Order.- This is a quite extraordinary application. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to have the enquiry into a proceeding before the Chairman, Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal stayed pending disposal of a case before the Special Judge, S.P.E. Cases, Secunderabad. The disciplinary proceeding pending before the Tribunal was launched against the petitioner under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960 in respect of a trap said to have been successfully laid against the petitioner by one Munuswamy Naidu then D.S.P. of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Munuswamy Naidu has since retired from service. After Munuswami Naidu’s retirement from service the petitioner filed a complaint against him for offences under sections 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act before the Special Judge. According to the petitioner the said Munuswami Naidu was at Luxettipet in Adilabad District at 1-40 p.m. on 18th February 1966 at the very time when he is supposed to have trapped the petitioner. He claims that this is revealed by the T.A. bills submitted by the said Munuswami Naidu, since the principal question in the case before the Criminal Court and one of the main questions before the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal is whether Munuswami Naidu was at Hyderabad or Luxettipet the petitioner seeks to have the proceeding before the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal stayed pending disposal of the case against Munuswami Naidu before the criminal Court. At the very outset I felt a doubt whether the application was maintainable as the Chairman of the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal is not a Court to which the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies. Having heard Mr. Sarma and the learned Public Prosecutor I have come to the conclusion that the application is not maintainable. 2. Sri Sarma urged that the jurisdiction under section 561-A is very wide and that in order to secure the ends of justice it is open to the High Court to pass appropriate orders even with reference to proceedings not pending in Courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is impossible to agree with this submission. The Code of Criminal Procedure, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. “High Court” is defined by section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as meaning the highest Court of criminal appeal for that area. It is impossible to agree with this submission. The Code of Criminal Procedure, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. “High Court” is defined by section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as meaning the highest Court of criminal appeal for that area. Chapter II of the Code of Criminal Procedure, deals with the constitution of criminal Courts and also prescribes their subordination to one another. The Chairman of the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal is admittedly not a criminal Court and not subject to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Chairman of the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal may be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. But that does not make him an inferior or a subordinate criminal Court Section 561-A contemplates the exercise of inherent power by the ‘High Court’, that is to say, by the High Court as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, is the highest Court of Criminal Appeal for that area. It is not the same thing as the High Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Code of Criminal Procedure, is concerned with regulating the procedure to be followed in Criminal Courts including the High Court and the power under section 561-A is to be exercised only in relation to proceedings in such Courts. Wide though the powers of the High Court under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, are, they do not enable the High Court to stretch its arm and reach proceedings which are pending before Courts and Tribunals whose procedure is not regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure.‘Sri Sarma argued that under section 561-A the High Court has jurisdiction to stay proceedings in a civil Court pending disposal of a criminal case and if it has jurisdiction to stay proceedings in a civil Court, he urged, there was no reason why proceedings before other Tribunal could not also be stayed. The initial fallacy in the argument of Sri Sarma lies in the assumption that the High Court in exercise of its powers under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, can stay the proceedings of a civil Court. It has no such power. The initial fallacy in the argument of Sri Sarma lies in the assumption that the High Court in exercise of its powers under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, can stay the proceedings of a civil Court. It has no such power. The power of the High Court under section 561-A is confined only to Courts whose procedure is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sri T.V. Sarma relied on the circumstance that on some occasions proceedings pending before a civil Courts have been stayed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The only case to which he was able to draw my attention where there was a direction that the trial of a civil suit may be stayed pending a criminal case was the case of M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras1. In that case while dismissing an appeal under section 476-B, Criminal Procedure Code, against an order of the High Court under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court directed that two civil suits in which were involved the identical questions involved in the criminal cases should be stayed pending disposal of the criminal cases. Their Lordships did not refer to the provision of law under which the direction was given. Their Lordships were apparently exercising their power under Article 142 of the Constitution. The power of the High Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to grant stay of trial of civil suits was not considered by their Lordships. The other cases referred to by Mr. Sarma were all cases where trials of criminal cases were stayed pending disposal of civil suits. I am satisfied that this application under section 561-A is not maintainable. It is open to the petitioner to file an appropriate petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition is dismissed. G.S.M. ----- Petition dismissed.