JUDGMENT C. Raghavan, J. The plaintiffs (marumakkathayis), whose suit for, setting aside an alienation by the third defendant, their mother, has been dismissed by the lower court, are the appellants; and the first defendant the first respondent, the alienee, is the contesting respondent. The second respondent is the wife of the first respondent; and the third respondent is the third defendant, the mother who alienated the properties. The suit properties consist of five items, items 1 to 4 being lands lying contiguous and item 5 a building thereon. The third defendant and her mother (D.W. 5) obtained these properties in a partition of their tarwad jointly as their share. A little earlier than 1124, D.W. 5 developed some illegal intimacy with a Parameswaran Pillai, and in disregard and even in defiance of the advice and protests of the third defendant and her husband (D.W. 7), continued the intimacy rather openly. That led to some incidents between D.W. 7 and Parameswaran Pillai, which resulted in two criminal cases against the third defendant and D.W. 7. As a result of these developments, a partition took place between D.W. 5 on the one side and the third defendant and her three minor children on the other. D.W. 5, taking her share, which was lying contiguous to the suit properties, went out of the tarwad and started living in a house belonging to her brother. She also entered into an agreement with Parameswaran Pillai, under which Parameswaran Pillai was given some right in the properties she obtained in the partition. While matters stood thus, the third defendant sold the suit properties to the first respondent for Rs. 4,500 and purchased another residential house and compound by name the Chittoor Purayidom. The third defendant, her children, and her husband, who was already living with her and the children, moved into the Chittoor Purayidom. The present suit was instituted when the eldest of the children of the third defendant attained majority to set aside the alienation by his mother on the allegation that the alienation was not supported by consideration or necessity. The lower court, as already indicated, dismissed the suit, and hence the appeal. Though the adequacy of the consideration and the passage of consideration were also disputed before the lower court, they are not questioned in the appeal. It was D.W. 1 who originally agreed to purchase the properties for Rs. 4,100. The lower court, as already indicated, dismissed the suit, and hence the appeal. Though the adequacy of the consideration and the passage of consideration were also disputed before the lower court, they are not questioned in the appeal. It was D.W. 1 who originally agreed to purchase the properties for Rs. 4,100. Subsequently, he backed out of the contract; and the first respondent purchased the properties for Rs. 4,500. Therefore, the price paid by the first respondent cannot be said to be inadequate, nor is there any case that the said amount did not actually pass. The contention of the appellants counsel is only that there was no tarwad necessity for the alienation so as to bind the tarwad. The counsel of the appellants has drawn our attention to the difference in language between section 33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act and section 25 of the Travancore Nair Act. Section 33 of the former Act says that no sale or mortgage of any immovable property of a tarwad shall be valid unless it is executed by the karanavan for consideration, for tarwad necessity or benefit, etc., whereas section 25 of the latter Act provides that; except for consideration and tarwad necessity, no karanavan or managing member shall sell tarwad immovable property, etc. The argument is that, under section 25 of the Travancore Nair Act, benefit to the tarwad is not a criterion for holding that the alienation is binding on the tarwad, while it is a relevant matter under section 33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act. On this question, a few decisions have been cited before us, but, we do not propose to refer to all of them. However, we shall refer to Gangadharan Pillai v. Narayana Pillai 1962 K.L.T. 952, a decision of this Court by Madhavan Nair, J., where the learned Judge has observed that meeting a tarwad necessity might be a manifest advantage to the tarwad, but, such manifest advantage is not always a tarwad necessity. The learned Judge has also pointed out that occasions might be conceived, where manifest advantage might amount to tarwad necessity. The learned Judge has also pointed out that occasions might be conceived, where manifest advantage might amount to tarwad necessity. We also feel that tarwad necessity has to be understood in the manner indicated by Madhavan Nair, J. In the case before us, the evidence is fairly clear that D.W. 5 was, openly and in defiance of the advice and protests of her own daughter and son-in-law, continuing the illegitimate connection with Parameswaran Pillai. It has also come out that Parameswaran Pillai belonged to a fairly big family