JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The question is if during the pendency of a suit the power of the civil court to take its cognizance is taken away and vested in the revenue court, is the civil court debarred from continuing to hear and determine the suit. A learned Single Judge of this Court felt that there is a conflict of opinion in this Court on this question he referred this appeal to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come before this Bench. 2. The Plaintiff Appellants in 1954 filed a suit in the civil court for declaration that they were the sirdars of the agricultural plots in dispute, for possession over them and for recovery of damages. It was agreed between counsel that at that time the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. The suit was ultimately decreed in toto on 17-4-1964. The Defendants Respondents filed an appeal. One of the points pressed in the appeal was that during the pendency of the suit in the trial court, the civil court lost jurisdiction to take its cognizance because of the amendments made in the UP ZA and LR Act by the Amending Act No. XXVIII of 1961. This plea was upheld by the appellate court. It allowed the appeal, set aside the decree and remanded the suit to the trial court with the direction that the plaint may be returned to the Plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court. Aggrieved, the Plaintiffs have come to this Court in appeal. 3. In Shri Ram Das Murari v. Binda Din 1951 AWR 203 the effect of the amendments introduced by UP Act No. X of 1947 in Section 242 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 came up for consideration. The learned single Judge held that by the amendments the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for possession of agricultural land was taken away. Such an amendment was an amendment in the procedural law. It had immediate effect and was applicable to suits pending in the trial court. If the relief sought in the suit was such as could be granted by the revenue court, the civil court could not continue to hear the suit. This decision was approved by a Division Bench in Durgapal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh 1957 AWR 853 . It had immediate effect and was applicable to suits pending in the trial court. If the relief sought in the suit was such as could be granted by the revenue court, the civil court could not continue to hear the suit. This decision was approved by a Division Bench in Durgapal Singh v. Kunwar Jahan Singh 1957 AWR 853 . These decisions were cited before another Single Judge in Raj Mangal Singh v. Bindhyachal Singh 1964 AWR 560. He held that these decisions were distinguishable because they related to the UP Tenancy Act whose provisions were materially different from the corresponding provisions of the UP ZA and LR Act. In view of the peculiar language of Section 331(1) of the UP ZA and LR Act, the suit pending before the civil court when the UP Act No. XXVIII of 1961 came into force could be heard and determined by the civil court even though such a suit was not thenceforward cognizable by the civil court, but only by the revenue court. This decision was followed by another single Judge in Irfan Ahmad v. Mohd. Shibli 1965 ALJ 413. 4. Section 242 of the Tenancy Act ran as follows: ....all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court and no court other than a revenue court, shall....take cognizance of any such suit....based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Section 331(1) of the UP ZA and LR Act provided: Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in col. 4 of Schedule II, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceeding mentioned in col. 3 thereof; or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application; Provided that.... 4 of Schedule II, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceeding mentioned in col. 3 thereof; or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application; Provided that.... In Raj Mangal Singh v. Bindhyachal Singh (supra) D.S. Mathur, J. observed that Section 242 of the UP Tenancy Act placed two kinds of restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil court, one was in the hearing and determination of suits an a applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule and the other in taking cognizance of such suits or applications. On the other hand, Section 331(1) of the UP ZA and LR Act places restriction only on the taking cognizance of certain suits, applications or proceedings. The learned Judge held that cognizance is taken at the time when the suit or application instituted was presented. Any steps taken after the institution of the suit or application is for their hearing and determination. Since Section 331(1) only debarred the civil court from taking cognizance of such suits the court could continue to hear and determine suits which were pending on the commencement of the UP Act No. XXVIII of 1961. It can be assumed that the Legislature intentionally departed from the wording of Section 242 and desired that all suits pending before the civil court be heard and determined by that court. 5. Section 331(1) provides that no court other than a court mentioned in col. 4 of Schedule II shall take cognizance.... By the words, "other than a court mentioned in col. 4 of Schedule II" the Legislature conferred jurisdiction on the mentioned revenue courts. The first clause of Section 242 also conferred jurisdiction on revenue courts. The subject matter of that first clause has been re-enacted in Section 331(1) though in a different language. 6. Section 331(1) debars the civil courts from taking "cognizance" of suits mentioned in col. 3 of Schedule II. It also confers jurisdiction on the revenue courts to take cognizance thereof. If the view that the word 'Cognizance" in Section 331(1) refers to the initial entertainment and does not include the hearing and determination be correct, a great anamoly will arise. Section 331(1) debars the civil courts from taking "cognizance" of suits mentioned in col. 3 of Schedule II. It also confers jurisdiction on the revenue courts to take cognizance thereof. If the view that the word 'Cognizance" in Section 331(1) refers to the initial entertainment and does not include the hearing and determination be correct, a great anamoly will arise. After the coming into force of the 1961 amending Act, the revenue courts could only receive and entertain the plaints and applications, but would have no power to hear and determine them. The civil courts stood debarred from even receiving them. Surely it could not hear and determine suits or applications instituted elsewhere. Will such suits or applications remain for ever on the file of the revenue courts unheard and undetermined? It is difficult to accept a construction which will make the statute unworkable. In our opinion, the Legislature used the flexible term 'cognizance' in Section 331(1) to include the whole process of adjudication from institution to decision. 7. The Legislature provided that only the revenue courts will do the entire work from entertainment to determination and that the civil court will not do any part of it. Having intended this, the re enactment of the first clause of Section 242 in the same form was superfluous. 8. Even if the term "cognizance" is held to mean only "entertain" the result will be no different. Section 9 of the CPC states: "The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." It will be seen that if a civil court is debarred from taking cognizance of a suit, it will not have jurisdiction to try it. Section 331(1) expressly debars the civil courts from taking "cognizance" of suits. Its inevitable consequence is that by virtue of Section 9 CPC the civil courts lose jurisdiction to try such suits. The power to try includes hearing and determination. It is also implicit in Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, that the jurisdiction to try is dependent on the power to take cognizance. The latter must continue to vest in the civil court all the time they try. Once it goes, they can no longer try. 9. The power to try includes hearing and determination. It is also implicit in Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, that the jurisdiction to try is dependent on the power to take cognizance. The latter must continue to vest in the civil court all the time they try. Once it goes, they can no longer try. 9. In both Sri Ram Das Murari and Durgapal it was held that a law relating to the forum where suits or applications may be instituted related to procedural matters. An amendment therein would apply to pending suits. In Durgapal (supra) Desai, J. observed that it was really not a question of giving retrospective effect to the provisions of the Amendment Act, it was a question of giving effect to them as soon as they came into force in matters to which they applied. 10. In Soman and Others Vs. Kedar Nath, AIR 1953 All 254 and Bhikham Vs. Natha, AIR 1952 All 188 it was held that suits which were pending on the date when the Amendment Act No. X of 1947 came into force would be governed by the procedure laid down by the amending law. These decisions proceeded on the basis that the change of forum from the civil court to the revenue court related to procedure. These decisions were referred to with approval by a Full Bench in Sobha Nath Vs. Ram Baran and Another, AIR 1954 All 493 . 11. In Irfan Ahmad v. Mohd, Shibli (supra) the view expressed in Raj Mangal Singh v. Bindhyachal Singh (supra) was followed. In our opinion, both these decisions do not lay down the law correctly. 12. The 1961 Amending Act came into force when the present suit was pending in the trial court. Thereafter the civil court lost its jurisdiction to try it. The decree passed by it in 1964 was without jurisdiction. The lower appellate court was justified in directing that the plaint be returned to the Plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court. 13. In the result the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.