JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra. J. 1. This application in revision is directed against an order of the Additional District Magistrate (Judl), Cuttack by which he upheld the order dated 16.2-1970 passed by a Magistrate refusing to implead certain persons as accused in G.R. Case No. 1109 of 1967 pending in his Court. 2. The Petitioner herein is the informant in that case. He lodged information at the Police Station on 3-6-1957 that while his son Prakash Kumar Das was proceeding along the public road, he was wrongfully restrained by Murali Behera, Raghunath Patra, Shyamsundar Pradhan, Mahani Samal, Maheswas Bhuyan, Ghanashyam Sahu and Tuni Sahu in front of the Saraswata Pathagara anti they demanded Rs. 50/- from him. On his refusal to pay, they abused and assaulted him. On Prakash Kumar raising a hulla, Muralidhar who was armed with a knife attempted to stab him on his head which however he averted by raising his hand and as a result thereof he received bleeding injuries on his palm and thigh. After investigation, the Police submitted charge-sheet only against Muralidhar u/s 324, Indian Penal Code. 3. The accused appeared in Court on 22.3.1968 where after the case was transferred for disposal to Shri M.R. Nanda, Magistrate, 1st Class, and on 24.4.1968 charges u/s 324, Indian Penal Code was framed against the accused and the case was adjourned for trial to 1.7.1968. As prosecution witnesses were absent from Court, the case could not be taken up and thereafter the. Magistrate was transferred from Cuttack and the case was transferred for disposal to Shri N. Misra, Magistrate, 2nd Class. The case underwent several adjournments due to the absence of prosecution witnesses and ultimately on 11.8.1969, p.w. 1 Praksh Kumar Das, the injured was examined in part. Magistrate was transferred from Cuttack and the case was transferred for disposal to Shri N. Misra, Magistrate, 2nd Class. The case underwent several adjournments due to the absence of prosecution witnesses and ultimately on 11.8.1969, p.w. 1 Praksh Kumar Das, the injured was examined in part. After several other adjournments, some occasioned due to the absence of p.w. 1 and some due to other reasons, the further examination of p.w. 1 could be completed only on 6-12-1969 on which date another witness p.w. 2 was examined and the case was adjourned to 3-1-197(sic) On that day, trial could not be taken up as the other prosecution witnesses were again absent and the case was adjourned to 24.1.197(sic) On the 24th, the Petitioner who is the father of the injured Prakash filed on application praying the Court to take cognizance under Sections 341, 147, 3231329, Indian Penal Code against Raghunath Patra., Shyamsundar Pradhan, Mahani Samal, Maheswar Bhuyan, Ghanashyam Sahu and Tuni Sahu on the ground that their complicity in the crime is revealed from the evidence of p.ws. 1 and 2. On 7.2.1970, the prosecuting Inspector also filed a similar application where upon the petition filed earlier by the Petitioner was not pressed. The learned Magistrate heard both parties on the application filed by the Court Sub-Inspector and rejected the application on the ground that although p.ws. 1 and 2 have stated in Court that the persons now proposed to be impleaded as accused had also assaulted p.w. 1, the latter, in his statement before the Police, had not mentioned their names and although two other witnesses had stated before the Police that these persons had assembled at the spot, they did not say that they had taken part in assaulting p.w. 1. Aggrieved by this order, the Petitioner preferred a revision before the Additional District Magistrate who rejected it on the grounds (1) that on merits the order passed by the learned Magistrate was justified; and (2) that the application dated 24-1-1970 filed by the Petitioner should be deemed to be a complainant petition and as such the trial court was not competent to take cognizance. It is the correctness of this order that is now challenged. 4. Mr. It is the correctness of this order that is now challenged. 4. Mr. D.C. Mohanty, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that as the names of persons now sought to be added as accused had been mentioned in the first information report but despite it, no charge had been submitted against them and consequently no charge had been framed against them, it must be deemed that they had been discharged by the learned trying Magistrate and unless that order of discharge was set aside, the trying Magistrate was not competent to issue summons against them. This contention is absolutely without any force because, there cannot be any question of discharge when the persons now sought to be impleaded had never been sent up when the charge-sheet was submitted by the Police and they were therefore never before the Court. 5. The view of the learned Additional District Magistrate that the trying Magistrate who had not taken cognizance of the offence but in the first instance to whom the case had been transferred for trial had no power to take cognizance against the other persons is equally fallacious. It is well settled that u/s 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when a Magistrate acts under any of the clauses therein, he takes cognizance of an "Offence". The expression "takes cognizance of an offence" cannot be equated to taking cognizance of an offender. When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence he takes 'cognizance of the case as' a whole and as such he gets seized of the whole case and there is no bar in his issuing process against all persons who appear to be involved in the offence. The contention that when a Magistrate takes cognizance under Clause (b) of Section 190(1), Code of Criminal Procedure on a report made by a Police Officer he is restricted to issuing process only to the persons challenged by the Police is not was ranted by the language of the sub-section. That is