In this writ petition under Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution by Amal Roy Choudhury challenge is made to the validity of the order dated 30th/31st March, 1954, by which his ser­vices, as Inspector in the Directorate of Food and Procurement, Government of Tripura, were terminated, as also to the order dated 8th of August, 1963, by which "ills representation to the Government for reinstatement was rejected by the Ad­ministrator of Tripura. 2. It is common ground between the parties that the petitioner was enrolled as Inspector in the Relief and Rehabilitation Department in October, 1955, and that he was subsequently transferred, in the same capacity, to the Directorate of Food and Procurement. In March, 1954, the petitioner was arrested on a charge under Section 420 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. While he was in judicial custody, he was firstly suspended from the service and then on 30th/31st of March, 1954, he was given one month's notice terminating his services. The peti­tioner was subsequently charge-sheeted and in course of time convicted by the trial Court. His appeal to the Sessions Judge, Agartala, and thereafter revision to the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Tripura, proved abortive. He did not lose heart and so went in appeal to the Supreme Court against the order made in revision by this Court. His appeal was accepted by the Supreme Court on 30th of October, 1962, and his conviction and sentence set aside. On 21st of January, 1963, the petitioner moved the Administrator of Tripura with a prayer for his reinstatement on the basis that his conviction and sentence had been set aside by the Supreme Court The Additional District Magistrate (Food Section) informed the petitioner by a letter dated 21st of August, 1963, that his prayer for reinstatement had been reject­ed by the Administrator. It is the con­tention of the petitioner that the orders terminating his services and rejecting his representation are violative of the provi­sions of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution inasmuch as the order which purports to terminate his services is in fact an order dismissing him from service, that that order had been made without giving him an opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed, and that that order had also been made by an authority subordinate to that by which he had been appointed. The prayers made in the petition were that the impugned orders should be quashed and the petitioner declared to be still in service of the Government of Tripura and entitled to the benefits of the arrears of full pay and allowances. 3. The respondents resisted the said prayers on divers grounds. Firstly, it was pleaded that the writ petition is liable to rejection because it had been filed after inordinate delay. It was pointedly emphasised that the services of the peti­tioner stood terminated with effect from 30th of April, 1954, whereas the writ peti­tion was filed on as late as 20th of July, 1964. In the second instance, it was alleged that the petitioner had been guilty of suppressio veri for he had not stated in the petition that his appointment as Ins­pector in the Relief and Rehabilitation Department in October, 1950, was subject to the conditions that that appointment would not entitle him to claim a perma­nent post under the Government and that it would be terminable on one month's notice. It was asserted that the appoint­ment given to the petitioner was of pure­ly temporary character and so he had no right to cling to it. On merits, it was denied that the order terminating the petitioner's services was in substance an order dismissing him from employment. It was contended that that order was one made in terms of the contract of employ­ment, that as such it does not fall within the ambit of clause (1) of Article 311, and that consequently there was nothing objectionable about it even if, as pleaded by the petitioner, it had been passed by an authority subordinate to the one by which the petitioner had been appointed. However, it was added that the order, dated 30th/31st of March, 1954, had actu­ally been passed by the Government of Tripura and that the Director of Food and Procurement was only the communi­cating authority. 4. In his counter-reply the petitioner reiterated the correctness of the stand taken by him in the writ petition and refuted the contention of the respondents that in terms of the contract governing his employment his services could be ter­minated on one month's notice or that his case did not attract the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. In his counter-reply the petitioner reiterated the correctness of the stand taken by him in the writ petition and refuted the contention of the respondents that in terms of the contract governing his employment his services could be ter­minated on one month's notice or that his case did not attract the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. He reserved his right to call upon the res­pondents to produce in Court before the date of hearing the agreement subject to which he had been engaged in October, 1950. 5. Shri H. C. Nath, the learned Gov­ernment Advocate, produced in Court at the hearing the agreement under which the petitioner had been employed. ShrJ M. R. Choudhury, appearing for the peti­tioner, did not contest the validity of that agreement (marked Annexure 5). 