JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - At the conclusion of the arguments in these four writ petitions we delivered short orders allowing the petitions and quashing the impugned orders. In these orders we stated that the reasons would follow. We now proceed to give our reasons for the orders. 2. These four writ petitions have been filed by four sugar-mills challenging orders of appointments of Receivers of the Mills in proceedings for the recovery of certain clues as arrears of land revenue. 3. The H. R. Sugar Factory (Private) Limited, Nekpur Bareilly, petitioner in writ petition No. 968 of 1970 was in arrears of the following dues:- Cane price Rs. 2,06,835-35 Cane Commission Rs. 92,438-93 Purchase tax Rs. 14,40,447-26 Total Rs. 17,39,721-54 Certificates for the recovery of these amounts were issued to the Collector, Bareilly for recovery of the amounts as arrears of land revenue. By an order dated March 4, 1970 the Collector in exercise if the powers under Sections 279(l) (g) and 286-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 appointed Sri Raghubir Singh, Deputy Collector, Bareilly, as Receiver of the Sugar Mills. The Receiver was, inter alia, empowered to run the Sugar Mills. By a subsequent order dated March 8, 1970 the Collector appointed Sri P. B. Ghate, Receiver, in place of Sri Raghubir Singh. 4. The Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Maliyana, district Meerut petitioner No. 1, in writ petition No. 969 of 1970 was in arrears of the payment of the following dues:- Cane price Rs. 4,22,111-81 Cane purchase tax Rs. 13,26,195-06 Interest on purchase tax Rs. 1,92,626-44 Provident Fund Rs. 7,435-25 Total Rs. 19,48,368-56 Certificates for recovery of these amounts as arrears of land revenue were issued to the Collector of Meerut. By an order dated March 3, 1970 the Collector appointed Sri H. D. Pande, Deputy Collector, Meerut, Receiver of the Mills. The Receiver inter alra, was empowered to run the Mills. On March 4. 1970 the Collector cancelled and withdrew the order of the March 3, 1970. Thereafter he passed another order on the same day again appointing Sri H. D. Pande, Deputy Collector as the Receiver and empowering him to run the Mills. By a subsequent order dated March 8, 1970 the Collector appointed Sri R. S. Mathur I.A.S. Receiver in place of Sri H. D. Pande. 5. Thereafter he passed another order on the same day again appointing Sri H. D. Pande, Deputy Collector as the Receiver and empowering him to run the Mills. By a subsequent order dated March 8, 1970 the Collector appointed Sri R. S. Mathur I.A.S. Receiver in place of Sri H. D. Pande. 5. Sir Shadi Lal Sugar and General Mills Ltd., Mansoorpur, district Muzaffarnagar, petitioner No. 1 in writ petition No. 1052 of 1970, was in arrears of payment of the following dues:- Cane price Rs. 58,391-41 Commission Rs. 1,193-54 Interest on cane price Rs. 5,024-12 Cane purchase tax Rs. 11,87,479-95 Total Rs. 12,52,089-02 Certificates for the recovery of these amounts as arrears of land revenue were issued to the Collector, Muzaffarnagar. By order dated March 4, 1970 the Collector appointed Sri G. D. Punetha, Deputy Collector, Muzaffarnagar, Receiver of the Mills. The Receiver was, inter alia, empowered to run the Mills. We are informed that in this case all the dues have now been paid off and the order appointing the Receiver is likely to be withdrawn. A certificate of the Receiver dated May 1, 1970, has been filed as Annexure A to the supplementary affidavit of Sri S. S. Garg which states that all the dues have been paid off. 6. The Mahabir Sugar Mills (Private) Ltd., Siswabazar, district Gorakhpur, petitioner No. 1, in writ petition No. 1962 of 1970 was similarly in arrears of payment of dues for different period. Three sets of recovery certificates for the different periods were issued to the Collector, Gorakhpur. The First set of certificates was for the recovery of the following dues : Cane price Rs. 1,81,000-00 Cane purchase tax Rs. 3,90,638-15 Interest on cane price Rs. 1,39,000-00 Commission Rs. 10,000-00 Total Rs. 7,20,638-15 7. The second set of certificates, issued was for recovery of interest on purchase tax upto 31-3-1969 amounting to Rs. 1,66,395-00. The third set of certificates issued was in respect of cane price amounting to Rs. 10,05,629-93 and interest on cane price amounting to Rs. 84,332,84. On March 4, 1970 the Collector first passed an order attaching the Mills with all its assets. Thereafter on the same day he passed three orders in respect of the three sets of certificates appointing Sri R. C. Verma, Sub-divisional Officer, Maharajganj, Receiver of the Mills and empowered him to run the Mills. 8. 84,332,84. On March 4, 1970 the Collector first passed an order attaching the Mills with all its assets. Thereafter on the same day he passed three orders in respect of the three sets of certificates appointing Sri R. C. Verma, Sub-divisional Officer, Maharajganj, Receiver of the Mills and empowered him to run the Mills. 8. These orders appointing the Receivers in these four cases with powers to run the Mills have been challenged by the petitioners on the following grounds : (1) That Section 20 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act forbids the appointment of Receiver to take over the running of the sugar Mills by the State Government or by its officers. (2) that the provisions of Sections 279(l) (g) and 286-A of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act merely authorise the appointment of a Receiver over movable and immovable property of a Sugar Mills but do not authorise the appointment of a Receiver to run the Mill. (3) that Sections 279 (1) (g) and 286-A of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, if they authorise the taking over of the running of the Sugar Mills, are beyond the legislative competence of U. P. Legislature. (4) that the provisions of