H. R. Khanna C. J. ( 1 ) THE short question whicharises for determination in this appeal and the six otherconnected cases which have been REFERRED TO the Fullbench is whether a person, against whom any decree ororder for eviction from the premises in dispute has beenobtained, is a tenant for the purpose of section 19 of theslum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (No. 96 of 1956) hereinafter REFERRED TO as the Slumareas Act. The circumstances, in which the question-has arisen in the instant appeal, would be detailed hereafter. It is not necessary to give the facts of the othercases and the learned counsel for the parties in those caseshave confined their arguments to the legal question reproduced above. ( 2 ) BARDU Ram appellant in the instant appeal is theowner of house No. 11675 situated in Sat Nagar, Karolbagh, New Delhi. Ram Chander respondent was a tenantunder the appellant of one room in that house on a monthly rent of Rs. 21. 00. The appellant filed an application undersection 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of1958) for eviction of the respondent from the above-mentioned room and obtained an order of eviction on 3/06/1964. The appeal of the respondent against theorder of eviction was dismissed by the Rent Controltribunal on 23/11/1964. The premises being ina slum area, the appellant applied to the competent authority under section 19 of the Slum Areas Act for permissionto execute the order of eviction. The said applicationwas dismissed by the competent authority on 27/03/1965 on the ground that the respondent was a poorman and, if evicted, would create a slum elsewhere. On 11/04/1966 the appellant filed the suit, out of whichthe present appeal has arisen, for recovery of possessionof the room in question and Rs. 497. 00 as damages for useand occupation for the period from 10/04/1965 to 31/03/1966 at the rate of Rs. 21. 00 per mensem. Itwas alleged by the appellant that on the passing of theeviction order on 3/06/1964 the respondent had ceasedto be a tenant and had become a trespasser and as suchwas liable to be evicted and to pay damages for use andoccupation of the room. ( 3 ) THE respondent denied that he had ceased to be atenant on the passing of the order of eviction and thathis possession had become unlawful. ( 3 ) THE respondent denied that he had ceased to be atenant on the passing of the order of eviction and thathis possession had become unlawful. The plea of therespondent was that he continued to be a tenant of theroom in question despite the order of eviction and that hewas not liable to be dispossessed therefrom or to pay anydamages. An objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the appellant having not obtained prior permission of the competent authority as required by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Slum Areasact for the institution of the suit, the same was not maintainable. Another plea taken was that the civil court hadno jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the provisions ofsection 37a of the Slum Areas Act. ( 4 ) THE trial Court held that the respondent, againstwhom an order of eviction had been made, ceased to be atenant within the meaning of section 19 of the Slum Areasact and the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertainsuit for possession against the respondent was not barred. It was further held that section 37a of the Slum Areas Actdid not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to try thesuit. As the respondent was found to be a trespasser inoccupation of the room, he was held to be liable to paydamages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 21. 00 permensem. The trial Court accordingly awarded a decreefor possession of the room in question and for recovery ofrs. 497. On appeal the learned Additional District Judgeaffirmed the findings of the trial Court. In secondappeal the learned Single Judge held that the word"tenant" used in section 19 of the Slum Areas Act includesa tenant against whom a decree or order of eviction hasbeen passed. The case was, accordingly, held to fallwithin the four-corners of the above provision of law. Suit for obtaining a decree for possession of the room inquestion, it was observed, could not be instituted againstthe respondent without the permission in writing of thecompetent authority. As no such permission had beenobtained, the suit for recovery of possession was held to benot maintainable. The contention that the Civil courthad no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the provisions of section 37a of the Slum Areas Act, was repelled. As no such permission had beenobtained, the suit for recovery of possession was held to benot maintainable. The contention that the Civil courthad no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the provisions of section 37a of the Slum Areas Act, was repelled. The protection afforded by section 19, it was further held,did not extend to suits for recovery of damages or rent. In the result the decree for recovery of Rs. 497. 