6. The foremost question that falls for determination in the petition is whether it is maintainable despite the fact that it had been instituted more than 10 years after the order terminating the services of the petitioner. I have stated above that the impugned order was made on 30th/31st of March, 1954. The writ peti­tion was filed on 20th of July, 1964. Shri H. C. Nath contended on the authority of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 , that the petition merits rejection because of the extreme delay in filing it. The Supreme Court held in the authority cited that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226, but nevertheless the maximum period fixed by the Legislature within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be claimed may ordinari­ly be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. It was ob­served further that the Court may con­sider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation pres­cribed for a civil action for the remedy sought in the writ petition, but where the delay exceeds that period of limita­tion, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. It was ob­served further that the Court may con­sider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation pres­cribed for a civil action for the remedy sought in the writ petition, but where the delay exceeds that period of limita­tion, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. The Supreme Court declared that the special remedy provided in Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil Court or to deny defences legiti­mately open in such actions, and that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power and this is speci­ally true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion, the Supreme Court emphasised, is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking the special remedy and what execute there is for it. It may be stated as a general rule, the Supreme Court observ­ed further, that if there has been unrea­sonable delay the Court ought not ordi­narily to lend its aid to a party by the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Shri M. R. Choudhury was unable to cite any authority to the contrary respecting the matter at anvil. Therefore, there looks to be no way put of the conclusion that the present petition merits rejection on the short ground that it is highly be­lated. It was admitted at the bar that if the petitioner wanted to challenge the validity of the order terminating his ser­vice in a civil Court he could have done so within 6 years of that order under Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908. There­fore, at the best he could have filed such a suit sometime in the first half of 1960. The instant writ petition was filed more than 4 years after the period of limitation for filing such a suit had run out. There­fore, the petition is hopelessly delayed. 7. Shri M. R. Choudhury, however,, submitted that the period of limitation for challenging validity of the order ter­minating the service began to run on 30th of October, 1962, the date on which the Supreme Court ordered the acquittal of the petitioner. There­fore, the petition is hopelessly delayed. 7. Shri M. R. Choudhury, however,, submitted that the period of limitation for challenging validity of the order ter­minating the service began to run on 30th of October, 1962, the date on which the Supreme Court ordered the acquittal of the petitioner. His argument in support of that contention was that the termina­tion of service having been ordered be­cause of the criminal prosecution, the petitioner could not have challenged the validity thereof until he had earned ac­quittal. I regret to say that the argument has fallen wholly flat with me. I propose dealing with it in two parts. Firstly, whether the impugned order is virtually an order of 'dismissal' or 'removal' of the petitioner from service within the mean­ing of those expressions as used in Arti­cle 311(2) though garbed as termination of service in terms of the contract, and, secondly, whether the law contemplates suspension of running of limitation in the circumstances of the case in hand. 8. I now take up analysis of the first part of the argument. The order termi­nating the service was actually passed by the Home Secretary to the Government of Tripura on 29th of March, 1954, arid it is marked Annexure 3. The order was communicated to the petitioner per letter dated 30th/31st of March, 1954, issued by the Director of Food and Procurement. The operative part of the order states that petitioner's "services are no longer required and accordingly he is hereby given one month's notice of termination of his service." The order does not pur­port to be one of dismissal or removal from service. The terms of the contract under which the petitioner was employed as Inspector clearly give power to the Government to dispense with the services of the petitioner on ore month's notice. It was also a term of the contract that the appointment as Inspector will not give any right to the petitioner to claim a permanent post under the Government. Therefore, the contention of Shri H. C. Nath that the Government had terminat­ed the services of the petitioner in exer­cise of the right vested in it by the terms of the contract and that the Government had not dismissed or removed the peti­tioner for his alleged involvement in a case under Section 420 I.P.C., appears to be a sound proposition. Therefore, the contention of Shri H. C. Nath that the Government had terminat­ed the services of the petitioner in exer­cise of the right vested in it by the terms of the contract and that the Government had not dismissed or removed the peti­tioner for his alleged involvement in a case under Section 420 I.P.C., appears to be a sound proposition. It was held in the case of State of Pun­jab v. Sukh Raj. AIR 1968 SC 1089 , that an order of termination of service in un­exceptionable form preceded by an en­quiry launched by the superior autho­rities only to ascertain whether the pub­lic servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Arti­cle 311 of the Constitution and that the circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service alone have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. An­other proposition laid by the Supreme Court in that case was that the services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination with­out anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitu­tion. It was held further that if the Impugned order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or inte­grity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. In the context of these propo­sitions of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, I see no merit