Sections 279 (1) (g) and 286-A, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are repugnant to the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and are therefore void. (5) that the impugned orders appointing Receivers have been passed by the Collectors in all the cases at the dictation of the State Government and not in exercise of the individual judgments of the Collectors concerned and are, therefore, illegal and invalid. (6) that the appointments of incompetent and inexperienced persons as Receivers to run the sugar factories infringe the fundamental rights of the share-holders of the Mills under Art. 19(l) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. (7) that the coercive steps for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue could only be availed of against the occupiers of the Sugar Mills and not against the Company, and (8) that no interest was recoverable on the arrears of purchase tax. Since we are of the opinion that the petitioners must succeed on the 5th ground it is not necessary to deal with the other points raised by the petitioners. In fact we have heard learned counsel for the respondents only on this point. 9. Since we are of the opinion that the petitioners must succeed on the 5th ground it is not necessary to deal with the other points raised by the petitioners. In fact we have heard learned counsel for the respondents only on this point. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions of the petitioners in respect of the 5th point raised by them it is necessary to first refer to the provisions of applicable to the case. Section 279 (1) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides that an arrear of land revenue may be recovered by any one of the following processes : (a) by serving a writ of demand or a citation to appear on any defaulter, (b) by arrest and detention of his person, (c) by attachment and sale of his movable property including produce, (d) by attachment of the holding in respect of which the arrear is due, (e) by lease or sale of the holding in respect of which the arrear is due, (f) by attachment and sale of other immovable property of the defaulter, and (g) by appointment of a receiver of any property, movable or immovable of the defaulter." Sections 280 to 286-A deal in detail with these various processes for recovery. Section 286-A deals with the appointment of receiver. it provides that when an arrears of revenue is clue, the Collector, may, in addition to or instead of any of the processes appoint a receiver of any movable or immovable property of the defaulter. Clause (d) of sub-Sec. (1) empowers the Collector to confer certain powers on the received. Sub-Sec. (4) makes the provisions of Order XL, Rules 2 to 4, C. P. C. applicable to a Receiver appointed under this section. 10. The first question which has to be considered is whether the Collectors in these four cases have, in passing orders appointing Receivers, exercised their own individual discretion of have done so on the dictation of the State Government. In this connection the most important document is a G. O. dated March 3, 1970 addressed by the State Government to all the Collectors. A copy of this G. O. Annexure B to the rejoinder affidavit in writ petition no. 968 of 1970. In this connection the most important document is a G. O. dated March 3, 1970 addressed by the State Government to all the Collectors. A copy of this G. O. Annexure B to the rejoinder affidavit in writ petition no. 968 of 1970. This G. O. states :- "I am directed to refer to the Chief Secretary's Radiogram dated 2-3-1970 on the above subject and to say that on consideration the Government are ad- vised that under the provisions of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, 1950 or the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, it is not necessary that the properties of a sugar mills must be attached before appointing a Receiver for the recovery of arrears from such a Mill Receivers can be appointed straight away under the relevant provisions of the said Acts. Consequently if in any case attachment of the properties of sugar Mills has already been made by you, such attachment may please be withdrawn at once. You may please appoint Receivers in respect of all the sugar Mills orders in the standard form a copy of which is appended below. As regards the question of providing funds for meeting the running expenses of the Mills by the Receivers the orders are being issued separately by industries Department. I am to request that a report about the compliance of orders issued in the Radiogram in question and in preceding paras may please be sent at once to Government in Rajaswa (Gha) Vibhag with a copy to the Special Secretary, Industry Department." From this G. O. it is clear that the State Government had ordered all the Collectors to appoint Receivers of all sugar-mills in respect of which proceedings were pending before them for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue. The Government even provided a standard form in which the orders were to be passed. In the end the G. O. directed the Collectors to report compliance of the order. In compliance with this order the four Collectors concerned passed orders appointing Receivers in all the four cases and the orders were passed on the same day, i.e. March 4, 1970. Receivers were appointed even in cases where previously orders of attachment of property of the Mills had been passed as well as in the cases where previously orders for appointment of Receivers had been passed. Receivers were appointed even in cases where previously orders of attachment of property of the Mills had been passed as well as in the cases where previously orders for appointment of Receivers had been passed. In the case of Sir Shadi Lal Sugar and General Mills Ltd. the Receiver was appointed on March 4, 1970 when the recovery certificates wen- also received by the collector on that very date. Then, the orders appointing Receivers in the four cases are in identical language and are word for word the same except for the names and the figures. Apparently all the orders are in the standard form supplied by the State Government to the Collectors along with the G. O. In addition to this, there is this important circumstance that none of the Collectors has filed any counter affidavit in any of these four cases controverting the allegations of the petitioners that the orders had been passed on the dictation of the State Government. These facts and circumstances conclusively establish that the Collectors in all these four cases passed the orders appointing Receivers at the dictation of the State Government and not in the exercise of their individual discretion. 