JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - Facts of the case may be stated in brief. Plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note which was registered as No. 32 of 1964 in the Court of the Munsif, Balasore. The suit was valued at Rs. 1,060/-. On 15th of July, 1966 the Munsif transferred the suit to the Court of the Additional Sub-Judge Balasore, by the following order: Addl. Sub-judge requested for a ready suit as he has no work today. Hence the suit is transferred to the file of A.S. J., Balasore, in antioipation of approval of District Judge for disposal according to law. Sd. M.V. Gangaraju Munsif. On receipt of the record the Additional Subordinate Judge, Balasore, dismissed the suit as indicated in the following order: The suit is received on transfer. Register. This suit was received on transfer at 12.30 p. ID. The names of parties were called out then in response to which only Advocate for Defendants. 1, 2, 4, and 5 turned up. The peon was sent to inform the lawyers with sufficient margin of bearing of this snit at 2 p.m. as this was transferred to day. At 2 p.m. the Plaintiff No. 1 and deft. 3 with his advocate turned up. The Plaintiff No. 1 verbally wanted further time to call his lawyer which was refused on the ground that they were given sufficient time. The Plaintiff No. 1 came to witnesses-box and made statement that in absence of his Advocate be cannot make any statement. The Advocates for deft. 3 and defts. 1, 2, 4 and 5 decline to examine any witness. There are decisions that mere physical presenoe of a party is not enough to show his preparedness for hearing. The Plaintiff No. 1 has clearly stated that he is unable to make statement in absence of Advocate. So I ignore his mere physical presence and dismiss the suit for default with costs to Defendants. Sd. B.C. Kanungo 15-7-1966. On 20th of July, 1966 Plaintiff No. 1 filed an application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC before the Addl. Subordinate Judge which was registered as Misc. Case No. 172 of 1966. He stated in the application for restoration that on 15th of July, 1966 he was waiting in the Court with his witnesses. Sd. B.C. Kanungo 15-7-1966. On 20th of July, 1966 Plaintiff No. 1 filed an application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC before the Addl. Subordinate Judge which was registered as Misc. Case No. 172 of 1966. He stated in the application for restoration that on 15th of July, 1966 he was waiting in the Court with his witnesses. At 1.30 p.m. he came to know that the case had been transferred to the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge. So he informed the fact to his Advocate Sri B.S. Mohapatra. The Advocate told him to can him when the case would be called out. When at 2 p.m. the case was called out be appeared before the Court and prayed for permission to call his lawyer. But as the Court did not give him permission and directed him to appear in the witness-box and to depose he declined by saying that his lawyer was absent and that in his absence he was not in position to make any statement. On 17th of September, 1966 the Misc. Case was transferred to the Munsif in pursuance of the order of the District Judge dated 14th of September, 1966 to the effect "Suits and appeals except part-beard oases be transferred, to the respective Courts to which they were received on transfer:' On 20th of December 1966 the Munsif dismissed the application under Order No. 9, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure. On 25th of January, 1967 Plaintiff No. 1 filed Misc. Appeal No. 5 of 1967 before the District Judge who transferred the case to the Subordinate Judge Balasore on 15-3-1967. The sub-judge allowed the appeal on 21-8-1968 and restored the suit. Defendants have filed this Civil Revision on 16-10-1968 against the order of the Subordinate Judge. The case was beard by a learned Single Judge who referred the same to a Division Bench in view of certain important questions of law arising in the case. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge thoroughly went into evidence and came to the conclusion that the facts and circumstances of the case gave him the impression that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was a bit hasty and that the occasion for dismissal of the suit would not have arisen had the Plaintiff been given some time to call his advocate. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge thoroughly went into evidence and came to the conclusion that the facts and circumstances of the case gave him the impression that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was a bit hasty and that the occasion for dismissal of the suit would not have arisen had the Plaintiff been given some time to call his advocate. After perusing the order of the Learned Additional Subordinate Judge passed on 15-7-1966 dismissing the suit for default we are satisfied that the Additional Subordinate Judge exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity in dismissing the suit without giving an opportunity to the Plaintiffs who were ready with their witnesses to call their Advocates. Transfer of suits fixed for a particular day for hearing in one Court would ordinarily cause in convenience to the parties and Advocates when they are heard by a different Courts. Advocates as professional men arrange their diaries adjusting their work in different Courts. It is not unlikely that when a suit is transferred all of a sudden they would not be able to spare time to deal with their case in a different Courts. This however does not preclude Courts from transferring suits on the same, day and hearing the same provided they are alive to the convenience of the parties and Advocates. In this case the Advocate and the Plaintiffs were ready. All that the Plaintiffs wanted was to go and call their Advocate. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge rather evinced impatience in nor waiting for a few minutes and dismissed the suit. We are unable to appreciate the attitude of the learned Judge. The learned so bordinate Judge who allowed the appeal reached the correct conclusion. Even on materials recorded by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge in the order-sheet, there was sufficient cause for restoration. Plaintiff's case for restoration of the suit is irresistible on the facts of this case. Mr. Rath did not rightly assail the finding of fact that there was sufficient cause for restoration. 