00 was maintained but the suit for recovery of possession of the roomwas dismissed. ( 5 ) THE present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letterspatent was thereafter filed after the requisite certificatehad been granted by the learned Single Judge. ( 6 ) WHEN the appeal came up for hearing before Duac. J. and Shankar J. on 11/12/1968 it was orderedto be placed before a larger Bench as the construction ofthe word "tenant" in section 19 of the Slum Areas Actwas regarded to be of considerable importance. Thematter thereafter came up for hearing before Dua CJ. ,shankar and Deshpande JJ. and by their order dated 24/03/1969 they directed that it should be heard bya still larger Bench. ( 7 ) THE Slum Areas Act was amended by the Slum Areasimprovement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964 (Act 43 fo 1964) Section 19 of the Act, as it stood beforethe amendment, read as under :- "19. (L) Notwithstanding anything containedin any other law for the time being in force, noperson who has obtained any decree or orderfor the eviction of a tenant from any buildingin a slum area shall be entitled to execute suchdecree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. " (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission REFERRED TO in sub-section (1) shall make anapplication in writing to the competent authorityin such form and containing such particularsas may be prescribed. " (3) On receipt of such application the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to thetenant of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the caseas it deems fit, shall by order in writing eithergrant such permission or refuse to grant suchpermission. " (4) where the competent authority refuses togrant the permission he shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish acopy thereof to the applicant. " (4) where the competent authority refuses togrant the permission he shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish acopy thereof to the applicant. AS a result of the amendment made by Act 43 of 1964,the section reads as under :- "19 (1) Notwithstanding anything containedin any other law for the time being in force, noperson shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority- (A) institute, after the commencement of theslum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)Amendment Act, 1964, any suit or proceedingfor obtaining any decree or order for theeviction of a tenant from any building or land in aslum area; or " (B) where any decree or order is obtained inany suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from anybuilding or land in such area, execute suchdecree or order. " (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission REFERRED TO in sub-section (1) shall make anapplication in writing to the competent authorityin such form and containing such particulars asmay be prescribed. " (3) On receipt of such application, the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to theparties of being heard and after making suchsummary inquiry into the circumstances ofthe case as it things fit, shall by order in writing,either grant or refuse to grant such permission. " (4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3), the competentauthority shall take into account the followingfactors, namely :- (A) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be availableto him if he were evicted; (B) whether the eviction is in the interest ofimprovement and clearance of the slum areas; (C) such other factors, if any, as may beprescribed. " (5) where the competent authority refuses togrant the permission, it shall record a briefstatement of the reasons for such refusal andfurnish a copy thereof to the applicant. " SECTION 19 of the Slum Areas Act, as it stood before theamendment, barred the execution of a decree or order foreviction of a tenant from property situated in a slum areawithout permission of the competent authority. As aresult of the amendment, the protection has been extendedto the tenants of such property even against the institution of a suit or proceedings after the amendment. As aresult of the amendment, the protection has been extendedto the tenants of such property even against the institution of a suit or proceedings after the amendment. Itis, therefore, obvious that after the amendment madeby Act 43 of 1964, no suit or other proceeding can beinstituted against a tenant of property situated in a slumarea without the requisite permission. Where the permission is refused, the question of making a decree ororder for eviction and of the execution of the same wouldnot arise because the. suit or proceeding would itselfbe not maintainable. Clause (a) of subsection (1) ofsection 19 would act as a bar to the maintainability ofsuch a suit or proceeding, while clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19 would remain confined to only thosecases where in decrees or orders for eviction from properties in slum areas were obtained in suit or proceedingsinstituted before the amendment made by Act 43 of 1964. ( 8 ) SECTION 19 (l) (a) of the Slum Areas Act would plainlybe attracted when a suit or proceeding is instituted forthe eviction of a tenant in occupation of property situated in a slum area in cases where no previous order foreviction has been obtained against such a tenant. Thequestion, with which we are concerned in these cases,is whether the above provision would also apply to asuit or proceeding for eviction of a person who was inoccupation as tenant of property in a slum area and againstwhom a decree or order for eviction has been obtainedbut who has not been evicted from the property in