JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a revision application u/s 115 of the CPC against the decision of the City Munsif, Farrukhabad that he had jurisdiction to take proceedings relating to the preparation of the final decree in a suit for partition of Bhumidhari holdings. 2. On 29-11-1957, the Plaintiffs-Respondents filed a suit in the court of the Munsif, Farrukhabad, u/s 176 of the UPZA and LR Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for partition of certain bhumidhari holdings. On 17-11-1958, the trial court passed a decree declaring that the parties were each entitled to a half share in the holdings. On 19-4-1958, it directed that the papars be sent to the revenue court for preparation of the final decree and that the case should be put up after three months. The record was sent to the revenue court and proceedings were commenced immediately thereafter by the SDO, Farrukhabad as is evident from the notices dated 20-6-1958 and 29-7-1958 issued by him. On 11-2-1959, he made an order carving out two Kuras of equal valuation, one in favour of the Plaintiffs and the other in favour of the Defendants. He then sent the papers back to the City Munsif, An objection to the Kuras was filed by the Defendant but was dismissed by the City Munsif by his order dated 18-5-1959, upon the view that in a suit u/s 176 of the Act he was merely required to pass a decree declaring the rights of the several parties and that the actual partition had to be effected by the Collector and he relied upon Prabhu Dayal v. The Sub-Divisional Officer 1958 AWR 715 . Not-withstanding that view, by the same order he directed the preparation of the final decree. The Defendants filed an appeal and the learned Additional Civil Judge, Farrukhabad, finding that some plots had already been partitioned in consolidation proceedings, observed that it was necessary to make a further enquiry in respect of the plots remaining joint for the purpose of setting fresh Kuras. In respect of those plots he remanded the suit to the trial court for an enquiry by the Munsif into the nature of the plots. He included a direction that in case the Munsif came to the conclusion that the plots constituted an "estate" assessed to payment of revenue he should send the record to the Collector for partition. In respect of those plots he remanded the suit to the trial court for an enquiry by the Munsif into the nature of the plots. He included a direction that in case the Munsif came to the conclusion that the plots constituted an "estate" assessed to payment of revenue he should send the record to the Collector for partition. If, however, the Munsif found that the plots did not constitute such an "estate", he should proceed to effect partition of the plots himself. The City Munsif became seized of the case again and on 18-10-1965, he directed that the record be sent to the Collector for preparation of Kuras. On 26-11-1965, the Assistant Collector prepared the Kuras and made a final order partitioning the plots between the parties. The Plaintiffs appealed. The Additional Commissioner, by his order dated 20-5-1966, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and directed him to return the record to the civil court. The Additional Commissioner took the view that the Civil court should have passed a final decree and the Assistant Collector should have returned the record back to the Civil court on the ground that he had no jurisdiction. No appeal was filed by the Defendants against that order. It appears that on 11-8-1967, the learned Additional Civil Judge deleted the direction contained in his order dated 26-2-1964, requiring the City Munsif to send the record to the Collector for partition in case the plots constituted an "estate" assessed to payment of revenue. 3. It may be mentioned that against the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge dated 26-2-1964, the Defendants filed a review application which was rejected on 30-8-1967, by the learned Additional Civil Judge, who directed the City Munsif to proceed to prepare a final decree in accordance with law. A revision application (Civil Revision No. 1659 of 1967) filed there-after in this Court was dismissed on the ground that the objection as to jurisdiction could be taken in the trial court. 4. Now, upon the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 20-5-1966, holding that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to pass the final decree, the record was once more placed before the City Munsif. 4. Now, upon the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 20-5-1966, holding that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to pass the final decree, the record was once more placed before the City Munsif. The Defendants filed an objection contending that the City Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass the final partition decree and the matter should be referred to the Collector for partition of the holdings. The objection was rejected by the City Munsif by his order dated 16-10-1967 and against that order the Defendants have filed the present revision application. 5. The case came on for hearing before Asthana, J., who seeing an apparent conflict between Shobh Nath v. Shri Dat 1965 AWR 276 and Dharam Narain v. Lalman Shukla 1965 AWR 584 relied upon respectively by the rival contending parties, has referred the case to a larger Bench. And now the case is before us. 6 In 1957, when the suit was filed Section 176 of the Act provided: Section 176 : Holding of a bhumidhar or sirdar divisible-- (1) A bhumidhar or sirdar may sue for partition of his holding. At that time a suit for partition of a bhumidhari or sirdari holding lay in the civil court. It was not one of the suits mentioned in Schedule II to the Act enumerating the proceedings which lay in the revenue court. 7. The Act was amended with effect from 10-10-1954, by UP Act No. XX of 1954. Sections 182-A and 182-B were introduced. They provided: Section 182-A : The provisions of Section 54 and Order XX, Rule 18, CPC 1908, shall apply to a suit for partition of a holding u/s 176. Section 182-B : Except as provided in Sections 178 to 182, the partition of a holding or separation of the share therein of a bhumidhar or sirdar shall be made by the Collector in accordance with the principles that may be prescribed. 8. Thereafter, the Act was amended on 28-5-1956, by UP Act No. XVIII of 1956. An entry at Serial No. 16 was made in Sch. If indicating that a suit u/s 176 for the partition of a holding of a sirdar would lie in a revenue court. So far, therefore, a suit for the partition of a bhumidhari holding still lay in the civil court. 