Judgment :- 1. Three decisions of this Court have been brought to our notice with a prater to consider their effect on the case before us, two of the decisions being Mohamed Khani Rowther v. Thaivana Ammal (1963 KLT. 205) and Harihara Iyer v. First Additional District Judge's Court, Trivandrum (1969 KLT. 974) by Single judges and the third one being the Full Bench decision in Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT. 1). 2. The petitioner was a tenant of a building under the respondent; and the respondent filed an application for evicting the tenant. An order in eviction was passed on the ground of arrears of rent; and the same was confirmed in appeal by the appellate authority on 7th October 1968. The appellate authority, however, gave a direction that, if the arrears of rent were deposited within a month from the date of disposal of the appeal, the order of eviction would stand vacated. Amounts were deposited; but, on 2nd November 1968, before the time of one month allowed by the appellate authority expired, the petitioner filed a petition for extension of time already granted praying that, in case the amounts already deposited were found insufficient to meet the arrears, further time of two months might be allowed to make a further deposit. This was allowed by the appellate authority; but, on revision to the District Court, the District Judge disallowed the prayer and varied the order of the appellate authority relying on the latest of the three decisions mentioned above, the decision in Harihara Iyer's case by Eradi J. The question for us to consider is whether the reversal of the order of the appellate authority by the District Judge is right. 3. In the earliest of these decisions, viz., Mohamed Khani Rowther's case, the facts were these. An application'for eviction under the Madras Rent Control Act was filed by the landlord and an order in eviction was passed. Appeal and revison followed, the revision having been dismissed on 12th June 1959. In the meantime, on 16th January 1959, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance (Ordinance 3 of 1959) came into force, which conferred on the tenant some additional benefits, one of them being the right to deposit the arrears of rent and to have the order of eviction vacated. In the meantime, on 16th January 1959, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance (Ordinance 3 of 1959) came into force, which conferred on the tenant some additional benefits, one of them being the right to deposit the arrears of rent and to have the order of eviction vacated. In exercise of that right, the tenant filed an application for vacating the order of eviction depositing the arrears of rent; and the District Judge ultimately disallowed that prayer, which was confirmed in revision by the Single judge. 4. What happened in the case before the Full Bench, the next case chronologically, was this. The landlord filed an application under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 for evicting the tenant on the ground that the tenant was is arrears. An order is eviction was passed; and that was confirmed in appeal, and in revisions, both to the District Judge and to the High Court. Pending revision, the (Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act, 1959 came into force; and the, tenant, taking advantage of the provisions in) that Act, 'filed an application, depositing the arrears of rent, praying that the order of eviction be vacated. The case ultimately came before the Full Bench; and the Full Bench allowed the prayer of the tenant. 5. Then we come to the last of the cases, Harihara Iyer's case, decided by Eradi J. In that case again, the eviction proceeding was commenced under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order. The proceeding was still pending before the Rent Control Court when the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance came into force on 16 January 1959. Within one month of the order of the Rent 'Control Court, the tenant filed a petition praying for three months' time under S.11 (2) (b) of the Kerala Ordinance for paying the arrears of rent. There was also a prayer for vacating the order of eviction on deposit of the arrears. It was this proceeding that came ultimately before Eradi J., and the learned judge disallowed the prayer of the tenant. Eradi J. has held that the Full Bench did not directly consider the question involved in the case before him and the earlier decision in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case applied to the case. 6. It was this proceeding that came ultimately before Eradi J., and the learned judge disallowed the prayer of the tenant. Eradi J. has held that the Full Bench did not directly consider the question involved in the case before him and the earlier decision in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case applied to the case. 6. The Full Bench was considering the scope or the ambit of the expression "Rent Control Court" in S.11 (2) (b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1959. And the Full Bench has held that the expression would include both the appellate and the revisional authorities. The Full Bench has consequently held that the deposit made by the tenant in the case before it was proper and in time. The Single Judge in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case was considering S.11 (2) (b) of the Kerala Act of 1959 before its amendment by Act 7 of 1966. The-Full Bench was also considering the same sub-section in its unamended form. However, the decision of the Single Judge in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Full Bench, nor the reasoning of the learned Judge. Still, since the Full Bench has also considered the same sub-section in its unamended form, after the pronouncement of the Full Bench, the decision of the Single Judge in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case cannot be good on whatever reason it was based. We hasten to repeat that the reasoning of the learned judge in that case was not considered by the Full Bench as that decision was not brought to the notice of the Full Bench, Still, the reasoning of the Single Judge must give place to the reasoning of the Full Bench, which was pronounced subsequently. 