having considerable influence in the locality. Parameswaran Pillai himself was not in a mood to keep the affair a secret: he was also defying public opinion and continuing the connection openly. It was in these circumstances that the two criminal cases arose. Naturally, the third defendant and her husband might have felt very insecure to live with their minor children in the tarwad house just adjoining the property in which Parameswaran Pillai obtained some right under the agreement between him and D.W. 5. The third defendant might have also thought (quite understandably) that it would be in the best interests of her tarwad of herself and her minor children to move away from the tarwad house and live somewhere else. The evidence shows further that the Chittoor Purayidom was in the midst of her husband's people, so that her choice of the Chittoor Purayidom was also equally understandable considering the interests of her tarwad. It was in these circumstances that the Chittoor Purayidom was purchased. Whether this was a tarwad necessity justifying the sale of the tarwad house and the purchase of the Chittoor Purayidom is the question for us to consider. And in the light of the observations of Madhavan Nair, J. in the decision cited, with which we are in entire agreement, we feel that there was even tarwad necessity for moving out of the tarwad house. In other words, this is a case where there was manifest advantage to the tarwad (this is not disputed by the counsel of the appellants), which, in the circumstances, amounted to tarwad necessity. In other words, this is a case where there was manifest advantage to the tarwad (this is not disputed by the counsel of the appellants), which, in the circumstances, amounted to tarwad necessity. If, due to some local insecurity (which is quite conceivable in these days) or due to an epidemic, a tarwad moves out of a particular locality and lives somewhere else for some time and for that purpose raises money, it cannot be said that the debt will not bind the tarwad, nor can it be said that such debt is not raised to meet a tarwad necessity. The circumstances before us are similar, if not stronger; and therefore, we feel that there was tarwad necessity for the sale of the tarwad house and the purchase of the Chittoor Purayidom. There is yet another way of looking at the question as indicated by Sankaran, J. in Kunjan Pillai Karunakaran Pillai v. Mani Pillai Devaki Pillai 1953 K.L.T. 452, which has been approvingly referred to by one of us in the decision of this Court in Omanakutty Pillai v. Krishnan Nair 1961 K.L.T. 626. Sankaran, J. has observed in the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court that, though an alienation of immovable property of the tarwad for acquiring other properties does not normally come within the course of management of the tarwad, it might be upheld where the fresh acquisitions were shown Madhava to have been for the manifest advantage of the tarwad. This indicates another line of thinking, which, as we have already pointed out, has approvingly been referred to in the later decision of this Court. If a tarwad karanavan thinks that one item of tarwad property should be sold and another should be purchased to the manifest advantage of the tarwad, could he not do so in the exercise of his rights of management? We feel that a tarwad karanavan has that power; and if, by such purchase of another property the tarwad is benefited, we do not know why the alienation by the karanavan should not bind the tarwad. There is evidence in this case that the Chittoor Purayidom was a better property than the tarwad properties sold away by the third defendant. The tarwad house was in existence even at the time of the earlier partition; and the evidence discloses that it was a fairly large house, but badly dilapidated. There is evidence in this case that the Chittoor Purayidom was a better property than the tarwad properties sold away by the third defendant. The tarwad house was in existence even at the time of the earlier partition; and the evidence discloses that it was a fairly large house, but badly dilapidated. To maintain such a house was not easy. Again, the evidence discloses that, of the 107 cents of the suit properties, only about 63 cents were income-yielding. The income that was being derived from the Chittoor Purayidom is also in evidence; and the income was better than the income from the tarwad properties sold away. Thus, looking at the question from this angle also, it cannot be said that the alienation of the tarwad properties to purchase the Chittoor Purayidom was an improvident act, against the interests of the tarwad. The alienation can therefore be justified on this ground as well. The consideration for the Chittoor Purayidom can be divided into three: one, the amount utilised for the purchase of 90 cents of the purayidom with the house thereon, two, a sum of Rs.1,335 utilised for the purchase of an otti right over this item as well as the neighbouring Karnavar two items, and three, a sum of Rs. 