9. Then, the Act was amended with effect from 7-11-1958, by UP Act No. XXXVII of 1958. If indicating that a suit u/s 176 for the partition of a holding of a sirdar would lie in a revenue court. So far, therefore, a suit for the partition of a bhumidhari holding still lay in the civil court. 9. Then, the Act was amended with effect from 7-11-1958, by UP Act No. XXXVII of 1958. In Section 176 the word "division" was substituted for the word "partition"., Section 182-A was deleted. Section 182-B now read: Section 182-B : Subject to the provisions of Sections 178 to 182 the division of a holding or the separation of the share therein of a bhumidhar or sirdar shall be made by the Court in accordance with the principles that may be prescribed. And the entry at Serial No. 16, Schedule II, was amended to include a suit for the division of a Bhumidhari holding. Section 87 of the Amendment Act of 1958 provided: Section 87(1) : Except as provided in Sections 85 and 86, any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, effect or consequence or anything already done or suffered or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. 10. The Defendants-Applicants contend that after the decree of the City Munsif dated 17-2-1958, declaring the respective shares of the parties, the proceedings fell within the jurisdiction of the Collector u/s 54 and Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC and the civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Reliance is placed on Shobh Nath v. Shri Dat (supra). The Plaintiffs-Respondents say that it is the civil court which has jurisdiction to pass the final partition decree and urge that the case is governed by Dharam Narain v. Lalman Shukla (supra). 11. As always, it is necessary to determine what is the law which applies to the case. For this purpose, it will be appropriate, we think, to examine the position obtaining before and after the Amendment Act of 1958 in respect of a suit for the partition of a bhumidhari holding. 11. As always, it is necessary to determine what is the law which applies to the case. For this purpose, it will be appropriate, we think, to examine the position obtaining before and after the Amendment Act of 1958 in respect of a suit for the partition of a bhumidhari holding. Before the Amendment Act of 1958, a suit u/s 176 of the Act lay in a civil court, there being no provision in respect of it in Schedule II of the Act. It was a suit governed by Section 182-A, which applied the provisions of Section 54 and Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC to it. Order XX Rule 18 of the Code has two sub-rules. Sub-rule (1) makes provision in respect of an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government and Sub-rule (2) relates to other immoveable property and to moveable property. Sub-rule (1) provides that a court passing a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein in respect of an estate assessed to the payment of revenue of the Government shall, by such decree, declare the Tights of the several parties interested in the property and shall direct such partition or separation to be made by the Collector in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of Section 54. The court passing the decree is confined to a declaration of the rights of the several parties. The partition or separation must be made by the Collector according to the rights declared and in accordance with Section 54. Section 54 applies expressly to estates assessed to the payment of revenue to the Govt. and provides that the partition of such estates or the separation of shares therein shall be made by the Collector "in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition, or the separate possession of shares, of such estates". Such a law was enacted in Section 182-B, which provided that the Collector would partition a bhumidhari holding or separate the share therein subject to Sections 178 to 182 and "in accordance with the principles that may be prescribed". Sections 178 to 182 of the Act detail one of the modes of dividing a holding. And Rules 156 to 164 made under the Act set out the principles. Sections 178 to 182 of the Act detail one of the modes of dividing a holding. And Rules 156 to 164 made under the Act set out the principles. Therefore a complete code stood provided for the partition of a bhumidhari holding. The suit would lie in a civil Court and the civil court would pass a decree declaring the rights of the respective parties, but the partition or separation would be effected by the Collector in accordance with Section 182-B. 12. It is urged that a bhumidhari holding is not an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government and therefore Section 54 and Order XX, Rule 18(1) cannot be invoked in the case of a bhumidhari holding. We are unable to accept the contention. Section 182-A of the Act has expressly made those two provisions applicable to a suit for partition of a bhumidhari holding and it appears that the Legislature contemplated that a bhumidhari holding was an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government. With the creation of new land tenures under the UP ZA and LR Act bringing the tenure-holder into direct relationship with the State, land revenue has now become payable by the tenure-holder to the Government. Section 242 of the Act provides for the payment of land revenue by a bhumidhar or a sirdar and by virtue of Section 243 all bhumidhars and sirdars in a village are jointly and severally responsible to the Government for the payment of land revenue assessed u/s 241 on that village. Section 245 makes detailed provision for determining the land revenue payable by a bhumidhar to the Government. It seems clear to us upon these considerations that for the purpose of the partition of a bhumidhari holding or the separation of a share therein the Legislature has treated a bhumidhari holding as an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government. We have been referred to the observations of D.S. Mathur, J. in Dharam Narain v. Lalman Shukla (supra) which appear to express a contrary view. With respect, we are unable to accept the conclusion to which he has come in this regard. 13. The position in respect of a suit for partition of a bhumidhari holding was substantially altered by the Amendment Act of 1958. With respect, we are unable to accept the conclusion to which he has come in this regard. 