Judgment :- 1. The learned trial magistrate found that the accused in this case had put up a stone and cement structure across, and obstructing, a drain forming part of a public road situate and vested' in a Panchayat. If that be so, the accused was guilty of a breach of clause (a) of S.84 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, the construction not being permitted by the rules made under the Act. That section, so far as is material, says: "84. Prohibition against obstruction in or over public roads, etc.- No person shall except as permitted by rules made under this Act and except in accordance with the conditions imposed by any licence made requisite by such rules (a) build any wall or erect any fence or other obstruction or projection or make any encroachment whatsoever whether permanent or temporary, in or over any public road; A breach of S.84 (a) is punishable under S.132 of the Act, read with the first item in Schedule III thereto, with a fine of Rs. 100/-. And the learned magistrate finding the accused guilty accordingly sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week. On appeal by the accused to the District Magistrate the latter acquitted him on three grounds: (1) that the prosecution had not proved that S.84 and 132 of the Act had come into force; (2) that the prosecution was bad for want of authorisation by the Panchayat under S.119 of the Act; and (3) that the prosecution had failed to prove that it was the accused that had effected the construction. This appeal against the acquittal brought under sub-section (3) of S.417 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the complainant, the Executive Officer of the Panchayat concerned, has come before us since it was thought that the decisions in Sreedharan v. State of Kerala 1969 KLT. 689, Pyli v. State of Kerala 1966 KLT. 102, Chandrasekharan v. State 1965 KLT. 638 and Executee Officer v. Bharathan 1967 KLT. 161 required reconsideration in the light of the decisions in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara AIR. 1951 SC. 318, Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer AIR. 1955 SC. 25 and State v. Gopal Singh AIR. 1956 M. B. 138. 2. 102, Chandrasekharan v. State 1965 KLT. 638 and Executee Officer v. Bharathan 1967 KLT. 161 required reconsideration in the light of the decisions in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara AIR. 1951 SC. 318, Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer AIR. 1955 SC. 25 and State v. Gopal Singh AIR. 1956 M. B. 138. 2. It is the first of the grounds stated by the learned District Magistrate that has been responsible for this case coming before us and we shall deal with it first. Sub-section (3) of S.1 of the Act provides that the Act "shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint". Also that "different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provisions" of the Act. It is because the notification bringing the relevant provisions of the Act into force had not been tendered in evidence and duly proved at the trial that the learned District Magistrate held that the prosecution must fail. 3. The offence is alleged to have been committed on 3-5-1969. There is, in fact, a notification by the State Government dated the 1st December 1961 and published in the Kerala Gazette of the 12th December 1961 appointing the first day of January 1962 as the date on which S.84 and 132 and Schedule III among other provisions of the Act shall come into force. That notification is extracted in the publication of the Act commonly used in the courts, and a copy of the notification has been produced before us. The short question is whether a Court which under clause (1) of S.57 of the Indian Evidence Act is bound to take judicial notice of all laws in force in the territory of India should insist on a notification like the present bringing a law into force being produced and proved in the ordinary course, or should itself find out whether, or not the law has been brought into force by resort to the appropriate books or documents of reference. 4. It is to be noticed that the trial magistrate did apparently take judicial notice of the fact that the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act were a law in force, something which everybody concerned obviously knew no contention to the contrary was (or could have been) taken before him, or, indeed, before the learned District Magistrate. 4. It is to be noticed that the trial magistrate did apparently take judicial notice of the fact that the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act were a law in force, something which everybody concerned obviously knew no contention to the contrary was (or could have been) taken before him, or, indeed, before the learned District Magistrate. That being so, and the provisions concerned being in fact a law in force, it was not for the District Magistrate in appeal to hold the contrary on the ground that the notification bad not been tendered and proved in evidence. That apart, it is clear from S.57 of the Evidence Act that in all cases where the Court is bound to take judicial notice, the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference. There is thus a duty cast on the Court to refer to the necessary documents for the purpose of taking judicial notice of something of which it is bound to take judicial notice. Therefore, if that were necessary, the Court should have looked into the Gazettee or other book or document of reference for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the law here in question had been brought into force. It is only where a document of reference for the purpose of deciding such a question is not readily available that the question of the Court calling upon the party concerned to produce it would arise. Here both sides proceeded before the learned magistrate on the basis that the provisions in question were in force. They were, in fact, in force; the Court apparently knew they were in force; and, therefore, no question arose of the Court calling upon anybody to produce the necessary document, namely, the notification, much less prove it. 5. There has been some discussion at the bar as to whether the notification itself is a law in force of which the Court was bound to take judicial notice. Although it is really not necessary to decide that question here, we are inclined to the view that it is. Bringing a law into force seems to us to be a legislative rather than an executive function, whether you call that conditional or delegated legislation when it is done by somebody other than the legislature. Although it is really not necessary to decide that question here, we are inclined to the view that it is. Bringing a law into force seems to us to be a legislative rather than an executive function, whether you call that conditional or delegated legislation when it is done by somebody other than the legislature. That being so, we are inclined to the view that a court is bound to take judicial notice of a notification like the present just as much as it is bound to take judicial notice of a statute or a rule made thereunder. 