a subsisting contract of sub-letting, the protection for all purposes would be ineffective, for, by express statutory Provision read with section 74 of Act 66 of 1950 all ryotwari sub-leases stood determined before Act 29 of 1555 was brought into force, and by virtue of section 185(3) of the Code a holder of land from a disabled Bhumiswami belonging to a class mentioned in section 168(2) of the Code does not qualify for the status of an occupancy tenant. It may be noticed that in the class of disabled persons in sub-section (2) of section 162 of the Code are included all persons who are declared disabled by sub-section (2) of section 74 of Act 66 of 1950. It may be noticed that in the class of disabled persons in sub-section (2) of section 162 of the Code are included all persons who are declared disabled by sub-section (2) of section 74 of Act 66 of 1950. If ryotwrai sub-lessees of disabled persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 74 of Act 66 of 1950 cannot claim rights of occupancy tenants by virtue of section 185(3) of the Code and other ryotwari sub-lessees cannot qualify for those because of the determination of their interest as sub-lessees by virtue of sections 75 and 76 of Act 66 of 1950, section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code will not apply to any class of ryotwari sub-lessees. This is a strong ground in support of the view taken by the High Court that the expression 'ryotwari sub-lessee in section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code includes persons whose contractual relation has been determined either under the terms of contract of sub-lessee or statutorily under Act 66 of 1950. Although a sub-tenant in a Zamindari village, that is, land vested in the Government under the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, Samvat 2008 (1951) is not within the purview of the sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955, yet, the principle of Rao Nihalkaran's case, (supra) applies in its entirety to a sub-tenant of a Zamindari village. What their Lordships have held may be analysed thus: (i) A sub-lessee from a disabled person within the meaning of section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue Act does not acquire occupancy rights under section 185(1) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, because by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 185, such a sub-tenant does not quality for the status of an occupancy tenant, (ii) If the word "sub-lessee" were to be construed to mean a sub-lessee between whom and him lessor there was a subsisting contract of sub-lease on the date of the commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, then, as soon as the contractual relations between all the sub-lessees and their lessors had been determined, under the terms of the contract of sub-lease or statutorily under Act 66 of 1950, they did not qualify for the status of an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code. The result will be that section 185(1)(ii)(b) would be rendered redundant and meaningless. The result will be that section 185(1)(ii)(b) would be rendered redundant and meaningless. It is true that the M. B. Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act, 1955 (No. 29 of 1955) did not apply to a sub-lessee to whom the land which was sub-let was governed by the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, but this is because he was already protected under section 38 of the last mentioned Act. In that section a sub-tenant was given a right to deposite the prescribed money and acquire the right of a pucca tenant. Sub-section (4) of that section as initially enacted fixed a period of two years from the date of vesting within which such deposit could be made. Subsequently by Act No. 31 of 1953 the word "two years" were replaced by the words "four years" ; again, by Act No. 1 of 1959, the period was extended to "six years" ; and, eventually, by Act No. 26 of 1958, to "eight years" and this amendment was given retrospective effect from the date of the Act. Thus, the right of acquiring of status of a pucca tenant had already been conferred on the sub-tenant and that right was subsisting when the above said Protection Act (No. 29 of 1955) was enacted. It is not possible to think that while the Legislature gave protection to subtenants holding land in ryotuxtri villages it would deny protection to subtenants who were holding land in Zamindari villages. It then becomes incontestable that when the sub-tenant was given the right to acquire the rights of a pucca tenant by depositing the prescribed money within eight years from the date of vesting (October 2, 1951), a statutory recognition of this status was given to him. He continued to a "subtenant". It is also clear that this enlarged period of eight years was to expire on October 2, 1959, which coincides with the commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. In the light of the above discussion the meaning of clause (d) of section 185(1)(ii) becomes absolutely clear. He continued to a "subtenant". It is also clear that this enlarged period of eight years was to expire on October 2, 1959, which coincides with the commencement of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. In the light of the above discussion the meaning of clause (d) of section 185(1)(ii) becomes absolutely clear. Shri Sapre argued with great emphasis that by virtue of section 76 of the Act, Gajrajsingh became a trespasser on October 2, 1955, or some time in 1958, on the expiry of one year from the date of Raghunathsingh's