in the submission of Shri Choudhury that the order termi­nating the services of the petitioner falls within the mischief of Article 311. That order is on the face of it quite unexcep­tionable and the Government had the right to discharge the petitioner from service on one month's notice in terms of the contract of service. Therefore, I can find no fault with it. The petitioner has not been able to establish that the Gov­ernment had any dishonest motive in ter­minating his services; nor motive is a relevant factor as observed by the Supreme Court, 9. Before proceeding further, I may briefly refer to the decision in Ram Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 158 , which was cited by Shri H. C. Nath to controvert the argument raised by Shri Choudhury. Before proceeding further, I may briefly refer to the decision in Ram Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 158 , which was cited by Shri H. C. Nath to controvert the argument raised by Shri Choudhury. In the re­ported case, the service of Shri Ram Gopal, a temporary Civil Judge, was ter­minated on one month's notice. Before that order was passed, allegations of seri­ous nature against the moral character of Ram Gopal had been made, they were informally enquired into by the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and on the basis of the conclusions reached by him a resolution was passed by the High Court recommending to the State Government that the services of Ram Gopal should be terminated. The-Government terminated the services after taking that resolution into considera­tion. The order of termination, however, was apparently altogether innocuous, it being, "The services of Shri Ram Gopal Chaturvedi, temporary Civil Judge, Waidhan, are terminated with effect from the 1st June 1960, forenoon". Shri Ram Gopal contended before the Supreme Court that in the background of all the circumstances leading to the impugned order there could be no doubt that the Government had actually removed him from service because of his misconduct and so his discharge from service was in the nature of removal from service and in consequence Article 311 would apply. The Supreme Court rejected the submis­sion with the observation that on the face of it the order did not cast stigma on the character or integrity of Ram Gopal, nor did it visit him with any evil consequen­ces, and that as such it was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted. I can state without demur that the facts of the reported case were much more stronger than those of the case in hand to support the contention that the impugned order was not by way of punishment. In our case, no enquiry, formal or informal, was held against the petitioner before the order terminating his services was passed, and by the date of that order the criminal case against him was only at the investi­gation stage. In our case, no enquiry, formal or informal, was held against the petitioner before the order terminating his services was passed, and by the date of that order the criminal case against him was only at the investi­gation stage. Hence, on repelling the submission of Shri Choudhury I hold that the order dated 29th of March, 1954, of the Home Secretary did neither purport to nor had the effect of dismissing or re­moving the petitioner from service, and the consequence that follows is that the petitioner cannot press into service the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitu­tion. 10. Shri Choudhury very candidly conceded at the bar that he had no autho­rity to cite to shore up his other submis­sion that the period of limitation for challenging the impugned order remained suspended right from the date the peti­tioner was arrested on the charge under Section 420 I.P.C. until his acquittal by the Supreme Court on 30th of October, 1962. That submission apparently looks to be highly fantastic. The order termi­nating the services had no nexus on the face of it with the criminal charge level­led against the petitioner. At any rate, the petitioner would have been well with­in his right to rush to the civil court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code or to the High Court under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution to challenge the order by which his services were dispensed with immediately after it was passed. The petitioner being major and cause of action in his favour having ac­crued on the date he was discharged from service, nothing could obstruct the run­ning of the limitation for a suit or an action challenging the validity or legality of the impugned order. The maturing of the cause of action or the running of the period of limitation did not depend on whether or not, as a result of investiga­tion, the case was sent to the court for trial, or if sent to court whether it re« suited in an acquittal or conviction of the petitioner. The cause of action was completely ripe when the order termi­nating the services was communicated to the petitioner. If he did not rush to the court to assail its validity within the time provided by law, he must bear the con­sequences that flow out of his own laches. The cause of action was completely ripe when the order termi­nating the services was communicated to the petitioner. If he did not rush to the court to assail its validity within the time provided by law, he must bear the con­sequences that flow out of his own laches. In a recent Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in AIR 1969 P & H 441, Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, the precise point raised by Shri Choudhury came up for conside­ration. There the point referred to the Full Bench was whether a Government employee whose dismissal from service has been found to be void and unlawful can recover by a suit or proceeding arrears of salary in respect of the entire period when he remained out of employ­ment or for the period of 3 years next preceding the institution of the suit or proceeding. The reply returned by the Full Bench was that a Government em­ployee could recover arrears of salary only for the period for