11. We have next to consider whether the State Government was entitled to direct the Collectors to appoint Receivers and whether the orders passed in compliance with this direction are vitiated on that account. The provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act invest the Collector with the discretion to select the mode of realisation of the dues as arrears of land revenue. The arrears of cane price are recoverable under the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of supply and purchase) Act, 1953. Sub-Sec. (4) of Section 17 empowers the Cane Commissioner to forward to the Collector a certificate specifying the amount of arrears on account of the price of cane plus interest and requires the Collector on receipt of such certificate to proceed to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 17 (4) specifically confers power on the Collector to recover the arrears of cane price as arrears of land revenue. The purchase tax on sugarcane is payable under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961. Section 17 (4) specifically confers power on the Collector to recover the arrears of cane price as arrears of land revenue. The purchase tax on sugarcane is payable under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961. Sub-Sec. (8) of Section 3 of this Act provides that the Officer or authority empowered to collect the tax may forward to the Collector a certificate specifying the amount of arrears of tax and interest. It further provides that on receipt of such certificate the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount specified from such person as if it were an arrear of land revenue. It thus appears that the Statutes cast a duty upon the Collector to realise the arrears upon receipt of the certificates as arrears of land revenue. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that it is not open to the State Government to tell the Collector how he should proceed and what mode he should adopt to realise the arrears in a particular case. The argument is that the power and the discretion having been vested in the Collector by the Statutes, the State Government is not entitled to usurp the power of the Collector and to compel him to act in the manner selected by it. In support of this contention reliance is placed on certain decisions of the Supreme Court. In Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16 permission was granted by the Commissioner of police to build a cinema house but subsequently, on the direction of the State Government, the Commissioner of Police cancelled the permission. The Supreme Court held that the order of cancellation came from the State Government and the Commissioner acted only as a transmitting agent and that this was not permissible in law. It observed : "It is clear to us from a perusal of these rules that the only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a license for the erection of a building to be used for purposes of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police. It is also clear that under R. 250 he has been vested with the absolute discretion at any time of cancel or suspend any license which has been granted under the sales. It is also clear that under R. 250 he has been vested with the absolute discretion at any time of cancel or suspend any license which has been granted under the sales. But the power to do so is vested in him and not in the State Government and can only be exercised by him at his discretion. No other person or authority can do it." In the State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1081 a similar question again arose before the Supreme Court. The Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952 by Section 5 (1) and (2) provides that when an application for license to run a Cinema is made it has to be considered by the licensing authority and dealt with under those provisions. Section 5 (2) provides that subject to the provisions of Section 5 (1) and subject to the control of the Government the licensing authority may grant a license under the Act to such persons as it thinks fit on such terms and condition as it may determine. The State Government directed the licensing authority to forward all the applications for licenses to it for disposal. The question which arose for determination was whether the State Governments order directing the licensing authority to forward to it all applications received for grant of license and the assumption by it of the power and authority to deal with the said applications for permits was justified. Holding that the State Government was not entitled to do so the Supreme Court observed "The Scheme of the Act clearly indicates that there are two authorities which are expected to function under the Act the licensing authority as well as the Government. Section 8 is an illustration in point. It empowers the State Government or the licensing authority to suspend, cancel or revoke a license on the grounds specified by it, and that shows that if a license is granted by the licensing authority it has the power