death, so that the nature and character of his possession, which, by force of that section, was that of a trespasser, could not be altered to that of a sub-tenant when the 1959 Code came into force. This contention is clearly wrong. What section 76 did was that it imposed a liability on the sub-tenant to be ejected in accordance with the provisions of the Act so that if a person entitled to eject him takes a proceeding under the Act for his ejectment, he would be dispossessed like a trespasser. The expression "he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act" merely imposes a liability. But if no proceeding is taken against a sub-tenant and he continues to hold the land, he necessarily holds it "as a sub-tenant". It is only for the purposes of his ejectment that the legal fiction was created, but the legal fiction could not be extended farther than the purpose for which it was introduced in the section. Under the general law, a tenant whose tenancy is terminated is not a trespasser within the ordinary legal connotation of that word. The fiction when read with section 58 speaks pointedly to the proceeding by which the sub-tenant could be dispossessed on the termination of the lease. In Hao Nihalkaran v. Ram Gopal, their Lordships made the whole position very clear in the following observations:- Act 66 of 1950 did not deal with the right of a landlord to evict a tenant from land. Act 66 of 1950 was expressly repealed by the Code, but since the right to evict a tenant was governed by the general law of landlord and tenant the proviso to section 261 had not operation... (.Italics by me). Act 66 of 1950 was expressly repealed by the Code, but since the right to evict a tenant was governed by the general law of landlord and tenant the proviso to section 261 had not operation... (.Italics by me). The sum and substance of this discussion is this. On the expiry of the period of sub-lease fixed under sections 75 and 76 of the Act, under the general law of landlord and tenant, the tenant was entitled to get the subtenant dispossessed and for that purpose, he was to be deemed to be a trespasser, so that proceedings could be taken against him under section 58 of the Act, But if no proceedings were taken against a sub-tenant for ejectment, he continued to hold the land as a sub-tenant and the dictum of Laxmi Kumar v. Barn Bihari Mishra and others (supra) fully applied. All that has to be seen for the application of section 185(1) (i) (b) or (d) is at two termini: (i) On the date of commencement of the Code-does he "hold" the land? (ii) Going back to the date of commencement of his occupation, was he a sub-tenant in whose favour a sub-lease was effected properly and legally ? If the sub-tenant had been dispossessed before October 2, 1959, the first requirement would be lacking, because then he did not hold the land, which expression refers to the factual possession. Likewise, if the sub-tenant occupied the land by force or fraud and was not legally inducted as a sub-tenant, the second requirement would be lacking. In the present case, both the requirements are satisfied and it must be held that Gajrajsingh, by virtue of section 185(1)(ii)(d), became an occupancy tenant on October 2, 1959. The learned Single Judge denied the benefit of sub-clause (d) to Gajrajsingh by applying sub-Section (3) of section 185 of the Code, 1959, to this case. But that sub-section has no application to the facts of this case because Raghunathsingh had died in 1957. It appears that this admitted fact escaped attention of the learned Single Judge when he applied sub-section (3) of section 185 to this case. If Raghunathsingh had survived upto October 2, 1959, when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force, Gajrajsingh could not have acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code because of sub section (3) of that section. If Raghunathsingh had survived upto October 2, 1959, when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force, Gajrajsingh could not have acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code because of sub section (3) of that section. It is in these words :- Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in subsection (2) of section 168. Section 168 enacts a prohibition for a Bhumiswami to make a lease of any land comprised in his holding for more than one year during any consecutive period of three years. One of the exceptions is contained in sub-section (2), by virtue of which a widow, an unmarried woman, a minor, among others, are permitted to lease the whole or any part of his holding. In the present case, as already said, Raghunathsingh was a disabled person, but he had already died in the year 1957. By virtue of section 76, the sub-tenancy came to an end in 1958, that is, on the expiry of one year from the date of Raghunathsingh's death. It is nobody's case that Raghunathsingh's heirs are also disabled persons. Therefore, on October 2, 1959, when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force and section 185 came into play, subsection (3) of that section was out of the way, and Gajrajsingh acquired, by force of the statute itself, the rights of occupancy tenant because both the requirements of section 185 (I) were satisfied. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are restored. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred throughout. By the Court:-This letters patent appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are restored. The suit stands dismissed. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred in all the Courts.