3. The appellate judgment i.e. attacked by Mr. Rath on the sole ground that the Muneif, Balasore, had no jurisdiction to hear the application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC when the suit had been dismissed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, superior Court. In the statement of facts we have already indicated that the suit was valued at Rs. 1, 060/-. The appellate judgment i.e. attacked by Mr. Rath on the sole ground that the Muneif, Balasore, had no jurisdiction to hear the application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC when the suit had been dismissed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, superior Court. In the statement of facts we have already indicated that the suit was valued at Rs. 1, 060/-. The initial jurisdiction was with the Munsif and the suit was filed in his Court. There was therefore no lack of pecuniary jurisdiction in the Munsif to hear the Misc. Case for restoration. Mr. Rath however contends that the order of dismissed having been passed by a superior Court, a Court of inferior jurisdiction is not competent to set it aside. There may be some force in the contention of Mr. Rath if the application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC had been filed before the Munsif and not before the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge had disposed of the case and the application for restoration of the suit would ordinarily be in his Court. In fact, it was filed in that Court. The Misc. Case was transferred by the District Judge to the Court of the Munsif for hearing. The Munsif had the pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the Misc. Case. In our view the case having been transferred by the District Judge and the Munsif having pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the same the order passed by the Munsif in the Misc. Case is not a nullity. This Munsif could not have entertained the application initially but when the application was pending without disposal before the Subordinate Judge there was no bar for the Munsif to dispose of it when the case was transferred to his file. We accordingly reject this contention of Mr. Rath. 4. Mr. Mohapatra, on the other hand, raises two contentions : (1) the transfer of the suit by the Munsif to the Addl. Sub. Judge on 15-7-1966 in anticipation of the sanction of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and as such the order of dismissal passed on 15-7-1966 is a nullity; and (ii) the High Court should not interfere in exercise of its powers u/s 115 where no injustice has been caused to the Defendants by the restoration of the suit. 5. Sub. Judge on 15-7-1966 in anticipation of the sanction of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and as such the order of dismissal passed on 15-7-1966 is a nullity; and (ii) the High Court should not interfere in exercise of its powers u/s 115 where no injustice has been caused to the Defendants by the restoration of the suit. 5. The facts relating to the first contention are that on 15-7-1966 the Munsif transferred the suit to the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Balasore, in anticipation of the sanction of the District Judge. On 20th of July, 1966 the District Judge gave post facto sanction to the transfer. Mr. Mohapatra contends that the section to the transfer u/s 24, CPC must proceed the transfer and Subsequent sanction would not cure the illegality. Section 24(1), CPC lays down that on the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after bearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage transfer any suit or appeal. Section 24 primarily deals with transfer on the judicial side. For instance, if a party complains that a particular judge is interested in a particular suit and fair justice is not expected from such a Judge he can apply for transfer and the District Judge after hearing the parties would pass the appropriate order. Transfer is also made on administrative side and that is why power has been given to the District Judge to exercise it suo motu. For instance, all suits upto,the value of Re. 4,000/- are to be instituted in the Court of the Munsif. When the number of suits are very large, posts of Additional Munsif are created to clear of heavy pendency. The District Judge accordingly transfer suits from the file of the Munsif to the file of the Additional Munsif for disposal. These transfers are mainly done on administrative grounds and parties have no right of hearing in such oases as to whether transfer would be effected or not. Despite each Court having arranged its diary for work, for various reasons work is not available. In such oases the usual practice is to make intense transfers of suits between Courts of competent jurisdiction in anticipation of the sanction of the District Judge. Despite each Court having arranged its diary for work, for various reasons work is not available. In such oases the usual practice is to make intense transfers of suits between Courts of competent jurisdiction in anticipation of the sanction of the District Judge. For instance, at Aska there is a Subordinate Judge and a Munsif. The Munsif cannot hear suits about Rs. 4,000/- pending in the Court of the Sub-judge. The Sub-judge however has got unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction and is competent to try oases pending in the file, of the Munsif. On a particular date the Subordinate Judge might not have any work if all the oases are adjourned on permissible grounds. He is expected not to waste time by going without work for the day and should ordinarily dispose of oases pending in the file of the Munsif. As the Court of the District Judge is situate at Berhampur it is not possible to get the sensation order in course of the day for transfer of a case. It is for this reason that the practice of inter se transfer is prevalent in anticipation of sanction of the District Judge. This practice is current even from the time when this State was under the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and is not an innovation after the formation of the Orissa High Court. It is contended that the post factor sanction by the District Judge causes some embarrassment to him. In our view the apprehension is ill founded. As the transfers take place in normal course of working, ordinarily the District Judge gives the sensation and such a sanction cures the initial absence of an order of transfer. But supposing in certain cases the District Judge comes to know that the transfer was effected at the instance of a party with a view to get some advantage from a particular Judge, he is not in any