execution of the decree or order. This would depend uponthe meaning of the word "tenant" and upon the answerto the question whether the "tenant" in section 19 of theslum Areas Act includes a person against whom an orderfor eviction has already been obtained. ( 9 ) THE word "tenant" has not been defined in the Slumareas Act. The definition, as given in section 2 (1) ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act, reads as under - " (1) tenant means any person by whom or onwhose account or behalf the rent of any premisesis, or but for a special contract would be, payableand includes a sub-tenant and also any personcontinuing in possession after the terminationof his tenancy but shall not include any personagainst whom any order or decree for evictionhas been made. " ( 10 ) THE contention, which has been advanced on behalfof the landlords, is that in the absence of any definitionof the word "tenant" in the Slum Areas Act, the definition,as given in section 2 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,holds good for the purpose of section 19 of the Slum Areasact. As the "tenant", according to the above definitiondoes not include any person against whom any orderor decree for eviction has been made, a suit against sucha person, it is urged, would not attract the provisionsof section 19 of the Slum Areas Act. Considerablereliance has also been placed upon the decision of theirlordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmichand Khemani vs. Kauran Devi, AIR 1966 SC 1003 . As the above decision is the sheet-anchor of the arguments advanced on behalf of the landlords, it wouldbe necessary to give the details leading to that decision. ( 11 ) ONE Mehtab Singh was the owner of a building situatein Gali Rajan, Delhi Lakshmi Chand Khemani appellant was a tenant under Mehtab Singh in respect of certain accommodation in the building. On 3/06/1955mehtab Singh filed a suit under the Delhi and Ajmerrent Control Act, 1952, against the appellant for hisejectment. The said suit was decreed on 11/10/1956. The appellant filed an appeal against that decreewhich was dismissed on 27/03/1957. The appellantthereafter moved the High Court in revision but herealso he was unsuccessful. On 8/02/1957 the Slumareas Act came into force in Delhi by notification undersection 3 of that Act. The area, in which the abovementioned building was situate, was declared a slum area. Mehtab Singh filed, an application under section 19 ofthe Slum Areas Act for permission to execute the decreebut the application was dismissed by the competent authority on Sep 12/09/1957. Appeal filed by Mehtabsingh was rejected by the appellate authority on 7/01/1958. Mehtab Singh sold the building to Kaurandevi respondent on 21/08/1961. On 28/03/1962 the respondent filed a suit against the appellantfor possession of the rooms in the latter s occupation. The case of the respondent was that in view of the ejectment decree against the appellant on 11/10/1956,his possession of the rooms was unauthorised and he wasa trespasser. Mehtab Singh sold the building to Kaurandevi respondent on 21/08/1961. On 28/03/1962 the respondent filed a suit against the appellantfor possession of the rooms in the latter s occupation. The case of the respondent was that in view of the ejectment decree against the appellant on 11/10/1956,his possession of the rooms was unauthorised and he wasa trespasser. In defence the appellant contended thatsection 19 of the Slum Areas Act barred the suit and alsothat civil court had no julisdiction to entertain it in viewof section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Thesubordinate Judge hearing the suit framed the followingissues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the premises in suit? (2) Whether the defendant is in unauthorisedoccupation of the premises in dispute andis not a tenant in the same? (3) Whether the suit is barred under section19 of the Slum Areas (Clearance and Improvement) Act. 1956. (4) Whether the civil court has jurisdiction totry this suit? (5) Relief. ( 12 ) ON the first issue, the Subordinate Judge held that therespondent had proved the ownership of the premises. While dealing with issues 2 and 3, the Subordinate Judgeobserved that the real question was whether the appellant was a tenant. He REFERRED TO the definition of theword "tenant in section 2 (1) of the Delhi Rent Controlact and observed that the word? "order or decree foreviction in that definition meant an executable decreeor order. As the prescribed authority under the Slumarea Act had refused permission to Mehtab Singh toexecute his decree, the decree was held to be not executable. The finding, accordingly, was that the appellant continued to be a tenant under Mehtab Singh, and after thepurchase of the property by the respondent he becameher tenant. As it was not disputed that if the appellantwas a tenant, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit forwant of jurisdiction. The respondent appealed againstthe judgment to the High Court. The High Court asper judgment reported in Shrimati Kauran Devi v. Lakhmi Chand, (1964) 66 P. L. R. 886, held that thedefinition of the word "tenant" as given in section 2 (1)of the Delhi Rent Control Act applied even though thedecree in ejectment had ceased to be executable. The respondent appealed againstthe judgment to the High Court. The High Court asper judgment reported in Shrimati Kauran Devi v. Lakhmi Chand, (1964) 66 P. L. R. 886, held that thedefinition of the word "tenant" as given in section 2 (1)of the Delhi Rent Control Act applied even though thedecree in ejectment had ceased to be executable. Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was held not totake away the Subordinate Judge s jurisdiction to try therespondent s suit, for the appellant was no longer atenant after the decree of 11/10/1956 directing hiseviction. The appeal of the respondent was allowed bythe High Court. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge were set aside and the case was remittedback to the trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law. ( 13 ) THE appellant went up with special leave to thesupreme Court against the above decision of the Highcourt. After observing that the only point, which thehigh Court had decided, was whether the Subordinatejudge had jurisdiction to try the suit, their Lordshipsdealt with the definition of the word "tenant" as givenin section 2 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and heldthat it would not be affected by the Slum Areas Act. Sarkar J. , as he then was, who spoke for the Court,observed: "it is pertinent to observe that notwithstanding this,the latter Act (Act 59 of 1958) excluded from thedefinition of tenant one who had suffered an ejectment decree. Obviously, the Act of 1958 did notcontemplate that the Slum Areas Act would in anyway affect the definition of tenant contained in it. No question as to what the rights of a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed inview of section 19 of the Slum Areas Act are, arisesin this appeal the only point being whether he is atenant within the Act of 1958 so as to oust thejurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain the suit. We think he is not, for section 2 (1) of the Act of1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannotbe affected by any consideration derived fromsection 19 of the Slum Areas Act. ( 14 ) SECTION 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was held notto bar the suit as the appellant was found to be not atenant. In the result the appeal was dismissed. ( 14 ) SECTION 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was held notto bar the suit as the appellant was found to be not atenant. In the result the appeal was dismissed. ( 15 ) IT would appear from the resume of facts of Lakhmichand s case that all that was decided in that case wasthat a person against whom an order for eviction hadbeen made would not be a tenant for the purpose of thedelhi Rent Control Act, and that the definition of thetenant in this respect would not be affected by section19 of the Slum Areas Act and a suit for possession againstsuch a person would not be barred by section 50 of thedelhi Rent Control Act. No opinion was expressedand their Lordships did not decide the question as towhat would be the rights under section 19 of the Slumareas Act of a person against whom an order of ejectment has been made. Indeed, their Lordships expresslyrefrained from expressing any opinion on that pointas it was found not to arise in the appeal. This is clearfrom the following observations: "no question as to what the rights of a tenantagainst whom a decree in ejectment has been passedin view of section 19 of the Slum Areas Act arearises in this appeal. . . . . . . . . . " ( 16 ) IT was further observed: "as we have earlier stated, we are not concernedin this appeal with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas Act to tenants, noras to the result of the application of both theacts to a particular case. " ( 17 ) THE matter with which we are concerned in these casesis not whether a person against whom an order for eviction has been made is a tenant for the purpose of thedelhi Rent Control Act, but whether he is a tenant forthe purpose of section 19 of the Slum Areas Act. Sofar as that question is concerned, the decision of thesupreme Court in Lakhmi Chand s case, in our opinion,can be of no avail to the appellants. ( 18 ) BEFORE parting with Lakhmi Chand s Case, we mayalso deal with the judgments of the High Court in thatcase both before and after the decision of the case bythe Supreme, Court, as reference has been made to thosejudgments on behalf of the landlords. ( 18 ) BEFORE parting with Lakhmi Chand s Case, we mayalso deal with the judgments of the High Court in thatcase both before and after the decision of the case bythe Supreme, Court, as reference has been made to thosejudgments on behalf of the landlords. The judgementof the High Court, as reported in 1964 PLR 886, showsthat the Court expressed no opinion withregard to themeaning of the word "tenant" as used in section 19 ofthe Slum Areas Act as is apparent from the followingobservations in Para 9 of the judgement. "the word "tenant", it may be recalled, has notbeen defined by this Act and we are not calledupon to express our opinion on the scope, effect andmeaning of this word as used in section 19, as indeed no arguments were addressed on this aspect. " ( 19 ) AFTER remand the above case of Lakhmi Chand wasdecreed by the trial Court and its decision was affirmedby the first appellate Court as well as by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court is dated 12/12/1968 and its persual