ORDER B.D. Gupta, J. - This is an application in revision u/s 6-B of the Court Fees Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. It arises out of an order passed by the Civil Judge, Shahjahanpur, on 12-3-1966, whereby the learned Judge took the view that the court-fee paid on the plaint, giving rise to original suit No. 1 of 1965, Firm Rameshwar Prasad Mahboob Hasan Khan v. Chandra Datt and Ors. was sufficient. 2. Firm Rameshwar Prasad Mahboob Hasan Khan, hereinafter referred to as the decree-holder, obtained a decree in Suit No. 6 of 1962 of the Court of the Civil Judge, Shahjahanpur, on 15-1-1963. Chandra Datt, the first Defendant in the suit was the judgment-debtor under that decree. In execution of the said decree a house and some land were attached whereupon the second Defendant Upendra Datt filed an objection Under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case set forward by Upendra Datt, hereinafter referred to as the objector, was that the attached property had been purchased by him (the objector) from the judgment-debtor under a registered sale deed of 1954 and that he was in possession since then and the property was, therefore, not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree against Chandra Datt. Evidence was led by the parties and by order dated 1-2-1964, the learned Civil Judge allowed the objection and set aside the attachment. Thereafter the decree-holder filed the suit in the course of which the order sought to be revised by this petition was passed. This suit, there is no controversy, is of the nature contemplated by Rule 63 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Two reliefs have been claimed, firstly, that the sale deed executed by the judgment-debtor in favour of the objector in 1954 be declared void and ineffectual and secondly, that it be declared that the property in question was liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree in Suit No. 6 of 1962. In the plaint the value of the property in suit has been shown as Rs. 6,000/-. In regard to the first relief, no objection as to the amount of court fee paid thereon was raised, but in regard to the second relief, report of the Inspector of Stamps was that court fee in a sum of Rs. In the plaint the value of the property in suit has been shown as Rs. 6,000/-. In regard to the first relief, no objection as to the amount of court fee paid thereon was raised, but in regard to the second relief, report of the Inspector of Stamps was that court fee in a sum of Rs. 200/, which had been paid in regard to that relief, was insufficient. This objection was based on the assertion that the said relief was covered by Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the UP Court Fees Act which runs as follows: In suits to set aside or to restore an attachment including suits to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rule 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure... According to half of the amount for which the attachment made, or according to half of the value of the property or interest attached, whichever is less. (Thereafter follows an explanatory clause which need not be set forward for the purpose of this revision). 3. The aforesaid objection has been overruled by the learned Civil Judge on the view that Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act did not cover the present case and the question which arises for consideration is whether the view taken by the learned Civil Judge is correct. After hearing learned Counsel for the Applicant and scrutinising the language of the Statute I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the learned Civil Judge. 4. Learned counsel for the Applicant urged that the order of the learned Judge dated 1-2-1964, whereby objector's objections Under Order 21, Rule 58 CPC were accepted and the attachment was set aside, was an order Under Rule 60 of Order 21 CPC and further, that in substance the present is a suit to restore an attachment. Rule 60 of Order 21 CPC provides, inter alia, that where upon investigation of an objection Under Rule 58 the court is satisfied that, for reasons stated in the claim or objection, the property was not, when attached, in the possession of the judgment-debtor the court shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as it thinks fit, from attachment. The reason stated in the claim set forward by the objector was that he had purchased the property from the judgment-debtor under a registered sale deed executed by the judgment-debtor in 1954 and the judgment-debtor was not in possession on the date on which the property was attached. In the order of the learned Civil Judge dated 1-2-1964, satisfaction of the court that at the time of attachment the property was not in the possession of the judgment debtor was recorded and in consequence thereof the court accepted the objection Under Order 21, Rule 58 CPC and set aside the attachment. I am, therefore, inclined to accept the contention that the order of 1-2-1964, was an order passed Under Rule 60 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A reference to this order has been made in para 3 of the plaint and in para 10 of the plaint the cause of action is alleged to have arisen on the date on which the aforesaid order was passed. However the relief claimed in the suit does not refer to the order dated 1-2-1964, but is in accordance with what is contemplated by Rule 63 of Order 21 CPC viz. to establish the right which the Plaintiff claims to the property in dispute. It may, therefore, be debatable whether the present suit should be treated as a suit to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rule 60 Code of Civil Procedure. The Court Fees Act is a fiscal Statute and as was observed by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Motilal 1962 AWR 152 , "it is trite that it has got to be strictly construed against the State and in favour of the subject." It may very well be that by using the expression "suits to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure" in Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act, the legislature intended to cover suits contemplated by Rule 63 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but if that was the intention of the legislature, it does not appear to have been incorporated in the language of the Statute. To carry out that intention there was nothing easier for the legislature than to use the expression 'or' instead of the expression "suits to set aside orders passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 5. Even if the present suit was to be treated as a suit "to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure", the further difficulty which, to my mind, arises is that this suit cannot be held to be a suit "to set aside or to restore an attachment." Learned counsel for the Applicant urged that Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act would cover suits to set aside orders passed Under Rules 60, 61 or 62 of Order 21 CPC irrespective of the fact whether in that suit a relief for setting aside or restoration of an attachment had been claimed or not. Learned counsel's contention was that the expression 'including' between the expressions "suits to set aside or to restore an attachment" and "suits to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure" should be construed as equivalent to the expression 'or', but I find myself wholly unable to accept this contention. Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act, as framed, appears to me to lay down, as a primary requirement for its applicability, that the suit in question must be a suit "to set aside or to restore an attachment". In case the aforesaid requirement was satisfied, the suit in question would be covered by Clause (viii), even though it was a suit to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but if the suit was not a suit to set aside or to restore an attachment, the mere fact that it was a suit to set aside an order passed Under Order 21, Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the CPC would not, to my mind, be sufficient to bring it within the purview of Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act. 6. 6. As regard the question whether the present suit can be treated as a suit to set aside or to restore an attachment, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Moti Lal 1962 AWR 152 referred to earlier in this judgment, appears to be conclusive. In the plaint of the present suit no relief for the setting aside or restoration of an attachment has been claimed and the averments in the plaint also are such that this suit cannot be construed as a suit, either in form or in substance, a suit to set aside or to restore an attachment. Moreover, as has been held by the Full Bench referred to above, a Plaintiff cannot be compelled to superadd a prayer for a consequential relief when he was not asked for such relief. It is manifest that if a relief for the restoration of the attachment set aside by the order of the Civil Judge dated 1-2-1964, is essential, Plaintiff's claim would be defective by reason of the provisions contained in Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. If such relief is not necessary, there is no reason why the Plaintiff should be compelled to ask for such relief or the plaint treated as involving such relief. I have, therefore, no doubt that, for all these reasons and particularly the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Om Prakash referred to above, it is not possible to accept the contention that the present suit is covered by the provisions contained in Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the Applicant conceded his inability to refer to a single decision in which it may have been held that a suit Under Rule 63 of Order 21 of the CPC is covered by Clause (viii) of Section 7 of the Act and in my opinion, the view taken by the learned Civil Judge that there was no deficiency in the court fee paid by the Plaintiff in regard to the second relief is perfectly correct. 7. Accordingly this revision is dismissed with costs. Let the record of the case be immediately sent to the court concerned to enable it to proceed with the suit.