to suspend, cancel or revoke such a license just as Government has a similar power to take action in the respect of the licence already granted. We, are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that appellant no. We, are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that appellant no. 1 had no authority or power to require all applications for licences made under the provisions of the Act to be forward to it, and to deal with them itself in the first instance. Section 5 clearly requires that such applications must be dealt with by the licensing authorities in their respective areas in the first instance and if they are granted they may be revised by Government under Section 5 (2) ; and if they are rejected, parties aggrieved by the said orders of rejection may prefer appeals under Section 5 (2) of the Act. The basic fact in the scheme of the Act is that it is the licensing authority which is solely given the power to deal with such applications in the first instance, and this basic position cannot be changed by Government by issuing any executive orders, or by making rules under Section 9 of the Act." In Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar, (1969) 1 S.C.C. 308 the question which areas for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the Chief Minister could direct the Cane Commissioner to modify a reservation order already made. In this case the Cane Commissioner, Bihar, had made an order reserving certain villages in favour of the appellant Company tinder Clause 6 (1) (a) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order 1966. The 5th respondent made representations to the Chief Minister and the Cane Commissioner against, the reservation of certain villages which were in Bihar in favour of the petitioner Company which was situated in U. P. The Chief Minister directed the Com- missioner to divide the allotted area into two portions and to allot one portion to the 5th respondent. On the basis of this direction the Cane Commissioner passed orders modifying his earlier reservation order and taking out certain villages which had been reserved for the appellant Company and allotted them to the 5th respondent. Holding that the Chief Minister was not entitled to give the direction to the Cane Commissioner the Supreme Court observed : "...... We are of the opinion that the impugned orders though purport- ed to have been made by the Cane Commissioner were in fact made by the Chief Minister and hence they are invalid. Holding that the Chief Minister was not entitled to give the direction to the Cane Commissioner the Supreme Court observed : "...... We are of the opinion that the impugned orders though purport- ed to have been made by the Cane Commissioner were in fact made by the Chief Minister and hence they are invalid. We have earlier seen that the Cane Com- missioner was definitely of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed but the Chief Minister did not agree with that view. It is clear from the documents before us that the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists 'Ka' and 'Kim'. Under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list 'Ka' were allotted to the appellant and in list 'Kha' to the 5th respondent. The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Sri Chagla that thought the Cane Commissioner was initially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the mate- rial before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6 (1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone-not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is, that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister an authority nog recognised by Clause (6) react with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is, that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister an authority nog recognised by Clause (6) react with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner. The executive officers entrusted with statutory discretions may in some cases be obliged to take into account considerations of public policy and in some con- text the policy of a Minister or the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but this will not absolve them from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision been made for them to be given binding instructions by a superior." 12. These cases make it abundantly clear that where it Statute casts a duty upon it particular officer or invests him with the exercise of a discretion then that duty must be performed and that discretion exercised by that officer and by no one else. The manner of the performance of the duty and the exercise of the discretion cannot be controlled by any other authority. 13. The learned Advocate General has not contested this legal position. He has contended however that the proceedings for recovering dues as arrears of land revenue were in the nature of execution proceedings and the State Government which had transmitted the certificates being in the position of a decree-holder was entitled to chose the mode of execution and to direct the Collector to adopt that mode. According to him it is open to a decree-holder to choose one of the several modes of execution of a decree mentioned in Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the executing Court is bound to execute the decree in that mode. The relevant part of Section 51 reads thus : "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed the Court may on the application of the decree-holder order execution of the decree (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property. The relevant part of Section 51 reads thus : "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed the Court may on the application of the decree-holder order execution of the decree (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property. (c) by arrest and detention in