shows that the Court did notexpress an opinion on the meaning of the word "tenant"as used in section 19 of the Slum Areas Act. It wasmerely observed that the question had arisen and hadbeen REFERRED TO a larger Bench in Bardu Ram v. Ramchander etc. (i. e. , the instant appeal ). It would thusfollow that the question as to what meaning should beplaced upon the word "tenant" in section 19 of the Slumareas Act is still at large and has not been decided inlakhmi Chand s Case. The landlords consequentlycannot derive any assistance from that judgment. ( 20 ) COMING to the argument advanced on behalf of thelandlords that the word "tenant" in section 19 of theslum Areas Act should have the same meaning as isgiven in section 2 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act andthat it should not include a person against whom anorder or decree for eviction has been made, we find thatthere is something inherent in the language of section19 which militates against the acceptance of the aboveargument. According to clause (b) of sub-section (1)of section 19, where any decree or order is obtained inany suit or proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)Amendment Act, 1964, for the eviction of a tenant fromany building or land in slum area, no person shall execute such decree or order, except with the previouspermission in writing of the competent authority. According to sub-section (2) of that section, a person desiring toobtain permission shall have to apply in writing to thecompetent authority on the prescribed form. Subsection (3) provides for the procedure to be followed bythe competent authority while granting the permission. Sub-section (4) lays down the criteria which have to bekept in view by the competent authority while grantingor refusing to grant the permission. A criterion givenin clause (a) of that sub-section is whether alternativeaccommodation within the means of the tenant would beavailable to him if he were evicted. The use of the word"tenant" in that clause, which also covers cases mentionedin clause (b) of sub-section (1) makes it manifest that theintention of the legislature was that the tenant wouldinclude a person against whom a decree or order foreviction has been obtained. If the word "tenant" werenot to include a person against whom a decree or orderfor eviction has been obtained, the use of the word"tenant" in clause (a) of sub-section (4) would be inexplicable when applying that clause to cases coveredby clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19. It alsocannot be said that the word "tanant" as used in subsection (1) has a connotation different from that of theword "tenant" used in sub-section (4) of section 19. It isa well-settled rule of construction that where the legislature uses the same expression in the same statute attwo places or more, then the same, interpretation shouldbe given to expression unless the context requiresotherwise. (See in this connection Raghubans Narainsingh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government, AIR 1967sc. 465 ). There is nothing in the context of section 19that the word "tenant" as used in sub-section (1) and (4) of section 19 was intended to have different meanings. ( 21 ) THE matter can also be looked at from another angle. The object of the Delhi Rent Control Act inter alia isto control evictions. The preamble of the Slum Areasact shows that it was intended to afford further protection to the tenants living in slum areas from eviction. ( 21 ) THE matter can also be looked at from another angle. The object of the Delhi Rent Control Act inter alia isto control evictions. The preamble of the Slum Areasact shows that it was intended to afford further protection to the tenants living in slum areas from eviction. An essential object of the Slum Areas Act is to enablethe poor, who have no other place to go to and who,if they were compelled to go out, would necessarilycreate other slums in the process and live perhaps inless commodious and more unhealthy surroundings thanthose from which they were evicted, to remain in theirdwellings until provision is made for a better life for themelsewhere. (See in this connection Jyoti Parshad v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 ). It wasobserved in that case:- "the Act, no doubt, looks at the problemnot from the point of view of the landlord, hisneeds, the money he has sunk in the house andthe possible profit that he might make if the housewere either let to other tenants or was reconstructed and let out, but rather from the point of viewof the tenants who have no alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the openif an order for eviction were passed. The Act itselfcontemplates eviction in cases where on the groundof the house being unfit for human habitation ithas to be demolished either singly under section 7or as one of a block of buildings under Chapteriv. So long therefore, as a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permitaccommodation, the policy of the enactmentwould seem to suggest that the slum dwellershould not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him". ( 22 ) TO accept the contention advanced on behalf of the landlords and to construe the word "tenant" so as not toinclude a person against whom a decree or order foreviction has been obtained would have the effectof setting