Judgment 1. This is an application in revision by the plaintiffs, namely, the Commissioners of Revelganj Municipal Board at Revelganj, and it is directed against the order of the Munsif, IVth Court, exercising the powers of a Small Cause Court Judge, at Chapra, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to realise arrears of building tax for the years 1963-64 to 1966-67. 2. The facts, shortly stated, are these. A building occupied at Revelganj by the North Eastern Railway within the Municipal limits has been in existence since long before 1937; and, in the assessment year for 1963-64, it was assessed to holding tax amounting to Rs. 201.04 per year. The previous holding tax payable by the Railway prior to the last assessment was at the rate of Rs. 150 per year. It is not in dispute that the Railway paid the holding tax for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65 at the rate of Rs. 150 per year which the Municipality accepted under objection. The Municipality, however, made further demands from the Railway for the payment of the balance, namely, Rupees 51.04 per year. Since the balance was not paid, a small cause Court suit was filed before the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Chapra, which was numbered as Small Cause Court Suit No. 26/45 of 1965, for recovery of the holding tax from the Railway at Rs. 201.04 per year, less the amount which had already been paid by them. The suit was dismissed on Contest. It appears that the Government of India took a decision subsequently to pay the enhanced holding fax on account of the increase in the valuation of the building, and, as such the plaintiffs case is that the Railway was liable to pay the balance of the amount to the plaintiffs for every year at the rate of Rupees 51.04. 3. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit on two grounds; firstly, because there was no justification for the Municipality to claim any increase in the holding tax on account of the increase in the valuation of the holding in question; and, secondly, because the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and the plaintiffs were estopped from agitating the same matter which bad already been decided in the earlier suit, referred to above. 4. The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. 4. The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji is that it is not a case of extension of the range of taxation, but it is a case of increase of the amount; of the taxation, because there has been an increase in the valuation of the building. In our opinion, the contention is, quite clearly, without merit and must be rejected. 4A. The contention of learned Counsel is that the increase in taxation became necessary on account of the fact that two rooms had been added in the same holding; and, as the Government of India had after the dismissal of the first suit agreed to pay the increased tax that might become payable on account of the increase in the valuation, the Railway was clearly liable to pay the tax at the increased rate. It, however, appears that the learned Munsif has considered another letter which was in supersession of the notification of the Railway issued earlier, by which the Union Government had taken a decision that in respect of Union Governments properties covered by Clause (2) of Article 285 of the Constitution, the Government of India would not pay with effect from the 1st April, 1966, any increased amount in the rate of the tax evied by a local authority, if such increase has come about after the 1st April, 1957. Quite apart from the notification and the letter in question, the matter is, quite clearly, covered by a decision of the Supreme Court to the Town Municipal Committee, Amraoti Taluqa V/s. Ramchandra Vasudeo Chemote, AIR 1964 SC 1166 . In that case, some discussion took place before their Lordships on most similar lines as has been contended by Mr. Quite apart from the notification and the letter in question, the matter is, quite clearly, covered by a decision of the Supreme Court to the Town Municipal Committee, Amraoti Taluqa V/s. Ramchandra Vasudeo Chemote, AIR 1964 SC 1166 . In that case, some discussion took place before their Lordships on most similar lines as has been contended by Mr. Mukherji before us, and their Lordships were pleased to examine the provisions of Article 277 of the Constitution, which are in the following terms: "Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of thin Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the State, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law." In their Lordships view, the sole object sought to be achieved by the provision in Article 277 for "continuance" was to avoid dislocation of the finances of the State and local authorities, by depriving them of the revenues which they were deriving at the commencement of the Constitution. If that was so, then it meant that the intention was to permit the existing range of the taxes to be continued; it did not mean that the Article conferred on the local bodies authority to expand, the range of their taxation by subjecting new items to taxation or by increasing the rates of duties. They further observed that apart from this consideration, it was not possible to read the words "notwithstanding that the taxes, etc., are mentioned in the Union List" as conferring an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect would be new taxes though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution. 5. Interpreting Article 277 of the Constitution, their Lordships affirmed the decision in the case of Ram Krishna Ramnath V/s. Janpad Sabha, Gondia, AIR 1962 SC 1073 . It would be useful to reproduce some passages from the judgment in the case of Amraoti Municipality, AIR 1964 SC 1166 referred to above. "6. Coming next to what one might term the narrower submission of Mr. It would be useful to reproduce some passages from the judgment in the case of Amraoti Municipality, AIR 1964 SC 1166 referred to above. "6. Coming next to what one might term the narrower submission of Mr. Setalvad we do not find it possible to agree with it either. His first submission may be expanded thus: The expression taxes, duties, cesses with, which Article 277 opens, has to be read in the context of Part XII in which the Article occurs and so read has to be understood as referring to the class or category of taxes which were levied and collected by the State, Municipality etc. before the commencement of the Constitution. In other words, the reference here is to the entries in the legislative lists which permit such taxes to be levied, and so read and taken in conjunction with the circumstance that the Article is one designed to prevent the dislocation of the finances of the State or other local authorities the terms of the Article would be satisfied and the legislative power to continue to levy the tax would be conferred "notwithstanding that the tax, etc., are mentioned in the Union List." This argument, in our opinion, proceeds "on ignoring the terms of Article 277." If, as is admitted, the