JUDGMENT H. Swarup, J. - Durgesh Prasad Bhargava has filed this petition challenging the validity of Rules 2 and 8 framed by the Zila Parishad, Aligarh, for regulating brick-kiln and other kilns. 2. The petitioner owns a brick-kiln situate in village Madrak, Tahsil Koal, district Aligarh. The bye-law No. 2 requires that no person will work a brick-kiln without obtaining a licence from the licensing Officer and bye-law No. 8 provides that the licence fee for a brick-kiln with a Chimni will be Rs. 250. The licence has to be an yearly licence. After the coming into force of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, these bye-laws were continued under the provisions of Section 270 thereof. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the bye-laws on the ground that the amount demanded as licence fee is in the nature. of..a tax and not a fee and as the procedure for the imposition of tax has not been followed the amount cannot be recovered from the petitioner and the same. cannot be made a condition precedent to the grant of the licence for the running of the brick-kiln. 4. Section 174 (2) (k) of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, gave to the District Board power to make bye-law for regulating slaughter-houses and offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices and prescribing fees to defray the expenditure incurred by a Board for this purpose. The Board could, therefore, frame a bye-law to regulate a brick-kiln and also to prescribed fees for meeting the expenditure that may be incurred by the Board for the purpose of this regulation. Section 232 (2) E (a) (iv) of the Kshettra Samities and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam provides for the making of bye-laws prohibiting the use' of -any place, in default of a licence granted by the Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of the licence so granted, as a factory or other plate of business for burning or making bricks, tiles, pottery or lime. Serb-clause (c) provides for the inspection and regulation of the conduct of business in a place used as aforesaid, so as to secure cleanliness therein or to minimise any injurious, offensive, or dangerous effect arising or likely to arise therefrom. Section 443 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam provides that a Zila- Parishad or a Kshettra Samiti may. Serb-clause (c) provides for the inspection and regulation of the conduct of business in a place used as aforesaid, so as to secure cleanliness therein or to minimise any injurious, offensive, or dangerous effect arising or likely to arise therefrom. Section 443 of the Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam provides that a Zila- Parishad or a Kshettra Samiti may. charge a fee to be fixed by a bye-law for any 'licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or is required to grant by or under this Act. Under the law, therefore, the Zila Parishad could require a person who wants to work a brick-kiln to obtain 4 licence. It could also require him to pay a fee for obtaining the licence but the licence fee can only be for the purpose of providing for the inspection and regulation of the conduct of business so as to secure cleanliness therein or to minimise any injurious, offensive, or dangerous effect arising or likely to arise therefrom. 5. For determining whether a levy is a tax or fee, the Supreme Court laid down the test in Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 400 in the following words :-"Thus, in fees there is always an element of 'quid pro quo' which is absent in a tax. Two elements are thus essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself is not enough to make the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes." In the present case the petitioner alleged that the Zila Parishad, Aligarh, was not spending any amount for the purposes mentioned in the Act for which they could charge the licence fee and the amount that was being recovered from the brick-kiln licences was not being spent for that purpose. According to the petitioner there was no quid pro quo between the fee levied and the amount spent. According to the petitioner there was no quid pro quo between the fee levied and the amount spent. It was also asserted by the petitioner that the amount recovered as licence fee goes to the general revenue of the Zila Parishad, Aligarh, and is utilised for the general purposes of the Zila Parishad and that the amount recovered as licence fee is not ear-marked to meet the expenses of rendering the services towards regulating the running of the brick-kiln within the local limits of the Zila Parishad. In the counter-affidavit these allegations are denied except the allegation that the amount realised by way of licence fee goes to the general revenue of the Zila Parishad and is utilised for the general purpose of the Zila Parishad. Further the statements made in the counter-affidavit go to show that the amounts recovered as licence fee are not set apart and are not specifically appropriated for the purpose for which they are collected but are merged in the general revenue of the Zila Parishad to be spent for general purposes of the Zila Parishad. In the counter-affidavit, the total income and expenditure of the Zila Parishad has been mentioned. This includes the income recovered as licence fee and only consolidated amount of expenditure has been given. Specific amounts have been mentioned about expenditure only about the money spent on roads and general sanitation. There is nothing in the counter-affidavit to show that any particular amount is being spent for the purpose of inspection or regulation of the conduct of business so as to secure cleanliness therein or to minimise any injurious, offensive, or dangerous effect arising or likely to arise therefrom. The amount recovered as fee from the petitioner cannot, therefore, be treated to be in the nature of a fee. On the facts established on the evidence in the case, it has to be held that the licence fee demanded from the petitioner is in the nature of a tax and not fee, and as the procedure for the imposition of tax has not been followed as prescribed by law, the levy is illegal and cannot be collected from the petitioner. 6. 6. As the Zila Parishad has a right to regulate the trade and to make it obligatory on the person who wants to run a brick-kiln to obtain a licence for running the same, bye-law No. 2, which requires the taking of the licence, cannot be held to be ultravires. However, bye-law No. 8, which levies the fee and makes it a condition precedent to the grant of the licence must be held to be illegal and void. 7. In the result the petition is allowed. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the Zila Parishad, Aligarh, not to impose the condition laid clown in bye-law No. 8 for the grant of the licence to the petitioner for running the brick-kiln. As the petition succeeds only in part, the parties will bear their own costs.