JUDGMENT B. D. Gupta, J. - The sole opposite party, Smt. Maqbool Begum, applied to the Insolvency judge at Aligarh, praying that the applicant Naseem Dad Khan, her son-in-law, be declared insolvent. The application was based on the assertion of certain facts alleged to constitute acts of insolvency. The only assertion accepted by the court below on which the order adjudicating the applicant insolvent is based was the assertion contained in Clause (b) of para. 5 of the petition which runs as follows: "That with intent to delay and defeat the creditors he is not found at his house and secludes himself from them. One such event took place on 15-11-1966 when the petitioner made a demand." It may be added at this very place that para. 6 of the petition contained the following averment "That the opposite party resides in his house purported to have been transferred and within the jurisdiction of this court." 2. The courts below have taken the view that the opposite party had established that the applicant had committed an act of insolvency by secluding himself. The court below appears to have had in mind sub-clause (iii) of pause (d) of Section 6 of the Provincial Insolvency Act which lays down that a debtor commits an act of insolvency if he, inter alia, "secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him." 3. Learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the evidence of the opposite party, even if accepted in its entirety, is altogether insufficient to warrant the inference that the applicant secluded himself and thus committed an act of insolvency. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having examined the material on record, I am satisfied that this contention must be accepted. 4. In her examination-in-chief all that the opposite party stated was that whenever she demanded the decretal amount from the applicant, the applicant often made himself scarce or went away after looking his house. In cross-examination the applicant stated that she had gone to the house purchased by the applicant about a year ago. 4. In her examination-in-chief all that the opposite party stated was that whenever she demanded the decretal amount from the applicant, the applicant often made himself scarce or went away after looking his house. In cross-examination the applicant stated that she had gone to the house purchased by the applicant about a year ago. The statement made by the opposite party in her examination-in-chief implies that she met the applicant every time though her demand for payment, instead of being complied with, was evaded by the applicant whenever she made the demand, I have no doubt that the aforesaid assertion does not warrant the inference that the applicant secluded himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him. Indeed, in the present case, the creditor admitted having communicated with the applicant, though the result of communicating the demand was disappointing inasmuch as the applicant instead of complying with the demand went away from the scene. I understand the expression "secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him" to mean that the creditor is unable to establish communication with the debtor by reason of the debtor secluding himself at a place or in a manner which makes communication between the two impossible. On the implied admission made by the opposite party herself to the effect that every time she went to demand the decretal amount, she met the applicant, it cannot possibly be held that the applicant had on any of these occasions secluded himself so as to deprive his creditor of the means of communicating with him. This appears to be in line with the decision in Ky v. Shav, 131 English Reports 417. In that case the evidence made out that on one occasion when the creditor called upon the debtor for his money, the debtor was seen peeping ever his wife's shoulders and on another occasion when the debtor saw a creditor approaching him as retired behind a partition at the back of his shop and his wife came forward saying he was not at home. These incidents were interpreted as establishing wilful seclusion by the debtor on the view that the debtor had withdrawn himself from a part of the house where he was likely to meet a creditor to a more retired apart. In the present case no such material is to be found. These incidents were interpreted as establishing wilful seclusion by the debtor on the view that the debtor had withdrawn himself from a part of the house where he was likely to meet a creditor to a more retired apart. In the present case no such material is to be found. Indeed the evidence given by the creditor herself as observed earlier, makes out that every time the creditor went to the applicant's house, she met the applicant and communicated to him her demand to make payment of the decretal amount. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party also referred to sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of Section 6 of the Provincial Insolvency Act which declares that a debtor commits an act of insolvency if with intent to defeat or delay his creditors "he departs from the dwelling house or usual place of business or otherwise absents himself." 6. This contention is in the teeth of the assertion contained in para. 6 of the petition itself made by the sole opposite party which, as mentioned earlier, runs as follows : "That the opposite party resides in his house purported to have been. transferred and within the jurisdiction of this court." 7. In face of the averment of the opposite party herself that the applicant resided in a particular house, it is impossible to hold that merely because when the creditor made a demand at, the applicant's house for payment of debts, the applicant left his house, the applicant committed an act of insolvency. I understand the expression "departs from his dwelling house" to mean leaving the dwelling house for a considerable period of time, it cannot be held to mean that every time a person residing in a house leaves his house to go elsewhere, he departs from his dwelling house within the meaning of that expression in Section 6 of the Act. A man in service or in business leaves his house to attend to his duties in office or at a shop or in an industrial establishment some time in the forenoon and reached back home after his duties are over sometime in tine afternoon. It cannot be said in case of such absence that every time the man leaves his house in the forenoon, he departs from his dwelling house. It cannot be said in case of such absence that every time the man leaves his house in the forenoon, he departs from his dwelling house. In the present case, far from any suggestion that the applicant had departed from his dwelling house, it was specifically asserted by the opposite party herself in her pleadings that the opposite party resided in a particular house. I find it impossible to accept the contention that sub clause (ii) of Clause (d) of Section 6 of the Act applies, with the result that the contention urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party on the basis of the above clause must, also be negatived. Apart from the above there appears no ground to justify an order adjudicating the applicant insolvent. 8. In the result this revision is allowed and the order of the Insolvency Judge dated the 28th September, 1967, affirmed by the learned district judge on the 9th of March 1968, is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.