prison; (d) by appointing it receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require." He has referred to certain decision where it has been held that it is for the decree-holder to decide whether he should execute the decree for the payment of money by the arrest of the judgment-debtor or by the attachment and sale of his property or both and that while the court has discretion to refuse execution against the person and property simultaneously it has no authority to decline to make order of committal to prison on the ground that. the decree-holder should proceed in the first instance against the property of the judgment-debtor. On the basis of these decisions it is urged that it is open to a decree-holder to choose any mode of execution and the court is bound to execute the decree in that mode. It is urged that the State Government was in the position of a decree- holder and it could tell the Collector to proceed to recover the amounts due by appointing a receiver and the Collector had, thereupon, no discretion in the matter, but had to proceed in the manner directed by the Government. The contention is not sound. In the first place it is not possible to accept that the proceedings before the Collector for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue are in the nature of execution proceedings. Though the recovery proceedings may resemble execution proceedings in some respects they cannot be equated with execution proceedings. Apart from this even in execution proceedings a decree-holder cannot insist upon execution of the decree by appointment of a receiver. In Hemendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Prakash Chandra Ghosh, A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 189. Though the recovery proceedings may resemble execution proceedings in some respects they cannot be equated with execution proceedings. Apart from this even in execution proceedings a decree-holder cannot insist upon execution of the decree by appointment of a receiver. In Hemendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Prakash Chandra Ghosh, A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 189. It Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed, referring to a decision of the Privy Council : "These observations also show sufficiently that the Subordinate judges' view that by the introduction of Section 51 in the new Code, the decree-holder may as of right and as a matter of course apply for execution by the appointment of a receiver, is not correct, but that, on the other hand, the remedy by the appointment of a receiver is by way of equitable execution or indirect execution the receiver taking the place of the debtor, in cases in which equitable and special considerations intervene ...... Section 51 of the Code of 1908 is to be read with Rule 11, Order 21 and Rule 10, 40, and the order is to be regarded as made under the last mentioned rule and justified if only that rule would justify it." The same view has been taken by other High Courts and it is not necessary to refer to more cases. No case has been cited before us which has taken a contrary view. It is now well settled that the appointment of a receiver in execution is not a matter of right and a proper case must be made out to justify the exercise by the court of its discretion to make the appointment. The discretion is regulated by the provisions of Order XL, Rule 1. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government could not dictate to the Collector that he should appoint a Receiver for the recovery of the dues. 14. Sri S. C. Khare, appearing for some of the Cane Co-operative Societies in respect of whose dues also certificates had been issued to the Collectors, contended that the State Government had the power to issue directions to the collectors under Section 219 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. 14. Sri S. C. Khare, appearing for some of the Cane Co-operative Societies in respect of whose dues also certificates had been issued to the Collectors, contended that the State Government had the power to issue directions to the collectors under Section 219 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Section 293 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides that the provisions of Chapter IX and X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, shall apply to applications and proceedings made or taken under Chapter X (Land Revenue) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 219 is contained in Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act and runs as follows "219. Power of State Government or Board to call for files of subordinate officers and to revise orders. The State Government may call for the record of any non-judicial proceeding not connected with Settlement held by any officer, sub-ordinate to it, and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. The Board may call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board, if the officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity;, and may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit." It is said that the power exercised by the Collector in revenue recovery proceedings is a non-judicial power and, therefore, Section 219,(1) is applicable to these proceedings. In Sudama Prasad v. State of U. P., 1968 R.D. 88 a Division Bench of this Court held that proceedings in respect of land revenue including recovery thereof under Chapter X of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are non- judicial proceedings and the State Government is competent to entertain a revision under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act in respect of these proceedings. It is contended by Sri Khare that it is in exercise of this power that the State Government issued the directions contained in his order dated March 3, 1970. It is contended by Sri Khare that it is