JUDGMENT Kirty, J. - I agree with my learned brother that the appeal must be allowed and the suit dismissed as being barred by Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 2. The assessment of tax, demand for payment of tax assessed and payment of the same, even if made under protest, became final under Section 15 of the Act and could not be questioned by means of a suit because of the express bar contained in Section 16. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff had submitted the forms making the declarations therein contained under protest or without prejudice to its rights, if any, to raise an action in a civil court. The circular order dated 13-12-1952 may have directed or even demanded a particular course of action to be adopted by the plaintiff and others similarly placed and may have also contained a threat of penal action. But the threat, assuming that such threat was there, was neither so over powering nor so snapping as to make the plaintiff yield to the demand, as it were, at pistol point. It was not pleaded, much less proved, that the authorities appointed under the Motor Vehicles Act had acted malafide or maliciously or with any oblique motive to cause illegal or wrongful gain to the State of U. P. They appear, at the worst, to have laboured under a misapprehension both in regard to the factual and legal position. It may as well be that the plaintiff, which was fully conversant with the facts, equally laboured under a misapprehension in regard to the correct legal position. It is not that the plaintiff was not given any breathing time and was denied time, opportunity and its right to seek legal advice. For ought we know, it may have taken legal advice and the same being in conformity with the circular order, it acted in the manner directed by the order. It may as we have acted by way of expediency. In the circumstances, the grounds upon which the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent sought to avoid the express bar contained in Section 16 cannot be held to be available to the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff's claim or the decree passed in its favour cannot also be saved or supported by resorting to the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. In the circumstances, the grounds upon which the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent sought to avoid the express bar contained in Section 16 cannot be held to be available to the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff's claim or the decree passed in its favour cannot also be saved or supported by resorting to the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Firstly, this doctrine cannot override express statutory provisions such as are to be found in Sections 15 and 16 of U. P. Act No. V of 1935; and secondly, except probably by way of ex gratin payment, when under a fiscal statute tax has been assessed upon a bonafide construction of some provision of the statute or upon a bona fide view of the law applicable to material facts by (he Officer or authority empowered to do so and such tax has been paid, refund or repayment of the same cannot be had except as and to the extent permitted by the statute itself. Were it not so, in consequence of posterior judicial pronouncement by a competent court of law in some other case reversing or differing from the construction of the statutory provision of the view of law entertained by the taxing authorities, all anterior assessments and payments of assessed taxes would necessarily have to be held to have become invalid and all claims for refund or repayment of taxes already paid would have to be decreed, unless barred by limitation, by the court on the ground of unjust enrichment whenever a suit for such relief is filed, even though no other ground may be available to the plaintiff. There is neither authority nor judicial precedent for such fantastic proposition. 4. I do not desire to express any opinion on the question as to whether threat or intimidation can constitute tort so as to be actionable, and, if so, under what circumstances. That question does not, on the facts of the instant case arise. Such tort, however, has acquired a distinct legal identity in England. Its legal existence as containing requisite incidence of furnishing adequate cause of action for a claim for damages can no longer be doubted in view of the decision of the House of Lords in Rooks v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129. 5. Such tort, however, has acquired a distinct legal identity in England. Its legal existence as containing requisite incidence of furnishing adequate cause of action for a claim for damages can no longer be doubted in view of the decision of the House of Lords in Rooks v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129. 5. H. Swarup, J. - The State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the court below decreeing the plain- tiff's suit for recovery of a sure of Rs. 65,000/- with pendent elite and future interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum. The plaintiff Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. carried on the business of manufacturing sugar during the year 1952 and purchased sugar-cane from the various sugar-cane growers at different points. The plaintiff had private carrier permits for its trucks for haulage of sugar-cane from out-purchasing centres to the factory at Meerut. On 13th December, 1952, the Secretary, Regional; Transport Authority, Meerut, sent a circular letter regarding issue of permits to sugar factories for the haulage of sugar-cane from out-purchasing centres to the factory, and stated therein that the factories, under the conditions in which they were working, should under the law have public carrier permits instead of private carrier permits. This order was issued on the basis of the order of the Government of India fixing price of sugar-cane. The Secretary Regional Transport Authority by this circular order intimated all sugar factories including the plaintiff