sole object sought to be achieved by this provision for "continuance" is to avoid dislocation of the finances of the State and local authorities, by depriving them, of the" revenues which they were deriving at the commencement of the Constitution, it would mean that the intention was to permit the existing range of the taxes to be continued, not that the Article conferred on them authority to expand the range of their taxation by subjecting new items to taxation or by increasing the rates of duties. The consideration apart, it is not possible to read the words "notwithstanding that the taxes etc. are mentioned in the Union List" as conferring an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect the argument involves new taxes, though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution. The question of the proper construction of Sec.143 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is for all practical purposes identical with Article 277 came up for consideration before this Court in (1962) Supp 3 SCR 70 = AIR 1962 SC 1073 . The question of the proper construction of Sec.143 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is for all practical purposes identical with Article 277 came up for consideration before this Court in (1962) Supp 3 SCR 70 = AIR 1962 SC 1073 . There it was submitted on behalf of the respondent local authority that by virtue of Sec.143 (2) of the Government of India Act the Provincial Legislature was vested with a plenary power to legislate in respect of every tax which was being lawfully levied by local authorities prior to the commencement of the Government of India Act. This Court rejected that contention and observed: Sec.143 (2) which is a saving clause and obviously designed to prevent a dislocation of the finances of Local - Governments and of local authorities by reason of the coming into force of the provisions of the Government of India Act distributing heads of taxation on lines different from those which prevailed before that date, cannot be construed as one conferring a plenary power to legislate on those topics till such time as the Central Legislature intervened. Such a construction would necessarily involve a power in the Provincial Legislature to enhance the rates of taxation -- a result we must say from which Mr. Sanyal did not shrink, but having regard to the language of the section providing for a mere continuity and its manifest purpose this construction must be rejected. 7. No doubt, even the words continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes might import a limited legislative power in the State. The scope of this limited power was also examined by this Court in the same case and it was stated.: In the context the relevant words of the sub-section could only mean May continue to be levied if so desired by the Provincial Legislature which is indicated by or is implicit in the use of the expression may in the clause may be continued until prevision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature. This would therefore posit a limited legislative power in the Province to indicate or express a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the exercise of this limited power the Province desires to discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant statute the repeal would be effective. This would therefore posit a limited legislative power in the Province to indicate or express a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the exercise of this limited power the Province desires to discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant statute the repeal would be effective. Of course, in the absence of legislation indicating a desire to discontinue the tax, the effect of the provision of the Constitution would be to enable the continuance of the power to levy the tax but this does not alter the fact that the provision by its implication confers a limited legislative power to desire or not to desire the continuance of the levy subject to the overriding power of the Central Legislature to put an end to its continuance and it is on the basis of the existence of this limited legislative power that the right of the Provincial Legislature to repeal the taxation provision under the Act of 1920 could be rested. Suppose for instance, a Provincial Legislature desires the continuance of the tax but considers the rate too high and wishes it to be reduced and passes an enactment for that purpose, it cannot be that the legislation is incompetent and that the State Government must permit the local authority to levy tax at the same rate as prevailed on April 1, 1937 if the latter desired the continuance of the tax. If such a legislation were enacted to achieve a reduction of the rate of the duty, its legislative competence must obviously be traceable to the power contained in words may continue. to be levied in Sec.143 (2) of the Government of India Act. "8. Dealing next with the import of the words may continue to be levied the same was summarised in these terms: (1) The tax must be one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the purpose of a local area, (2) the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilised and the purposes for which the utilization is to take place continue to be the same, and (3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence in any manner altered, so that it continues to the same tax. It is obvious that if these tests were applied the submission on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. 6. It would thus appear that their Lordships finally came to the conclusion: "We can see no difference between the inclusion of new items and the increase in the rate of duty because if there is an increase it would not be mere continuance of the duty which had been lawfully levied which is the only purpose and function of Article 277. The judgment of the High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondent was therefore correct." It would thus appear on the authority of the aforesaid case that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is without substance. Mr. Mukherji, however; endeavoured to raise certain other points which we do not think it necessary to mention as they do not arise for decision in the present case. 7 The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Mukherji was that the learned Munsif was wrong in holding that the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata, and the plaintiffs were estopped from agitating the same matter which was already decided earlier. In our opinion, it was not necessary for the learned Munsif to decfde this question and we do not think it necessary to give any opinion on this matter. It is clear that the opposite party, namely, the Railway, has always been paying the amount of tax which had been levied before 1937 and the" controversy was only in respect of the increased amount of taxation. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the application is without merit and is, therefore, dismissed. There will not, however, be any order for costs.