Judgment 1. THIS appeal is by the plaintiff against an appellate decree, judgment being one of affirmance. 2. THE plaintiff-the father filed an suit for declaration that the deed of gift executed by him in favour of his son-Parbati Charan Das by his de-ceased first wife was illegal and void,, The case as set out in the plaint, briefly,, is that after the death of his first wife he married for the second time Maharani dasi who put pressure upon him to transfer the suit property to her. To avoid her he transferred this property to his only son by the first wife by an deed of gift drawn up in the form of an notarial deed on 20th May, 1943, which, however, was merely a fictitious transfer and never intended to operate as a real deed of transfer as under the French Law the donor was incapable of accepting any gift on behalf of his minor son. Further, he having two other sons the gift was void as it related to his only immovable property. It was also alleged that it was onerous gift as the donee was obliged to maintain the plaintiff and his second wife properly but instead of doing so the defendant has been ill-treating them after attaining majority which disentitled him to take the benefit of the gift under the law. The defendant who contested the suit in his written statement denied all material allegations. It was asserted that the deed of gift was fully effective and he made new construction on the suit property by selling the ornaments of his deceased mother. He further alleged that he had been in possession of the property in his own right and not as a licensee and the suit was barred under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. THE trial court found that the gift was valid and operative in law, and dismissed the suit also on the ground of limitation. On appeal the appellate court below substantially agreed with the view taken by the trial court and dismissed the appeal The correctness of this decision is now being disputed before us in this appeal. 4. THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the disputed gift made by the father is valid and operative. On appeal the appellate court below substantially agreed with the view taken by the trial court and dismissed the appeal The correctness of this decision is now being disputed before us in this appeal. 4. THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the disputed gift made by the father is valid and operative. The trial court, it appears, on consideration of a number of articles on minority and guardianship under the French Law has held that the father himself where he is the donor could not accept the gift in favour of his minor son but at the same time it could not find out how under the French Law such a gift could be accepted on behalf of the minor particularly when a father needed no authorisation of family council in accepting the gift On behalf of the minor son. The appellate court although took the view that in such a contingency the matter must be referred to the family council agreed with the trial court relying on certain "commentary in French Law applicable to Hindus" by one J. Sanner that the personal law of the Hindus was respected by the French Authorities relating to administration of the estate of Hindu miners and on application of the Article 3 of Arretee dated the 6th January, 1812 of the French Law held that the Hindus were governed by their personal law, usages and customs in French Chandernagore. Accordingly, it found the deed of gift as valid both on application of Hindu Law and Transfer of Property Act which were held when applicable to Hindus. The translation of relevant Article 3 as appears from a book entitled "compilation of Legislation" by 'laud is as follows:- "the Indians whether Christians, moors or Nobelmen shall be tried as in the past according to laws, usages and customs of their castes. " On a fair reading of the above translation it is difficult to see how Hindus could be said to have been included amongst the sects or classes mentioned therein. It may be that the text books of personal law of Hindus might have been respected but merely on that supposition it is not possible to conclude that the Hindus at the material time during the French regime used to be governed by their personal law as regards their rights to immovable properties. 5. It may be that the text books of personal law of Hindus might have been respected but merely on that supposition it is not possible to conclude that the Hindus at the material time during the French regime used to be governed by their personal law as regards their rights to immovable properties. 5. THIS apart, the appellate court below never looked to what may be called personal laws of the Hindus relating to transfer of immovable properties including the gift. It cannot be said that the statutory provision of Transfer of Property Act can be equated with the personal laws of the Hindus. The Transfer of Property Act at the material time was a law of British India which was made applicable to the Hindus but that fact by itself can not establish that the Transfer of Property act equally applied to the Hindus in French Settlement in India. In our opinion the decision on this aspect of the matter by the court below is entirely incorrect. It would be wholly speculative to enter into this question under the state of law as it then stool. In such matters it is argued by Mr. Mitter, the personal laws of Hindus also do not permit the father to accept the gift on behalf of his minor son where he himself is the donor. We are not prepared to find out what the personal laws of the Hindus were in this respect since in our view there is nothing to indicate that the Hindus were governed by their personal law