13. The position in respect of a suit for partition of a bhumidhari holding was substantially altered by the Amendment Act of 1958. By the amendment of the entry at serial No. 16 in Schedule II, the suit now lay in the revenue court. Section 54 and Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC could not apply. Accordingly, Section 182-A was deleted. The suit, being now maintainable in the revenue court, it was governed entirely by the provisions applicable to suits tried by the revenue courts. It was the revenue court which would not declare the rights of the several parties and the partition of the holding or separation of the share therein would also be effected by the revenue court. For this reason, Section 182-B was amended and in place of the word "Collector" the word "Court" was substituted. Thereby, the dichotomy between the jurisdiction of the civil court and of the Collector formerly existing in a suit for partition of a bhumidhari holding was abolished. It was no longer necessary. When Section 182-B provides that the partition of a holding or separation of a share shall be made by the court it refers to the court which entertains the suit and that is the revenue court. Therefore, after the Amendment Act of 1958, a suit for partition of a bhumidhari holding lies in the revenue court, which declares the rights of the parties and finally partitions the holdings or separates the shares therein. 14. The question next is whether the amendments introduced by the Amendment Act of 1958 have any effect upon a suit already pending. As to that, Section 87(1) of the Amendment Act provides that a court or authority before whom a proceeding has been instituted or commenced prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act (which is 7-11-1958) continues to have jurisdiction to hear and decide that proceeding. Accordingly, the civil court which entertained the present suit continued to have all the jurisdiction in respect of it which it possessed originally. It had no less and no more. It had already pasted a decree on 17-2-1958 declaring that the parties were each entitled to a half share in the holding. With that its jurisdiction in the suit was exhausted. It had no less and no more. It had already pasted a decree on 17-2-1958 declaring that the parties were each entitled to a half share in the holding. With that its jurisdiction in the suit was exhausted. There was nothing in the law to empower the civil court to partition the holding. That was a matter falling entirely within the scope of the Collector's jurisdiction. That is also the view expressed by S.N. Singh, J. in Shobh Nath v. Shri Dat (supra) and we agree with him in that regard. With respect, we are unable to accept the view referred by D.S. Mathur, J. in Dharam Narain v. Lalman Shukla (supra) that in a suit for partition filed in the civil court before the Amendment Act of 1958 came into force the partition of the holding or separation of the share therein is, by virtue of the amended Section 182B, a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the civil court. It seems to us that such a construction proceeds against the fundamental object behind the relevant amendments introduced by the Amendment Act of 1958, which intended that all suits for partition of a bhumidhari holding should now be tried and disposed of entirely by the revenue courts. If before the amendments of 1958 it was the Collector who partitioned the holding or separated the share it is difficult to accept that after the amendments the civil court is not intended to exercise that jurisdiction. 15. There is, further, the circumstance that in June 1958 the SDO, Farrukhabad, had already initiated proceedings for partitioning the holding. If by that circumstance the SDO continues to have jurisdiction by virtue of Section 87(1), the proceeding having commenced prior to the date when the Amendment Act of 1958 came into force, that constitutes another ground for holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to partition the holdings. 16. It is urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents that the proceeding before the SDO must be deemed to have been quashed in consequence of the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge dated 26-2-1964 and that it cannot now be said that any proceeding was commenced by the SDO before the Amendment Act came into force. 16. It is urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents that the proceeding before the SDO must be deemed to have been quashed in consequence of the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge dated 26-2-1964 and that it cannot now be said that any proceeding was commenced by the SDO before the Amendment Act came into force. Even if that be accepted, the amended Section 182-B will apply and upon the construction which has found favour with us, it will be the revenue court which has jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore whether the unamanded Section 182B or the amended Section 182-B applies it is clear that it will not be the civil court which has jurisdiction in the present case to partition the holdings. 17. The Plaintiffs-Respondents then point out that by his order dated 20-5-1966, the Additional Commissioner had already decided that the final proceeding lay in the civil court and not with the Assistant Collector and contend that inasmuch as that decision has not been challenged in appeal or revision it is final and binding between the parties. It seems to us that a finding by a Court or other judicial tribunal that it has jurisdiction or does not have jurisdiction in a certain matter cannot be clothed with a conclusive character so as to operate as res judicata between the parties in subsequent proceedings or a subsequent stage of the same proceeding. If the jurisdiction rightly belongs to another Court or tribunal, an erroneous decision of the former Court or tribunal cannot operate to divest it of such jurisdiction. Equally, if the jurisdiction is hot vested in another Court or tribunal, such a decision cannot confer jurisdiction upon it. In our opinion, the contention now raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs Respondents must be rejected. 18. In our judgment, by his decision dated 26-10-1967, the City Munsif, Farrukhabad, has assumed jurisdiction which does not belong to him. 19. The revision application is allowed, the order of the City Munsif, Farrukhabad, dated 26-10-1967, is set aside and the case is remanded for disposing it of in accordance with law in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The Applicants are entitled to their costs.