ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a Plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for possession on the allegation that the mortgage money of the mortgage described in the plaint has been satisfied. The Plaintiffs' case was that Raghubar Nonia, Plaintiff No. 1, along with his brothers mortgaged on 16-6-1912 the plots in suit for Rs. 500/- to Ram Pati Shukla and Radha Krishan Shukla out of whom the latter alone is alive. Four plots namely Nos. 1494, 1501, 1927 and 1801 were fixed rate tenancy plots and the remaining plots Nos. 1491 and 1499/2 were occupancy plots. The other brothers of Raghubar Nonia were dead and the present Plaintiffs were their heirs, according to the pedigree which need not be gone into in detail for the purposes of deciding this case. It was further alleged that the Defendants were members of a joint Hindu family which was not disputed, that the mortgage had been taken with the fund of the joint Hindu family that all the Defendants were in possession over the plots in dispute as mortgagees that the Plaintiffs were agriculturists on the relevant date and were entitled to the benefit of the UP Debt Redemption Act; that the plots in suit were very productive and the entire mortgage money had been satisfied on or before 5-6-1955; that they asked the Defendants to deliver back the possession and the mortgage deed after recovering full satisfaction but they refused, hence the suit. It may be added that the Plaintiffs had previously instituted a suit in the revenue court for redemption and possession u/s 12 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act but in the meantime the UP Act No. 1 of 1951 came into operation and the revenue court returned the plaint for presentation to the civil court where the present suit was instituted. 2. The main defence in the case was that subsequent to the mortgage the Plaintiff No. 1, namely Raghubar Nonia, sold by a registered sale deed dated 19-7-1935 the aforesaid fixed rate tenancy plots only for Rs. 2. The main defence in the case was that subsequent to the mortgage the Plaintiff No. 1, namely Raghubar Nonia, sold by a registered sale deed dated 19-7-1935 the aforesaid fixed rate tenancy plots only for Rs. 999/- to Rampati Shukla and Radha Krishna Shukla; that since then the vendees had been in possession over those fixed rate tenancy plots not as mortgagees but as purchasers; that since the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee with respect to those plots had come to an end by the sale, the suit in respect to those plots had come to an end by the sale, the suit in respect of the fixed rate tenancy plots was liable to be dismissed. As regards occupancy plots, it was contended that the plots in dispute were not productive, no part of the mortgage money had been paid up or satisfied, that no money had been deposited, that the Plaintiff No. 1 could not get possession over those plots without paying the said Rs. 500/- i.e. the mortgage money and hence the suit was liable to be dismissed in respect of the occupancy plots as well. Some other pleas were also taken to which it is not necessary to refer. 3. The trial court came to the conclusion that the entire mortgage deed had been satisfied and that no sale deed in regard to the fixed rate tenancy plots had been proved. As such, it decreed the Plaintiff's suit but though the decree for possession in regard to the occupancy plots was passed straightway, so far as fixed rate tenancy plots were concerned, a decree for redemption of mortgage only was passed as the suit, in the view of the trial court, for actual possession lay in the revenue court. 4. On appeal the decree relating to the occupancy plots was arfirmed and the finding with regard to the sale of the fixed rate tenancy plots was reversed and the Plaintiff's suit for possession or redemption of the mortgage in regard to the fixed rate tenancy plots was dismissed. Aggrieved by that decree the Plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. The Defendants have also filed cross-objections in respect of the decree relating to the occupancy plots. 5. Aggrieved by that decree the Plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. The Defendants have also filed cross-objections in respect of the decree relating to the occupancy plots. 5. The main question which has been canvassed before me in this appeal is as to whether the fixed rate tenancy plots had been actually sold on 19-7-1935 as alleged by the Defendants so as to terminate the relationship of mortgagor and the mortgagee. It is common ground that the original sale deed in respect of those plots was not filed in the civil court. The defence version was that the said document in original was produced in the earlier suit when it was instituted in the revenue court. After the withdrawal of that suit in the circumstances to which I have already referred, the Defendants alleged to have applied for the return of the documents but then it was found missing from the record. The Defendants have filed Ex. B-7 which was a certified copy of the list of documents produced on their behalf in the earlier revenue suit. This paper indicates that on 12-12-1946 Sheo Kumar Shukla had produced the mortgage deed in original executed by Raghubir Nonia and others in favour of Ram Pati Shukla and Radha Krishna Shukla on 15-6-1921. Along with that a sale-deed in original executed by Raghubir Nonia in favour of Ram Pati Shukla and Radha Krishna Shukla dated 19-7-1935 was also filed. Ex. B-9 is a true copy of the written statement filed by the Defendants in that revenue suit and it shows that Ram Pati Shukla and Sheo Kumar Shukla made a reference therein to the sale-deed executed on 19-7-1935 in regard to the fixed rate tenancy plots. It is in evidence that the effort to obtain a certified copy of the sale deed proved abortive inasmuch as on account of the holocaust of the year 1942 which had shaken the town of Ballia to its foundations, a large number of valuable documents in the Registration Office were lost