that they should surrender their private carrier permits and obtain public carrier permits by 20th December, 1952. It was also stated in the circular letter that any private carrier of sugar mills transporting sugar-cane from purchasing centres to mill gate after 20th December, 1952, will be deemed to be committing an offence warranting action under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act for breach of condition of permit. Forms of application for temporary permits were also enclosed. After receiving this circular letter the plaintiff surrendered its private carrier permits and obtained public carrier permits for its trucks and subsequently also obtained public carrier permits for the trucks and paid tax payable for public carriers sander the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and continued to pay the tax regularly at quarterly intervals upto 1957. After receiving this circular letter the plaintiff surrendered its private carrier permits and obtained public carrier permits for its trucks and subsequently also obtained public carrier permits for the trucks and paid tax payable for public carriers sander the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and continued to pay the tax regularly at quarterly intervals upto 1957. Another Company, the Laxmi Sugar and Oil Mills Ltd. in the meantime filed a writ petition No. 78 of 1956 in the High Court which was decided on August 24, 1956. In this writ petition it was held that for transport of sugar- cane by a factory after purchasing it at its purchasing centre it did not require a public carrier permit but could transport it to its gates in vehicles having private carrier permits. The present suit was instituted after the decision of the writ petition. In the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that it was compelled to 'take public carrier permits for its trucks by the aforesaid circular order of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority and had paid the tax on its vehicles at the rate chargeable for public carriers under protest, duress and coercion. The protest, according to the plaintiff, was lodged on 18th April, 1953, by means of a letter to the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. The, plaintiff by the present suit has claimed refund of the excess tax which it had paid under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act during the years 1953 to 1957 as instead of paying tax at the rate applicable to private carrier vehicles, tax had been paid at the higher rates applicable to public carrier vehicles. 6. The defence to the suit was that it was not maintainable in view of Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sections 15 and 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 7. 6. The defence to the suit was that it was not maintainable in view of Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sections 15 and 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 7. The trial court held that the suit was maintainable in law for the refund of the excess amount of tax which the plaintiff had paid although the vehicles in transporting sugar-cane from out-purchasing centres to the mall gate had been used only as private carriers and not as public carriers, it also held that Article 96 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable and the entire claim was within time as the plaintiff will be decried to have realised the mistake after the judgment had been pronounced by the High Court in the writ petition filed by Laxmi Sugar and Oil Mills Ltd. The State of U. P. has challenged the decree of the trial court and has re-asserted the pleas of defence raised in the trial Court. 8. In essence, according to the averments in the plaint, the plaintiff's suit is for the refund of the amount of tax which the plaintiff claims it had paid under pretest and duress. The permits for running of motor vehicle are granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the Regional Transport Authority. Private carrier according to Section 2(22) of the Motor Vehicles Act, means an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public. carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-Sec. (2) of Section 42. A "public carrier," according to See. 2(23) of the Act, means an owner of a transport vehicle who transports or undertakes to transport goods, or any class of goods, for another person at any time and in any public place for hire or reward, whether in pursuance of the terms of a contract or agreement or otherwise and includes any persons, body, association or company engaged in the business of carrying the goods of persons associated with that person, body. association or company for the purpose of having their goods transported." 9. Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for cancellation and suspension of permits. association or company for the purpose of having their goods transported." 9. Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for cancellation and suspension of permits. An appeal against the order passed under Section 60 lies under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicle Act to the prescribed authority and a revision under Sec: 64-A lies against.the non appealable orders to the State Transport Authority. The Motor Vehicles Act provides for the grant of permits to persons for running his vehicles either as private carriers or as a public carriers and also provides matters incidental thereto. 