at naught the protection afforded to such persons by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 19 of theact. The inevitable consequence of the acceptance ofthat contention would be that though a landlord cannotevict his tenant in execution of a decree or order foreviction without the permission of the competent authority, he may circumvent The above protection affordedto the tenant by filing a separatesuit for possession afterobtaining the eviction order or decree. The inevitable consequence of the acceptance ofthat contention would be that though a landlord cannotevict his tenant in execution of a decree or order foreviction without the permission of the competent authority, he may circumvent The above protection affordedto the tenant by filing a separatesuit for possession afterobtaining the eviction order or decree. The protectionto the tenant would thus become illusory and the provision of law containing such protection would be rendered nugatory. Such a construction, which wouldnecessarily defeat an essential object of the statute, inour opinion, should be avoided. When a questionarises about the construction of a word or expression ina statute, the Court should lean in favour of the construction which subserves and effectuates the dominantpurpose of the legislation rather than that which hasthe effect of frustrating and thwarting that purpose. The office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance theremedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasionsfor continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo,and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bonopublico. (see in this connection Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition page 40 ). Ithas been observed on page 45 of that book: "if the choice is between two interpretations the narrower of which would fail to achievethe manifest purpose of the legislation, we shouldavoid a construction which would reduce thelegislation to futility and should rather accept thebolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose ofbringing about an effective result". ( 23 ) IT is well settled that in construing the provisions of astatute courts should be slow to adopt a constructionwhich tends to make any part of the statute meaninglessor ineffective; an attempt must always be made so toreconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedyintended by the statute. (See in this connection Siraj-ul-Haq. v. S. C. Board of Waqf, AIR 1959 SC 198 ). In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge andothers v. Millikarjun Bhavananna Tirumale, 1960-1scr 890 the Supreme Court while dealing with legislation conferring further protection on the tenants,observed: "in interpreting provisions of such beneficiallegislation the Courts always lean. in favourof that interpretation which will further thatbeneficial purpose of that legislation. v. S. C. Board of Waqf, AIR 1959 SC 198 ). In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge andothers v. Millikarjun Bhavananna Tirumale, 1960-1scr 890 the Supreme Court while dealing with legislation conferring further protection on the tenants,observed: "in interpreting provisions of such beneficiallegislation the Courts always lean. in favourof that interpretation which will further thatbeneficial purpose of that legislation. " ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the object and the scheme of section19 of the Slum Areas Act, as made manifest by its provisions, we are of the opinion that the word "tenant"in that section includes a person in occupation of thetenanted premises even though a decree or order foreviction has been obtained against him. ( 25 ) REFERENCE has been made to some cases whereinword "tenant" has been held to include an extenant. It is not necessary to refer to those cases as the word"tenant" was construed in those cases in the contextof the statutory provisions mentioned in those cases. Reference has been made on behalf of the landlordsto the case of Vijendra Nath and others v. Jagdishrai Aggarwal andothers, AIR 1967 SC. 600 . Althoughthere was reference to section 19 of the Slum Areas Actin that case, the question, which arose for determination,was whether the object of subsequent application wasto revive a previous application. It was held that thesubsequent application must be regarded as continuationof the proceedings started on the prior application andthat the amendment made in section 19 did not affectthe pending proceedings. The above case has obviouslyno bearing on the point which has been REFERRED TO thefull Bench. ( 26 ) ANOTHER case, upon which reliance has been placedby the landlords, is C. R. Abrol v. Administrator underthe Slum Areas and others, 1960 RCR. 519. Thatwas decided in that case was that the competent authoritywhile dealing with an application under section 19 of theslum Areas Act is bound to make a preliminary inquiryinto existence of relationship between the landlord andtenant. No question arose in that case as to what isthe cannotation of the word "tenant" and the Courtdid not decide this matter. As such, the said case canalso be of no help to the landlords. ( 27 ) THE instant appeal and the connected cases shall nowbe posted for hearing and decision in the light of theirfacts and the question of law decided above. THE costs shall abide the event.