7. Two reasons appear to have weighed with the Single Judge is Mohamed Khani Rowther's case. The first was that the language of S.11(2) (b) in its original form- in its unamended form-was "within a month of such order or such other period as may be allowed." The learned judge has. pointed out that, since the expression' used-was "such"-other period" instead of "such further period", the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. The first was that the language of S.11(2) (b) in its original form- in its unamended form-was "within a month of such order or such other period as may be allowed." The learned judge has. pointed out that, since the expression' used-was "such"-other period" instead of "such further period", the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. "The reasoninng was that the expression "other period" suggested a "substitution" and not an "ehlargement" or "other modification" and the substitution had to bb made by the Rent Control Court itself when it passed the order eviction; This suggestion thrown out by the learned judge appeal's to have been accepted by the legislature; 'since the legislature has substituted by Act 7 of 1966 clause (e) to S.11 (2) by adding such further period" in the place of "such other period. Therefore; this reasoning based on the language, even if it had force at the time when the decision in Mohamed Khani Rowtner's case" was given, ceased to to have force after clause(c) 'was substituted. The amendment had taken away the force of the reasoning of the Single Judge in that case, and it had strengthened or added to the reasoning of the Full, Bench, though the Full Bench came to its conclusion on other reasoning., 8. The next reason which weighed with the Single, Judge in Mohamed Khani Rowthers case was one touching S.23 (1)of the Kerala Lease, and Rent Control Act, of. 1959. S.23 (1) provides that "the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Contol Court and the appellate Authority shall have the powers, which are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure".,. The section then enumerates some of the powers", one of them being "enlargement of, time originally fixed or granted", clause (i). The learned judge has discussed this question in Para.4 of his judgment: the learned judge appears to have proceeded on the basis that what S.23 has done was to, attract the Code of Civil Procedure as, such to the Lease and Rent Control Act, so that the restrictions, if, any imposed on the powers of a court under the Code were also attracted to the 'Lease and Rent Control Act. With all respect to the learned judge, we find it difficult to agree with this. With all respect to the learned judge, we find it difficult to agree with this. In our opinion, what has been attracted was not the Code of Civil Procedure as such, but the powers which were vested in a court by the Code.' In other words, what S.23 has done was to confer on the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority the several powers contained in the Code of Civil Procedure which were conferred on a court under the Code. If that were not the intention of the legislature there 'would not have been an enumeration of some of the powers in S.23. The language of the section also indicates that: the language is that "the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority shall have the powers which are vested in a court under the code of Civil Procedure and not that the Civil Procedure Code is attracted or made applicable'. Putting' still differently, those powers ;which the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority exercise under S.23 'are no more powers under the Code of Civil Procedure: they are power under S.23 of the Lease and Rent Control Act. It must then follow that under clause "(i) of the section ("enlargement of time originally fixed or granted) the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court and the appellate 'Authority have power to extent' the time originally granted; We may also point out how guarded the Single Judge was, because the learned judge has said "Even if the construction placed by me on S.11.(2) (b) and S.23 (1) of Kerala Act XVI of 1959 be wrong, I do not think, that the Rent Control Court should have vacated the order of eviction on a deposit made two years after the order when the statute itself says that one month is the normal time." Thus, in the view we have taken on the second reasoning of the learned judge' in the light of the decision of the Full Bench and in the light of the amendment to S.11 (2) by the substitution of clause (e) by Act 7 of 1966, the Single Judge's decision in Mohamed Kharu Rowther's case is no more good law. 9. 9. Then we come to the decision of Eradi J. That was after the decision of the Full Bench; and the learned judge has considered the Full Bench decision too. But, the learned judge has said in Para.12 of his judgment. "While considering the above question the Full Bench has however incidentally touched upon the nature and the extent of the prohibition against execution imposed by S.11 (2) (b) and the power conferred on the "Rent Control Court" in relation thereto." This does not appear to be correct. The Full Bench was considering the question directly, not incidentally: in fact, the Full Bench has held that the expression A "Rent Control Court" in S.11 (2) (b) included the appellate and the revisional authorities, so that the statutory period of 30 days allowed before which execution could not be taken applied not only to orders of the Rent Control Court I but also to orders of the appellate and revisional authorities. The Full Bench has also pointed out the anomalies if the decision were otherwise (vide Para.6 of the reports). Again, the first reasoning which was available to the Single Judge in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case was not available to Eradi J. in Harihara Iyer's case, because by that time clause (e) of S.11 (2) had been substituted by Act 7 of 1966 incorporating "such further period" in the place of "such other period". Still further, the second reasoning in Mohamed Khani Rowther's case on S.23 of the Lease and Rent Control Act was also not right, so that that reasoning could not have also sustained the decision of Eradi J. The learned judge does not appear to have noted the substitution of clause (e) to S.11 (2), which was the clinching circumstance which weighed with the learned judge in Mohamed Kharu Rowther's case, the decision in Harihara Iyer's case coming. both after the Full Bench decision and after Act 7 of 1966 is therefore erroneous, j 10. The decision of the District Judge following the decision in Harihara Iyer's case has to be set aside and the decision of the appellate authority restored. It is pointed out that since we have already dismissed A.S. No. 370 of 1967 between the same parties, where the rate of rent was in dispute, this question might not probably be of much consequence. It is pointed out that since we have already dismissed A.S. No. 370 of 1967 between the same parties, where the rate of rent was in dispute, this question might not probably be of much consequence. At any rate, since the tenant is entitled to have the decision of the appellate authority restored, she can take advantage of that also in case it becomes necessary. 11. The civil revision petition is allowed, the order of the District Judge is set aside and the order of the appellate authority is restored. However, we do not pass any order regarding costs.