or destroyed. Thus, no register regarding the registration of the documents relating to that period was available. The two courts below accepted the Defendants' contentions on this point and it is in these circumstances that secondary evidence was led to prove the execution of the sale deed and its contents. Thus, no register regarding the registration of the documents relating to that period was available. The two courts below accepted the Defendants' contentions on this point and it is in these circumstances that secondary evidence was led to prove the execution of the sale deed and its contents. It may also be noted that the two marginal witnesses of the sale-deed were also since dead. 6. It has been strenuously contended on behalf of the Appellants that the secondary evidence of the kind which the Defendants were allowed to lead in proof of the execution and the contents of the sale deed dated 19-7-1935 was wholly inadmissible and the court below committed a palpable error of law in allowing the sale-deed to be proved by such secondary evidence. He relied on the provisions contained in Clause (e) and (f) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, the relevant portion of which runs as under: 65. Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, Condition, or contents of a document in the following cases: .... .... .... (c) When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; .... .... .... (e) When the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74; (f) When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence; .... .... .... In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. 7. Strong reliance was placed on the proviso to the above section which is to the effect that in lease of (e) or (f) a certified copy of the document can be admissible but no other kind of secondary evidence can be admissible. Sri G.P. Bhargava appearing for the Appellants also adverted to Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act which defines 'public document' and includes therein public records of private documents kept in any state, vide Sub-section (2). It is not disputed that the certified copies of such registered document as the sale deed are permissible to be issued by the registration office. It is not disputed that the certified copies of such registered document as the sale deed are permissible to be issued by the registration office. It is, however, clear from the facts stated above that the Defendants were unable to secure and file a certified copy of the document which could be used as secondary evidence of the original sale deed. In these desperate circumstances the Defendants had no other alternative except to adduce such oral and circumstantial evidence in respect of the original sale deed as was possible. I have already referred to the certified copies of the list of papers and the written statement filed in the revenue court where the suit was originally brought by the Plaintiffs. 8. Further, the Defendants examined a few witnesses. DW 1 was Ram Pujan Pande, the scribe of the sale-deed. He deposed about the execution and the contents of the sale-deed and also stated that Radha Krishna Shukla, the sole surviving vendee was alive but he was not present at the time of execution of the sale-deed and further that the two mariginal witnesses were also since dead. DW 2 Sheo Kumar Shukla had been the Pairokar of Radha Krishna Shukla throughout in this litigation which originally commenced in the revenue court. This witness corroborated the defence case in full. Both of these witnesses were believed by the lower appellate court, which was also greatly impressed by the testimony of another important witness to whom I shall presently refer, namely Sri Ram Singhasan Lal (DW 3). He had been practising as revenue agent in the revenue court at Ballia since 1925 and had appeared for Ram Pati Shukla in the earlier suit before the revenue court. The sale deed regarding which he took down notes had been shown to him. On the basis of the sale-deed the notes were stated to have been prepared and taken down. The above notes were in original produced, being Exhibit A-2. A perusal of the notes indicated that there was a reference to the aforesaid sale-deed and the plots mentioned therein were fixed rate tenancy plots. The mode of payment and other essential details were covered in the notes. The above notes were in original produced, being Exhibit A-2. A perusal of the notes indicated that there was a reference to the aforesaid sale-deed and the plots mentioned therein were fixed rate tenancy plots. The mode of payment and other essential details were covered in the notes. On the basis of this evidence the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the Defendants had succeeded in proving by secondary evidence that the sale-deed as alleged by them had been executed and registered with respect to the fixed rate tenancy plots. That is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in second appeal. 9. However, the question still remains as to whether that finding is vitiated by an error of law, inasmuch as the court allowed secondary evidence to be adduced, regard being had to the provisions of Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Counsel for the Respondents referred to Clause (c) of Section 65 and submitted that the prohibition contained in the proviso to Clauses (e) and (f) could be attracted only where a certified copy of the original document alluded to in Clause (f) was available. He contended that if in the circumstances of a particular case it was conclusively proved that a certified copy of the registered document was utterly incapable of being obtained, the prohibition would not be attracted. The learned Counsel vehemently pressed the submission that a contrary construction would in some cases occasion miscarriage of justice. More than anything else the equitable aspect of the case appeals to me. I am alive to the situation that if the seeming rigour of law suggested by Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act was not mitigated by some rule of equity, it was bound to lead to grave injustice. It is possible to conceive of a situation in which through no fault of his own a party may be greatly handicapped on account of some mischief perpetrated by his adversary and the original document may not only be surreptitiously spirited away at his instance but the calamity may be further aggravated by the intervention of such accidental causes that the Certified copy of the document may also not be available from the registration office. I find it difficult to reconcile myself to the position that the law and courts of justice are helpless to cope with an unfortunate situation like this and are unable to afford relief to a party who may have approached the court with a genuine case. 10. Equitable consideration apart, to me it also appears that a careful analysis of the various limbs of Section 65 of the Evidence Act as a whole leads to the conclusion that the clauses which are incorporated after Clause (c) are not really intended to graft exceptions upon the rule contained in Clause (c). In my opinion, the substantive rule is fully and completely set out in Clause (c) which says that when the original has been destroyed or lost, etc., secondary evidence may be given of the existence, conditions or contents of the document. The succeeding clauses are not prefaced by the words "when the original has been destroyed or lost." In other words, they do not fully set out the conditions precedent when the secondary evidence can be led and they are not intended to abridge the right which is available to a party of adducing secondary evidence where the conditions precedent are fulfilled. In these circumstances, Clauses (e) and (f) and the prohibition with regard to the leading of secondary evidence contained in the proviso cannot be regarded as exhaustive at all. The object of incorporating those clauses and the proviso was not to curtail the ambit of the right conferred by Clause (c) but merely to prescribe (for an entirely different and technical reason to which I shall presentely refer) the particluar kind or nature of secondary evidence which might be led by a party in certain circumstances. The substantive right to resort to secondary evidence is fully enunciated in Clause (c) only the manner or details as to the kind of secondary evidence which might be given in a particular case is explained in Clauses (e) and (f). It is in this light that the prohibition contained in the proviso relating to Clauses (e) and (f) must be construed. It is common experience that if the original documents are summoned with great frequency from the record office and since the claimants are several and sometimes simultaneous, a great confusion and distress can arise. It is in this light that the prohibition contained in the proviso relating to Clauses (e) and (f) must be construed. It is common experience that if the original documents are summoned with great frequency from the record office and since the claimants are several and sometimes simultaneous, a great confusion and distress can arise. In order to mitigate this difficulty and for purely administrative reasons a rule of expediency was incorporated in Clauses (e) and (f) which permitted the filing of certified copies of the original document in the shape of secondary evidence. Therefore, it is merely a permissible rule based on expediency rather than a substantive one circumscribing the scope of Clause (c) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. I find strong support for the construction that I am placing upon the aforesaid provision from a decision reported in Kunneth Odangat Kalanadan v. Vayoth Pallioil Kunhunni Kidavu ILR 6 Madras 80. It was observed in that case that the rule laid down in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act that a certified copy is the only secondary evidence admissible when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by law to be given in evidence, does not apply where the original has been lost or destroyed. It was pointed out that the provisions in Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act were "intended rather to protect the originals of public records from the danger to which they would be exposed by constant production in evidence than to interfere with the general rule of evidence given in Clause (c) of the case section that secondary evidence may be given when the original has been destroyed or lost." 11. A division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Anand Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Secretary of State for India ILR 43 Cal 973 (at page 983) endorsed the same view and ruled that the prohibition of production of secondary evidence other than the certified copy of the document referred to in Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 65 was subject to the condition that when the original had been destroyed or lost any secondary evidence may be given. To the same effect is the decision in Chandrashwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Bisheshwar Pratab Narain Singh AIR 1927 Patna 61 wherein the contents of the deposition of a witness were allowed to be proved by secondary evidence. 12. No authority to the contrary was shown to me. Thus, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the present case, I think that the court below was justified in accepting the secondary evidence of proof of the execution and contents of the sale-deed. 13. In case the sale deed is accepted as it was done by the lower appellate court, the finding with regard to the fixed rate tenancy plots was right and cannot be disturbed and the decree in respect of the entire mortgage property was validly passed. 14. So far as the cross objections of the Defendants relating to the occupancy plots are concerned, I find that they have no force and they are concluded by findings of fact recorded by the courts below. 15. The result is that this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.