6. Sreedharan v. State of Kerala 1969 K. L. T. 689, a decision of a learned single judge of this Court, is directly in point but takes a view contrary to that we have taken. There it was held that a notification bringing the statute there concerned, namely, the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, into force would have to be proved in the ordinary course by tendering the notification in evidence and that the Court could not take judicial notice of the fact that the law had been brought into force. With respect we do not think that this decision is correct. 7. The other decisions of this Court, namely, Pyli v. State of Kerala 1966 KLT.102, Chandrasekharan v. State 1966 K. L. T. 638 and Executive Officer v. Bharathan (1967 K. L. T 161) deal with notifications of a different kind. The first of these deals with a notification under S.19 of the Kerala Forests Act, 1961, declaring a particular area to be a reserved forest; the second deals with a notification fixing a maximum price under the Essential Commodities Act; and the third with a notification including a trade within the schedule of dangerous trades in the Madras Village Panchayats Act. Whether notifications like these are legislative, or albeit statutory, essentially executive in character is a matter on which two views seem possible and on which we do not feel called upon to pronounce, although it would appear that there is much to be said for the view that the second and third are legislative in character. 8. The notifications considered in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara A. I. R.1951 S. C. 318, Edward Mills Co. 8. The notifications considered in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara A. I. R.1951 S. C. 318, Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer A. I. R.1955 S.C. 25 and State v. Gopal Singh A. I. R.1956 M. B. 138 are not of the same kind as the notification we are here considering, and these decisions are of no great assistance in deciding the present case. Indeed, the two decisions of the Supreme Court were not concerned at all with the question whether judicial notice should be taken of the notifications concerned. 9. The first ground on which the learned District Magistrate acquitted the accused was clearly mistaken. 10. The remaining two grounds do not seem to us to stand on any better footing. Regarding the second, we might say that it seems to have proceeded on a complete misreading of S.119 of the Act as if under that section an authorisation by the Panchayat were necessary even when the complaint is, as here, by the executive authority. That is not so. What the section says is that "no person shall be tried for any offence against this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder unless complaint is made by the police, the executive authority or a person expressly authorised in that behalf by the Panchayat or executive authority within three months of the Commision of the offence". Here, the complaint was by the executive authority and it was made on 9-6-1969 within three months of the Commision of the offence. Indeed, even counsel for the accused has submitted that this ground is unsustainable. 11. With regard to the third ground, namely, whether it was the accused that had put up the structure, the learned trial magistrate accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 in holding that it was. PW. 3, a peon of the Panchayat, said in his evidence that it was the accused that put up the structure with the help of a mason and two workmen and that he orally reported this fact to the executive officer without delay. PW. 4, a person running a press in the immediate vicinity, also gave evidence to the same effect. In fact, his evidence was more specific in that he said that the accused brought the workmen and had the structure put up. PW. 4, a person running a press in the immediate vicinity, also gave evidence to the same effect. In fact, his evidence was more specific in that he said that the accused brought the workmen and had the structure put up. The structure, we may mention, is immediately adjoining the accused's land just north of the drain, and it would appear that there were disputes between the Panchayat and the accused regarding this drain, the accused's case being that it was an encroachment on his land. We do not think that the learned trial magistrate erred in any way in accepting the evidence of PWs. 3 and 4, and the grounds on which the learned District Magistrate rejected their evidence seem to us unsustainable. That Pw. 3 is a peon of the Panchayat and that PW. 4 was running a press without the licence required for the purpose and further that he could not have seen the construction sitting inside his press, when it was not his case that he saw it from there, which are the reasons put forward by the learned District Magistrate, seem to us unconvincing. We accept the evidence of PWs. 3 and 4 and hold that it was the accused that put up the offending structure encroaching on and obstructing the public road vested in the Panchayat. 12. We might add that both the courts below have found that the drain in question is part of the public road and is not in the accused's private land. That finding has not been assailed before us. 13. In the result we allow this appeal, convict the accused under S.132 read with item 1 of Schedule III of the Kerala Panchayats Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week. Allowed.