100 paid in Rama cash. Now that we have held that the purchase of Chittoor Purayidom was a necessity of the tarwad, the amount utilised for the said purchase is beyond attack : and that constitutes the major portion of the consideration of Rs. 4,500. We may then dispose of the objection against the cash consideration of Rs. 100. D.W. 1 paid Rs. 100 to the third defendant as advance when he entered into an agreement with her to purchase the properties for Rs. 4,100. D.W. 1 has given evidence that this small sum was utilised for tarwad necessity. After he dropped out of the contract, the first respondent paid Rs. 4,500; and the cash consideration of Rs. 100 was paid to the third defendant to enable her to repay that amount to D.W. 1. Therefore, it cannot be said that this small amount was not utilised for tarwad necessity. Lastly comes the sum of Rs. 1,335 spent for purchasing the otti right. 4,500; and the cash consideration of Rs. 100 was paid to the third defendant to enable her to repay that amount to D.W. 1. Therefore, it cannot be said that this small amount was not utilised for tarwad necessity. Lastly comes the sum of Rs. 1,335 spent for purchasing the otti right. The counsel of the appellants has argued that it is a well settled principle of marumakkathayam law that an item of immovable property belonging to a tarwad should not be sold for purchasing an otti right. This proposition cannot be questioned; and the proposition has been recognised too. But, the question here is whether this principle can be applied to the case before us. The counsel of the contesting first respondent has argued that the principle should be applied only to a case where the alienation was wholly for the purpose of purchasing an otti right and should not be confused with a case like this, where a small portion of the consideration that remained after purchasing immovable properties was used for purchasing an otti right. There is force in this contention. Still more, in this case the position is stronger for the alienee. As indicated already, the purpose of purchasing the Chittoor Purayidom was for the third defendant and her children to move out of the tarwad house : life in the tarwad house became unbearable and even dangerous. The Chittoor Purayidom and the neighbouring two items of properties were already in the possession of a third party under an otti and unless the otti was taken assignment of or redeemed, there was no possibility for the third defendant and her children to obtain possession of the house. It was in such a situation that the third defendant purchased the otti right first; and it was the purchase of the otti right that enabled the tarwad to move into the house. The alienation of the tarwad properties and the purchase of the otti right were on the same date; and there is good evidence both of D.W. 7 and of the third defendant as D.W. 6 that the purchase of the otti right was only for moving into the house at the earliest opportunity possible. And it was a few days thereafter that the purchase of the Chittoor Purayidom (90 cents with the house thereon) followed. And it was a few days thereafter that the purchase of the Chittoor Purayidom (90 cents with the house thereon) followed. Therefore, the alienee, the first respondent, was helping the tarwad and protecting its interests, though he was taking care to secure his money too. The counsel of the contesting first respondent has also suggested that out of this Rs. 1.335 probably 90 out of 145 would again have to be reduced, because this portion of the otti amount related to the 90 cents purchased by the third defendant out of the 145 cents, so that the price of the Chittoor Purayidom should be increased by this amount. But, the counsel of the appellants has attempted to point out that this contention might not be right, because the recitals in the document of purchase will show that provision was made for the otti as well: in other words, the amount mentioned in the document for purchasing the Chittor Purayidom included its share of the otti amount as well. At any rate, we need not go into this question, because, in our opinion, even if the entire sum of Rs. 1,335 was spent for purchasing the otti right and no portion of it related to the Chittoor Purayidom, still, the circumstances of the case will not make the purchase any the less binding on the tarwad. Therefore, this item of consideration is also binding on the tarwad. There is a memorandum of cross-objections by the first respondent. The lower court has not given costs to the first respondent stating that this type of tarwad necessity was not the subject-matter of any decision of our High Court. We do not think that this is a reason for disallowing costs, if the Subordinate Judge found that all the items of consideration were binding on the tarwad. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. And the memorandum of cross-objections is allowed with costs of the first respondent; but, costs in the memorandum of cross-objections will not include counsel's fee.