Judgment 1. THIS appeal) is against a preliminary decree for partition. The plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons respectively of Radhika and Tarakeswar while the plaintiff No. 3 is the daughter of Nanda Gopal. Radhika, tarakeswar and Nanda were the nephews (sister's sons) of one jagneswar Poddar who was the owner of the properties in suit. By a will executed on Baisakh 22, 1328 B. S., and duly probated Jagneswar bequeathed some properties to his Gurudeb, created a Debattar in respect of some other properties and gave some properties to his legally married wife swarnamoyee absolutely with full rights of alienation while some other properties were given to his mistress Sidheswari Baisnabi in life interest without power of alienation. The residue of the properties were given to Swarnamoyee, in life estate. It was further provided in the will that after the death of Swarnamoyee, the properties left and as would be acquired by their income, would devolve in the three nephews in -|2|- annas share each while the remaining -|10|- annas would devolve on the defendant appellant, Ram Narayan an agnatic nephew of the testator who was treated by him and his wife as their son, to be enjoyed by them down to sons and grandsons. It was also provided that if any of the four nephews predeceased the testator or swarnamoyee their heirs would be entitled to the interest of such deceased person. 2. THERE was a further provision in the will following the above provision to the effect that the heirs of such nephews predeceasing the testator or Swarnamoyee would never be entitled to divide the estate of the testator but would divide the usufructs less expenses in the said share. It is this clause on the scope and effect whereof the decision of the appeal hinges. The three nephews, the predecessors-in interest of the plaintiffs, predeceased Swarnamoyee and there is no dispute that the plaintiffs thereupon inherited the interest of their respective predecessors-in-interest each in -|2|- annas share while -|10|- annas share had already devolved on the defendant. It is this clause on the scope and effect whereof the decision of the appeal hinges. The three nephews, the predecessors-in interest of the plaintiffs, predeceased Swarnamoyee and there is no dispute that the plaintiffs thereupon inherited the interest of their respective predecessors-in-interest each in -|2|- annas share while -|10|- annas share had already devolved on the defendant. According to the plaintiffs, they were entitled to a partition of the estate in their admitted shares while according to the defendant, the estate of the testator was impartible in view of the above provision in the will and the plaintiffs were only entitled to the usufructs from the estate in proportion to their interest and further the defendant under its provisions was the sole trustee of the estate. The plaintiffs also claimed accounts from the date of death of Swarnamoyee who died in Jaishta. 1352 B. S. (May and June, 1945)while the defendant admitted his liability for accounts from the death of the last executor to the will Jadunandan Poddar on April 11, 1947. There was another objection in respect of Gadibari property left by the testator which according to the defendant, could not be subject of partition as the defendant, under terms of the will, was required to reside there. The learned Judge held, on a construction of the will, that the deceased nephews were given absolute interest in the estate in -|2|- annas share each and the same was to descend from generation to generation. The plaintiffs thereby acquired the interest of their respective father's absolute interest and the clause restricting their right to receive usufructs only and also not to "divide the estate" was repugnant to and inconsistent with the nature of the absolute gift provided in the will. The Court also found that the defendant was liable for accounts from the death of Swarnamoyee. It was further held that the Gadibari was also to be subject of partition as claimed and merely because the defendant was to stay therein it could not mean exclusion of their cosharers therefrom. The suit was decreed accordingly in preliminary form and the present appeal is from the said decree. 3. IN this appeal, Mr. It was further held that the Gadibari was also to be subject of partition as claimed and merely because the defendant was to stay therein it could not mean exclusion of their cosharers therefrom. The suit was decreed accordingly in preliminary form and the present appeal is from the said decree. 3. IN this appeal, Mr. Narayan Chandra De, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant appellant, contended that the judgment under appeal is wrong in that it permitted partition of the estate of testator on the face of the provision therein prohibiting partition. He relied on the other provisions of the will, whereby bequests were made to legatees unconditionally as also conditionally and its terms expressly provided that in the happening of the contingency, viz. the death of any nephew, his heirs while inheriting his interest would only be entitled not to any absolute estate but to the usufructs thereof without any right to divide the estate. Any other construction permitting partition of the estate by the heirs of any deceased nephew, Mr. De submitted, would be against the wishes of the testator unequivocably expressed in the impugned provision in, the will. Mr. Sudhansu Bhusan Sen, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs respondents contended that it must be held that the nephews were given absolute interest in the properties boqueathed to them, and their interest, on their death before Swarnamoyee, according to the will, devolved on their respective heirs, and any clause curbing their right so acquired, would be repugnant to the provisions of the will and of no effect. The plaintiffs' suit for partition was therefore maintainable and they are entitled to the partition of the suit properties to the extent of their interest. 4. THE rule of construction of deeds came up for consideration of the supreme Court in (1) Ramkishorelal and another v, Kamalnarayan, AIR, 1963 SC 890, where Das Gupta J., speaking for the Court, restated the law as follows:- "the golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, up their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens ? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. It is clear, however, that an attempt should be made to read the two parts of the documents harmoniously, if possible; it is only when this is not possible e. g. where an absolute title is given in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provision has to be held to be void." The principles of construction of deeds stated above closely applies to the facts of the present case. It appears that the nephews had been given by the will specific undivided interest in the residue estates of the testator and in properties, if any, acquired by its income, as would be left after the death of his wife Swarnamoyee and they were to enjoy and possess the same down to sons and grandsons There can be no doubt that by this provision the nephews were thereby given absolute interest in the estate. It was further provided that in case any of the nephews predeceased the wife, his heirs would be entitled to the interest o f their predecessor-in-interest and there is no provision that on the happening of such contingency, the absolute interest of the heirs would extinguish. It was further provided that in case any of the nephews predeceased the wife, his heirs would be entitled to the interest o f their predecessor-in-interest and there is no provision that on the happening of such contingency, the absolute interest of the heirs would extinguish. It appears to us as clear and obvious that the heirs also were thereby given absolute interest in the estate. If once an absolute interest is given by any instrument, on the rules of construction referred to above it will appear that any clause or provision restricting the absolute interest so conferred must be deemed to be void. In the instant case the clause restricting the right of the heirs of nephews to claim partition, being thus inconsistent with or repugnant to the absolute title conferred on them by the earlier provisions must therefore be held as void and inoperative and the trial court's conclusion to the same effect must be upheld as correct. 5. FURTHER it will also appear from the other provisions of the will that the testator, who appears to us to be a person of worldly prudence, made provisions for his Guru, deities, wife and even his mistress, bequeathing separate properties to them. The residue properties as would be left on the death of the wife was to devolve on the nephews absolutely in unambiguous and unequivocal language to be possessed and enjoyed by them down to sons and grandsons. Where the testator desired that legatees like the wife, in respect of some properties and the mistress should have limited interest, there was express provision therefore in the will. Further as also conceded by Mr. De, the defendant appellant himself had always right to partition the property. If that is the position, it cannot be argued with any force that the estate is impartible as claimed in the written statement. The nephews were given absolute interest which was to go down from generation to generation. It is difficult to conceive that their heirs who were to inherit the nephews' absolute interest should be deprived of such right for no apparent reason. This would be so contrary to the tenor of the instrument which is otherwise a comprehensive disposition by a careful testator Again if the nephew had the absolute right to properties, they had the right to partition also. This would be so contrary to the tenor of the instrument which is otherwise a comprehensive disposition by a careful testator Again if the nephew had the absolute right to properties, they had the right to partition also. If one nephew predeceased Swarnamoyee, and the other nephews partition out their shares, in whom the title and management of the properties would lie, the heirs being entitled to only usufructs therefrom ? Such an estate in perpetuity is unknown in law and cannot be a valid disposition. On a consideration of all circumstances, the construction that the heirs will have the absolute right including the right to partition appears to be in harmony with the other provisions of will. 6. AS to the claim for accounts, it appears that the defendant admittedly had been in possession of the properties since the death of Swarnamoyee and, he in his written statement claimed to be in such possession as sole trustee under the provisions of the will. There was never any refusal of or infringement by the defendant of the plaintiffs' right to account or oven any clear or unequivocal threat to infringe that right. The judicial decisions concur in holding that in a suit for accounts between co-owners in similar circumstances, Article 120 of the Limitation Act would be applicable from the date of accrual of cause of action. There could be, however, no "right to sue" until there was an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least an unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted as was held in (2) Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan and others AIR 1930 PC 270. If there is no infringement of such right or even a threat to infringe that right, as in the instant case no bar of limitation could arise at all, so that accounts could be ordered for a period much longer than six years preceding the suit (vide Sitaram v. Narayan and others AIR 1943 Bombay 216. If there is no infringement of such right or even a threat to infringe that right, as in the instant case no bar of limitation could arise at all, so that accounts could be ordered for a period much longer than six years preceding the suit (vide Sitaram v. Narayan and others AIR 1943 Bombay 216. The defendant being admittedly in possession of the properties since that date and in absence of any denial by him of his liability prior to institution of suit there is no legal bar or reason why he should not be liable for accounts for the period and we do not find anything wrong or improper in the decree for accounts passed by the trial court. A point was also raised by Mr. De about the Gadibari property which under the provisions of the will was to be and had been the residence of the defendant. The will merely provides that the defendant would reside in the Gadibari or dwelling house in English Bazar. It is not exclusively given to the defendant by the will nor does the will provide that the other co-sharers would have no interest or right in the said property. The defendant accordingly cannot claim exclusive possession of the same and if such possession is claimed or it is not possible to divide the property into suitable blocks, the plaintiffs will be entitled to such adjustment or compensation as the Court, at proper stage, may deem fit. There is therefore no ground to refuse partition of this item of property as claimed by the plaintiff. 7. AS all contentions of the appellants fail, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs in this Court.