( 1 ) THIS revision petition under S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is by a tenant against whom a decree for eviction was passed by the Munsiff and affirmed in appeal by the district Judge. The premises were leased in the year 1956 and the tenant has been carrying on therein the business of vending Kadle and Pori. ( 2 ) THE landlord presented an application for eviction of the tenant on the grounds specified in clauses (a), (h) and (p) of the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the Act. Though the learned Munsiff found that the landlord bona fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation, the learned Munsiff herd that eviction could not be ordered under clause (h) of the said proviso, as the tenancy commenced prior to the coming into force of the Act and as the landlord wants the premises to start a business. However, the learned Munsiff decreed eviction under clause (p ). In appeal, the learned district Judge held that the ground specified in clause (p) was not established, but sustained the decree for eviction on a different ground, namely, that specified in clause (h ). In this petition, the learned Counsel for the landlord did not also rely on the ground specified in clause (p ). The only ground that is material in this petition is that specified in clause (h ). The landlord averred in his application that he had retired from service on a meagre pension of Rs. 25 per month, that in order to augment his income he intended to start a business in the premises now occupied by the tenant. ( 3 ) THE tenant denied these averments and pleaded that the landlord's application was merely an attempt to get a higher rent for the premises. The tenant also pleaded that greater hardship would result by passing the decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it, mr. S. V. Narasimhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant, complained that the learned Ditsrict Judge has entirely overlooked the ground on which the learned Munsiff held that a decree for eviction cannot be founded on clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (1 ). ( 4 ) THE criticism of Mr. Narasimhan is well-founded. S. V. Narasimhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant, complained that the learned Ditsrict Judge has entirely overlooked the ground on which the learned Munsiff held that a decree for eviction cannot be founded on clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (1 ). ( 4 ) THE criticism of Mr. Narasimhan is well-founded. The judgment of the learned District Judge does not show that he considered what the learned munsiff has said as to why the landlord cannot invoke clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (h ). However, it is not necessary, in my opinion, to send back the case to the learned District Judge to consider this aspect. I shall myself examine in this petition the correctness of the ground on, which the learned Munsiff held that in the present case the landlord cannot ask for eviction under clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (1 ). ( 5 ) FOR holding that the ground specified in clause (h) of the proviso to s. 21 (1) is not available in the present case, the reasoning of the learned munsiff is briefly as follows: The landlord had let the premises to the tenant at a time when the Mysore House Rent and Accommudation Control act, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) was in force. S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of tne Old Act provided that in the case of a non-residential the landlord could ask lor eviction of the tenant, if He (the landlord) bona fide required the premises tor a business which he or a member of his family was carrying in premises not owned by him or sucn member thus under the ola Act, the landlord could not asitior eviction of his tenant, if he (the landlord) was not already carrying on the business on tne date of the petition for eviction. No doubt, under clause (h) of Sec. 21 (1) 01 me present Act, a landlord can ask for eviction of his tenant from nonresidential premises even if he (the landlord) has not already been carrying on business but intends to start a business. But the proviso to S. 62 of the present Act, provides that 5. 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act shall be applicable in respect of the repeal of the earlier enactments including the old Act. But the proviso to S. 62 of the present Act, provides that 5. 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act shall be applicable in respect of the repeal of the earlier enactments including the old Act. Any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under tne old Act, continues inspite of the repeal of the old Act. Hence, the landlord in the present case could not maintain the application under the proviso to S. 21 (1) (h) as he was not already carrying on any business when the application was filed. ( 6 ) THE learned Munsiff appears to have had in mind clause (c) of S. 