at the material time in the matter of a gift by the father to his minor son in the French Settlement of Chandernagore. We feel, therefore, justified in holding that the validity of the gift made by the father to his son must be in terms of the French law in force at the material time in Chandernagore. We fully endorse the view taken by the appellate court that the father was not competent under the French Law to accept the gift on behalf of his minor son and accordingly, we hold that the gift was invalid. In this view of the matter, the question whether the father was competent to make a gift of the entire property as being his only property does not arise. Mr. In this view of the matter, the question whether the father was competent to make a gift of the entire property as being his only property does not arise. Mr. Das Gupta, however set up rule of estoppel and pleaded that the father himself could not challenge the validity of gift. We do not think, there is much of substance in such a plea since the gift was void 6. ON the next question of imitation, also Article 1304 of the French Code which prescribes the limitation of ten years was not properly applied in this case. It appears that the appellate court have agreed with the trial court in applying this Article mainly relying on certain notes of an annotated edition of the French Code by 'dalloz' presumably a French legal commentator. The admitted English translation of the relevant notes of this commentator as supplied to us are as follows:- "104.-Thus, the prescription of Article 1304 applies to the suit for nullity of a gift instituted by the heirs of the donor on account of defect of form, resulting, either for want of mentioning the causes which has prevented several of the parties from signing. 105.-Or from the defect of acceptance of the donee." "Now the English translation of the relevant Article 1304 runs thus "in all cases in which the action for nullity or for rescission of an agreement is not limited to a less time by the law, such action enures for ten years. Such time does not run in the case of duress, except from the day on which it ceases; in the case of mistake of fraud from the day on which they have been discovered; and as respects acts passed by married women unauthorised, from the day of the dissolution of the marriage. Such time does not run in the case of duress, except from the day on which it ceases; in the case of mistake of fraud from the day on which they have been discovered; and as respects acts passed by married women unauthorised, from the day of the dissolution of the marriage. The time does not run with respect to acts made by interdicted persons, except from the day on which the interdiction is removed; and with respect to those made by minors, only from the day of majority." Article 2262 provides : "all actions, as well real as personal, are prescribed by thirty years, without compelling the party who alleges it to produce a document thereon, or without permitting an objection to be opposed to him derived from bad faith." From the above provision it seems clear that the Article 1304 applies to only cases either for nullity, or for recession of agreement. It is difficult to see how a suit for nullity of gift can come within the purview of this Article. The above notes which possibly express the opinion of the author are not backed by any authority. We think, it would be totally unsafe to come to a legal conclusion relying on these notes particularly when the Article itself is quite explicit. This apart, even from the notes it appears that the Article 1304 would apply to the suit for nullity of gift instituted by the heirs of the donor but in the instant case the suit has not been instituted by the heirs but by the donor himself. So, this seems to us to be another reason far which no legitimate conclusion can be drawn for application of Article 1304 to the case under consideration. In our opinion the other Article 2262 of the Code prescribes the general law of limitation in respect of action relating to immovable properties and, therefore, is the appropriate article which is applicable in the present case. In our opinion the other Article 2262 of the Code prescribes the general law of limitation in respect of action relating to immovable properties and, therefore, is the appropriate article which is applicable in the present case. The appellate court itself quoted note No. 198 under this article which lays down that the action for nullity of gifts illegally covenanted by the guardian is barred by limitation of 30 years, limitation of ten years being restricted to deeds executed by the minor himself but the appellate court took the view that since the limitation of 30 years relates to transfer by the guardian on behalf of the minor and not to transfer by the guardian of his own property, this article could not have any application. Such conclusion, in our view, is not correct for the notes do not speak anything about the transfer by the guardian of his own property In any case, it would be wholly improper and unreasonable to decide this question simply relying on these notes which are again not consistent with each other. In our opinion, the decision of the appellate court below is not correct. 7. WE accordingly hold that the suit is not barred by limitation. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to go into further question whether after the commencement of the Chandernagore Merger Act on 2. 10. 54 Indian Limitation Act applied. 8. THE result is, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of both the courts below are set aside. The Suit is decreed but considering the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no costs throughout.