10. The U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act deals with the imposition of tax on Motor Vehicles. See. 4 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935, is the charging section and tax is chargeable at different rates provided in the first schedule to the Act. The public carrier vehicle; are chargeable to tax under Art. 6 of para. B of this Schedule while private carrier vehicles are to be charged under Art. 9 of part B to the Schedule. Under Article C. vehicles plying for hire for the transport of goods are chargeable at, a higher rate of lax than vehicles used for carriage of goods in connection with a trade or business carried on by the owner of the vehicle but not plying for hire or reward. The tax is payable under Section 5 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act in advance on or before the 15th day of January in each year by the owner of a Motor Vehicle. The tax is under the proviso payable also in four quarterly instalments. Under Section 10 of the Act, the owner of every motor vehicle is required to make a declaration in respect of it in the prescribed form stating the prescribed particulars and is required to deliver the declaration within the prescribed time to the Taxation Officer and is further required to pay to him the tax which is payable on the basis of his declaration. Under sub-Sec. (2) of Section 10, where a motor vehicle is altered so as to rEnder the owner thereof liable for the payment of an additional tax under Section 11, such owner is required to make within the prescribed time an additional declaration in the prescribed form showing the nature of the alteration made and is required to deliver it to the Taxing Officer and to pay the additional tax as required by Section 11 of the Act. Under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, procedure has been prescribed for the assessment of Tax. The declaration as mentioned in Section 10 of the Act has to be made under Rule 9 in forms prescribed by the rules. Part I of these forms is to be filled in by the owner of the Motor Vehicle and part 2, which contains a certificate is to be signed by the Regional Transport Officer, who is the Taxing Officer under the Act. He has to certify the amount of tax payable on the basis of the declaration made in part 1 of the form. He has also to certify that subject to correctness of the above declaration the licence will remain valid for a particular period. Section 13 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act provides. for penalties for violation of the provisions of the Act and Section 14 provides for the recovery of the tax where any person without any reasonable cause fails or refuses to pay the. tax. The amount of tax then becomes recoverable as arrears of land revenue through the Collector. Any person aggrieved by an order relating to the assessment, imposition or recovery of tax can file an appeal under Section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act to the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration). The order passed in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) under Section 15 has been made finial and conclusive. Any person aggrieved by an order relating to the assessment, imposition or recovery of tax can file an appeal under Section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act to the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration). The order passed in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) under Section 15 has been made finial and conclusive. Section 16 provides a bar to jurisdiction of civil courts in matters of taxation; it runs as follows : "The liability of a person i(, pay the tax shall not be questioned or determined in any manner nor by any authority other than is provided in this Act or any rules made thereunder and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against any officer of the Government for anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act." 11. The present suit is based oil the allegation that the plaintiff was not liable to pay the amount of tax which it had paid and will certainly involve the determination of the liability of the plaintiff to pay the tax and the extent of that liability, which will mean questioning the assessment of tax made under the provisions of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the rules framed thereunder. Section 16 prohibits a Civil Court doing the same. It is not possible to decree the plaintiff's suit without a finding that the plaintiff had paid tax in excess of the amount which he was, on the facts of the case, liable to pay. In the present case, the plaintiff had itself filed returns declaring that it was to use the vehicle for hire and was liable to tax under Art. 6 of part B of the Schedule. Tax was accordingly certified to be payable at that rate. This will amount to assessment of tax and to a determination of the liability of the plaintiff to pay the tax. The U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935, not only creates a complete machinery for the assessment and collection of tax but also creates an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in platters of taxation and the present suit cannot, therefore, be maintainable. The principles governing the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters was considered by the Supreme. The principles governing the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters was considered by the Supreme. Court in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78 : 1969 M.P.W.R. 200 and certain principles were laid down which are as under : "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to lire orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction mint be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not- acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act.to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the. intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil court are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the previsions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even that High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to. be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 12. In the present case the conditions nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 are applicable. As already seen, the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act provides a machinery and gives a finality to the order passed in appeal. Section 16 of the Act creates an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The tax is collected in accordance with the declaration of the assessee himself. The question of correctness of the assessment has to be determined by the authority concerned. 