All the suits and the appeals arising therefrom in the Court below were tried together and disposed of by common judgment. Hence all these second appeals are also taken up together and disposed of accordingly. 2. These are nine second ap­peals by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decrees in nine title suits whereby the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the earlier judgment and decrees of the learned Munsiff. The plaintiffs are a company and pur­chased a tea garden owning the lands in suit from the previous owners some time in 1958. They brought these suits for evicting the defendants on the al­legation that they have been on the land under permissive occupation of their predecessors-in-interest as licen­sees. Although they are not entitled to any notice, they gave each of them notice for eviction, with which they did not comply. 3. The defendants submitted written statements almost in identical terms and alleged that they have been on the land from the time of their forefathers for the last hundred years. They denied that they were under permissive occupation of the plaintiffs or in any sense licensees under them. They made a categori­cal assertion that they and their fore­fathers dispossessed the Garden Authorities forcibly and occupied the land and began to settle there by doing cultivation and erecting other struc­tures thereon. 4. Several issues were framed in the suits. The material issues which are now being canyassed be­fore me are: Issue No. 3: Is the suit barred by limitation? Issue No. 5: Has the defendants acquired right, title and interest over the suit land by right of adverse possession on the suit land? The learned Munsiff accepted the story of the plaintiffs relying on the oral and documentary evidence, parti­cularly Hajira book, Ext. 7, that the defendants were licensees under the plaintiffs' predecessors and in that view of the matter held that the suits were not barred by limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed this finding. After carefully considering the entire evidence, oral and documentary, he came to the con­clusion that the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants were licensees either under them or under their predecessors-in-interest. This is a finding of fact which even Mr. Chaudhuri does not seek to challenge. 5. Mr. The learned Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed this finding. After carefully considering the entire evidence, oral and documentary, he came to the con­clusion that the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants were licensees either under them or under their predecessors-in-interest. This is a finding of fact which even Mr. Chaudhuri does not seek to challenge. 5. Mr. Chaudhuri's main con­tention is that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in law in making a wrong approach in dealing with the controversy raised in the suits be­tween the parties. According to the counsel, the learned Judge wrongly applied Article 142 of the Old Limita­tion Act, which is admittedly applica­ble in this case. According to him, Article 144 was the appropriate arti­cle and in that event the entire case has been wrongly decided and he, in the alternative, submits that the ap­peals should go back to the Court be­low for proper disposal. 6. This was a case where the plaintiffs are admitted not in posses­sion of the land. In that view of the matter, whether the defendants claim­ed adverse possession or not, at any rate, it is clearly established that the plaintiffs' possession over the land has been discontinued. On the top of that, it has been clearly averred in the written statements that the defen­dants' forefathers dispossessed the gar­den authorities by force. No more speci­fic allegation than this is necessary to make an averment under Article 142 of the Old Limitation Act. It is there­fore clearly a case which falls under Article 142. That being the position, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to establish that they were in possession of the land within twelve years prior to the institution of the suits. On this point, the learned Subordinate Judge has come to a categorical finding that the plaintiffs could not prove their possession within twelve years. This again is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with in a second ap­peal. 7. Mr. On this point, the learned Subordinate Judge has come to a categorical finding that the plaintiffs could not prove their possession within twelve years. This again is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with in a second ap­peal. 7. Mr. Choudhurl, the learn­ed, counsel has drawn my attention to a decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1935 PC 53 (Bias Alt v. Special Mana­ger, Court of Wards) and reads the following passage: "A person, who bases his title on adverse possession, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed." Since, however, in this case the de­fendants had pleaded forcible dispos­session, this decision does not come to the aid of the learned counsel. He strongly relies on a Division Bench decision of this Court in an unreported Judgment in LPA No. 1 of 1964 dis­posed of on 28-4-1965 (Assam). Here again the facts are clearly distinguish­able. In this particular case, the plaintiffs did not allege dispossession. The following passage from this judg­ment makes the point clear: "......I am clearly of opinion that where a suit for possession of immoveable property is brought by the plaintiff based on title and not on dis­possession (alone) and the title of the plaintiff is established, the onus would shift to the defendant to prove that that