in exercise of this power that the State Government issued the directions contained in his order dated March 3, 1970. We are unable to accept this contention. The order does not purport to have been passed in the exercise of this power. In the counter affidavits filed by the State Government it has not been asserted that the order was made in the exercise of the power under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act. The stand taken by the State Government in the counter affidavits is that the Collectors had, in spite of the order of the State Government dated March 3, 1970, exercised their individual judgments in passing the orders appointing Receivers. It further appears that the power under Section 219 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act is it revisional power. It is contained in Chapter X which deals with appeals, references and revisions. The second part of Section 219 admittedly confers revisional power on the Board of Revenue in respect of judicial matters. The marginal heading of this section is also "power to revise orders". There can be no manner of doubt that the first part of Section 219 confers a revisional power on. the State Government in respect of proceedings which are non-judicial. Such power can only be exercised in respect of orders passed by a subordinate authority. It is implicit in the revisional power itself that some action must have been taken by the subordinate authority to attract the exercise of the power. The first part of Section 219 confers power on the State Government to call for the record of "proceedings held" by a subordinate officer. This indicates that the power of the State Government is attracted only when some orders have been passed by a subordinate authority. This section does not empower the Government to substitute itself for the Collector. If the Collector had passed some order then it might have been open to the State Government to revise that order. But before the Collector had passed any order the State Government could not itself pass an order in the proceedings pending before the Collector or direct the Collector to pass any particular type of order. If the Collector had passed some order then it might have been open to the State Government to revise that order. But before the Collector had passed any order the State Government could not itself pass an order in the proceedings pending before the Collector or direct the Collector to pass any particular type of order. In the present case the State Government has not revised any order of the Collector but has ordered the Collector to pass orders appointing Receivers, thereby virtually exercising the original power of the Collector itself. This is not exercise of the revisional power, but a usurpation of the original power of the Collector. 15. It was urged by Sri Khare that the petitioners had themselves approached the State Government to issue directions to the Collectors in the matter of lifting the earlier attachments made by them and, therefore, they had acquiesced in the exercise of the powers by the State Government. We are not impressed with this argument. The conduct of the petitions can at best amount to their recognition of the revisional power in the State Government. But their action cannot be construed as accepting or admitting that the State Government was entitled to order the Collector to appoint Receivers, or that the order passed by the State Government directing the Collectors to appoint Receivers was in exercise of this power. We may at this stage also notice an argument urged on behalf of the petitioners that the power to realise the dues in these cases as arrears of land revenue was conferred upon the Collector by other enactments and not by the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and therefore, the limitation on the power of the Collector making it subject to the revisional power of the State Government must be found in those enactments. Reliance for this proposition was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works v. Land Reforms Commissioner U. P., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 897 It is unnecessary however to examine this contention as we are clearly of opinion that the order of the State Government dated March 3, 1970 was not made in exercise of its revisional power under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act. 16. 16. It was lastly urged by Sri M. A. Ansari, appearing for some of the Cane Co-operative Societies that the petitioners were defaulters who had deliberately not paid the cane price and the purchase tax and, therefore, this Court should not exercise its discretion in their favour. We cannot accept this contention either. From the material on the record we are unable to accept that the petitioners have deliberately refused to pay cane price and the purchase tax which was legally due from them. Learned counsel for the petitioners have ringed that on account of the controls imposed by the Central Government and by the State Government it situation arose where become impossible for the petitioners to pay off the entire dues in respect of the cane price and the purchase tax. They have stated that a major portion of the cane price and the purchase tax has been paid by the petitioners and only a small portion could not be paid on account of the difficulties created by the controls. Since we are of the opinion that the orders of the Collectors appointing the Receivers are clearly illegal, we see no reason not to grant the reliefs prayed for by the petitioners. 17. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed and the orders of the Collectors dated March 4, 1970 appointing Receivers of the petitioner's Mills and their subsequent orders changing the Receivers are quashed. In the circumstances of the cases we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of the petitions.