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, which provides that the repeal of an enactment shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. But from the order of the learned Munsilf it is not clear whether in his view, the tenant had acquired a right or privilege under S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the old act, or whether the landlord had incurred any liability or obligation under that Section. ( 7 ) IT is true that under S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the old Act, the tenant could not have been evicted from the said premises as the landlord was not already carrying on any business. But can that immunity from eviction, under S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the old Act, be regarded as a right acquired by, or accrued to the tenant? in Narayanappa and Brothers v. Narasimhaiah 1962 Mys. L. J. 760, Ahmed Ali Khan, J,, said that the immunity from eviction under S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the old Act, cannot be construed as having an effect of conferring on a tenant a right of possession and that such immunity cannot be equated to the right to possession. The view of his Lordship was approved by the Supreme Court in Padmanabha Setty v. Papaiah Setty AIR 1966 SC. 1824 . The view of his Lordship was approved by the Supreme Court in Padmanabha Setty v. Papaiah Setty AIR 1966 SC. 1824 . ( 8 ) THUS the restriction placed on the landlord under S. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the old Act, cannot be regarded either as giving rise to any liability or obligation on the part of the landlord or any right or privilege on the part of the tenant, so as to attract the application of S. 6 of the General Clauses act to the repeal of the old Act. Hence the proviso to S. 62 of the present act does not in any way come in the way of giving full effect to clause (h) of the proviso to S. 21 (1) of the present Act, which empowers the Court to evict a tenant where the non-residential premises are reasonably and bona -fide required by the landlord for occupation for starting a business. The view taken by the learned Munsiff that a decree for eviction could not be made on the ground specified in clause (h), is clearly unsustainable and the learned District Judge was right in decreeing eviction on that ground. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, Mr. Narasimhan urged that in the circumstances of the case, the learned District Judge should have refused to pass a decree for eviction on the ground that other reasonable accommodation is not available to the tenant and that greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Dealing with the question of comparative hardship, the learned district Judge has pointed out that the tenant has not placed anv evidence on record to show that he tried to secure an alternative shop, but could not get it. ( 10 ) IN a place like Bangalore where new non-residential buildings are coming up in such large number, it is difficult to accept the plea that it is not possible for the tenant to pet alternative accommodation. It may be, the tenant will be put to some inconvenience on account of shifting his established business from the present place. It mav be. he mav have to pay a higher rent for alternative accommodation. Such difficulties are inevitable in practically every case of eviction of tenant from the premises he has been occupying. On that score the landlord cannot be denied possession of the premises for his own use. It mav be. he mav have to pay a higher rent for alternative accommodation. Such difficulties are inevitable in practically every case of eviction of tenant from the premises he has been occupying. On that score the landlord cannot be denied possession of the premises for his own use. ( 11 ) BUT, Mr. Narasimhan urged that the respective financial resources of the tenant and the landlord should be taken into account in assessing such relative hardship and that in the present case, the tenant is a petty trader with meapre financial resources, while the landlord is petting not only a pension Rs. 25 per month but also rents from two other shop premises in the same building. It is in evidence that the total rent that the landlord is receiving from two other shops, is only Rs. 90 per month. He can by no means be said to be in affluent circumstances. By refusing eviction he will be prevented from occupying his own building for starting a business to augment his income. ( 12 ) THE following observations of Jagadisan, J. . who spoke for the Bench in Mohamed Jaffar v. Palaniappa Chettiar (1964) 1 Mad. L. J. 112, 118, while considering the effect of the proviso to S. 7 (3) (c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act, 1949, which is in pari materia with sub-sec. (4) of s. 21 of the Mysore Act, are apposite:"the proviso ought not to be read as conferring a practical immunity on the tenant from being displaced from the demised building even at the expense of the landlord suffering inconvenience and hardship. It is certainly not the object of the proviso to weigh the hardship of the tenant as against the advantage of the landlord on delicate scales giving the benefit of slight tilting in favour of the tenant. The substance of the provision is that the Court should take into account the possible hardship that would ensue to the tenant if he were to be evicted, and, if the Court were to find, in a proper case, that while the hardship resulting to the tenant would be considerable and the advantage accruing to the landlord would be little or small, the application might be rejected. " ( 13 ) CONSIDERING all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the hardship resulting to the tenant by passing the decree for eviction, would outweigh the hardship to the landlord by denying eviction. In the result, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. The tenant is given four months time from this day to vacate the premises. In this petition, parties will bear their own costs. --- *** --- .