13. Again in the case of Union of India v. A. V. Narasimbalu, 1969 (2) S.C.C. 658 , a similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. It was a case under the Sea Customs Act, in which there was no express bar of the jurisdiction of the civil court but still the Supreme Court held that the suit was barred for the recovery of duty paid by the plaintiff which was not legally due. It was held that "the Act was a complete code dealing with liability to pay custom duty and for obtaining relief against excessive or erroneous levy and other related matters. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit on the ground that the duty was improperly c:r illegally levied is excluded. It is true that the decision or order passed under Section 188 in appeal to the appellate authority is expressly declared final. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit on the ground that the duty was improperly c:r illegally levied is excluded. It is true that the decision or order passed under Section 188 in appeal to the appellate authority is expressly declared final. But on that account it cannot be held that by refusing to appeal against the decision or by refusing to claim relief in the manner provided by Sec. .186 of the Sea Customs Act and Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act a party aggrieved by the order of a Customs Officer may invest the Civil Court with jurisdiction to entertain a suit." It was further observed : "An erroneous decision of the Customs Authority cannot be said to be reached without jurisdiction merely because it may be shown in some collateral proceeding to be wrong. Naturally an action of an administrative authority interfering with the right to property may be challenged by report to a civil court. Yet in the case of a right which depends upon a statute, the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief may by express provision or by clear implication of the statute be excluded. Where a statute reenacts a right or liability existing at common law, and the statute provides a special form of remedy, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief in the absence of an express provision, will not be readily inferred. Where, however, a statute creates a new right or liability and it provides complete machinery for obtaining redress against erroneous exercise of authority, jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief is barred. Liability to pay a duty of customs is not a common law liability; it arises by virtue of the Sea Customs Act : in respect of any grievance arising in consequence of enforcement of that liability, machinery has been provided by the Act. Having regard to the complicated nature of the questions which arise in the determination of liability to pay duty of customs the Legislature has invested the power of determining liability and the manner of enforcement thereof upon a specially authorised hierarchy of tribunals. An appeal lies against the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs against an order imposing duty as well as an order refusing to refund duty, and the grievance may be carried to the Central Board of Revenue. An appeal lies against the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs against an order imposing duty as well as an order refusing to refund duty, and the grievance may be carried to the Central Board of Revenue. In our judgment, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is by clear implication of the statute excluded." 14. Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the present suit cannot be maintainable. To hold that despite Section 16 of the Act a suit such as the one giving rise to appeal is legally maintainable would be to permit circumvention or negation of the clear and express bar contained in that section. Before the Taxing Authority the plaintiff gave a declaration that it intended to use the vehicle for hire. If it had not given such a declaration and had given a declaration that it will not use it for hire and then had infact used it as a public carrier vehicle it would have been open to the authorities concerned to take proper proceedings against the owner of the vehicle by prosecuting it and by demanding and recovering from it the higher tax, but the assessee having itself made the taxing authority believe by its declaration that it will use the vehicle as a public carrier vehicle cannot be permitted to challenge the assessment of tax and the liability to make the payment of a particular amount of tax by stating different facts in the civil court. Such a course cannot be open to the owner of a motor vehicle in view of the scheme of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and Rules framed thereunder, particularly in the teeth of the express provisions of Section 16 of that Act. The suit was, therefore, not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. 15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, con- tended that no finality should be attached in the present case in spite of the provisions of Section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act or the scheme under the Act because in the present case the plaintiff was forced to give a wrong declaration and to pay higher tax. The contention is that the circular order mentioned above had left no option to the plaintiff and it was bound to give the declaration it gave before the Taxing Officer. Sic. The contention is that the circular order mentioned above had left no option to the plaintiff and it was bound to give the declaration it gave before the Taxing Officer. Sic. 