manner handicapped in refusing to give the post facto sanction as a consequence of which the transfer would be held invalid and a fresh trial would be held. Transfer to a Court competent to hear the suit does not affect the jurisdiction of the transferee Court. It is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. Transfer to a Court competent to hear the suit does not affect the jurisdiction of the transferee Court. It is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. The transferee Court has got the pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit but there is a procedual defect in as much as the transfer is not effected by the District Judge u/s 24, Code of Civil Procedure. We are clearly of opinion that such transfers do not affect the jurisdiction of the transferee Court to hear the suit and the judgment rendered by that Court is not a nullity unless the District Judge by specific order refuses to give post facto sanction. In our experience covering a period of over thirty years we have never come across a case in which the District Judge ever refused to give such post facto sancation. Reliance was placed by Mr. Mohapatra on an unreported decision of our learned brother R.N. Misra, J. in Shyamsundar Kishan v. Kastu Dehuri and Ors. O.R. No. 287 of 1969-D/24-7-1970 wherein it was held that such transfer renders the judgment of the transferee Court a nullity. With respect, for reasons already given, we are clearly of opinion that it does not lay down the correct law. Our view is supported by a Division Bench decision in Posan Singh and Others Vs. Inderdeo Singh and Others. In that case the judgment proceeded on the basis that there was no order of the District Judge sanctioning the transfer of the suit from the Court of the 2nd Additional Munsif to that of the 3rd Additional Munsif. Their Lordships after thorough analysis summed up their conclusion thus (See Para 9): To sum up, the Additional Munsif, Third Court, had inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. An that was necessary was that certain procedure should have been followed in order to remove the case from the file of the Additional Munsif, Second Court, to his file. The failure to obtain this order was a defect of procedure which has been cured by waiver. In that case there was no objection to the trial at the initial stage and therefore their Lordships applied the doctrine of waiver. The theory of waiver is not applicable to a case where the judgment itself would be a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. In that case there was no objection to the trial at the initial stage and therefore their Lordships applied the doctrine of waiver. The theory of waiver is not applicable to a case where the judgment itself would be a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. As their Lordships were of opinion that there was no look of inherent jurisdiction the judgment was not considered to be a nullity. Even assuming that the trial was held despite objection to the question of jurisdiction on account of the absence of a prior order for transfer; it would not be vitiated if post facto sancation is given by the District Judge. This is based on the principle that the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to try it. Only a particular procedure to transfer the case from one Court to another had not been followed. The defect so caused is curable by the post facto sanction. It is merely an irregularity and not an illegality. 6. In this case, as has already been stated the District Judge gave the post facto sanction to the transfer and as such the defect, if any, was cured. 7. On the aforesaid analysis we over-rule the contention of Mr. Mohapatra. 8. The second contention of Mr. Mohapatra is that the High Court should not interfere u/s 115, CPC when no injustice has been caused to the Defendants by the restoration of the suit. There is considerable force in this argument. The powers of this Court u/s 115, CPC is discretionary. The significant expression in Section 115 is "the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit." In Bahadur Pradhani Vs. Gopal Patel a learned single judge of this Court observed thus: There is another broad principle why this order of restoration of the suit should not be interfered with in revision. The revisional powers are discretionary. It is consistently held that the revisional powers should not be exercised in a case where the exercise of the power is likely to cause injustice to a party. (sic) the discretion is used to interfere with the order, the suit is to be dismissed and the Plaintiff would have no opportunity to get his case investigated into by the Court. (sic) the discretion is used to interfere with the order, the suit is to be dismissed and the Plaintiff would have no opportunity to get his case investigated into by the Court. Once the trial court has exercised the discretion in favour of the party, it would be unusual for the High Court to interfere with the exercise of discretion unless it is injudiciously exercised. On facts, this case is on par with the aforesaid decision. The suit has been restored to file by the learned Subordinate Judge and the Defendants would get full opportunity to fight the Plaintiffs' suit. On the other hand, if we interfere with the order of restoration the Plaintiffs' suit is to be dismissed without their getting an opportunity to establish the truth of their case. These are proper oases where the High Court would not ordinarily exercise its discretionary power for interference. The same view has taken in Dinamani Dass and Ors. v. Bimbadhar Padhan and Ors. AIR 1969 Ori 28 . There is was said: It is well settled that the exercise of powers u/s 115 is not as a matter of right. It is discretionary with the High Court as the word used is 'may'. Even where the Court acts contrary to law on a question which impinges on the question of jurisdiction the High Court is not bound to interfere if the conduct and the act of the Petitioner do not arouse its conscience. 9. We are in agreement with the conclusions laid down" in the aforesaid two decisions and are of opinion that this is not fit case for interference u/s 115, Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. On the aforesaid analysis, the Civil Revision fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances parties to bear their own costs. 11. Records of the case be sent back at once. As the case has become very old, it should be disposed of within three months hence with intimation to this Court. B.K. Patra, J. 12. I agree.