which the suit was within time. The High Court held in support of that conclusion that a legal fiction having been employed for saying that an order of dismissal is non est and non-existing in the eye of law if it is found to be wrongful and ultra vires, all the consequences flowing from it should be logically pursued and followed and one of such consequences is that the salary had been regularly accruing to the official who had been wrongfully dismiss­ed. The sweep and amplitude of the legal fiction that the employee should be deemed to be in service all along will have the effect of preventing payment of arrears in respect of a period beyond 3 years when actually the employee was doing nothing for the Government. Ethi­cal considerations of fairness and equity, it was observed further, are hardly rele­vant or germane in determining the strict and technical rules of limitation. When the terminus a quo is the time when the wages accrue and by a legal fiction the entire period of removal or dismissal is deemed to be one spent in actual service, it is legitimate to give full meaning and content to the words in the third column of Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. When the terminus a quo is the time when the wages accrue and by a legal fiction the entire period of removal or dismissal is deemed to be one spent in actual service, it is legitimate to give full meaning and content to the words in the third column of Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. These propositions of law enunciated by the High Court, if I may say so, are un­exceptionable and apply with full force to the case in hand. Therefore, I nega­tive the contention that the period of limitation did not begin to run against the petitioner until he was acquitted by the Supreme Court. 11. Before parting with the case I feel it necessary to refer, in brief, to an­other two points urged by Shri Chou­dhury. He submitted firstly that in view of the proviso (a) to clause (2) of Arti­cle 311 the petitioner could not have challenged his discharge from service in terms of that clause. That clause states that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India ser­vice or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismiss­ed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been inform­ed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges against him, and where it is proposed, after inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportun­ity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such in­quiry. The proviso (a) is to the effect that clause (2) shall not apply where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. I think the argument raised by Shri Choudhury is altogether without merit. In the first instance, it being not proved that the petitioner had been dis­missed or removed from service, neither clause (2) nor the proviso (a) therein comes into play. Further, clause (a) has no effect on the commencement of the period of limitation respecting a suit or proceeding arising out of dismissal or removal of a civil servant. In the first instance, it being not proved that the petitioner had been dis­missed or removed from service, neither clause (2) nor the proviso (a) therein comes into play. Further, clause (a) has no effect on the commencement of the period of limitation respecting a suit or proceeding arising out of dismissal or removal of a civil servant. The limita­tion would begin to run immediately the dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of the servant is ordered, and it cannot remain in suspension until a final verdict is given respecting the charge levelled against that servant. Finally, clause (a) contemplates only those cases where the dismissal or removal or reduction in rank is ordered after the Government servant concerned has been convicted on a crimi­nal charge. In the instant case, the im­pugned order was made before the peti­tioner was sent to the Court for trial. Therefore, he cannot be heard to say that he had been removed from service on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Hence, I negative the point canvassed by Shri Choudhury. 12. The other point raised by him was that since the petitioner had been recruit­ed in October 1950 on probation of three months, as mentioned in Annexure 5, he must be taken to have been confirmed on the expiry of that probationary period and so he could not have been discharged from service without compliance with the provisions of Article 311. Here, again, it is not possible to agree with Shri Choudhury. It was held in the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan, AIR 1961 SC 177 , that a probationer has no right to the post held by him. Subse­quently, in the case of Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 , the Supreme Court declared, setting at rest the then prevalent controversy be­tween the various High Courts, that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of probationary period, automatically ac­quire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless, of course, the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result Shri Choudhury was unable to cite any rules by which the appointment of the petitioner was gov­erned, or to affirm that in terms of such rules the petitioner had acquired the status of a permanent member of a ser­vice under the State Government. He banked only on the terms of Annexure 5 in support of his contention that the peti­tioner was a permanent servant by the time the impugned order was made. That contention is clearly negatived by the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbans Singh for there is no order of the Government confirming the petitioner, nor, has any rule been cited to support the plea of confirmation. Conse­quently, the second point also fizzles out. 13. No other point was canvassed be­fore me in support of the prayer made In the writ petition. 14. As a result, the petition fails and so stands rejected. Taking all the cir­cumstances into consideration, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.