JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal against an order of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Baripada acquitting the Respondent of a charge u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955)(hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is not disputed that at about 2 p.m. on 22-7-1967, the Respondent was found near the Jamsula Check Gate which is situated in the district of Mayurbhanj and at a place about a few yards off from the Orissa-Bihar border, driving the truck bearing No. ORC 5097 which was loaded with 100 bags of rice. Two other persons Prabhudayal Khandelwalla and Gourahari Das were also alleged to be sitting in the truck along with the driver and were prosecuted along with him, but they were acquitted on a finding that the prosecution failed to establish their presence in the truck. The State has not appealed against the acquittal of these two persons. It is admitted by the Respondent that when the truck which he was driving was searched by p.w. 8, the Police Officer near the Jamsola Check Gate, it was found to contain 100 bags of rice and that he had no permit to carry the rice beyond the Orissa border. His sole defence was that he was not aware of the fact that the truck was loaded with bags of rice. According to him, the co-accused Prabhudayal Khandelwalla represented to him that some bags of Mohua flower belonging to him had to be transported from a place called Kalama and the Respondent agreed to do so on payment of Rs. 3/- per mile. He went to Kalama with the truck but the goods were not there and then Prabhudayal asked him to drive the vehicle to Khantapara. At Khantapara the Respondent went to a nearby hotel to take his tiffin and by the time he came back, a coolly told him that the goods had already been loaded in the truck. He also found that the bags had been loaded and had been covered by tarpaulin. Bona fide believing that he was transporting bags containing Mohua flowers, he drove the truck but at Jamsola Check Gate, when the Police searched the vehicle, it was found to contain 100 bags of rice. He also found that the bags had been loaded and had been covered by tarpaulin. Bona fide believing that he was transporting bags containing Mohua flowers, he drove the truck but at Jamsola Check Gate, when the Police searched the vehicle, it was found to contain 100 bags of rice. The learned Magistrate found that the plea put forth by the Respondent appeared to be reasonably true and that the prosecution had failed to establish that the Respondent had the necessary mens rea to commit the offence with which he was charged. 2. It is Dot disputed that rice is an essential commodity within the meaning of the Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Act, which are relevant for the purpose may be quoted in so far as they are material: 3. (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or he efficient conduct of military operations, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide xx xx xx xx (d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity. xx xx xx xx In pursuance of this power, the Central Government made the Orissa Rice (Movement Control) Order, 1964. Clause (4) thereof runs thus: "4. Restrictions on transport of rice to Border Area no person shall transport or attempt to transport or abet the transport of rice to any place in the border area, from any place in the State of Orissa outside that area except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the State Government or any officer authorised by that Government in that behalf: xx xx xx It is followed by two provisos which are not material for the purpose of this case. The expression "border area" is explained to mean the area inside the State of Orissa, falling within a five-mile belt all along the border of the said State. The expression "border area" is explained to mean the area inside the State of Orissa, falling within a five-mile belt all along the border of the said State. As stated above, the Jamsola Check Gate where the truck was found loaded with rice is situated inside the Mayurbhanj district and at & distance of about 100 yards from the border. Section 7 of the Act in so far as is material runs thus: 7. If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made u/s 3 (a) he shall be punishable (i) in the case of an order made with reference to Clause (h) or Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of that section, with imprisonment for a term which-may extend to one year and shall also be liable to fine, and (ii) in the case of any other order, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. xx xx It is therefore clear from the provisions extracted above that the offence alleged to have been committed by the Respondent is for contravention of para 4 of the order which relates to transport of rice and is punishable under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act which provides for a punishment of imprisonment for five years and also fine. 3. The discussion above has become necessary in view of the contention put forward on behalf of the Respondent that the learned Magistrate having followed the procedure laid down in Section 251-A, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the trial is illegal. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to refer to Section 11 of the Act which provided that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act. except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended on behalf of the Respondent that cognizance of the offence having been taken on a report in writing of p.w. 8, the Police Officer, u/s 11 of the Act and not on a Police report u/s 173 of the Code, the learned Magistrate should have in trying the accused followed the procedure outlined in Section 202 to 259 of the code and inasmuch as the trial was made in accordance with Section 251-A, of the Code, the Respondent was prejudiced by the trial. In support of this contention, be relied on a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ghisia and Others Vs. State where a Bench of that Court held that the trial of a warrant case, which is instituted otherwise than on a police report, under the procedure laid down in Section 251-A, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, instead of that laid down in Section 252 and the next following sections of the Code, is a mis-trial which amounts to an illegality sufficient to vitiate the trial. In coming to this decision, their Lordships did not agree with a decision of this Court in N.V. Jagannadhayya Vs. Ramanatha Mohapatra where Narasimham, C.J. after discussing the relative advantages to the accused of a trial u/s 251-A, and the advantages available to him in a trial u/s 252 and in the following sections, came to hold that each of the two procedures has its own advantages, and that, therefore, merely because the trial of a case was held according to the procedure laid down in Section 251-A, which should have been tried according to the procedure laid down in Section 352 and the following sections, cannot ipso facto be held to have caused prejudice to the accused. But this aspect of the case need not detain me any further because, as I would presently show, the present case is (sic) which is triable in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 251-A, of the Code. Section 251-A, prescribes the procedure for the trial of cases instituted on a police report. Section 252 prescribes the procedure for trial of cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 251-A, prescribes the procedure for the trial of cases instituted on a police report. Section 252 prescribes the procedure for trial of cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. u/s 190 of the Code, cognizance of an offence may be taken (a) either on a complaint, (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or (d) upon the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed. The report of a police officer made otherwise than u/s 173 of the Code cannot be a "complaint" as defined in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code. It is also not an information received from any person other than a police officer so BS to attract Section 252 of the Code for the purpose of the trial of the offence mentioned therein. If Section 252 be thus excluded, the procedure prescribed u/s 251-A, of the Code must be attracted and the term "police report" in that section must be held to have been used by the Legislature in a generic sense including both the police report u/s 173 of the Code as also the report of a police officer. That apart, it has already been stated that the offence which the Respondent is alleged to have committed is punishable u/s 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also fine. Schedule II of the Code dealing with offense under other laws provides that if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards but less than seven years, it is a cognizable offence which would be liable to be investigated by the Police under Chapter XIV of the Code and the report that is submitted as a result of that investigation would be a "police report" within the meaning of Section 173 of the Code, in which CASE', it cannot be disputed, the procedure that will be applicable for the trial of the case, would be one outlined in Section 251-A, of the Code. The contention of Mr. Mohanti, learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent that the latter was prejudiced in any way by being tried according to the procedure laid down u/s 251-A of the Code has therefore no substance. 4. The contention of Mr. Mohanti, learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent that the latter was prejudiced in any way by being tried according to the procedure laid down u/s 251-A of the Code has therefore no substance. 4. Coming now to the merits of the case, I am unable to accept the finding of the learned Magistrate that the Respondent was not aware that the load which he was carrying in the truck was rice. D.w. 1 was a coolly who actually loaded the bags of rice inside the truck at Khantapara mills. He says that by the time the rice bags were loaded in the truck on the direction of Prabhudayal, the Respondent driver was absent and bad gone to take tiffin elsewhere. The loading of one hundred bags of rice in the truck would have taken a considerably long time. Khantapara, as is well known is a small village and the driver, if at all be bad gone to take his tiffin, could not have gone a long distance from the mills. Even, otherwise, he could not have taken a considerably long time in taking tiffin so as to absent himself from near the truck during all the time which must have been occupied for loading the hundred bags of rice. If one merely felt the bags from outside, be would easily distinguish a bag containing Mohua flowers from a bag containing rice. Mohua flowers also have got a peculiar smell which one would not fail to notice. I am, therefore, unable to accept the plea of the accused that be was not at all aware that rice bags bad been loaded in the truck. While the truck was proceeding towards Jamsola Check Gate p.w. 8, the Sub-Inspector of Police and p.w. 3 the Police Constable who were standing near the Kalabadia crossing with a view to check motor vehicles, signalled the Respondent, to stop the truck near the crossing. It seems, the Respondent lowered down the speed a little but immediately afterward speeded up towards the Jamsola Check Gate. This naturally armed the suspicion of p.ws. 3 and 8 and they followed this truck by another vehicle which reached the crossing shortly afterwards and on reaching the Jamsola Check Gate, they found the Respondent's truck there and on search found the bags containing rice. This naturally armed the suspicion of p.ws. 3 and 8 and they followed this truck by another vehicle which reached the crossing shortly afterwards and on reaching the Jamsola Check Gate, they found the Respondent's truck there and on search found the bags containing rice. The Respondent admits that near the Kalabadia crossing, p.w. 8 signalled him to stop the vehicle and he says that he stopped the vehicle, but as nobody came near him, he proceeded towards Jamsola Check Gate. It is difficult to accept such an explanation. When p.ws. 3 and 8 who stood near the crossing only for the purpose of checking the vehicles and signalled the Respondent to stop the truck, they did so with a view to check it. If really the Respondent had stopped the truck, there is no reason to believe that p.ws. 3 and 8 would not have proceeded towards the truck. The very fact that they followed the truck immediately afterwards belies the Respondent's statement that in spite of his stopping the truck near the crossing, p. ws. 3 and 8 did not go near it. I am, therefore, unable to believe the Respondent's explanation that he did stop the truck and this conduct on the part of the Respondent is only consistent with the prosecution case that he knew that the truck contained bags of rice. 5. I, however, feel that in a prosecution for an offence u/s 7 of the Act for contravening any order made u/s 3 of the Act it is not necessary to establish that the accused knowingly or intentionally contravened the provisions of the Orissa Rice (Movement Control) Order, 1964. Unfortunately during the course of argument, the learned Advocate appearing for the State did not invite my attention to the amendment made to Section 7 of the Act by which the words and figure "If any person contravenes any order made u/s 3" have been substituted in Sub-section (1) of Section 7, by the words and figure "if any person contravenes, Whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made u/s 3". This amendment makes it clear that where, as in this case, the accused was found in a border area transporting rice, he must be deemed to have contravened the provisions of the Order irrespective of the fact whether be knew that what he was transporting was rice. This amendment makes it clear that where, as in this case, the accused was found in a border area transporting rice, he must be deemed to have contravened the provisions of the Order irrespective of the fact whether be knew that what he was transporting was rice. Doubtless it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there must be some blameworthy conduct or mens rea in an accused before he is found guilty of an offence. But, if the statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea an a constituent part of a crime, effect has to be given to the statute. In the present case, an absolute prohibition has been imposed from transporting goods to the border area and the statute by express words has made it clear that whether or not a person knowingly, intentionally or otherwise transports rice to places in border area, he would be punishable. The prohibition is absolute and has to be given effect to. In the result, I would allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal of the Respondent and convict him u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It has not been shown by the prosecution that the Respondent is not a first offender. There is nothing to show that he was transporting rice on his own account. In fact, the prosecution case, as originally laid, was that he was transporting the rice as a carrier for one Prabhudayal Khendelwalla. Having regard to these circumstances, I feel, that a substantive sentence of imprisonment is not called for and that a sentence of fine would meet the ends of justice. I would accordingly sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 300/- (Rupees three hundred) and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. Appeal allowed & sentence modified. Final Result : Allowed