so far as a Magistrate taking cognizance of an, offence is concerned. That is so far as a Magistrate taking cognizance of an, offence is concerned. When such a Magistrate transfers a case for disposal to another Magistrate u/s 192(1) Code of Criminal Procedure he transfers the entire case an d not the case of a particular accused in respect of a particular offence as, specified in the original order of the transfering Magistrate while taking cognizance. Hence the transferee Magistrate is in fun seisin of the entire case and has jurisdiction to issue process against the persons who were not named in the original order of the S.D.M. taking cognizance. His discretion to frame charges in respect of offences that may be disclosed during the examination of the witnesses and his discretion to summon persons other than those mentioned in the charge-sheet is not in any way fettered by the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance. Raghubans Dubey Vs. State of Bihar, ; Gurucharan Hiswal and Ors. v. State 24 1958 C.L.T. 155 : ILR 1908 Cutt. 74 and N. Baksi Vs. M. Yunus, 6. In view of my finding that the trying Magistrate had undoubtedly jurisdiction to summon the other accused persons named in the petition filed before him the quest/ion is whether he has exercised some sound discretion in refusing to summon them. Indeed, the learned Magistrate is passing the order does not appear to have entertained any doubt regarding his power to summon the other accused persons. It is only the learned Additional District/Magistrate who appears to have entertained that doubt. I have already briefly mentioned the grounds on which the Magistrate refused to summon the other accused persons. 7. It is contended by Mr. Palit appearing for the Petitioner that at this stage that the learned Magistrate should have considered was that whether from the evidence of p. ws. 1 and 2 a prima facie case has been made out against the persons Bought to be added as accused and that the learned Magistrate has erred in discussing the evidence at length. In other words, the submission is that the enquiry at this stage should be restricted only to find out whether there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial and the approach should not be whether the evidence available is sufficient to sustain a conviction. In support of this contention, he relied on Markandey Rai Vs. In other words, the submission is that the enquiry at this stage should be restricted only to find out whether there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial and the approach should not be whether the evidence available is sufficient to sustain a conviction. In support of this contention, he relied on Markandey Rai Vs. Sheo Kumar Thakur and Another, and Harekrushna Mohanty Vs. Adikando Behera. The Patna case related to the scope of enquiry u/s 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Court observed that the inquiring officer should not take upon himself the function of a trying Magistrate and evaluate evidence. His function is only to satisfy himself whether a prima facie case has been made out so as to put the accused on trial. What happened in Harekrushna Mohanty's case referred to above is that on receipt of information from the Magistrate u/s 202 Code of Criminal Procedure the S.D.M. instead of taking into consideration the statement of the complainant and the witnesses recorded by the inquiring Magistrate and the result of the investigation or inquiry, he also took into consideration other extraneous matters and dismissed the complaint petition. It was pointed out that he was not entitled to do so and in such circumstances the order dismissing the complaint petition was set aside. Neither of these two cases is of any assistance to Mr. Palit in the present case. We are concerned here, with an order passed by the trying Magistrate himself who on considering the evidence of p.ws. 1 and 2 in so far as they implicated the other accused persons took into consideration the statements made by them during the investigation by the police and' came to the conclusion that no case has been made out against the other accused persons. I am of the view that in doing so he had not committed any illegality and did not exceed his jurisdiction. 8. That apart, there is considerable delay on the part of the Petitioner in filing the application before the trying Magistrate. The concurrence took place as long ago as on 3.6.1967 but the application in question was filed about two and a half years thereafter. 8. That apart, there is considerable delay on the part of the Petitioner in filing the application before the trying Magistrate. The concurrence took place as long ago as on 3.6.1967 but the application in question was filed about two and a half years thereafter. It is stated in para 4 of the revision application that in the G. R. Case the Petitioner never had any opportunity of knowing as to who actually were summoned as accused in the case till p.ws. 1 and 2 were summoned to depose at the trial. The order sheet of the case however shows that when the prosecution witnesses did not attend Court in spite of summons, an order was passed on 12-10-1968 for issue of bailable warrants against them and later that day, the informant appeared in Court through a lawyer and prayed for recall of the earlier order. The order was recalled and the informant was directed to produce his witnesses on 12-11-1968. At least on that day, the Petitioner would have know who actually were the persons who had been summoned as accused. But for more than a year from that day, the application under consideration had not been filed in Court. There is, therefore, considerable force in the contention of the learned Advocate for the opposite party that the application filed by the Petitioner is designed only to harass the persons who are now proposed to be added as accused. 9. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed