ORDER V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. This is an odd instance, and I hope it will remain odd and an exception where a subordinate judicial officer failed to carry out a direction of the High Court and, in a belated report, made mention of facts which hardly suffice as an explanation. I insist that no subordinate judicial officer should give the impression that he is above or indifferent to the laws and for that matter, no one, not the highest judge nor administrator, is free from the rule of law. 2. I had directed the Subordinate Court, Calicut to dispose of a petition to set aside the ex parte decree pending before it's in six weeks from today (18-8-1970) as the disposal of that petition would probably render a pending appeal in this court unnecessary. The order was duly communicated but, some-how , was not complied with. The last date for rendering the decision was 29-91970 as against which the Sub Court disposed of the petition only on 16-10-1970 which is clearly violative of my direction and inconsistent with diligence and efficiency in disposing of a small matter. Naturally, my attention was drawn by counsel to the fact of the delayed disposal and I felt that the contravention should not go unnoticed lest it should be repeated with impunity by the officer concerned or others in his position. When the case came up ultimately before me on 26-10-1970 I found that the learned Subordinate Judge had not even sent to this court a report of the disposal of the case and I had to post the C.M.P. from time to time awaiting it. When I did expressly call for a report as to when the petition was heard and disposed of, the Learned Subordinate Judge did send one which was, to say the least, perfunctory and hardly sufficient as an explanation of the indifference in complying with the direction of this Court. I was not inclined to ignore this conduct but did not want to take any further action without giving the officer concerned a fair opportunity to set out a fuller explanation, if he had any. I observed in that order: Disregard of the High Court's direction or of any superior court's directive, by a subordinate court is subversive of the rule of law and calls for severs notice. I observed in that order: Disregard of the High Court's direction or of any superior court's directive, by a subordinate court is subversive of the rule of law and calls for severs notice. Even though the conduct of the Subordinate judge, at the first flush, lends itself to an inference of objectionable and actionable indifference, I do not think it fair to take any further steps without giving the judicial officer concerned on opportunity to explain if he has anything to state on the facts set out above.t I had in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in a ruling reported in Bhopal Sugar Industries v. Income-Tax Officer, (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 182). Mr. Justice S.K. Das underscored the grave consequence of disobedience, at the lesser levels, of directives issued from the higher echelane of the Judiciary: We think that the learned judicial Commissioner was clearly in error in holding that no manifest injustice resulted from the order of the respondent conveyed in his letter dated March 24, 1955. By that order the respondent virtually refused to carry out the directions which a superior tribunal had given to him in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. Such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of courts. If a subordinate tribunal refuses to carry out directions given to it by a superior tribunal in the exercise of its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the administration of justice and we have indeed found it very difficult to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the learned Judicial Commissioner while roundly condemning the respondent for refusing to carry out the directions of the superior tribunal, yet held that no manifest injustice resulted from such refusal. 3. Any-way, the Subordinate Judge has submitted his explanation now, and there he admits that the evidence and arguments were over on 26-9-1970 and the petition was posted for orders. 3. Any-way, the Subordinate Judge has submitted his explanation now, and there he admits that the evidence and arguments were over on 26-9-1970 and the petition was posted for orders. He proceeds: Due to an omission in the office, records were sent to me for dictating the order only on 29th evening along with the records in other cases and that too without placing any slip on the records indicating that a time limit was fixed in the matter.t He also extenuates that the time limit fixed by the High Court for disposal of the case was not borne in mind due to failure of my memory. As if to atone for the minor sin of not pronouncing judgment in a petition to set aside an exparte decree even within a long fortnight the Learned Subordinate Judge refers to the heavy out-turn of work in his court between the 26th September and 16th October when it appears he had deliverd 49 judgments. He pleads: If my memory had not failed or if my attention was drawn to the time limit fixed by the office, I would have pronounced the order in this I.A. before pronouncing judgments in other matters. Nevertheless, I am unable to understand why in the report sent by him on 17-10-1970 there is no reference to failure of memoty on his part or the omission of the clerk to insert a slip drawing the attention of the Judge to the direction of the High Court by the Bench Clerk or to the undue delay in disposing of a simple case. The alibi on the Bench Clerk makes me a little skeptical; but the expression of regret is a sufficient expiation. The assurance that I shall be more careful hereaftert induces me to drop further proceedings. The officer states that the omission to dispose it within the time was only due to an inadvertent and unintentional lapse of memory and an omission by the Bench Clerk. The many maybes of life, common and uncommon, cannot be ruled out altogether and skepticism must be silenced by the circumstances that the person who makes the statement is a judicial officer of some standing. Moreover, the contrition expressed by him must be accepted in a liberal spirit. 4. The many maybes of life, common and uncommon, cannot be ruled out altogether and skepticism must be silenced by the circumstances that the person who makes the statement is a judicial officer of some standing. Moreover, the contrition expressed by him must be accepted in a liberal spirit. 4. In these circumstances, I drop all further proceedings in connection with the failure of the Subordinate Judge to finish the case within the time set for him.