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act however does not admit of any such exception. The circular order, the effect of which will be considered later, had been issued under the Motor Vehicles Act and riot under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. The order even if it be deemed to be exacting in nature was an administrative one while the proceedings under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act were of a quasi-judicial nature and there was no bar' to the plaintiff's giving before the Taxing Officer, a declaration to the effect that the motor vehicles were to used by the plaintiff not for hire but for carrying its own goods. If such contention o', the plaintiff had not been accepted by the Taxing Officer it would have been open to the plaintiff to go up in appeal. The plaintiff cannot get out of the mischief of Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Act only because it had abstained from demurring before the Taxing Officer that the vehicles were in fact to be used for transporting sugar cane purchased by it to its factory, thereby avoiding decision in the question by the Taxing Officer and of the appellate authority. 16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent placed reliance on the case of The State of Bombay (now Gujrat) v. Jagmohandas and another, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1412, and urged that the suit would be maintainable. In that case, however, the contention of the plaintiff was that the Act levying the tax on sales out-side Bombay was void and the authorities had no jurisdiction to assess such a tax and that the tax had not been actually assessed but had merely been deposited in advance under a mistake. The fact, of the present case are entirely different. Here under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act the assessment is made on the basis of the declaration given by the assessee in the form of the certificate which is followed by the issue of token. The proceedings had been completed in the manner prescribed by the rules. The fact, of the present case are entirely different. Here under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act the assessment is made on the basis of the declaration given by the assessee in the form of the certificate which is followed by the issue of token. The proceedings had been completed in the manner prescribed by the rules. It is also not the plaintiff's case that the authorities had no jurisdiction to charge the amount of tax which had been paid by the plaintiff. The amount of tax depended on the existence of certain facts. If the vehicle was to be used as a private carrier a lower rate of tax was chargeable while if it was to.be used for hire the tax at a higher rate was payable. The question depended entirely on the facts and did not touch at all either the validity of the taxing statute or the jurisdiction of the authority to assess or collect the 'tax. 17. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also relied on the case of Firm United Breweries Co. Lid., and another v. Bath Justices, 1926 All. E. R. 576 for the contention that the proceedings under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act be treated as of no consequence. The contention is that as the Taxing Officer under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was the Regional Transport Officer who was also the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority and as the Appellate Authority under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration) himself no independent view or justice could be expected from them. The assessing and appellate authorities it is urged, should be deemed to be suffering from official bias and the proceedings before them should be deemed to be non-est in the eye of law and should not be 'taken into regard for considering the bar created by the provisions of Section 16 of that Act or the rule of finality laid down in Section 15 of that Act. It is no doubt thus that the Regional Transport Officer is both the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority and the Assessing Officer, but that does not mean that while acting under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act lie would not have applied his mind if the plaintiff had raised objections before him or that if he did not apply his mind to the facts of the case, the appellate authority would not have applied its independent mind. Further there is no evidence that the individual officer who had issued the circular order had continued in office for all the material years and that plaintiff could not have raised any objections before the Taxing Authority or the Appellate Authority during this period. The provisions of Sections 16 and 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, therefore, cannot he disregarded simply for this reason. Bias on the part of the taxing authorities cannot be presumed, specially when the person who alleges bias omitted or neglected to demand justice in accordance with law by raising necessary pleas and making necessary declaration and thereby prevented the arising of the occasion for the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers by the authorities concerned. 18. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent also referred to Dhulbhai v. State of M. P. for the proposition that a suit is maintainable for recovery of the tax illegally collected; but that was a case in which the exercise of jurisdiction was ultra vires as the tax was not payable. In the present case it is only the quantum of tax that is in dispute and the assessment has been made on the declaration given by the plaintiff itself. The suit challenging such determination by the Assessing Authority is expressly barred by Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 19. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent then sought to justify the decree, of the court below on the ground that the suit could be treated as one for compensation for the wrong caused by the circular order issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority dated 13-12-1952. 19. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent then sought to justify the decree, of the court below on the ground that the suit could be treated as one for compensation for the wrong caused by the circular order issued by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority dated 13-12-1952. According to him the plaintiff was compelled to file wrong returns and declarations under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act by reason of the aforesaid circular order as the plaintiff was thereby forced to take public carrier permits for its vehicles, and the amount of extra tax had to be paid only for getting public carrier permits instead of private carrier permits. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the order of 13th December, 1952 had thus by itself given rise to a cause of action as it was because of it that the plaintiff suffered the loss. It is contended that if the suit is treated as one based on this cause of action it will not be hit by Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. But 'there is no force in this contention as even if the suit be treated to be such a suit, although it is not so framed in the plaint, the suit cannot be decreed because in effect, the suit remains a suit for refund of the amount paid as extra tax. To determine if the circular order dated 12/13th December, 1952. Ext. 1, could give rise to the claim of damages or compensation it would be necessary to examine it's contents. In the letter, Ext. 1, the Regional Transport Authority had stated, on his interpretation of an order passed by the Government of India fixing the price of sugar-cane and allowance of rebate on that price, that in the prevailing circumstances the sugar mills should transport the sugar-cane purchased at their out purchasing centres through public carriers. It may have been a wrong interpretation placed by the authority concerned on the document and on the basis of that it may have asked the plaintiff to get public carrier permits instead of private carrier permits. It was open to the plaintiff to look into the order of the Government of India and then to act in accordance with Jaw. In the letter, Ext. It was open to the plaintiff to look into the order of the Government of India and then to act in accordance with Jaw. In the letter, Ext. 1, it was further stated that if after 20th December, 1952, any private carrier will be found carrying sugar-cane from the purchasing centres to the mill gates in private carriers, the act of such transportation will amount to an offence and a breach of the condition of the permit warranting action under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This was only in the nature of warning. If any authority considers according to its interpretation of the rules of some other orders of the Government that a condition of permit is violated if a particular act is done or it amounts to an offence then the warning given to the permit-holder in respect of it .cannot be said to be an actionable treat. It was within the legal right of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority to launch a prosecution or to take action under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act in case it found or was of opinion that the permit-holder had committed violation of the condition of permit or committed an offence. The warning or threat given of such a legal action cannot be held either to be tortious or otherwise action- able. Even if the prosecution had actually been launched, damages could have been claimed only if it had been proved to be malicious or without reasonable cause. The order, Ext. 1 does not show that it was issued on the basis of any malice. It also does not show that the warning was given without any cause. In the order it was explained why the authority considered that the transport of sugar-cane from the purchasing centers to the mill gate could not be done by private carriers. It had also mentioned the order of the Government of India on the basis of which the warning was issued. It was open to the plaintiff to look into the order of the Government of India and to show to the authority concerned that its interpretation of the order was not correct. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the circular order dated 12th December, 1952, contained any material which might have given cause of action for a suit for compensation or damages. 20. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the circular order dated 12th December, 1952, contained any material which might have given cause of action for a suit for compensation or damages. 20. The Motor Vehicles Act is a complete code and provides for the control of the vehicles and the permitted actions for breach of the conditions of permits. See. 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides a procedure for such action and Section 64 of the Act permits an appeal. Any order which is not appealable can be subject to revision under Section 64A of the Act. If an authority points out certain provisions of the Act or tell a permit holder that a particular action may be taken against him under some provisions of the Act in which permit had been issued to trim, the same cannot be field to be actionable or tortious. According to Clerk and Lind sell on Torts par as. 639 and 640 :- "A threat to do or abstain from doing an act which the threatened has a right either to do or abstain from doing at his own choice cannot be wrongful or create a cause of action. There is nothing unlawful in giving a warning or intimation that if the party addressed pursues a certain line of conduct, others may act in a manner which he will not like and which will be prejudicial to his interests, so long as nothing unlawful is threatened or done. According to Clerk and Lind sell on Torts (Twelfth Edition) para. 640 Tile terms "threat", "coercions" and even "intimidation" are not terms of art, and are often applied in popular language to utterances which are quite lawful and which give rise to no liability either civil or criminal. They mean no more than this, that the so called threat puts pressure, and perhaps extreme pressure, on the person to whom it is addressed to take a particular course. Acts or utterances which are not unlawful for any other reason do not become unlawful because they present such an irresistible inducement as to amount to what is sometimes called coercion." According to Winfield on Tort, (Seventh Edition, page 686-687) : "A threat to effect a purpose which is in itself lawful gives no right of action unless: it is to use intrinsically unlawful means." In Hodges v. Webb, (1920) 2 Ch. at p. 91 Peterson, J. pointed out that everything depended on the nature of the statement by which the pressure was exercised and that the law cannot regard an act differently because it is called a threat or coercion instead of an intimidation or warning. 