title, which is otherwise good, is no longer good because of his having acquired a better title by adverse possession for the requisite period." It is only on that basis that the case was lifted out of Article 142 of the old Limitation Act 8. The learned counsel next lays great stress on another unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in F. A. No. 40 of 1959 dis­posed of on 25-5-1964 (Assam). There are two separate judgments, given in this case, one by Mehrotra, C. J., and the other by Nayudu, J., as he then was. Both the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' suit ought to be dismissed. While the learned Chief Justice held that Arti­cle 142 was applicable, Nayudu, J. took a contrary view, holding that Article 144 was attracted. The learn­ed Judge, however, found on the evi­dence that the defendants proved ad­verse possession enabling them to succeed in extinguishing the title of the plaintiffs. While the learned Chief Justice held that Arti­cle 142 was applicable, Nayudu, J. took a contrary view, holding that Article 144 was attracted. The learn­ed Judge, however, found on the evi­dence that the defendants proved ad­verse possession enabling them to succeed in extinguishing the title of the plaintiffs. While the learned Chief Justice in that case relied on an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1950 Assam 55 (Premeswar Das v. Madhab Chandra) Nayudu, J. did not think it necessary to consider this decision. Although Mr. Chaudhuri lays considerable em­phasis on the judgment of Nayudu, J., even the following passage from that judgment will show that this decision cannot be an authority for the proposi­tion which Mr. Chaudhuri is advanc­ing before me: "On the other hand, if the suit for possession of immoveable property is based on title and not on disposses­sion alone (the underline is mine), then Article 144 alone would be attracted as the plaintiff's title once established can only be extinguished or rendered nugatory by proof of the acquisition of title by adverse posses­sion by the defendant, who claims to remain in possession. X X X X 9. Mr. Lahiri, appearing on be­half of the respondents, tried to draw considerable inspiration from the deci­sion in AIR 1950 Assam 55 (supra), which, more or less, clinches the issue. This was a case where the defendants asserted adverse possession and the plaintiffs pleaded permissive occupa­tion and the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove permissive character of the possession of the defendants. In this context, their Lord' ships held as follows: "If, therefore, a plaintiff bases the case on the permissive character of his defendants' possession and fails to prove it, he may succeed if his title and possession within 12 years have been proved. It is only on proof of subsisting title that a defendant can be called upon to prove his adverse possession. It would not be necessary to go into the question of defendant's adverse possession if plaintiff has not proved his subsisting title in the suit property." Their Lordships came to this conclu­sion relying on several pronounce­ments from their Lordships of the Privy Council. Mr. Lahiri also re­ferred to two Full Bench decisions of the Madras and Mysore High Courts, namely, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) (Official Receiver East Godavariv. Govindaraiu) and AIR 1963 Mys 1 (Lingamma v. Putte Gowda). Mr. Lahiri also re­ferred to two Full Bench decisions of the Madras and Mysore High Courts, namely, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) (Official Receiver East Godavariv. Govindaraiu) and AIR 1963 Mys 1 (Lingamma v. Putte Gowda). In the first case, it has been observed by their Lordships: "The plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he shows in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit. The burden lies upon the plain­tiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of suit: the onus is not upon the defendant to prove ad­verse possession for a period of 12 years." In AIR 1963 Mys 1 (FB) at p. 3 the following observation is apposite: "The plaintiff, who seeks to eject persons from immoveable property claimed by him on the ground that although they entered into such pro­perty as tenants, they were in wrongful possession thereof, but fails to prove his allegations, has to establish his possession within 12 years from the date of the suit; otherwise the suit should be dismissed." Mr. Chaudhuri on the other hand, drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 875 (Mt. Murti v. Mohd. Mir Khan). A careful perusal of the facts of this case will clearly show that this authority cannot come to the aid of the counsel. In this case, the defendant admitted that he derived possession from the plaintiff as tenant and therefore their Lordships held that it was a case under Article 144 of the Old Limitation Act because the nature of possession was challenged. Another Supreme Court's decision to which reference has been made by Mr. Chaudhuri is AIR 1965 S. C. 1553 (Gurbinder Singh v. Lai Singh). This decision also is to a similar effect on facts. Here, the plaintiff was initially in possession and later dis­possessed. 10. It is therefore clear that on the pleadings as well as on the proved facts before the Courts below the plaintiffs' case is governed by Arti­cle 142 of the Old Limitation Act and since on the finding of the Court be­low they could not establish their possession within 12 years of the suits, all the suits were rightly dismissed. 11. There is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 11. There is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is refused. Appeals dismissed.