21. Once the plaintiff complied with the directions issued by the authority concerned then it cannot subsequently come forward and say that as it had done what was not required of him by law to be done and claim damages or compensation for what lie himself did voluntarily although in accordance with the directions given by an authority. As the action of the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority cannot be held to be threatening any illegal act on its part or of doing something which the law did not permit it to do its warning cannot be held to be actionable in law. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, relying on the case of The State of Tripura v. The Province of East Bengal, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 23 contended that order amounted to an actionable cause in the present case. But in the case of the State of Tripura assessment of tax had not been made and the case is therefore, clearly distinguishable. In the present case the assessment has been completed and the action, if any, demanding the tax or requiring the taking of the permit is merged into the final payment of tax under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. In the case of the State of Tripura it was held that an action requiring the filing of a return for taxation did not amount to a tort but could be only ,in actionable wrong in case it was without jurisdiction and authority of taw. The plaintiff in the case of The State of Tripura had not done anything voluntarily in compliance with the alleged notice requiring the filing of the return while in the present case the plaintiff had acquiesced to the request made by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority and had thus suffered loss, if any by his voluntary act and 1(1920) 2 Ch. at p. 91 7 A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 23 not as a direct consequence or result of the request or warning issued through Ext. 1. The present action of the form of Ex. at p. 91 7 A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 23 not as a direct consequence or result of the request or warning issued through Ext. 1. The present action of the form of Ex. I cannot, therefore, also be held to be an actionable cause or wrong entitling the plaintiff to claim damages or compensation. 22. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent then contended that as the State had illegally enriched itself the amount was refundable or returnable on the principle of unjust enrichment. In support of his contention he has relied upon the following cases : State of West Bengal v. Produce Trader's Corporation, AIR 1959 Calcutta 597 and State of Saurashtra v. Thakkar Vallablidas Tulsidas, A.I.R. 1956 Saurashtra 65 and Kailash Chandra Nag v. Secretary of State for India, I.L.R. 40 Cal. 452. The first two cases were the cases of illegal seizure of goods which had not been returned and the third one was a case of punitive tax which though not legally assessed was illegally collected. In the present case the tax was collected in accordance with law in compliance with the provisions of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act The State cannot, therefore, be said to have been illegally or unjustly enriched. Where tax is paid in accordance with the provisions of a taxing statute on the basis of a voluntary return it cannot amount to an unjust enrichment of the State so as to entitle the tax payer to claim it back on the principle of unjust enrichment. 23. Accordingly the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable and no decree could be passed in its favour. 24. There was considerable argument at the bar on the question as to whether the suit in its entirety or the part was barred by limitation. The trial court has held that Art. 62 of the Limitation Act 1908 was applicable to the case and that in computing the period of limitation the period prior to the daft of the decision of this court in Civil Mics. Writ petition no. 78 of 1956 must be excluded under equity. The defendants contention that the suit would be governed by Art. 16 was not accepted. The suit having been held by us to be barred by Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, the question of limitation become, of academic importance only. Writ petition no. 78 of 1956 must be excluded under equity. The defendants contention that the suit would be governed by Art. 16 was not accepted. The suit having been held by us to be barred by Section 16 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, the question of limitation become, of academic importance only. Since, however, the question was raised and the case may be taken in appeal to the Supreme Court, it may be mentioned that on behalf of the appellant it was contended that the suit would be governed either by Art. 2 or by Art. 16 or by Art. 36, whereas the respondent's counsel contended that either Art. 12 or Art. 62 would apply. Ultimately they appeared to agree that Art. 96 would be the appropriate Article applicable to the case. We are also inclined to take the same view. 25. The result is that the appeal is allowed The decree of the trial court is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. 26. By the Court.-The appeal is allowed. The decree of the trial court is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.